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David Lewis's Argument for Compatiblism

David Lewis's Argument for Compatiblism

taiho
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Posted 05/04/08 - 06:09 AM: Subject: David Lewis's Argument for Compatiblism	#1
I'm having a lot of trouble understanding the intuition behind David Lewis's defense of compatibilism in "Are We Free to Break Laws?". The essay is, in part, a response to Peter Van Inwagen's essay, which defines determinism as such: a) For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of the world at that instant. b) If A and B are propositions that express the state of the world at some instants, then the conjunction of A with the laws of nature entails B. Free will is understood as "the power or ability of agents to to act otherwise than they in fact do." In other words, "To deny that men have free will is to assert that what a man does and what he can do coincide." Let's assume then that some proposition that expresses the state of the world, H, and some laws of nature proposition, L, jointly imply the proposition that I raise my hand. Lewis says that although this is true, I am free to raise my hand. If I had raise my hand, Lewis agrees that L, would have to be false. Then it starts getting puzzling. I'm going to quote David Lewis's explanation: "If L had not bee true, that implies that some law of nature would have been broken, for L is a specification of the laws. That is not to say that anything would have been both a law and broken- that is a contradiction in terms if, as I suppose, any genuine law is at least an absolute unbroken regularity. Rather, if L had not been true, some that is in fact a law, and unbroken, would have been broken, and no law. It would at best have been an almost-law." He seems to be saying that L, the proposition of natural law, if broken can't be a law and is not a law. The natural determinist response seems to be that Lewis just made a mistake in how he chose L. There is an actual proposition of natural law, L', that in conjunction with H, would correctly imply all of the future and past. This case is silly because Lewis picked an L that was not an actual proposition of natural law. How would Lewis respond to that? Lewis further writes "I am committed to the consequence that if I had done what I was able to do- raise my hand- then some law would have been broken." I think what Lewis is saying is that we could have done differently, but we would be in a different counterfactual situation with different laws. In effect, having free will (the ability to act otherwise) is the ability to have acted otherwise in a possible world with different laws. Is that what Lewis is saying? If so, are people generally satisfied with this notion of free will? The notion that free will is the ability to have done otherwise in a different world, but our actions are predetermined in our world. I would appreciate any information on my understanding of Lewis's argument and would really appreciate the comments from people that support Lewis.

reincarnated
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Posted 05/04/08 - 06:45 AM:	#2
The whole notion that free will is "the power or ability of agents to to act otherwise than they in fact do" is imho ludicrous and incoherent. If I am free, then it follows that I do what I want to do. Doing what I want to do is perfectly compatible with the notion that what I do and what I can do coincide (ie determinism). To me, that is free will. And that is (my version of) compatibilism. So long as I am free to do what I want to do, what does it matter whether I could have done otherwise or not? Why on earth would I wish to do otherwise than what I want to do anyway? Can anybody tell me?
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

taiho
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Posted 05/04/08 - 07:13 AM:	#3
I think a hard determinist/incompatibilist would say that there is no such thing as "what you want to do." Why do you want to do anything? It is because there are facts about the world and laws of nature that necessitate that you want to do what you to do. If this is the case, then there is no free will because even what you want to do is deterministic.

reincarnated
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Posted 05/04/08 - 07:52 AM:	#4
taiho wrote: I think a hard determinist/incompatibilist would say that there is no such thing as "what you want to do." Why do you want to do anything? It is because there are facts about the world and laws of nature that necessitate that you want to do what you to do. If the world is deterministic, it does not follow that there is no such thing as "what we want to do". In a deterministic world it is simply the case that "what we want to do" is determined. taiho wrote: If this is the case, then there is no free will because even what you want to do is deterministic. There is no free will in the metaphysical libertarian sense, I agree. But there IS free will in the compatibilist sense (this is what compatibilism is all about!)
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

keda
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Posted 05/04/08 - 08:00 AM:	#5
Why is "the power or ability of agents to to act otherwise than they in fact do" incoherent?
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan A prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation. - Immanuel Kant

Makarismos
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Posted 05/04/08 - 08:15 AM:	#6
taiho wrote: I think a hard determinist/incompatibilist would say that there is no such thing as "what you want to do." Why do you want to do anything? It is because there are facts about the world and laws of nature that necessitate that you want to do what you to do. If this is the case, then there is no free will because even what you want to do is deterministic. I agree, but I still vote for compatabilism on those terms. Sure, If the world is a string of cause and effect, then every single thing I do was caused by something which affected/created me: it is still that me which acts. If it was not me which was acting, then it would certainly not be my will. If some random/chaotic occurrence caused me to act differently than I would have done, then of course this would be a random/chaotic occurrence, and not a product of my will, certainly not an act of freedom. In short, from my perspective there is such a thing as "what I want to do", but this need not be the case from every perspective. From a much more knowledgeable position my behaviours may be horribly predictable - however this affects my experience of freedom not one bit. From a hypothetical perspective of absolute knowledge we would no doubt find all things entirely predictable - but this does not affect freedom at all: If such a hypothetical position could exist, it is lost to us because we cannot probe the universe for all the info. Quantum Physics tells us that observation itself changes the results. If we observe the direction of a moving particle with sufficient accuracy, it will mean we have changed its speed: if we observe its speed we shall alter its direction of movement. The uncertainty principal lays the omniscient demon to rest, and so we regain freedom. It is simply impossible to predict what the future is, regardless of whether the universe is pre-determined. Secondly we must be clear about what we refer to by me. Is me my mind only? or my body only? or my past and memories only? or my brain and lungs only? It seems clear to me that I am all of these things, past, present, brain, mind, body, consciousness, sub consciousness. If we take a person to be the sum of influences to them, we get a clearer picture, any particular person as a nexus of causes, with many different sources (including books, TV, Plays, Genetic material from your parents, schooling, friends, even a soul or divine messages add to all of this) then it seems absurd to ask the question: do I have free will? I would say that the term 'Free will' is somewhat of a category mistake, as the will's proper function is to chose a course and direction of action. Concepts of freedom which do not consider the will must therefore re-define freedom as something which may or may not be willed by the participant - leading to a very unusual use of the term "freedom". Some would still say that determinism must be false, for they feel that their will is free: to them I say this: How does indeterminism help you? If you will an action, it is because of the sort of person you are. You become the sort of person you are through living your life and interacting, with your parents, with your family, with your friends, with books etc. If determinism is false, then it seems that who you are needn’t affect what you do – as you might be able to act in a way which is not shaped by what came before. This action could be called an uncaused action, but let us consider it more closely. Is an Uncaused action your own action? Nothing in your makeup gave rise to this action; nothing in your past made you chose it. It “fell from the sky” so to speak, and was something outside the control of your present form, state, personality. Because of the problems in translating an uncaused action to a free action, I reject indeterminism as a way of solving the free will debate. It adds no solution; it merely confuses the issue hopelessly. Still, "is there free will" is certainly a question to keep philosophers busy. Hope that this helped rather than hindering, it’s very easy to become confusing on this subject. Cheers

reincarnated
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Posted 05/04/08 - 08:25 AM:	#7
keda wrote: Why is "the power or ability of agents to to act otherwise than they in fact do" incoherent? Free will (imho) is simply the ability to do what I want to do, why do I need to be able to do otherwise? Why would I wish to do otherwise than what I want to do? If I am free to do what I want to do, how does being able to do otherwise than what I do do make me MORE free?
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

180 Proof
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Posted 05/04/08 - 11:43 PM:	#8
keda wrote: Why is "the power or ability of agents to to act otherwise than they in fact do" incoherent? How does one know (i.e. learn) from what agents "in fact do" that they have "the power or ability ... to act otherwise"?
_____________________ If faith is irrational, then it is rational to dismiss "faith-based claims" out of hand. If faith is rational, then "faith-based claims" must be testable and/or sufficient -- but they are neither. If faith is a-rational, then "faith-based claims" are inexplicable and thus cannot explain anything.

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Posted 05/05/08 - 03:18 AM:	#9
taiho wrote: He seems to be saying that L, the proposition of natural law, if broken can't be a law and is not a law. The natural determinist response seems to be that Lewis just made a mistake in how he chose L. There is an actual proposition of natural law, L', that in conjunction with H, would correctly imply all of the future and past. This case is silly because Lewis picked an L that was not an actual proposition of natural law. How would Lewis respond to that? Apparently he is saying that laws cannot be broken by definition, and it is a bit presumptious to say he has chosen a particular L that is broken. I think what Lewis is saying is that we could have done differently, but we would be in a different counterfactual situation with different laws. In effect, having free will (the ability to act otherwise) is the ability to have acted otherwise in a possible world with different laws. Is that what Lewis is saying? That is not clear from the text you quoted. reincarnated wrote: Free will (imho) is simply the ability to do what I want to do, why do I need to be able to do otherwise? A word can have more senses than one. You don't need to opine to use one, but I was talking about another. 180 Proof wrote: How does one know (i.e. learn) from what agents "in fact do" that they have "the power or ability ... to act otherwise"? I'm not arguing that one can know it, but even if one can't, how is it relevant to my question?
_____________________ Free Europe Now The man who trades freedom for security does not deserve nor will he ever receive either. -Benjamin Franklin If my sons did not want wars, there would be none - Gutle Rothschild It's not the people who vote that count, it's the people who count the votes - Josef Stalin Sometimes Satan comes as a man of peace - Bob Dylan A prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation. - Immanuel Kant

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Posted 05/05/08 - 08:15 PM:	#10
keda wrote: I'm not arguing that one can know it, but even if one can't, how is it relevant to my question? Assuming that the answer to your question is that the definition of "free will" at issue is not incoherent, I'm taking the implication of that (coherent) definition to task: it seems to me to be an idle claim unless it's constituent terms are more specified (i.e. what makes this an adequate concept of "free will"?) Feel free to ignore my questions, keda, if you find them irrelevant to the thread topic.
_____________________ If faith is irrational, then it is rational to dismiss "faith-based claims" out of hand. If faith is rational, then "faith-based claims" must be testable and/or sufficient -- but they are neither. If faith is a-rational, then "faith-based claims" are inexplicable and thus cannot explain anything.

reincarnated
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Posted 05/05/08 - 11:24 PM:	#11
reincarnated wrote: Free will (imho) is simply the ability to do what I want to do, why do I need to be able to do otherwise? keda wrote: A word can have more senses than one. You don't need to opine to use one, but I was talking about another. Another what? So long as I am free to do what I want to do, why would I either want or need to do otherwise than what I do do? If I am free to do what I want to do, the notion that I perhaps could have done otherwise than what I did do is valueless. Edited by reincarnated on 05/05/08 - 11:30 PM
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

Makarismos
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Posted 05/06/08 - 04:35 PM:	#12
reincarnated wrote: Another what? He seemed to be talking about another sense in which one of those words or phrases can be interpreted. Let me see.. Could it have been "free will"? He was responding to your definition after all. Perhaps what you mean by "free will" is not what he meant. Perhaps your definition contained words which were ambiguous. You said:- reincarnated wrote: Free will (imho) is simply the ability to do what I want to do, why do I need to be able to do otherwise? So doing what you want to do is free will: what if you can’t do what you want to do? What if you want to go to the park with your girlfriend, but can’t because you have to work? What if you want to read a book on Kant, but can’t because you are unable to penetrate the text? What if you want to get a new job, but can’t because you’re hooked on crack? Where is your freedom here? To an extent what we want to do and what we actually do is the result of a conflicted chain of reasoning in our heads, the result of which is an action. The result would be said to be the sum total of our conscious consensus - but we might not want it. People are constantly doing things they regret - that is why we have a word for it. A thing regretted was not wished for, wanted, desired, except for the one moment where it is forgotten. I guess forgetting might be desired . It’s not just the men in chains who might not be free; perhaps we are limited by our very selves. So there you have it, we don’t always do what we "want to", and this is why when answering the question of free will you must first ask "who is it that is making choices" then you can ask if they have free will. Who do you think it is?

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Posted 05/06/08 - 09:36 PM:	#13
Makarismos wrote: He seemed to be talking about another sense in which one of those words or phrases can be interpreted. Let me see.. Could it have been "free will"? He was responding to your definition after all. Perhaps what you mean by "free will" is not what he meant. Perhaps your definition contained words which were ambiguous. Perhaps perhaps perhaps. My question was directed at Keda so, with respect, I'll wait for Keda to explain what he was referring to rather than play guessing games. Makarismos wrote: So doing what you want to do is free will: what if you can’t do what you want to do? What if you want to go to the park with your girlfriend, but can’t because you have to work? You "have to work"? Now who is ambiguous? If you mean you are forced to work against your will (ie working is not what you want to do), then clearly you are not exercising free will in working. If however you mean that you choose to work rather than go to the park (because there are potential consequences of "not working" which you prefer to avoid, such as you need the money, or there is a deadline which needs to be met, or you might get fired, etc etc) then you are exercising free will. Makarismos wrote: What if you want to read a book on Kant, but can’t because you are unable to penetrate the text? Exactly. There are some things we may want to do but are incapable of doing (such as jumping to the moon) - we are not free to do anything and everything. Makarismos wrote: What if you want to get a new job, but can’t because you’re hooked on crack? Where is your freedom here? Exactly, if we show compulsive behaviour or addiction it could be argued that we are not exercising free will. Makarismos wrote: People are constantly doing things they regret - that is why we have a word for it. A thing regretted was not wished for, wanted, desired, except for the one moment where it is forgotten. It may have been wished for at the time of the action - but we later realised that what we wished for at the time was a mistake. Oh yes, we are free to change our minds as well. Makarismos wrote: we don’t always do what we "want to", and this is why when answering the question of free will you must first ask "who is it that is making choices" then you can ask if they have free will. I never suggested that we always do what we want to do - that's a straw man. I simply said that when we do what we want to do, then we are exercising free will. Period. Nothing to do with "could have done otherwise" Edited by reincarnated on 05/06/08 - 09:43 PM
_____________________ �If one pays attention to the concepts being employed, rather than the words being used, the resolution of this problem is simple.� (Stuart Burns)

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