Debate 7 Discussion: On the existence of free will: Philosophy Forums

Philosophy Forums » Debates » Debate Discussion » Debate 7 Discussion: On the existence of free will » Debate 7 Discussion: On the existence of free will

Debate 7 Discussion: On the existence of free will

Page: 1 2 3 4 5

Debate 7 Discussion: On the existence of free will

dreamweaver
Web we Weave

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Nov 29, 2003
Location: London, UK

Total Topics: 21
Total Posts: 2039

Posted 03/14/05 - 01:42 AM: Subject: Debate 7 Discussion: On the existence of free will	#1
Debate 7 has now concluded. This thread is for the discussion of that debate, and for voting on who you think "won" the debate. Please note that when voting, you shouldn't necessarily vote for the person whose position you agree with, or is most alike yours; but rather, you should vote for the person that you think put up the best defense of their argument. This poll will close in three days. Edit: or not. Edited by dreamweaver on 05/23/05 - 02:00 PM
Dos moi pou sto kai kino taen gaen. ~ Archimedes

Machiveli
post-philosopher

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Aug 19, 2004

Total Topics: 122
Total Posts: 1282

Posted 03/14/05 - 04:01 AM:	#2
I felt Socrastein was winning during the first 2 posts with Paul using a confusing spread of unrelated arguments. Particulary Paul shied away from clarifying the meaning of free will in a deterministic universe. However having sowed the seeds of confusion Paul rose above it for his final post where as Socrastein stayed in the swamp. It is after all, only the closing arguments that idiots like me remember. Edited by Machiveli on 03/14/05 - 04:10 AM

Paul
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 10, 2002

Total Topics: 465
Total Posts: 12173

Posted 03/14/05 - 04:14 AM:	#3
I did use a lot of unrelated arguments, but then that's the reason I was in the debate -- I had several arguments I'd been pondering that I wanted to try out in a situation which would help me to refine and improve them (which this debate did to an extent, so I thank Socrastein for that). Particulary Paul shied away from clarifying the meaning of free will in a deterministic universe. It seems to me that's what I spent the whole debate on -- clarifying how free will exists in a deterministic universe. I think you're looking too hard for some sort of new, deeper, spiffy philosophical meaning to replace the normal meaning. I see no need to redefine free will, the meaning of it is clear to all (except maybe quantum mystics) and my purpose in the debate was to establish that the universe being deterministic has no impact on that meaning. dreamweaver wrote: This poll will close in three days. Not unless you impliment a poll expiration feature for me in the next three days, it won't. Edited by Paul on 03/14/05 - 04:22 AM

Socrastein
Looking to understand

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 28, 2004
Location: A desolate sea of bollocks

Total Topics: 44
Total Posts: 2181

Posted 03/14/05 - 04:19 AM:	#4
Machiveli wrote: I felt Socrastein was winning during the first 2 posts with Paul Too bad you can't give me 2/3rds of a vote
"The time has come for people of reason to say enough is enough. Religious faith discourages independent thought, it's devisive, and it's dangerous." -Richard Dawkins

Paul
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 10, 2002

Total Topics: 465
Total Posts: 12173

Posted 03/14/05 - 07:54 AM:	#5
Socrastein brought it to my attention that I didn't explicitly and directly address in my last debate post the question of why rationality is the criteria for free will. So, I'll put my brief-but-more-explicit answer here (much as it may disappoint for lack of deep-new-disoveryness): I can only show that rationality is the criteria, not prove it. Criteria are created from an existing concept to underpin a concept and show when you have arrived at that concept, they don't create or define the concept itself. We can establish that rationality is the criteria simply by observing that it matches how we use the word. (This of course ties in with the linguistic theme that runs through all my posts in the debate.) To illustrate by reference to the heat analogy, science has not said why molecular motion is the criteria for heat. Instead, science has simply observed that molecular motion best matches the way we use the term "heat" in that the objects we call hottest are the ones with the most molecular motion (just as the choices we call freeest are the ones with the most rationality involved).

AKG
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 15, 2004
Location: Berkeley, CA

Total Topics: 87
Total Posts: 3329

1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 03/14/05 - 03:13 PM:	#6
Both Paul and Socrastein agree that we cannot choose our motives. Socrastein claims that a choice based on unchosen motives is not free, Paul claims that it can be free. Whereas Paul suggests that Socrastein's strange criteria that free choice requires free choice is a problem with Socrastein's argument, he seems to miss the fact that the strange criteria required for free choice is Socrastein's argument. It is because "free choice" must satisfy this absurd criteria that it is absurd, Socrastein seems to argue. Paul, on the other hand, suggests that "free chioce" need not satisfy this criteria. In fact, he argues that this type of criteria could be applied to make any concept seem absurd, with the following analogy: If a free choice exists only if the reasons for it are freely chosen, then we can say that an object is hot only if the stuff it is made up of is hot. First of all, the analogy is weak because the manner in which an object relates to the stuff it is made up of is not the same as the manner in which a "free choice" relates to the reasons for it. Also, the claim about heat is not really that bad. It doesn't provide a good explanation for what makes things hot, but Socrastein isn't attempting to explain why free choices exist, but pointing out a property of free choices, just as the heat-sentence above points out a (supposed) property of hot things. For example, "All young children drink milk" may be a true property of young children, but this does nothing to explain why young children drink milk, or what makes them young, or what makes them exist in the first place, etc. Now, although it is a useless explanation, is the sentence about hot things absurd? No. It could very well be that the things making up the hot thing are themselves hot, therefore the big thing satisfies the given property of hot things. Socrastein previously argued that motives cannot be chosen, and it is that, in conjunction with the statement that a choice is free only if its reasons are freely chosen that is Socrastein's argument. A hot object may not require hot parts to be hot (although on average, it must), but this analogy doesn't give us reason to believe that a choice can be free if its reasons are not freely chosen. Since the analogy fails, its attempt to show that a choice can be free without freely chosen reasons fails. Paul also claims that "free will" refers to some aspect of our experience, and so, it is not nonsense to speak of freedom since it is wrong to say that it doesn't apply to anything (it applies to our experience). By the same token, there are miracles, because miracles refer to some aspect of our experience. When something unexplicable happens that, to me, seems to defy the laws of nature, I claim that it is a miracle, when, in fact, I'm probably just wrong about the laws of nature. Similarly, whereas an act can indeed seem free to me, that doesn't mean it is. Freedom is not just an aspect of our experience. The concept of freedom is derived from experience, but to say freedom exists requires more than saying that freedom seems to exist, it requires that some thing actually be free, i.e. that it actually has the properties that it appears to have. We cannot see the forces controlling us, and so, as far as we can tell, the choices we make are free, because we are not immediately aware of the causes of the choice that we don't control. But to say that this is enough to claim that the choices are free is wrong, since despite the fact that we don't see those hidden forces, it doesn't mean that they're not there, and hence, it doesn't mean that the choices are free. A very clear example is preference in ice cream. It seems to be a free choice if, when offered vanilla ice cream and grass-flavoured ice cream, you choose vanilla. That is because you are not aware of what causes you to prefer vanilla to grass, so as far as you can tell, the only thing that played a role in your choice was yourself, and so it seems free to you. But I couldn't like grass if I wanted to. I'm not free to choose that. I couldn't like it when I cut myself shaving if I wanted to, I couldn't like men instead of women, etc. I have no choice over my preferences. If I were hypnotized to have certain preferences, or if I were a robot programmed with certain preferences, I would have no more or no less freedom. On a small scale, and within certain contexts, we are not concerned with the forces that we aren't immediately aware of, and so within these contexts, we can talk about free will existing. But this is only possible when we commit to ignoring certain information. When we do not ignore this information, we can't claim to have control. And free will is not the common sense thing we grew up with, something we are deluded into believing. Most people are pretty aware that they never chose to like vanilla over grass. Nobody is deluded into believing that. People may be deluded into believing that since they aren't immediately aware of what it is that causes us to prefer vanilla to grass, that when choose vanilla ice cream over grass, they did so freely. This is only because people tend to ignore certain information; in truth, a person hypnotized into liking grass would be just as free.
"The only reason we die... is because we accept it as an inevitability." -- Stewie "To enslave nuance to dogma is folly." -- Lord Hillyer

Paul
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 10, 2002

Total Topics: 465
Total Posts: 12173

Posted 03/15/05 - 03:01 AM:	#7
AKG wrote: he seems to miss the fact that the strange criteria required for free choice is Socrastein's argument. It is because "free choice" must satisfy this absurd criteria that it is absurd, Socrastein seems to argue. I didn't miss that, I spent the whole debate giving arguments for why we cannot logically require such strange criteria for free choice. Unfortunately, it seems at this point that nothing I say is going to make the point clear to the people who try to choose the impossible criteria.

AKG
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jan 15, 2004
Location: Berkeley, CA

Total Topics: 87
Total Posts: 3329

Posted 03/15/05 - 03:06 PM:	#8
It's very simple, but I think people maintain that free will exists for 2 reasons: 1) They define "free choice" to be something different, like "choice" or "rational choice." A choice, or a choice made for reasons based on weighing the options, isn't necessarily free. If I were forced to weigh the options, then the decision process would be rational, but still not free. That is, they make the criteria for "free choice" have nothing to do with freedom. 2) They define "free choice" as something that exists because it appears to exist. When I hallucinate, that image of whatever I'm hallucinating exists because it appears to exist. The thing it's supposed to represent in the physical world does not exist, but for the hallucination itself, all that is required is that it appears to exist. This is a rather useless criteria for free choice. This says nothing about whether a choice is really free, but just that it appears to be free, or rather, we normally ignore the causes behind our motives. You've done both things in your posts, neither of which are remotely convincing arguments for free will. I think the very basic argument Socrastein intially gives simply shows why free will doesn't exist. Choices are determined by motives (by definition of motives). We don't determine motives. On the small scale, where we take motives to be a part of ourselves, we only consider the fact that choices are determined by motives, so we attribute choice to us. When we look at the broader picture and realize that we don't determine our motives, then something else (or perhaps nothing, making motives random) determines motives. So if X determines motives, and motives determine choices, then isn't X responsible for the choice? And if X is not us, then the choice is not free, since X is responsible for it, not us. Either you would have us believe that if a puppet government orders military action, and if the "puppeteer" is the one who determines what motives the puppet government will work to satisfy, then the puppet government is responsible for the military action, or an agent can be said to make a free choice even if he is not responsible for that choice.
"The only reason we die... is because we accept it as an inevitability." -- Stewie "To enslave nuance to dogma is folly." -- Lord Hillyer

Ben WV
Initiate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Mar 19, 2005

Total Topics: 0
Total Posts: 1

Posted 03/19/05 - 09:45 AM: Subject: re:	#9
Hiya. I'm new to the forums, and I enjoyed reading your debate. I liked Socrastein's point that the concept "chosing motives" requires an infinite regress. But there's an aspect of his argument which I think needs refinement. When you say, "I never chose to get hungry after not eating for a while, I never chose to go through puberty and experience a hightened sex drive, I never chose to get tired after physical exertion, I never chose to want to be loved by others, I never chose to prefer happiness to unhappiness, etc.", you're raising issues that can't be included in a discussion on whether man is able to exercise free will. These are natural and instinctual qualities that we are fitted out with by nature. So for the same reason it would be fishy and irrelevant to cite our unchosen physical endowmenets as evidence against free will (e.g. I never chose to have blue eyes, but I do), it's equally fishy to cite our unchosen instinctual endowments as evidence against it. In order to proceed with a discussion of whether man can exercise free will, you have to settle on what your definition of man is, and exclude all those attributes from the analysis. Otherwise, you have no subject to work on. So the issue of free will is not really concerned with whether we choose to experience hunger, but in whether we have control over how we satisfy it (pizza/hot-wings vs. brown rice/lettuce). It's not concerned with whether choose to prefer pleasure over pain, but in whether we have a say in how we define and go after pleasure. I don't bring this up to critique any argument that was already offered-- just to narrow the scope and clarify the issue.

flat6
build

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Dec 28, 2003
Location: Toronto

Total Topics: 22
Total Posts: 274

Posted 03/27/05 - 05:01 PM:	#10
This drives me nuts every single time I see people bring it up in the wrong context: quantum mechanics. 1) The probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics applies only to an individual or small collection of particles. In something like the human brain (which we're concerned with if we're talking about will, decisions, and anything involving intelligence), the circuitry may be so large that it renders any such effects no longer applicable. If you wish to make this sort of argument - quantum effects in the brain - you've got to be able to support it with some scientific research, and then pick up your Nobel prize on the way out. 2) As far as current quantum mechanical theory is presently developed, things seem to act randomly, building up to a predictable behavior over time or number. Introducing randomness - which is what you do by appealing to quantum mechanics - does not give free will. Having random things happen is in clear contradiction to anything being willed. Edited by flat6 on 03/27/05 - 05:14 PM
wulffmorgenthaler

Page: 1 2 3 4 5

Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.