Debate 12 discussion: Does God Exist?: Philosophy Forums

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Debate 12 discussion: Does God Exist?

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Debate 12 discussion: Does God Exist?

180 Proof
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Posted 04/29/09 - 01:24 AM:	#81
SnoopDoug wrote: Not every contingent concrete object is actually instantiated in the real world. I've not claimed or implied otherwise. I don't know any theists who would claim that God is separate from substance. I'm sure there are some out there, but that's not a position I would defend. The implication of theism (re: JCI god) is that god is not identical to substance. If you're a Thomist / Christian then (your) god is a creator distinct and separate from creation. The alternatives are rather heterodox (i.e. contra Thomist): panentheism, pantheism or acosmism.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

bert1
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Posted 04/29/09 - 03:32 AM:	#82
180 Proof wrote: The implication of theism (re: JCI god) is that god is not identical to substance. If you're a Thomist / Christian then (your) god is a creator distinct and separate from creation. The alternatives are rather heterodox (i.e. contra Thomist): panentheism, pantheism or acosmism. looks up definitions of panentheism, pantheism and acosmism Ugh! What a mess definitions make. I've always referred to myself as a theist, but I do identify God with substance. So maybe I'm not. Oh, well. After a brief reading, I'm not exactly sure what the difference is between panentheism and acosmism is. In wikipedia's entry on acosmism reality is referred to as transcendant, again making a mess of the distinction between theism and acosmism. A casual-sounding definition of 'transcendence' grabbed off an online dictionary: "a state of being or existence above and beyond the limits of material experience" That could just as well apply to substance. Both 'transcendence' and 'substance' refer to an undetectable reality. The modes of substance are detectable, quantifiable etc, but substance un-modified, as it were, is itself necessarily uncharacterised and therefore unknowable in an objective way. In this sense, substance transcends its modes, without, obviously, being separate from them. A bit like a piece of paper could be said to 'transcend' the words written on it. The paper also stands under (sub-stance) the words. We have problems with what existence means. Does substance exist? Literally, existence means something like 'standing out from'. This puts it in direct contrast with sub-stance. So maybe substance does not exist, except when it is 'standing out', when it ceases to be substance qua substance (first time I've ever used the word 'qua') and becomes a mode. So I'm in the slightly odd-sounding position of thinking that God is substance, which doesn't exist, but everything depends it for its existence. I'm going to distinguish three common types of general metaphysical position, the third being the most interesting (for me): 1) Some theists do believe in a transcendent God in the sense 180 Proof originally meant. Their concept of God has no referent IMO. 2) There are atheists, materialists and scientists who don't believe in substance, or perhaps just have no concept of it. They think they can understand the universe in all its aspects just fine by only talking about objects and structure. This is a bit like atomism and is perhaps a kind of substance-dualism without being explicit about it. There is a problem of relation between atoms/substances with this kind of view. 3) There are people who believe in substance, but some of them are happy to call it God, others not. The main difference I think it's to do with personality. Substance-theists think that substance is sentient, and self-moving. Substance-materialists think that substance is insentient and non-personal, yet able to form modes which may become sentient. I think this is where the interesting discussion is: What are the non-accidental (or intrinsic, or necessary, not sure what the right word is) properties of substance? ----- An interesting aside: 'to be' is a verb. What is doing the being? Is the subject of the sentence "I am" a being? If so, what is being the 'I'? Another 'I'? A cosmic pirate, "Eye-eye cap'n"? Is substance doing the being, for all beings? Is substance then the universal subject? Or can only beings do things? Just a thought. Language might not be a good guide to metaphysics. Edited by bert1 on 04/29/09 - 08:13 AM. Reason: made a bit clearer
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Posted 04/29/09 - 05:50 PM:	#83
180 Proof wrote: The implication of theism (re: JCI god) is that god is not identical to substance. If you're a Thomist / Christian then (your) god is a creator distinct and separate from creation. There's a misunderstanding here. Thomists don't claim that God is "beyond" susbtance, or being, or essence. As Thomas himself says in Summa Contra Gentiles Book One, Ch. 22: "[God's] essence or quiddity is not something other than His being." He continues: "Each thing is through its own being. Hence, that which is not its own being is not through itself a necessary being. But God is through Himself a necessary being. He is, therefore, His own Being."

Erik
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Posted 04/29/09 - 08:07 PM:	#84
bert1 wrote: It doesn't sound like ridiculous nonsense at all to me. I agree with much of what you say in your post. Based upon your last post, I can definitely say that we're thinking in the same direction.
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180 Proof
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Posted 04/29/09 - 11:44 PM:	#85
SnoopDoug wrote: There's a misunderstanding here. Thomists don't claim that God is "beyond" susbtance, or being, or essence. As Thomas himself says in Book One, Ch. 22: "[God's] essence or quiddity is not something other than His being." He continues: "Each thing is through its own being. Hence, that which is not its own being is not through itself a necessary being. But God is through Himself a necessary being. He is, therefore, His own Being." Aquinas, following Aristotle, posits "substance pluralism" (or dualism), whereby he grounds, or reformulates, the "revealed truth" (i.e. biblical doctrine) of "eternal creator - temporal creation" in the metaphysics of "necessary substance - contingent substances" with the latter being transcended / caused by the former. You're right, Snoop, Aquinas doesn't claim that god is "beyond substance" but rather that god is a "substance beyond all other substances". Spinoza, however, shows that the concept of 'a plurality of substances' is self-contradictory (Ethics: Ip6, Ip11, Ip13-14, et al), from which I derived my "proof" in post no. 79 above. bert1 wrote: What are the non-accidental (or intrinsic, or necessary, not sure what the right word is) properties of substance? Substance, according to Spinoza, is necessarily eternal (i.e. self-causing) & infinite (i.e. unbounded / unnumerable). Thus, it cannot be transcended (by its modes) or transcend itself. Does substance exist? Only substance exists. All else belongs to substance (like drops, waves, currents ... in the ocean). Edited by 180 Proof on 04/30/09 - 12:23 AM. Reason: Deus ex metaphysica?!
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

bert1
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Posted 04/30/09 - 03:25 AM:	#86
180 Proof wrote: Substance, according to Spinoza, is necessarily eternal (i.e. self-causing) & infinite (i.e. unbounded / unnumerable). Thus, it cannot be transcended (by its modes) or transcend itself. Oh, sure. But can substance be said to transcend its modes? Would that be an abuse of the word 'transcend', in your view? Was substance ever unmodified (or could it ever be?)? Or is possession of modifications a necessary property of substance? Do you think substance is sentient? 180 Proof wrote: Only substance exists. All else belongs to substance (like drops, waves, currents ... in the ocean). I think I completely agree with your metaphysics so far. I'm a fan of Spinoza too. It's a while ago now since I read the beginning of the Ethics (by the way, is there any actual ethics in that book?) but I remember being very impressed by it. What I would like to query is your use of the word 'exist'. Do your shoes exist? It seems you would have to say 'no' if I hold you to the view that only substance exists. Of course, I know what you mean. In normal usage, though, 'exists' is normally applied to the modes of substance, not to substance itself.
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Incision
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Posted 04/30/09 - 10:38 AM:	#87
SnoopDoug wrote: A defense of the S5 axiom really shouldn't be necessary. That was picky of me. It's a widely-, if not universally-, accepted axiom, and it's probably not necessary to defend in a debate like this one. I enjoy challenging my own beliefs, so I was happy to read your intelligent defense of the contrary position. But on to the main point: [N]ame that tune. Happily! (n + 1) Necessary being b exists. (Assumption) (n + 2) Possibly necessarily no necessary being exists. (Obvious truth) (n + 3) B exists and b doesn't exist. ((n + 1), (n + 2)) (n + 4) B doesn't exist. ((n + 1), (n + 3), reductio) Anyone who denies (n + 2) must show that it is self-contradictory. Snicker, snicker. Pardon my sophistry, but here's my point. Your original (1 - 4) is valid, and you consider its premises obviously true, so you believe it sound. Not only that, but no one has proven a premise of it false. So it's dialectically unassailable for you to say you know its conclusion, and as far as I can tell, it's epistemically permissible for you to take yourself to know it. But you should still realize that it's not a good argument, because its premises are unacceptable to reasonable people who disagree (should there be such). In short, is your argument any better than "either 2 + 2 = 5, or there's a necessary being, so there's a necessary being?"

Aetixintro
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Posted 04/30/09 - 02:42 PM:	#88
If you sense the macro-effect of substance, is it not reasonable to say substance definitely exists? If you deny this, it seems to me you are in the same group of people who deny it's impossible to know any true proposition whether social in nature, human-made artifacts or whatever else. Nice post, Incision, but... "(n + 2) Possibly necessarily no necessary being exists. (Obvious truth)" - As we exist in reality in the first place, is it not reasonable to say that something necessarily makes out the foundation of this reality?
Efficacy of "for since it is at present manifest to me that even bodies are not properly known by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding alone" - Descartes, Meditation II I'm always wanting more, Anything I haven't got, Everything, I want it all, I just can't stop - The Cure, Want

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Posted 04/30/09 - 07:59 PM:	#89
180 Proof wrote: Aquinas, following Aristotle, posits "substance pluralism" (or dualism), whereby he grounds, or reformulates, the "revealed truth" (i.e. biblical doctrine) of "eternal creator - temporal creation" in the metaphysics of "necessary substance - contingent substances" with the latter being transcended / caused by the former. You're right, Snoop, Aquinas doesn't claim that god is "beyond substance" but rather that god is a "substance beyond all other substances". Spinoza, however, shows that the concept of 'a plurality of substances' is self-contradictory (Ethics: Ip6, Ip11, Ip13-14, et al), from which I derived my "proof" in post no. 79 above. Okay, so you're defending ontological monism, then? I think Spinoza's argument has the same problem Parmenides' argument had - namely, he begs the question by assuming that all substance (or being) is univocal. Why can't there be different kinds of being? Incision wrote: But you should still realize that it's not a good argument, because its premises are unacceptable to reasonable people who disagree (should there be such). At the most, this would mean it's not a rationally compelling argument. It may still be rationally acceptable, which would make it a good argument, at least depending on your definition of a good argument. (n + 1) Necessary being b exists. (Assumption) (n + 2) Possibly necessarily no necessary being exists. (Obvious truth) (n + 3) B exists and b doesn't exist. ((n + 1), (n + 2)) (n + 4) B doesn't exist. ((n + 1), (n + 3), reductio) Anyone who denies (n + 2) must show that it is self-contradictory. (n + 2) assumes that there is a contradiction with the notion of a necessary being. This seems unwarranted to me, unless one can show that a necessary being is like a square-circle. In short, is your argument any better than "either 2 + 2 = 5, or there's a necessary being, so there's a necessary being?" Gotta love Plantinga. I do think the MCA is a better argument, since it shifts the burden of proof to the skeptic to demonstrate some contradiction with the idea of a necessary being. In addition, the MCA is much stronger than the MOA, since the former doesn't assume that necessity is a great-making property.

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Posted 05/01/09 - 01:50 AM:	#90
Aexitintro wrote: As we exist in reality in the first place, is it not reasonable to say that something necessarily makes out the foundation of this reality? Actually, I don't see why. It's arguable that if we exist, then we have a cause. But it doesn't follow that everything has a cause, or that our cause necessarily exists. (There might be an ambiguity here. We should not confuse "necessarily [if we exist then we have a cause]" with "if we exist then [necessarily we have a cause].") SnoopDoug wrote: At the most, this would mean it's not a rationally compelling argument. Granted. I was working under the stronger understanding of "good argument." [T]he MCA [. . .] shifts the burden of proof[. . .]. Really; why is that? I see how it shifts the burden of rejoinder, but that's easily done. I'm under the impression that normally the burden of proof is on whoever makes a controversial statement, and that it is only discharged by giving a (non-circular) argument.

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