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Critique of God
Tiantai Buddhist Critique, from Ziporyn, Being and Ambiguity

Critique of God

Golem
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Posted 11/05/05 - 06:47 PM: Subject: Critique of God	#1
We are a group of aspiring comparative philosophers who have organized a small informal reading group of intriguing, difficult and seminal modern philosophical texts. Right now we’re reading Brook Ziporyn’s Being and Ambiguity. We are tentatively planning to take up Hofstadter’s Godol Escher Bach next, but we are open to suggestions. I am posting these dispatches as summaries of our discussions, in an attempt to open up the conversation to others who have perhaps broader or otherwise oriented philosophical expertise or experiences. Comments are thus very welcome, whether or not you have read Ziporyn’s book. This time we took up Ziporyn’s critique of God, specifically the monotheistic concepts of God. It is what might be called a “spiritual critique” in that it sees God as detrimental to the spiritual life of mankind. In this sense Spinoza and Nietzsche are obvious antecedents. But his approach is cognitively rigorous in a sense that is perhaps closer to Hume. That is, God is both intellectually implausible and pragmatically disastrous. First, there is what is almost an “ontological proof” of the impossibility of God’s existence. This is unique, as far as I know. Critiques of God generally assume that the burden of proof is on the side of those who assert the empirically questionable belief in God’s existence. Ziporyn goes further. His proof assumes only one premise: causality. Since this premise is also assumed by most attempts to prove God’s existence (first cause argument, etc.), it should be uncontroversial. But Ziporyn’s exploration of Causality, based on Buddhist resources, stipulates that causality cannot be understood as a single cause creating a single effect, nor a single cause creating multiple effects, nor multiple causes creating a single effect: in every case, by definition, causality must be multiple causes creating multiple effects. (Multiplicity is the centerpiece of both the logical and the pragmatic critiques of God. Ziporyn’s book is in one sense an extended critique of oneness in any form.) The critique of God is just one consequence of the critique of “a single cause producing effects.” Empirically, this is unproblematic: no case of single-cause effectivity has ever been observed, and we have no reason to infer or extrapolate causality in this form from the empirical world: our concept of causality derives solely from observed multiple-cause effects (although the secondary causes are often ignored, because they are relatively constant or more long-lasting than the primary cause.) But there is also a logical proof: if a single cause could create an effect, there is no reason why it would not have always been creating that effect. There would be no reason for the effect to arise at moment M rather than any other moment. If it is eternally present in or with the cause, then the effect is not a second entity, but just a constant aspect of that cause, and in the final analysis none other than that cause itself; no causality of one entity by another has taken place. The fact that causality “takes place” as a temporal event at a specific moment in time means that there was at least one more condition besides the existence of cause C that brings about that effect: at the very least, “the passage of a certain amount of time.” Even if C creates the effect “spontaneously” after being left to itself for awhile, this “awhile” constitutes another cause. It is something heterogeneous to the original cause, the combining of causes and conditions. E.g., two causes are necessary to produce effect E: Cause C + the passage of X amount of time. Possible theistic objection: Does causality apply internally to the monotheist God? He’s supposed to be “free,” isn’t he? Does that mean free from causal constraints? The Ziporyn point would be, assuming that God exists, there is no reason why He would create a world at one time rather than another; the second condition for world-creation would be God’s act of will, his decision to create. But why does this willing arise at one time rather than another? We have an infinite regress, which has to take refuge either in the idea of continuous creation (which already undermines somewhat the usual anthromorphic God of tradition), of timelessness before God created Time (we hear St, Augustine puzzling over it, finally concluding with a threat and an appeal to authority), or God’s freedom as exempt from causality internally, although capable of exercising causality externally, e.g., in creating a world. Or the usual theistic refuge: it is beyond human understanding, requires faith, etc. This is perhaps equivalent to the assertion of acausal freedom: it simply means unintelligibility, it means that no questions can be asked or answered, because, as Kant showed, causality in some sense is synonymous with explanation, with undertstanding. To say, “He does it freely, not because of any cause” is just another way of saying “I don’t know anything about it.” Hence it is devoid of meaning, and equivalent to giving no answer at all. The theological question would be: is God’s being different from God’s will? If different, how does his being generate his will? Again we have to imagine some sort of causal relation, and the same question applies. If not different (as Maimonides, Aquinas and Spinoza all assert, I think), there can be no event of creation. But isn’t continuous creation (not of this or that, but of the entire world, ex nihilo) a bit of an oxymoron? Creation is by definition an event, a passing from non-being into being; if it’s always happening, no event occurs. In any event, the use of God as an explanation of the world fails. If we are willing to admit inexplicability for God, we might as well admit it for the world and save ourselves this detour. In fact, this is just where Ziporyn is heading with his doctrine of global incoherence. Our concepts of causality and so on are inadequate not only for God, but for any event, or for the world itself, for which no single account can be given: it is in this sense beyond words and thought, but in a way that makes it still describable in terms of local coherences, and allows the orderliness and predictability of the world as local coherences. But here we start to get to the spiritual critique of God: the draining of all the mysteriousness into the God side leaves the world despiritualized, a thoroughly knowable and controllable machine, which can be given a single meaning and purpose—and ourselves as well. We become substances with a finite set of predictable qualities, or else we ourselves are bifurcated into a free soul and a mechanical body, constitutively at war with ourselves. Rather, Ziporyn claims, all possible entities without exception are locally knowable but globally mysterious. (So we really are at war with ourselves in a way? Yes, but he goes on: global incoherence is local coherence!) This is the first part of the logical critique of God, God as cause. The next concerns a demolition of the concept of “Natural Law,” which attacks God as philosophical principle of unity or guarantor of the consistency or orderliness of the world. Next there is the critique of God as omniscient observer, which is part of the critique of the concept of God’s spiritual effects on man. I will post further summaries of our discussions in the coming weeks. Comments?

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Posted 11/05/05 - 07:18 PM:	#2
Yes I probably agree with what you said for the most part, because I have been thinking in similar lines for a long time. Your thoughts on substances with a finite set of predictable qualities are pretty similar to ideas I have been whirling in my head for some time now. I didn't think anyone else thought of them. I guess this proves that for every philosopher we know of there are 1,000 others who have thought the exact same thing but didn't write or their writings got lost. However I find the causiality of god quite pointless. It reaks of inferiority to theologians. Many have chosen to ignore that part not because it's hard to prove but because they would be doing the theists a favor by stooping themselves to their level. I think it's an obvious fact that the theory of god's existence is full of holes, but the theists don't care about that. So by trying to prove that it's full of holes even though it's obvious to us(we think we are superior in that way), we would indeed be making ourselves targets for people who do believe in god.

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Posted 11/05/05 - 08:30 PM:	#3
God is both intellectually implausible and pragmatically disastrous. I look forward to this argument. The critique of God is just one consequence of the critique of “a single cause producing effects.” Empirically, this is unproblematic: no case of single-cause effectivity has ever been observed, and we have no reason to infer or extrapolate causality in this form from the empirical world: our concept of causality derives solely from observed multiple-cause effects. The statement “no reason” seems off to me. Certainly Aristotle’s old argument of a prime mover is a “reason”, and one that Aristotle was brought to by his observation. Noting a multiplicity of causes both fails to distinguish the different senses of the word “cause”, and fails to address the prime mover argument as the argument itself is a kind of “infinite being solves infinite regress” argument. Again we have to imagine some sort of causal relation, and the same question applies. If not different (as Maimonides, Aquinas and Spinoza all assert, I think), there can be no event of creation. But isn’t continuous creation (not of this or that, but of the entire world, ex nihilo) a bit of an oxymoron? Creation is by definition an event, a passing from non-being into being; if it’s always happening, no event occurs. This is a misunderstanding of the Dogma of Creation ex nihilo, which should be reviewed. I would also like to mention that there are certain understandings of time, and being, that are too limited and mistaken. Perhaps we could explore this in detail following this original post.
There is no more pleasant food for the soul than the knowledge of truth. - Lactantius

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Posted 11/05/05 - 09:39 PM:	#4
thanks, golem, for the reference. Being and Ambiguity looks very interesting.
If faith is irrational, then it is rational to dismiss "faith-based claims" out of hand. If faith is rational, then "faith-based claims" must be testable and/or sound -- but they are neither. If faith is a-rational, then "faith-based claims" are inexplicable and thus cannot explain anything.

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Posted 11/06/05 - 10:25 AM:	#5
But Ziporyn's exploration of Causality, based on Buddhist resources, stipulates that causality cannot be understood as a single cause creating a single effect, nor a single cause creating multiple effects, nor multiple causes creating a single effect: in every case, by definition, causality must be multiple causes creating multiple effects Im interested to know how Ziporyn explains there being multiple causes before the "first effect", and what these causes were (sort of elaboration of Philosophy's point). I'm also interested to know where the conclusion that there could only be multiple causes causing multiple effects came from? single cause could create an effect, there is no reason why it would not have always been creating that effect Was there a time when the effects weren't created? God is both intellectually implausible and pragmatically disastrous Can you provide a sample from the book about why this is so? (EDIT) Or is this ontological 'proof' the reason God is "intellectually implausable"?

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Posted 11/07/05 - 03:19 AM:	#6
The statement “no reason” seems off to me. Certainly Aristotle’s old argument of a prime mover is a “reason”, and one that Aristotle was brought to by his observation. Noting a multiplicity of causes both fails to distinguish the different senses of the word “cause”, and fails to address the prime mover argument as the argument itself is a kind of “infinite being solves infinite regress” argument. Aristotle's observation, though, was skewed by a presopposition of single causality, which is the result of a certain narrowing of attantion, useful for certain purposes, but then habituated to create a false inference. The four types of cause are not relevant to the question of multiplicity: whether there are two heretogeneous causes of the same "type" or across types, we still have irreducible multiplicity as the essence of the causal process. And if an infinite cause, which is therefore unthinkable in that it subverts the normal concept of causality, can be used to solve the infinite regress, why not spare ourselves the detour, and rethink the finitude of causality even in emprical cases? All causality does indeed presoppose an infinite cause, because any finite cause would reduce to a "one" and no "one" cause can produce an effect. This is important, because it means that even "the whole," if conceived as a fixed finite totality, can do nothing. So here Ziporyn is quite close to Aristotle in a way, but he wants this wondrous form of creation to be operative at all times and places without bifurcating the world into the finite and the infinite. Here we can perhaps defer to Hegel: there is no finite which is not also infinite, and no infinite which is not also finite--neither on heaven nor on earth. The point is to reconfigure what we mean about these loosely used and inconsistent terms "finite" and "infinite." This is a misunderstanding of the Dogma of Creation ex nihilo, which should be reviewed. I would also like to mention that there are certain understandings of time, and being, that are too limited and mistaken. Perhaps we could explore this in detail following this original post. [/quote] Do tell me your understanding of the ex nihilo--I would like to learn this, and if it can circumvent this problem.

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Posted 11/07/05 - 03:26 AM:	#7
The whole point here is that no "first" effect can be conceived, any more than a first cause can. We can go on to say that it is also impossible to imagine an infinite series with no beginning. This is nothing new, just Kant's antinomies: for time and space to have a beginning, or to have no beginning, are equally self-contradictory. This means we have to rethink what we mean by "time" "space" and "beginning" and "first"--indeed, what we mean by "an entity." This is just what Ziporyn seems to be up to in his book. To exist in any form--this applies to abstract and concrete entities, to anything perceivable or conceivable--is to be a "coherence." That means to be a coming-together (a cohering) of at least two qualitatively distinct (i.e., discernible) "other" entities, and also to be coherent in the sense of itself "readable," i.e., distinguishable from other such entities. In fact, this "contrast to another" is itself one possible form of the "coming together" constitutive of the entity. The identity of the coherence is dependent on its elements, its contrasting contrasts and its precedents and antecedents. But the horizons of relevance of contexts is always indeterminable (this is where the Buddhist "Emptiness" comes in), since context is constitutive of content. In that case, Ziporyn concludes, to be is to be a coherence, and to be a coherence is always to be a merely local coherence (that is, it's readable as thus and so only within a certain arbitrarily fixed local context). But to be a local coherence means to be a global incoherence (when other contexts are allowed to exert their relevance, the original identity is effaced, or overlaid with conflicting identities). Hence: coherence is incoherence, or to be and not to be are identical. There's a next step: it means not a blank "not-being" which excludes all beings (that would be a "being" acc. to Ziporyn) but the "intersubsumption" of all possible coherences! This strikes me as quite ingenious, and so far I've been unable to discover a logical flaw in the argument, although I find it rather unnerving. All the more so because the rest of the book teases out the implications of this premise in some very radical way.

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Posted 11/08/05 - 08:05 AM:	#8
All causality does indeed presoppose an infinite cause, because any finite cause would reduce to a "one" and no "one" cause can produce an effect. I suppose this leads back to the "multiple causes cause multiple effects" theory. How does Ziporyn support this? All I can really see is an unfounded statement The whole point here is that no "first" effect can be conceived, any more than a first cause can. We can go on to say that it is also impossible to imagine an infinite series with no beginning. This is nothing new, just Kant's antinomies: for time and space to have a beginning, or to have no beginning, are equally self-contradictory. This means we have to rethink what we mean by "time" "space" and "beginning" and "first"--indeed, what we mean by "an entity." But that's just wordplay. There was a 'beginning', the same as there was a 'first effect'. More to the point, does Ziporyn do anything apart from skipping around words here? It's all very well and good to say that we can't conceive something, but that doesnt mean it didn't happen... I'm going to try to be as careful I possibly can here: how do we get to here from the point in time where there wasn't a second or minute or hour before, if there was no first effect?

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Posted 11/08/05 - 10:08 PM:	#9
The argument for the "multiple cause-multiple effect" stipulation was already given. I repeat it: But there is also a logical proof: if a single cause could create an effect, there is no reason why it would not have always been creating that effect. There would be no reason for the effect to arise at moment M rather than any other moment. If it is eternally present in or with the cause, then the effect is not a second entity, but just a constant aspect of that cause, and in the final analysis none other than that cause itself; no causality of one entity by another has taken place. The fact that causality “takes place” as a temporal event at a specific moment in time means that there was at least one more condition besides the existence of cause C that brings about that effect: at the very least, “the passage of a certain amount of time.” Even if C creates the effect “spontaneously” after being left to itself for awhile, this “awhile” constitutes another cause. It is something heterogeneous to the original cause, the combining of causes and conditions. E.g., two causes are necessary to produce effect E: Cause C + the passage of X amount of time. Is there any loophole to this argument? You also make an interesting statement about the relation between existence and thinking, or being and knowing, if you like: "just because we can't conceive of something doesn't mean it didn't happen." The whole history of philosophy spins around this problem. But it becomes an infinite regress if we assume that our categories of being are themselves adequate and self-consistent, which Ziporyn demonstrates quite powerfully. You will ALWAYS generate a remainder "outside thought" and then have to reclaim it with the THOUGHT "outside thought," and so on ad infinitum, as long as we maintain the usual finite categories of thinking. But either a statement has some discernible content or it is meaningless, in which case it is equivalent to making no statement at all. "Outside thought" or "something we can never know" is one of these pseudo-statements--very useful for the paradoxes it generates, which destabilize the rest of the structure of knowledge, but meaningless nonsense if taken literally. Ziporyn claims that "useful if taken figuratively, meaningless if taken literally" actually applies to all possible statements, every type of knowledge, every experience--even "something happens, although we don't understand it." This is what is so great about the local coherence/global incoherence model; it finally provides a solution to the old "thinkable and the beyond-of-the-thinkable" problem. If this is mere wordplay, even life and death are mere wordplay. And in a sense they are! The point is that it is fruitless to cling to a one-sided dogma about "the beginning" or "no beginning"--what is useful is to understand how, when fully realized or pushed to their ultimate conclusion, these two apparently contrary points of view end up indicating the same thing. After all, no one can have been present to experience "the beginning." Its sole existence is as a concept in our PRESENT world of experience. "Beginning" and "beginningless," to the extent that they have ANY MEANING AT ALL, are alternate but synonymous expressions for the same horizon experience.....

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Posted 11/08/05 - 11:45 PM:	#10
if a single cause could create an effect, there is no reason why it would not have always been creating that effect. My response to this was to name a point in time where the single cause in question, God, didn't create the effect. Are you asking why it took place at moment M (ie the 'beginning' of time) rather than before time existed? After all, no one can have been present to experience "the beginning." Its sole existence is as a concept in our PRESENT world of experience. "Beginning" and "beginningless," to the extent that they have ANY MEANING AT ALL, are alternate but synonymous expressions for the same horizon experience..... I don't really understand this part of Ziporyn's argument enough to counter it. There is no infinite regress if there's a beginning. The strongest evidence we have points to there being a beginning. If there was a beginning, there was a first effect, created by a first cause. I'm still left wondering how Ziporyn suggests we got to here, without a first cause and effect.

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