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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/09/09 - 03:38 PM:	#71
aletheist wrote: No, if the will is random, I agree that it is not even my will, let alone my free will. Remember, undetermined and random are not synonymous in my vocabulary; random is a subset of undetermined. Since we have no ultimate control over what actions result from a (completely) determined will, we have no responsibility for those actions (if determinism is true). Having ultimate control over our actions is precisely what libertarians mean by free will, and determinists effectively deny. I have provided reasons for why an undetermined will is not even my will. I have provided reasons why an undetermined will eliminates responsibility. In the above quote, you simply proclaim that your account of "free will" is right and mine is wrong. You simply proclaim that determinism removes responsibility, assuming that I'm wrong. You simply proclaim that my idea of having control over my actions is irrelevant and that your idea of "ultimate control" is the correct one. I will once again put forth arguments, not only for how an undetermined will does not solve the problem, but for how a compatibilist position does. If I am to control my actions, they need to completely result from who I am - from my beliefs and desires - instead of being undetermined, even to an extent. If they aren't completely under my control, but are, even to a small extent, undetermined, then I cannot be said to have ultimate control. I cannot take responsibility for something that is undetermined and, to that extent, alien. My actions either result from who I am, or they do not. If my will is undetermined, then they do not. If it is determined, and my actions arise directly from who I am, then they are my actions; they are what I have chosen. aletheist wrote: To me, reason and punishment appear to function as free choices made by human agents, influenced but not dictated by various external and internal factors. This is not how they function if determinism is true; instead, they are inevitable outcomes over which the agent has no real say. Does this way of explaining it help at all? If choices are dictated by the internal factors of the agent, combined with information that the agent receives from her environment, then, and only then, are the agent's actions dictated by her. If the internal factors, which I call her "moral outlook," do not determine what she does in a given environment, then she is not free, but being led in an way undetermined by her, and thus, in a way that she is not responsible for. Far from her actions being "inevitable outcomes over which [she] has no real say," they are completely in accordance with the say that she would like to have. Only if they do not result from her moral outlook, and are instead undetermined to an extent (or the result of coercion), should we assert that she has no real say over the outcome. After all, the very meaning of "her having a say" is to express an accord with her internal factors; her not having a say accords with actions that don't result from said factors. aletheist wrote: I have never denied or doubted that effects follow from causes. The question is whether the agent acts as the primary cause of free choices, or if those choices are entirely caused by various factors over which the agent has no control. The agent has control over her choices in as much as they follow from her moral outlook, and no control to the extent that they don't. If the will is undetermined, then the agent does not act as the primary cause of her choices; her choices aren't determined by her. She is, however, the primary cause if she completely determines her actions - according to her own beliefs, desires, sense data, etc. - even if who she is results from yet other causes. That her upbringing makes her who she is does not remove our notion of agency from her actions. It does not run contrary to the fact that she deliberates and makes a choice. She could have chosen otherwise had she wanted to choose otherwise. That she wanted what she did, and that said want determined her action in lieu of others, does not make her unfree. On the contrary, that is precisely what makes her free; only if her actions did not reflect how she wished to act would she be unfree. aletheist wrote: Going back a couple of posts, "these things" are making moral judgments, assigning responsibility when it is warranted, and mitigating or eliminating responsibility in cases of coercion. In my view, determinism entails that assigning responsibility is never warranted, because everything that humans do is coerced, in the sense that we never have the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under any circumstances. I realize that you have a different defintion of coercion, just like you have a different definition of free will, but I hope that this helps you to understand my position a bit better. Assigning responsibility is warranted when it is practical. That the motions at the beginning of the universe added up to one's actions today does not mean that punishment will not change one's behavior. That one is blackmailed does mean that punishment will not change one's behavior. It is practical to attempt to condition people out of undesirable behavior despite it being (distally) caused by motions at the beginning of the universe. It is not practical to attempt to change one's behavior if they have been blackmailed into behaving the way they did; they aren't likely to repeat the behavior unless they are once again blackmailed (in which case what they do is not morally reprehensible - i.e., saving innocent lives by giving the bank code - and does not warrant an attempt at conditioning them to behave otherwise). aletheist wrote: Determinism, in my view, entails that whether we try to change the undesirable behavior of others is not up to us; it has already been determined. It entails that our views of what kinds of behavior are undesirable are not up to us; they have already been determined. It entails that the whole concept of "ought" is meaningless; everything has already been determined. Any moral theory - any notion of "ought" - happily functions within the bounds of determinism. For example, that happiness is something that could be maximized or minimized does not depend on a lack of causal density. Whether we are utilitarians is "up to us" in the sense that it follows from who we are and not in some undetermined manner, from an undetermined will. No further notion of it being "up to us," beyond it being totally decided by who we are, is required or sensible. aletheist wrote: Whether you hope is not up to you; it has already been determined. Whether punishment does change my behavior is not up to either one of us; it has already been determined. Whether I am punished is part of my fate, along with whatever I do subsequently; it has already been determined. I realize that this is repetitive, and probably rather annoying, but I find it necessary to drive home what I see as the relentless (and unacceptable) implications of determinism. Whether I hope is up to me because it results from who I am. If it resulted in an undetermined manner instead, then it would no longer be up to me. Whether punishment changes your behavior is up to you in the sense that you could choose to change your behavior or not; that is, who you are determines which choice you will make, and I'm sure that's the way you'd prefer it to be.
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/09/09 - 03:41 PM:	#72
mway wrote: You didn't answer my question. What are the differences between a rock and a human that fall outside of matter arrangement? Yes, I did. Look back at post #44 and deal with the differences I already listed. There were there before you, in response to that very post, asked me to list differences. I also argued that they did not entail dualism in that very post. Your response to it asks me to show you have any attributes don`t entail dualism, even though I had already done this in the post you responded to. Now, you`re ignoring the fact that functionalism, biological naturalism, etc., are not dualism. You have yet to read a post that I have written before responding to it. You can do better than that. You seem to be trolling this thread as a part of your witch-hunt against dualists. You can do better than that. Edited by Kamerynn on 07/09/09 - 04:19 PM
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 04:07 PM:	#73
Makarismos wrote: I think I understand you as saying something like "if we make a choice because of our pasts, we are not free, because this would mean that we are unconscious, pre programmed machines"? Something along those lines, yes. I would add "completely" or "entirely" between "choice" and "because".
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 04:39 PM:	#74
Kamerynn wrote: If I am to control my actions, they need to completely result from who I am - from my beliefs and desires - instead of being undetermined, even to an extent. Okay, I think that I may (finally) see the disconnect here; but please correct me if I am misunderstanding you (again). You hold that I determine my actions; in that sense, they cannot be undetermined. Right? But determinism holds that who I am is completely determined by factors that are beyond my control; in fact, everything is determined, and whatever occurs could not possibly have been otherwise. When you talk about "determined" and "undetermined", you are referring to the relationship between me and my choices; but I am applying those terms to the relationship between everything else (besides me) and my choices. The issue, for me, is really whether the "self" that makes choices is completely determined. I am going to stop right there and make sure that you agree with this assessment before I say anything else.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

jsidelko
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Posted 07/09/09 - 07:30 PM:	#75
Freewill, in my opinion, is a product of both historical determinism and present indeterminism. They are two sides of the same coin. We weigh the options and select the alternative among the sum of determined and random inputs with the greatest weight. To what extent freewill plays a part is unanswerable. For ethical purposes, freewill is a useful belief.
thanatos

aletheist
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Posted 07/10/09 - 05:18 AM:	#76
I decided to make one additional attempt at clarification. Here is the incompatibilist position, as I understand it: i1. If everything is completely determined, then I am not the ultimate cause of my own thoughts and actions. i2. If I am not the ultimate cause of my own thoughts and actions, then I do not have free will or moral responsibility. i3. Therefore, if everything is completely determined, then I do not have free will or moral responsibility. Here is the compatibilist position, as I understand it: c1. Even if everything is completely determined, I am still the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions. c2. If I am the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions, then I have free will and moral responsibility. c3. Therefore, even if everything is completely determined, I still have free will and moral responsibility. These are both perfectly valid arguments, and I think that people on both sides can accept both i1 and c1; so the dispute centers on i2 and c2--different definitions of free will and moral responsibility. The key distinction is obviously between ultimate and proximate causes. My contention throughout this thread has been that, in order to be the ultimate cause of my own thoughts and actions, I must have the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. In order to be the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions, it is sufficient for me merely to be the last link in an enormous and complex chain of causes over which I have no control. To the incompatibilist, free will and moral responsibility require that I have inherent causal power, such that my choices are uniquely mine and are not completely determined by prior events. To the compatibilist, it is sufficient that my choices are consistent with my desires, even if those desires--and therefore the resulting choices--are completely determined by prior events. I hope that I have not erected a straw man here; I am sincerely trying to grasp and recapitulate the compatibilist view. Have I succeeded, or do I still not have it quite right?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/10/09 - 08:53 AM:	#77
aletheist wrote: Okay, I think that I may (finally) see the disconnect here; but please correct me if I am misunderstanding you (again). You hold that I determine my actions; in that sense, they cannot be undetermined. Right? But determinism holds that who I am is completely determined by factors that are beyond my control; in fact, everything is determined, and whatever occurs could not possibly have been otherwise. When you talk about "determined" and "undetermined", you are referring to the relationship between me and my choices; but I am applying those terms to the relationship between everything else (besides me) and my choices. The issue, for me, is really whether the "self" that makes choices is completely determined. I am going to stop right there and make sure that you agree with this assessment before I say anything else. I suggest you read my full response. In it, you will find the following: "That her upbringing makes her who she is does not remove our notion of agency from her actions. It does not run contrary to the fact that she deliberates and makes a choice. She could have chosen otherwise had she wanted to choose otherwise. That she wanted what she did, and that said want determined her action in lieu of others, does not make her unfree. On the contrary, that is precisely what makes her free; only if her actions did not reflect how she wished to act would she be unfree."
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

aletheist
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Posted 07/10/09 - 09:55 AM:	#78
Kamerynn wrote: I suggest you read my full response. Please bear with me here. I did read your full response; repeating some of it back to me does not clarify anything. Do you agree with my assessment of the disconnect, or not? If not, why not? Once you address that, I will probably have more to say about the rest of your earlier post. My concern is that if we keep talking (okay, writing) past each other, we will never get anywhere. And did you read my subsequent post? In it, you will find the following: "To the compatibilist, it is sufficient [for free will and moral responsibility] that my choices are consistent with my desires, even if those desires--and therefore the resulting choices--are completely determined by prior events." This pretty much sounds like what you said; however, I am saying it back to you in my own words in order to ascertain whether I have accurately understood you. What is your verdict?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/10/09 - 10:58 AM:	#79
aletheist wrote: To the compatibilist, it is sufficient [for free will and moral responsibility] that my choices are consistent with my desires, even if those desires--and therefore the resulting choices--are completely determined by prior events. This does sound like a part of the picture. I suppose that the part missed is the why - It seems that I think something like this for the very reason that I cannot see how a choice could be anything but this. To want to chose ultimate freedom seems impossible, as it seems to require one to literately cause ones self. It seems to require a separateness from the universe which I am certain that I do not have.

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/10/09 - 02:25 PM:	#80
aletheist wrote: When you talk about "determined" and "undetermined", you are referring to the relationship between me and my choices; but I am applying those terms to the relationship between everything else (besides me) and my choices. The issue, for me, is really whether the "self" that makes choices is completely determined In other words, I apply those terms between everything else as well, not just to the relationship between a person and her choices. As I've stated, the will, and not just actions, cannot be undetermined. An undetermined will isn't mine whereas my will, which has developed in a causally dense fashion from my experiences, is mine. So, yes, the self that makes those choices is completely determined; that's why I included what I had already written. In it, I imply that and state why I don't see that as a problem for free will. I'm aware that you do, and I've attempted to argue against that. For what it's worth, I have argued against your position's fit with i2. If your will is undetermined, then you are not the ultimate cause of your own thoughts/actions. Makarismos wrote: It seems to require a separateness from the universe which I am certain that I do not have. Exactly. And, whether the will is separate and uncaused, or caused by antecedents, the incompatibilist should encounter the same problem: if a fixed relation to antecendents makes us unfree, then no relation to anything, being just as out of our control, also makes us unfree (that is, it is "out of our control" for the incompatibilist in the former case as well as the latter, while only the latter is out of our control for the compatibilist).
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

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