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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

aletheist
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Posted 07/10/09 - 05:40 PM:	#81
Kamerynn wrote: As I've stated, the will, and not just actions, cannot be undetermined. An undetermined will isn't mine whereas my will, which has developed in a causally dense fashion from my experiences, is mine. But what I have called the disconnect is that what you mean by "undetermined" here is not what I usually mean by it. If what you are saying is that my will is "determined" by me, then I have no problem with that. Kamerynn wrote: So, yes, the self that makes those choices is completely determined; that's why I included what I had already written. In it, I imply that and state why I don't see that as a problem for free will. I'm aware that you do, and I've attempted to argue against that. Yes, and the problem (again) is that what you mean by "free will" is not what I mean by it. Determinism is compatible with your definition of "free will", but not with mine. Kamerynn wrote: For what it's worth, I have argued against your position's fit with i2. If your will is undetermined, then you are not the ultimate cause of your own thoughts/actions. But I have never argued that the will is "undetermined" as you are using that term here. In fact, here is what I said way back in post #38. aletheist wrote: I guess you could say that the agent's actions are determined by the agent, but this is not how "determinism" is generally understood. Do you have no other comments on post #76? Does it provide a fair summary of the compatibilist position? Do you agree with my ultimate/proximate distinction? I spent some time today reading through all of the previous PF threads with "compatibilism" in the title, as well as several relevant articles on the Web. It was both amusing and frustrating to see that almost exactly the same disconnect seems to occur almost every time this subject is debated. At least I feel like we have made some progress in understanding each other, even though (not surprisingly) we still disagree.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kingt2
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/10/09 - 07:38 PM:	#82
Sorry I took so long to respond. Out of town for a couple days. aletheist wrote: It is a problem if we define free will as the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. Given that definition, if "my decisions are [completely] determined by causes that are out of my control," then I do not have free will. This is why I say that compatibilism requires redefining free will. That seems to be a very greedy definition of free will, though; no? I mean, you always have the option available; that is to say: At any given time, your external options are unlimited [assuming you are not being coerced into anything by an outside force]. It is obviously impossible for one to make various different decisions at the same time; one decision must be made. I don't see how you are left optionless simply because "you" wouldn't choose anything different were the scenario to be repeated... What I mean is: Despite the fact that one will choose the same thing given an infinite number of identical situations, his external options are never limited to but one choice; only his actual choice is limited. But even that is not limited by any external factor, but by his OWN WILL. No, I am claiming that decisions are caused by the agent and are not the involuntary result of deterministic and/or random processes. The decision itself is within the agent's control, even though most of the factors surrounding it are not. I don't believe that they are involuntary either. We may not have any say over them from some cosmic scale, but the decisions are surely "ours". Only if one defines "I" as an agent that exists outside of a causal chain does it become a problem. The way I have described it, while we have no control over who we become, we "are who we are"--so to speak. And "we" make decisions. It is not involuntary, we simply have no choice but to act as we would act in the given situation, given "who we are". As I have stated previously, I believe that humans are unique causal agents; as far as we know, nothing else in the material universe exhibits consciousness, free will, rationality, a unified self, intrinsic value, and moral absolutes. We operate within the context of causal processes, to be sure, but we still make our own decisions; they are influenced by other causes, but not dictated by them. Do we know that to be true? I mean, it seems to be true, but I don't think we can say definitively that we are the only species with consciousness. We may have the most complex form of consciousness known to, well, us; but that does not exclude the possibility that "level of consciousness" is a graded scale, rather than a "have / have not" type deal. I do not see how. If you have no control over how you make decisions, then how can they be yours? As I've noted. If I define "I" as: the ongoing, changing result of constant intake of experiences and external stimuli as they shape and form the brain-->personality. Then any decision made by me is entirely mine, given that no one has a gun to my head or anything. My experiences are all that I have, all that I can use to make decisions. Even guesses have a basis in something, be it mood, the sound of one word being preferable to the other, anything really. Point being, it is necessary for me to draw my decisions from my past experiences and my "personality"--in the broadest possible usage of the word--and what my personality is, is ultimately out of my control. What exactly do you mean by "motives"? Desires? Reasons? Please clarify your question. O.K. So we agree that who we are is at least influenced a great deal by our experiences and the myriad things that our brain takes in to learn and grow, yes? All we really disagree on is this: That I see myself as an aggregate--albeit a truly complex one--of these things, and nothing "extra" [that is not to undermine the complexity of the brain. Our experiences form a "personality", basically every nuance of who we are, and our personality makes decisions based on the things that make it up] While you see yourself as all that, plus an extra "me-agent" which has the sort-of final say in decisions. I understand the concept, that there exists an inherent human quality that allows us to step out of the causal chain and take an objective stance on decisions. I contest, however, that this is rational. Say you are presented with X and Y. Your personality dictates that you would rather choose Y; you argue that it is possible that, because of this "me-agent", you could possibly think to yourself "OK, I understand that I would prefer Y, but I believe that I will choose X, this time." My question is, then, for what purpose does this "me-agent" act? Why choose X over Y? Why contradict what the personality is insisting? Consider this: I am confronted with the choice: Fruity Pebbles or Honey Bunches of Oats. I argue that if at time X in my life, if I decide to eat HBoO, that given identical simulations of the same event, I would always choose HBoO, because everything that makes me "me", and thus everything that is drawn upon to make decisions, has led me to that choice. I would like to know what the motive would be for choosing Fruity Pebbles in some iteration of the event. What becomes the reason behind the fruity pebbles choice, over the HBoO?
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

Kingt2
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Posted 07/10/09 - 07:51 PM:	#83
aletheist wrote: I am not sure what you mean here. I am an agent; I am not born with an agent "inside" me somehow. Well, you'd have to be. You are saying that "you" have the capability of transcending the causal chain [or, really, stepping outside of it] and offering some form of "me-input" that is not dependent on the events of your environment. So, then, there must exist some sort of "me-agent" that came pre-packaged at birth. You'd have to be born with this "me", which is absurd. You can't be anyone before you are born! What I mean is, if this agent is outside of the causal chain, then it must be an inherent quality; you must have this "me-agent" from birth, and it must remain unchanged by any outside factors. The "me-agent" of 50 years must be identical in nature to the "me-agent" of toddler-hood. And, you'd then have to somehow argue how the "me-agent" is more "you" than the parts of you which were determined and created by your experiences and your environment... Since I reject materialism and determinism, I also reject the notion that who I am and how I respond to stimuli are strictly functions of physiology and environment. Again, I prefer to say that those things influence who I am and how I respond to stimuli. My "self" cannot be reduced to my body or any portion thereof, including my brain. What else could there be? Do you subscribe to a dualistic approach to consciousness? I'd like to direct you to another post of mine, that deals with this topic; if only because it may be interesting to you: http://forums.philosophyforums.com...self-and-others-34352.html Again, I was not born with "me"; I was born as "me". Are you the same "you" now as you were ten years ago? Edited by Kingt2 on 07/11/09 - 06:45 AM
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/11/09 - 07:32 AM:	#84
aletheist wrote: But what I have called the disconnect is that what you mean by "undetermined" here is not what I usually mean by it. If what you are saying is that my will is "determined" by me, then I have no problem with that. Huh? All I mean by "undetermined" is "not determined." That isn't what you usually mean by it? Your position just gets more and more slippery, and you continue to fail to address my substantive point. I see that Kingt2 is taking a similar tack, but with a homunculous argument. Perhaps you'll carefully read what he writes and address the idea that an undetermined will does not make you the ultimate cause of your actions. aletheist wrote: But I have never argued that the will is "undetermined" as you are using that term here. In fact, here is what I said way back in post #38: I guess you could say that the agent's actions are determined by the agent, but this is not how "determinism" is generally understood. Above, you assert that the agent's actions are determined by the agent. You have stated that the will is undetermined, and what you mean by that must be "not determined." I am not using the term in any special manner. An undetermined will is not even your will. Allow me to quote a passage that you said you read: "I cannot take responsibility for something that is undetermined and, to that extent, alien. My actions either result from who I am, or they do not. If my will is undetermined, then they do not." You can't simply wiggle out of that by saying "oh, I'm using 'undetermined' differently than you." I no longer have any hope that you'll address my substantive point or that you're giving what I write an honest read. I'm going to give up. For what it's worth, I'm not angry, I just see no point in continuing. I hope you find any future mental gymnastics in this thread to be stimulating, and I might check back to see what people make of Kingt2's well worded efforts. Kingt2 wrote: And, you'd then have to somehow argue how the "me-agent" is more "you" than the parts of you which were determined and created by your experiences and your environment. I've been trying to point out the necessity for such an argument for quite some time; as I keep saying, an undetermined will isn't even my will... it cannot be anyone's will. I hope that your way of wording things has some effect.
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Makarismos
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Posted 07/11/09 - 10:23 AM:	#85
Is there something about the libertarian position I am missing that would prevent a libertarian discussing the existence of a kind of essence, or soul? I had always thought that such a position entailed dualism, but I now think it might not be necessary. What I do find hard to understand is the gap between causation and responsibility from the point of view of the libertarian: to me this position now seems untenable. I wonder if this is a matter of blindness on my part, or on the part of the libertarian? I see no reason to abandon a compatabilist notion of free will, and am puzzled as to why anyone would adopt a libertarian position...

ecspose
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Posted 07/12/09 - 01:12 AM:	#86
aletheist wrote: My question was, would complete knowledge of all the factors that lead up to a human decision entail an infallible prediction of that choice? The fact that such complete knowledge is (presumably) impossible is beside the point. A determinist says yes; a libertarian says no, because no matter what those factors are, the agent retains the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action. Remember that the idea of "prediction" indicates the presence of an awareness. An awareness to a situation indicates a greater responsibility to the situation. I believe this reasoning is common to many forms of morality. But to answer your question, yes, every single thing within a limited scope, could hypothetically be predicted. Not perfectly mind you, but so close to perfect the difference would be negligible. What significance do you suppose this holds for us? aletheist wrote: As a libertarian, my initial response is that someone's awareness of coercion should not serve as the decisive factor for whether, in fact, coercion occurred. I might suggest something more along these lines: Coercion occurs when a human is prevented from having the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. Would you say that every time you feel hungry or thirsty you are being coerced? How many genuine options for existence do you suppose we actually have? How do you tie this with your idea of being prevented from taking more than one course. Do you have a choice that you are born? Do you have a choice that you will die? According to your description, coercion is seemingly everywhere. In fact, I can see no seams in the construction that leads from 'choice' to coercion. Should we liberate people from the cultural influences that helped shape them? What about the biological influences? At what point do we magically we say we are "in control" of what we are? aletheist wrote: If it [Determinism] completely accounts for them [our choices], then how can it not "detract from our choices"? How could they be our choices at all? They are only our choices in the sense that they come from our mind, however our mind is not our choice. They are our choices, but we are not our own choice. For us to be our own choice would be circular reasoning. We can make decisions about ourselves, but it still comes from "us", and at some point we are not accountable for our own origin. aletheist wrote: But if "I" am merely "a collection of deterministic processes," then I have no say in my moral outlook; it has already been completely determined for me. Yes, you are right, but who was to know? We have to engage reality at the level we experience it at. From our experience we make choices. It doesn't really matter what's going on behind the scenes. aletheist wrote: Since I reject materialism and determinism, I also reject the notion that who I am and how I respond to stimuli are strictly functions of physiology and environment. Again, I prefer to say that those things influence who I am and how I respond to stimuli. My "self" cannot be reduced to my body or any portion thereof, including my brain. I actually think I understand where you are going with this line of thought, though it seems obscure and unlikely. The best I could say is, your idea of causal agent and deterministic free-will exist as two parts interacting on a grander plane. If you want to get right down to it, it is impossible to say which is the lead foot, materialism or consciousness. Consciousness might be so powerful that it creates the material universe in its wake. There isn't really a way of knowing for sure, though this is quite a delve into the metaphysical. Kamerynn If I might add a side point, all this talk about punishment has me a bit uneasy as I think it's a completely different topic. Surely there is a lot to say in this matter, but it does not seem more than incidental in the talk about free-will. I think there is a great opportunity for confusion. Responsibility is a different idea from punishment.
Self replication leads to self replication

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 05:14 AM:	#87
Kingt2 wrote: I don't see how you are left optionless simply because "you" wouldn't choose anything different were the scenario to be repeated... What I mean is: Despite the fact that one will choose the same thing given an infinite number of identical situations, his external options are never limited to but one choice; only his actual choice is limited. But even that is not limited by any external factor, but by his OWN WILL. I had to think about this for a while. Do I agree that I "wouldn't choose anything different were the scenario to be repeated"? Is it a "fact" that I "will choose the same thing given an infinite number of identical situations"? You might be surprised--I lean toward saying yes. However, as you might expect, I want to make a couple of qualifications that I think are crucial. 1. The fact that I would always make the same choice in a perfectly identical situation does not entail that it is necessary for me to do so; i.e., it is not impossible for me to do otherwise. It sounds like you might agree with this; in which case, I think that compatibilists would do well to stop disputing the libertarian definition of free will and focus instead, as you seem to have done, on the question of whether the "self" that makes choices is completely determined. Which leads me to . . . 2. If another "self" were placed in the exact same scenario, including all of the precise prior causes/influences that I had experienced up to that point, then it is possible that a different choice would be made (every time). More to the point, I believe that another "self" could not possibly have had all of the precise prior causes/influences that I had experienced up to that point, because another "self" would have made at least some different choices all along the way. Another self's "OWN WILL" would necessarily be different from mine. Kingt2 wrote: Only if one defines "I" as an agent that exists outside of a causal chain does it become a problem. The way I have described it, while we have no control over who we become, we "are who we are"--so to speak. There seems to be a kind of chicken-and-egg phenomenon at work here. Our experiences cause/influence our subsequent choices, but our choices also cause/influence our subsequent experiences. Which come first--the choices, or the experiences? My view is that each and every human is born (conceived, actually) as a unique "self" with the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. Genetic and environmental factors that are not within our control--a great many of which result from the free choices of other humans--impose some constraints on this freedom, to be sure. However, they mainly tend to reduce the number of possible courses of thought or action, rather than our ability to choose one in a particular situation. Kingt2 wrote: Do we know that to be true? I mean, it seems to be true, but I don't think we can say definitively that we are the only species with consciousness. That is why I said, "as far as we know." Kingt2 wrote: As I've noted. If I define "I" as: the ongoing, changing result of constant intake of experiences and external stimuli as they shape and form the brain-->personality. As explained above, that is not how I define "I". My self-identity does not change over time. I am the same person today that I was in my mother's womb, even though all of my physical attributes--except, presumably, my DNA coding--are different. Is someone who has amnesia or Alzheimer's or brain damage a different person than before? Kingt2 wrote: My experiences are all that I have, all that I can use to make decisions. Your experiences are inputs to your decisions, but the decision itself is yours. Your experiences do not determine your decisions. Kingt2 wrote: Point being, it is necessary for me to draw my decisions from my past experiences and my "personality"--in the broadest possible usage of the word--and what my personality is, is ultimately out of my control. Not entirely--because your past decisions affected your subsequent experiences, and thus contributed to shaping your "personality" into what it is now. Likewise, your present and future decisions will affect your subsequent experiences, and thus contribute to shaping your "personality" into what it will be later. Your "personality" (as you have defined it) is not you. If the basis for all of my decisions is entirely "out of my control", then I am not responsible for those decisions. Kingt2 wrote: All we really disagree on is this: That I see myself as an aggregate--albeit a truly complex one--of these things, and nothing "extra" . . . While you see yourself as all that, plus an extra "me-agent" which has the sort-of final say in decisions. I still contest your characterization of the "me-agent" as something "extra". I am the "me-agent"; it is not part of "me", or a subset of "me"--it is "me". My "self" is not my body, or my brain, or the "aggregate" of my experiences, or anything else that I have; it is who I am. Kingt2 wrote: Say you are presented with X and Y. Your personality dictates that you would rather choose Y; you argue that it is possible that, because of this "me-agent", you could possibly think to yourself "OK, I understand that I would prefer Y, but I believe that I will choose X, this time." My question is, then, for what purpose does this "me-agent" act? Why choose X over Y? Why contradict what the personality is insisting? Perhaps I recognize that my "personality" (as you have defined it) is insisting that I do something that I know to be morally wrong, but I choose to do the right thing instead. How could this be praiseworthy if it was the inevitable consequence of factors beyond my control? How could doing what my "personality dictates" be blameworthy? Besides, even if a choice that "contradicts what the personality is insisting" is irrational or otherwise inexplicable, that does not mean that it is impossible--which is what determinism entails. Kingt2 wrote: Consider this: I am confronted with the choice: Fruity Pebbles or Honey Bunches of Oats. All I can say about this example is that I would always choose Fruity Pebbles, of my own free will!
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 05:28 AM:	#88
Kingt2 wrote: You are saying that "you" have the capability of transcending the causal chain [or, really, stepping outside of it] and offering some form of "me-input" that is not dependent on the events of your environment. Pretty much, yes. Kingt2 wrote: So, then, there must exist some sort of "me-agent" that came pre-packaged at birth. You'd have to be born with this "me", which is absurd. You can't be anyone before you are born! No, I was born as this "me". Of course I was someone when I was born! Kingt2 wrote: What I mean is, if this agent is outside of the causal chain, then it must be an inherent quality; you must have this "me-agent" from birth, and it must remain unchanged by any outside factors. Again, I am this "me-agent" from birth (conception, actually); and yes, my personal identity remains unchanged by any outside factors. Kingt2 wrote: The "me-agent" of 50 years must be identical in nature to the "me-agent" of toddler-hood. And, you'd then have to somehow argue how the "me-agent" is more "you" than the parts of you which were determined and created by your experiences and your environment... Yes and yes. Kingt2 wrote: What else could there be? Do you subscribe to a dualistic approach to consciousness? I believe that each and every human person is, fundamentally, an immaterial soul that has a material body; not the other way around, or a purely material entity. Kingt2 wrote: I'd like to direct you to another post of mine, that deals with this topic; if only because it may be interesting to you: Okay, I will try to take a look at that when I get a chance. Thanks. Kingt2 wrote: Are you the same "you" now as you were ten years ago? Of course. Who else would I be?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 05:36 AM:	#89
Kamerynn wrote: Huh? All I mean by "undetermined" is "not determined." That isn't what you usually mean by it? Well, earlier in this thread you explicitly insisted that undetermined = random, and I explicitly rejected this equivalence. More recently, it became apparent that when you say "undetermined", you mean "not caused by anything whatsoever", but I was using it to mean "not completely dictated by causes beyond the agent's control". Kamerynn wrote: Your position just gets more and more slippery, and you continue to fail to address my substantive point . . . You can't simply wiggle out of that by saying "oh, I'm using 'undetermined' differently than you." I no longer have any hope that you'll address my substantive point or that you're giving what I write an honest read. These kinds of comments seem rather uncharitable to me, but I know that I have (unintentionally) been frustrating you greatly. Again, I apologize. It would help me if you (or anyone else) would comment on post #76. Does it provide a fair summary of the compatibilist position? Is my ultimate/proximate distinction appropriate? Kamerynn wrote: I'm going to give up. For what it's worth, I'm not angry, I just see no point in continuing. I hope you find any future mental gymnastics in this thread to be stimulating, and I might check back to see what people make of Kingt2's well worded efforts. Obviously, that is your right. Thanks for sticking with it this far. See my last two posts for my responses to Kingt2.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/12/09 - 06:34 AM:	#90
aletheist wrote: I believe that each and every human person is, fundamentally, an immaterial soul that has a material body; not the other way around, or a purely material entity. If you are a immaterial soul, and you existed before your own birth, then why does this give you more choice? You did not chose your own soul? You did not chose your own 'personality'/'character' which resulted from this soul? You were infact created before you had a choice about what you were going to be. It is logically impossible for a person to be consulted about what they want to be before they exist.

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