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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

Makarismos
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Posted 07/09/09 - 09:19 AM:	#61
aletheist wrote: Again, I would prefer to say that one's character is "influenced" by past events, rather than "caused" or "determined" by them, because I think that the agent has the final say in establishing his or her own character. Do you? Where does the character come from? if it was given to them, its not their choice, if it was caused you don't count it as a choice: how could their character become their own? aletheist wrote: Why would we do that? Materialism pretty much entails determinism, so that cuts off the debate right there. We don't have to, I simply do not see any explanatory power in the alternatives aletheist wrote: But if determinism is true--if humans do not have the genuine ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances--then there are no "unrestrained actions". Why would you want to act differently than you want to act? "I chose to take a promotion, but it wasn't a free choice because my mum always taught me to take promotions, and because I like money, and because the job looked good, and it looked good because I like management." Makes no sense.

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 09:52 AM:	#62
Makarismos wrote: The passage quoted is one I would particularly like Aletheist comments upon, as he did not seem to note it before. Okay, I will take a stab at it. Kingt2 wrote: If we are not born with this specific "me" agent--basically a form of homunculus--then it must develop. I am not sure what you mean here. I am an agent; I am not born with an agent "inside" me somehow. Kingt2 wrote: The only way for it to develop is qua interaction with external environment and the intake of thousands of stimuli that, coupled with physiology [that help determine how one will respond to stimuli, and how the brain will morph with the new info]. THAT is you. Since I reject materialism and determinism, I also reject the notion that who I am and how I respond to stimuli are strictly functions of physiology and environment. Again, I prefer to say that those things influence who I am and how I respond to stimuli. My "self" cannot be reduced to my body or any portion thereof, including my brain. Kingt2 wrote: If you are simply born with the "me", how is it really "you" that is doing anything? Again, I was not born with "me"; I was born as "me". Kingt2 wrote: Since you had no choice in who the first "you" was that would make them, right? I suspect that some words are missing here, right after "them".
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 10:22 AM:	#63
Makarismos wrote: Do you? Where does the character come from? if it was given to them, its not their choice, if it was caused you don't count it as a choice: how could their character become their own? Maybe we need to agree on what we mean by "character" before we go any further. What did you have in mind in your questions here? I like this definition from the United States Air Force Academy: "the sum of those qualities of moral excellence that stimulates a person to do the right thing, which is manifested through right and proper actions despite internal or external pressures to the contrary." If "those qualities of moral excellence" are completely determined by "internal or external pressures," then no one should ever be praised for doing the right thing or blamed for doing the wrong thing. Makarismos wrote: Why would you want to act differently than you want to act? Are you suggesting that our desires always dictate our actions? I am not sure about that. There are plenty of things that I want to do (at some level) but do not do, for one reason or another. One response would be to say that in such cases, a greater desire takes precedence. To me, though, an agent has the genuine ability to weigh the various relevant desires and decide which one will govern under a given set of circumstances.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/09/09 - 12:40 PM:	#64
aletheist wrote: You are blatantly misquoting me. Here is what I actually said:I later clarified:You even quoted this in your post! You are fabricating a contradiction in my statements by imposing your definitions on my words, despite my explicit refusal to accept those definitions. By all means, be vigorous in defending your position; all I ask is that you be charitable in representing mine. I am not "trying to sneak in" anything. I have been very clear about my belief that human choices are not (completely) determined, which means (as you have pointed out) that they must be (at least partially) undetermined; but I have been equally clear about my denial of your insistence that "undetermined" is synonymous with "random". Here's what I wrote in post #37: "The proclamation that something that isn't determined is not random doesn't help; something is either determined or it isn't. By "random" I mean "undetermined." This is an incredibly common construal of "random." You can disagree with this construal if you wish; splitting such a hair won't save your position from the fact that an undetermined will removes responsibility for actions resulting from it. Again, if my will, even in part, doesn't result from my own moral outlook, then it isn't even my will. Be as prescriptivist about "random" as you wish; you won't get past the substantive point by ignoring it and playing word games." To a part of the above (about my will not even being mine in such a case), you respond, "we are in complete agreement on this (I think)." So, if the will is undetermined, you agree that it is not even my will, let alone my free will? Doesn't that have implications for your position? That is, in your view, the will does not arise from our moral outlook. There is a part of the will arising without cause and it ensures that our actions cannot be perfectly predicted. Thus, our actions do not result from our moral outlook. They do not result from our desires or beliefs. They result, in part, because of fluctuations in the will (making it undetermined by anything) that we obviously cannot control. As I've already stated, that does not make us free. It impedes our notions of freedom. It certainly impedes our notions of responsibility. Since we have no ultimate control over what actions result from an undetermined will, we have no responsibility for those actions. aletheist wrote: The question is not about the machine, it is about the man who flicked the switch. Was that action determined, just like everything done by the machine, or was it the result of a genuinely free choice by the man? Are you suggesting that humans are equivalent to machines? I reject this presupposition. It was brought up in an attempt to understand this mysterious 3rd way (and, if you read carefully, you'll notice that I wasn't even the one who brought it up; I just quoted it). Apparently there is no 3rd way, and, like I've already said, you simply take what I've called "the philosopher's definition" of free will. I fail to see how we're responsible for an undetermined will or anything that results from it. aletheist wrote: Fair enough. In light of that, consider this formulation: 1. If determinism is true and incompatible with free will, then humans are not morally responsible. 2. But humans are morally responsible. 3. Therefore, determinism is not true or determinism is compatible with free will. This is a perfectly valid argument, and libertarians and compatibilists (I think) agree with both premises; consequently, both sides should agree with the conclusion. The difference is which option in #3 each favors. Notice, however, that even if the second option is correct, it does not follow that the first one is incorrect--it may be the case that determinism is compatible with free will (which I deny) and that determinism is false (which I affirm). I believe that determinism is true, although you're correct: its truth has nothing to do with the truth or falsity of compatibilism. aletheist wrote: Somehow, laughter is not my response to your claims to know my "true" thoughts, such that you feel justified in accusing me of "pretending". It frustrating to be asked how reason or punishment can possibly function if determinism is true. My answer is they function exactly as they appear to function. In other words, you already know how they function. I know you do. I'm not sure what else to say at this point. I've already given reasons for why determinism is required for us to reason or punish. As I've said, how can we reason about something if we aren't sure that effects follow from causes? How could we punish if we are unsure that punishment counts as a cause that can have effects? That we do understand causation is why we can reason, and why we can rationally punish. I do not understand how you could ask the question "how can reason possibly function if determinism is true" when all of this has already been pointed out, and when you already know how it functions. What else can I say? Can you tell us why punishment doesn't work, or why reasoning cannot be done, given the truth of determinism? aletheist wrote: Of course I know this. I have argued that we do these things because humans have the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. However, I have yet to see a convincing argument for how we could legitimately do these things if determinism were true. Legitimately? We do these things, and determinism doesn't make them impossible. Why would it? Does determinism, in your view, entail that we ought not try to change the undesirable behavior of others? Does it make our desire to, say, not be stolen from somehow irrelevant? Surely, it doesn't entail punishment's inefficacy. aletheist wrote: A person is "fated to do X" if that person does not have the genuine ability not to do X. Here's what you wrote (post #47): "Hope is also an illusion. Nothing we do can alter our fate; it is already determined!" Do you see how that isn't relevant? We can hope that punishment will change your behavior. Punishment in fact might change your behavior. You are not fated to act in a certain way regardless of whether you're punished. Punishment is one factor in what determines how you will act in the future, no matter what you have to say about fate! Do you see how I wasn't asking for a definition of fate, but refuting the idea that, in the case of punishment, hope is somehow an illusion? Can you see that you aren't fated to repeat your offenses and that punishment might succeed? There's nothing wrong with hoping that it will. There is no illusion, here, although hope, in this example, does reflect a lack of knowledge about punishment's success. aletheist wrote: I generally enjoy engaging in good-faith exchanges of ideas with those who disagree with me. I sincerely hope that we can get back to that level of discourse. I apologize for what must seem to you to be unfair. I hope you realize that I find many of your denials and comments to be unfair as well (such as the one about fate making hope an illusion, implying the inefficacy of punishment). To me, many of those comments seem to derail the discussion rather than make it progress. I'm doing my best, but I can't help but be frustrated by questions like "how can the concepts of "dissuading" and being "rational" have any meaning if everything is determined?" The answer is: they have the meaning that you think they do (unless you really don't know what they mean). Edited by Kamerynn on 07/09/09 - 01:06 PM
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/09/09 - 12:47 PM:	#65
mway wrote: Kamerynn can you please list the differences between a rock and a human other then the arrangment of atoms that make up each object? Please show how anything you list does not enforce dualism. I did. Pay attention. Dualism is not the only notion of mind; educate yourself. If you wish to gain an understanding of emergence, I suggest starting with Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. That should help cure you of your conceptual dualism (i.e., the belief that dualism is the only alternative).
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Makarismos
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Posted 07/09/09 - 12:56 PM:	#66
aletheist wrote: Maybe we need to agree on what we mean by "character" before we go any further. What did you have in mind in your questions here? I like this definition from the United States Air Force Academy: "the sum of those qualities of moral excellence that stimulates a person to do the right thing, which is manifested through right and proper actions despite internal or external pressures to the contrary." If "those qualities of moral excellence" are completely determined by "internal or external pressures," then no one should ever be praised for doing the right thing or blamed for doing the wrong thing. Its a good definition. The word is more than the definition, as with all words, but it will serve. aletheist wrote: Are you suggesting that our desires always dictate our actions? I am not sure about that. There are plenty of things that I want to do (at some level) but do not do, for one reason or another. One response would be to say that in such cases, a greater desire takes precedence. To me, though, an agent has the genuine ability to weigh the various relevant desires and decide which one will govern under a given set of circumstances. I know what you mean! I want to go to kung fu, in my head - but my body rebels and I end up eating ice cream instead. I think of the process of deciding as all of the effects that have caused me fighting with one another for presidency. My genes and hormones, my situation, the time of day, the smell of food, my rational desire to eat a good meal... all of these things will add to the choice, and at a certain point I shall make a choice. How do you think choices are made?

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 01:50 PM:	#67
Kamerynn wrote: So, if the will is undetermined, you agree that it is not even my will, let alone my free will? No, if the will is random, I agree that it is not even my will, let alone my free will. Remember, undetermined and random are not synonymous in my vocabulary; random is a subset of undetermined. Kamerynn wrote: Since we have no ultimate control over what actions result from an undetermined will, we have no responsibility for those actions. Since we have no ultimate control over what actions result from a (completely) determined will, we have no responsibility for those actions (if determinism is true). Having ultimate control over our actions is precisely what libertarians mean by free will, and determinists effectively deny. Kamerynn wrote: It frustrating to be asked how reason or punishment can possibly function if determinism is true. I share your frustration, because I think that we are both struggling to communicate what we believe and why, but are not being successful (so far). Kamerynn wrote: My answer is they function exactly as they appear to function. To me, reason and punishment appear to function as free choices made by human agents, influenced but not dictated by various external and internal factors. This is not how they function if determinism is true; instead, they are inevitable outcomes over which the agent has no real say. Does this way of explaining it help at all? Kamerynn wrote: As I've said, how can we reason about something if we aren't sure that effects follow from causes? I have never denied or doubted that effects follow from causes. The question is whether the agent acts as the primary cause of free choices, or if those choices are entirely caused by various factors over which the agent has no control. Kamerynn wrote: How could we punish if we are unsure that punishment counts as a cause that can have effects? Punishment does count as a cause that can have effects; but those effects are not guaranteed, because the one punished still has the free will to repeat the behavior that prompted the punishment. Kamerynn wrote: Legitimately? We do these things, and determinism doesn't make them impossible. Why would it? Going back a couple of posts, "these things" are making moral judgments, assigning responsibility when it is warranted, and mitigating or eliminating responsibility in cases of coercion. In my view, determinism entails that assigning responsibility is never warranted, because everything that humans do is coerced, in the sense that we never have the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under any circumstances. I realize that you have a different defintion of coercion, just like you have a different definition of free will, but I hope that this helps you to understand my position a bit better. Kamerynn wrote: Does determinism, in your view, entail that we ought not try to change the undesirable behavior of others? Determinism, in my view, entails that whether we try to change the undesirable behavior of others is not up to us; it has already been determined. It entails that our views of what kinds of behavior are undesirable are not up to us; they have already been determined. It entails that the whole concept of "ought" is meaningless; everything has already been determined. Kamerynn wrote: We can hope that punishment will change your behavior. Punishment in fact might change your behavior. You are not fated to act in a certain way, regardless of whether you're punished. Whether you hope is not up to you; it has already been determined. Whether punishment does change my behavior is not up to either one of us; it has already been determined. Whether I am punished is part of my fate, along with whatever I do subsequently; it has already been determined. I realize that this is repetitive, and probably rather annoying, but I find it necessary to drive home what I see as the relentless (and unacceptable) implications of determinism. Kamerynn wrote: I apologize for what must seem to you to be unfair. Apology accepted. Kamerynn wrote: I hope you realize that I find many of your denials and comments to be unfair as well (such as the one about fate making hope an illusion, implying the inefficacy of punishment). To me, many of those comments seem to derail the discussion rather than make it progress. I apologize, as well. I respond as honestly as I can, and my sincere intention is always to contribute productively to the conversation, rather than detract from it. Kamerynn wrote: I'm doing my best, but I can't help but be frustrated by questions like "how can the concepts of "dissuading" and being "rational" have any meaning if everything is determined?" Well, I hope that I have been able to clarify, at least somewhat, why I keep asking those kinds of questions. Kamerynn wrote: The answer is: they have the meaning that you think they do (unless you really don't know what they mean). Disagreements about meanings seem to be a big part of our disconnect. I will keep trying if you will!
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 02:06 PM:	#68
Makarismos wrote: How do you think choices are made? I think that choices are made by human agents who weigh their various relevant desires and decide which one(s) will govern under a given set of circumstances. These choices are influenced, but not dictated, by various external and internal factors, many of which are not within the agent's control. The agent has the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action, and selects the one to actualize. Nothing new here, obviously; just consolidating the key points in response to your specific question.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/09/09 - 02:38 PM:	#69
aletheist wrote: ...These choices are influenced, but not dictated, by various external and internal factors, many of which are not within the agent's control.... Ok, so if the choice is caused by previous events, then the outcome (the choice) is caused by previous events. Perhaps the problem is one of reductionism? When I say "previous events" I am thinking of everything that has happened in the universe up to this point: all evolution, every death birth and marriage, the rise and fall of great civilisations which we have now forgotten - right up to the billion things that had to happen to put my breakfast on the table. I emphatically do not mean that I chose X because of Y, and that given X I would always chose Y. If I described myself as a machine, remember it would be fantastically complex. Conciousness is not a simple thing, in fact it may be beyond us to understand it. If we are material, or spiritual in nature, if the universe is determined or merely casual, or merely the dream of someone else - these things are beyond our knowledge. I think I understand you as saying something like "if we make a choice because of our pasts, we are not free, because this would mean that we are unconscious, pre programmed machines"?

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Posted 07/09/09 - 03:38 PM:	#70
Kamerynn wrote: I did. Pay attention. Dualism is not the only notion of mind; educate yourself. If you wish to gain an understanding of emergence, I suggest starting with Searle's The Rediscovery of the Mind. That should help cure you of your conceptual dualism (i.e., the belief that dualism is the only alternative). You didn't answer my question. What are the differences between a rock and a human that fall outside of matter arrangement?
Lame is to Wav, as the Brain is to Reality.

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