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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

Compatibilism

ecspose
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Posted 07/03/09 - 09:28 PM: Subject: Compatibilism	#1
Let me start by saying, yes determinism is true, but at the same time it's impossible to say that free-will isn't. Who's to say whether our choices are a result of billiard ball physics, or if billiard ball physics are assembled around our choices. What I mean is, who is to say whether a thing happens because we choose it to, or whether our choice is a result of things happening? For one thing we cannot calculate the infinite number of small factors leading up to a "decision", so we will likely never be able to prove determinism. On the other hand, without tossing logic out the window, there is no such thing as chance. Everything that does happen, happens with 100% certainty. There is not a 50% chance that a coin will land on one side or the other, there is a 100% chance that it will land on the side it eventually lands on. There is 100% chance for everything that does happen, to happen. Odds are just a game we create to estimate our ignorance of something, but ultimately are unproven and unprovable. Any percent chance allows for any deviation of the predicted results, because it is only a "chance". Ultimately, it is of inconsequence whether what you think you are choosing is actually predetermined, or whether what happens results from your inexplicable "choice". It amounts to the same thing for the individual experience. Who's to say billiard ball physics aren't painted around our choices? Who is to say the movement of every physical piece isn't tied to consciousness on some plane? The movement of clouds, or the flicker of a fire, they might be neurons in a greater brain. What we think of as random, may just be an order we have failed to understand. I believe that determinism and free-will both exist as different aspects of the same, unitary phenomenon. They are just different ways of describing the same thing that is happening. Either one is lacking without some kind of reconciliation.
Self replication leads to self replication

Ratheius Netheros
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Posted 07/03/09 - 09:48 PM:	#2
The issue I have is that free will seems to be unable to properly explain determinism while determinism can properly explain free will. I agree with compatibilism, but I don't agree in the manner you do. Free will is the conscious experience we have of our existence and the ability to reach to circumstances without conscious awareness of the processes causes us to react. If you push me, and I push you back, what caused it? I experienced free will. If I hooked myself up to a brain scan, and you pushed me, could I see, theoretically, the causal mechanisms causing me to react to your push with a push of my own? Probably. Would that eliminate the experience that we call "free will." No. Is that experience really "free." Not in the way we currently define free. As I see it, the only way to believe in free will is to redefine it to represent what the phenomenon is actually trying to represent. However, the determinist will rightfully counter that you aren't talking about free will anymore. As free will in the previous sense was linguistic nonsense, a non-real concept, I see no problem. Simply attach the name "free will" represent the idea it original intended to mirror.

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/04/09 - 01:28 AM:	#3
Ratheius Netheros wrote: As I see it, the only way to believe in free will is to redefine it to represent what the phenomenon is actually trying to represent. However, the determinist will rightfully counter that you aren't talking about free will anymore. As a compatibilist, I find the above to be backwards. It is the philosopher (determinist) who redefines "free will." This redefinition is spurious because uncaused actions (or an uncaused will) do not result in what we think of as "free will" at all. If we are responsible for our actions only because they are free, and we redefine "free will" to mean "uncaused will" or "random will," then we can never be responsible for our actions; after all, why would we be responsible for random occurrences? A free will is one that is free from certain kinds of causes, i.e., ones that are relevant to our moral judgments. A will must be free from coercion in order for us to ascribe responsibility, in the normal, straightforward manner, for the actions that result from it . If one is blackmailed, one is either not responsible for one's actions, or that responsibility is mitigated, since some of it (or all of it) lies with the blackmailer. If a lawyer asks a witness "was the defendant acting of his own free will," you'll never see the witness answer "no, since determinism is true, none of us act freely." She might answer "no, a mobster was holding his family at gunpoint and insisting that he give the bank robbers the vault code." This shows what I mean by "it is the philosopher who redefines 'free will.'" A far more common and practical notion of free will is already in place, so we can easily do away with the philosophical notion that makes free will something that is impossible. Edited by Kamerynn on 07/04/09 - 01:33 AM
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Makarismos
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Posted 07/04/09 - 03:02 AM:	#4
I love it when compatabilists disagree about the same answer. As Kamerynn rightly points out, free will is a term which has at least two definitions: 1) The freedom to act in a way unrestrained by others. 2) The freedom to act with no influence from the past. The second is logically imposable. The first is fine.

keda
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Posted 07/04/09 - 03:10 AM:	#5
Makarismos wrote: 2) The freedom to act with no influence from the past. The second is logically imposable. The first is fine. Why is the second logically impossible?
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

dman1
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Posted 07/04/09 - 04:32 AM:	#6
^Because the past influences our current perception, which in turn influences our actions.

aletheist
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Posted 07/04/09 - 05:32 AM:	#7
Ratheius Netheros wrote: Free will is the conscious experience we have of our existence and the ability to reach to circumstances without conscious awareness of the processes causes us to react. Makarismos wrote: As Kamerynn rightly points out, free will is a term which has at least two definitions: 1) The freedom to act in a way unrestrained by others. 2) The freedom to act with no influence from the past. None of these accurately represents the libertarian view, which is that free will requires the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. Conscious humans are thus unique causal agents whose beliefs and decisions are not the result of strictly deterministic and/or random processes. The past certainly influences our choices, but it does not dictate them. Kamerynn wrote: As a compatibilist, I find the above to be backwards. It is the philosopher (determinist) who redefines "free will." This redefinition is spurious because uncaused actions (or an uncaused will) do not result in what we think of as "free will" at all. If we are responsible for our actions only because they are free, and we redefine "free will" to mean "uncaused will" or "random will," then we can never be responsible for our actions; after all, why would we be responsible for random occurrences? I submit that it is the compatibilist who redefines free will, in a misguided attempt to preserve it while still endorsing determinism. The libertarian concept of free will is consistent with a powerful human intuition. Besides, at precisely what point do the deterministic causes of any given choice become coercive; i.e., "relevant to our moral judgments"? And if determinism is true, how can we have "judgment" of any kind, as it is commonly understood? Whatever "decisions" I think I make, they would have been inevitable from the beginning of the material universe (assuming that it had one). This is not what non-philosophers typically mean when they talk about "free will".
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

ecspose
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/04/09 - 11:02 AM:	#8
aletheist wrote: None of these accurately represents the libertarian view, which is that free will requires the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. I agree that more than one course is possible, but I don't see an important distinction between the possibilities we call choice, and the possibilities we call chance. The concept of different outcomes only exists as an estimation, in the absence of actual knowledge. It seems to me, that the only common distinction between a chance and a choice, is that a choice requires one to believe it was a choice. aletheist wrote: And if determinism is true, how can we have "judgment" of any kind As it has been pointed out, we are dealing with more than one definition of free will. One deals with choice, and one deals with the causal chain which encompasses choice. I submit that is doesn't matter whether one's choices are predetermined. Whether the mind was destined to arrive at a choice, or even if an outside influence is orchestrating the hidden pieces in a mind to cause a choice, this does not translate to anything meaningful in the moral world. The mind and its decisions are accountable to a different order of things. So long as it is believed a choice is being made, then a choice is being made. Believing in determinism does not free one from the existence of a choice within one's own mind. It only explains the mind and choice to be within a substrate of causality.
Self replication leads to self replication

Ratheius Netheros
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/04/09 - 11:12 AM:	#9
I don't accept the freedom to take more than one course of action as being possible. That's why I mentioned that compatibilism, as I see it, can redefine free will in a way that makes it not really "free" but still a real phenomenon. As for the consequences, I am saying a person held by gunpoint and a person who made the choice are different. The person who made the choice free from "typical" constraints did so because of how their brain works, or intrinsic causal relationships. This means ultimately that their actions are a reflection of their character. We find people guilty on the basis of this character because they would likely be a threat in the future. A person who is insane has an insane character. There is no real reason to consider them less morally responsible. Free will as an idea necessary for punishment is largely responsible for the failures of the modern legal system. We think someone did it because "they're bad" so we don't try to establish a causality in order to fix the problem. The issue is that if someone does something, no matter what the reason, and they are a threat again or leaving them unpunished sends a bad message, you have to utilize legal means. Saying "that bundle of causal relations killed my daughter" and "he killed my daughter" are the same thing. Insane people may feel they lack "control." What free will is, the feeling we have of control over our lives, is likely a causal relationship in the brain. It may be a mental property in the sense of David Chalmer's property dualism, but it's still coming from a physical basis. If free will was removed, I suspect, by some sort of physical procedure, we wouldn't feel the same sensation. Determinism is typically argued for on the basis of causal relations outside the person. Neuroscience was rather undeveloped at the time determinism emerged. It's not saying there are not certain behaviors that are determined by the person. It is simply saying those procedures influence people. If everything was known about the world, we could predict what someone would do. If we told them what they would do, they might change it. We could predict that, too. That's all determinism is saying. The problem is confusing what you have done with what you can do. If a child fails at math, they may wrongly believe they are unable to accomplish the task. Free will can serve as an "optimism" or realization of what is possible but hasn't happened yet. However, we can still determine that some people can't do X. I can't fly. Advancement in sciences may be able to predict whether I am capable of satisfying the emotional and physical needs of multiple wives. I suspect I'm not. The conclusion that we can predict our actions with such certain is undesirable, it seems. However, I suspect we would feel just as free if we could, at any time, look at a watch and determine what we will do in the future.

Kamerynn
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/04/09 - 01:06 PM:	#10
aletheist wrote: I submit that it is the compatibilist who redefines free will, in a misguided attempt to preserve it while still endorsing determinism. However, philosophers are well known for taking common concepts and analyzing them more deeply than the layman. If a "sophisticated" philosophical notion of the uncaused will came first, we should all be amazed. After all, random, uncaused will impedes our moral notions rather than sustaining them. aletheist wrote: Besides, at precisely what point do the deterministic causes of any given choice become coercive; i.e., "relevant to our moral judgments"? While that is an interesting problem (and not as easy to solve as it might first appear to some), it should be sufficient, given the present discussion, to give examples of things that are clearly coercive (my blackmail example) and things that are not (the arrangement of matter at the beginning of the universe). This shows that there is a distinction to be had even though the subject of exactly where to draw the line has a large enough scope to fill a fair sized book. In other words, I'm merely trying to head off the argument that there is no such thing as freedom from coercion, as I'm sure we can all agree that blackmail counts. aletheist wrote: And if determinism is true, how can we have "judgment" of any kind, as it is commonly understood? Whatever "decisions" I think I make, they would have been inevitable from the beginning of the material universe (assuming that it had one). This is not what non-philosophers typically mean when they talk about "free will". Firstly, that we can perform judgment in a deterministic universe does not seem to be a problem. However, in a universe that lacks the causation needed for judgment (e.g. conditioning/learning) there would certainly be a problem. How could we assess a given situation if we could not analyze potential causes and predict probable effects? Secondly, I notice that you comment on the fact that the notion of an entirely uncaused will is not what non-philosophers mean by "free will." This is one reason why I say that it is the incompatibilist who redefines the notion, not the compatibilist. The compatibilist simply works with a more common-sense, practical notion that already exists in the vocabulary of many laymen (such as non-philosophers in the field of law). After all, meaning is based on convention; this meaning can already be found in the language and, unlike the incompatibalist definition, it is useful. Ratheius Netheros wrote: I don't accept the freedom to take more than one course of action as being possible. That's why I mentioned that compatibilism, as I see it, can redefine free will in a way that makes it not really "free" but still a real phenomenon. The trick in the above is the use of "really free" instead of something more precise such as "freedom from all causation, i.e., randomness." My contention is that freedom from coercion counts as "really free," while freedom from all causation counts as a completely impractical philosophical exercise, only useful in terms of mental gymnastics, since such a notion of "free will" divorces everyone who has it from responsibility for all their actions. Ratheius Netheros wrote: A person who is insane has an insane character. There is no real reason to consider them less morally responsible. Free will as an idea necessary for punishment is largely responsible for the failures of the modern legal system. We think someone did it because "they're bad" so we don't try to establish a causality in order to fix the problem. Since the legal system has been once again brought up: a person who does not understand that what they did is wrong won't benefit from punishment, as it's commonly construed (jail time, etc.). We don't think that they did it because they're bad people; on the contrary, we simply acknowledge that they need help of a different variety. Thus, we do attempt to "establish a causality in order to fix the problem," just one that has, it is supposed, a greater chance of success.
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

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