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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

mway
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Posted 07/08/09 - 05:05 PM:	#51
Kamerynn wrote: No, compatibilism consists of the proposition that free will and determinism are compatible. It requires no metaphysical assumptions; it is incompatibilist notions that require a lack of determination. Any responsible reading of compatibilist literature should convey that notion to you. It has never been shown how humans are different from rocks!? You can't be serious. Rocks, for starters, aren't rational. Therefore, they cannot be moral agents. They do not have sensations. Therefore, they cannot be moral patients. And, that's just for starters... the differences between humans and rocks are many and varied. I find it hard to believe that this is the first you've heard about it. I suppose the hidden premise in what you're loosely calling "logic," here, is the idea that the only possible difference between humans and rocks is the mind. That hidden premise has been shown to be false; there are many other differences. In addition, dualism isn't the only philosophy that recognizes the existence of mind. Look up epiphenomenalism, identity theory, functionalism, and emergentism (or biological naturalism). Kamerynn can you please list the differences between a rock and a human other then the arrangment of atoms that make up each object? Please show how anything you list does not enforce dualism.
Lame is to Wav, as the Brain is to Reality.

aletheist
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Posted 07/08/09 - 05:13 PM:	#52
Makarismos wrote: When an agent performs an action, they do so in a way influenced by their character, and their character was at least caused (if not determined entirely) by events over which they had no choice. Again, I would prefer to say that one's character is "influenced" by past events, rather than "caused" or "determined" by them, because I think that the agent has the final say in establishing his or her own character. Makarismos wrote: If we assume a material mind . . . Why would we do that? Materialism pretty much entails determinism, so that cuts off the debate right there. Makarismos wrote: From the point of view of this ticking time bomb it makes perfect sense to say that unrestrained actions are free. But if determinism is true--if humans do not have the genuine ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances--then there are no "unrestrained actions". Makarismos wrote: If the human mind is ‘just’ a machine, and the outcomes of our initial circumstances can effect a dramatic and impossible-to-predict result, then does it follow that freedom is an illusion? Yes, if we do not have the genuine ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. I apologize for repeating myself, but this is still the fundamental issue. Mere unpredictability is not equivalent to free will. Makarismos wrote: If the future is determined, we have no way of finding out in principal, and so it doesn’t seem to matter. Then why should we presuppose determinism, rather than libertarianism? Makarismos wrote: Further, only actions based upon our character are our own property, and so involuntary actions cannot be free. If determinism is true, then all of our actions are (effectively) involuntary. Makarismos wrote: We are left with agent caused actions, undetermined by past events: and these are find if taken from the perspective of the individual, and seem contradictory if taken from the perspective of the universe. So which perspective is correct? They cannot both be right. Again, I appreciate your perspective on this issue, even though we do not agree.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/08/09 - 06:42 PM:	#53
Kamerynn wrote: That is, once again, you've contradicted the notion you set out originally: that the will is neither determined nor undetermined (nor a combination of the two). You are blatantly misquoting me. Here is what I actually said: aletheist wrote: You are ignoring the libertarian thesis that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices that are neither determined nor random, nor merely some combination of the two. (emphasis added) I later clarified: aletheist wrote: This is the problem with your insistence that undetermined = random. I reject this equivalence since a choice that is agent-caused is neither determined nor random. (emphasis added) You even quoted this in your post! You are fabricating a contradiction in my statements by imposing your definitions on my words, despite my explicit refusal to accept those definitions. By all means, be vigorous in defending your position; all I ask is that you be charitable in representing mine. Kamerynn wrote: As you should be able to see, you're trying to sneak in a notion of it being, in part, undetermined without admitting to that move. I am not "trying to sneak in" anything. I have been very clear about my belief that human choices are not (completely) determined, which means (as you have pointed out) that they must be (at least partially) undetermined; but I have been equally clear about my denial of your insistence that "undetermined" is synonymous with "random". Kamerynn wrote: Flicking the switch and turning the machine on is what puts the machine into action. The question is not about the machine, it is about the man who flicked the switch. Was that action determined, just like everything done by the machine, or was it the result of a genuinely free choice by the man? Kamerynn wrote: The make-up of the machine, and perhaps its environment, determines its actions now that it has been turned on. Nowhere do we see something that isn't determined. Are you suggesting that humans are equivalent to machines? I reject this presupposition. Kamerynn wrote: I never stated that fully responsible people aren't free agents. You simply don't agree with the manner in which I say they're free Fair enough. In light of that, consider this formulation: 1. If determinism is true and incompatible with free will, then humans are not morally responsible. 2. But humans are morally responsible. 3. Therefore, determinism is not true or determinism is compatible with free will. This is a perfectly valid argument, and libertarians and compatibilists (I think) agree with both premises; consequently, both sides should agree with the conclusion. The difference is which option in #3 each favors. Notice, however, that even if the second option is correct, it does not follow that the first one is incorrect--it may be the case that determinism is compatible with free will (which I deny) and that determinism is false (which I affirm). Kamerynn wrote: The humorous thing is, you only pretend that you can't see how people can be responsible in a causally dense universe. You only pretend that morality cannot function in such place. Somehow, laughter is not my response to your claims to know my "true" thoughts, such that you feel justified in accusing me of "pretending". Kamerynn wrote: You know very well that we make moral judgments, and do so easily. You know very well that we can assign responsibility when it's warranted or mitigate/eliminate responsibility in cases of coercion. Of course I know this. I have argued that we do these things because humans have the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. However, I have yet to see a convincing argument for how we could legitimately do these things if determinism were true. Kamerynn wrote: You are simply pretending, for the sake of argument, that such distinctions cannot normally be made because of causal density. We make such judgments all the time, even on parents who abuse their children because they, as children, were abused. I would only be "pretending" if I really believed that determinism and free will are compatible. I do not. Kamerynn wrote: Again, if you examine your actual beliefs carefully, you'll realize you're only pretending to not understand. Are you seriously claiming to understand my beliefs better than I do? Kamerynn wrote: Do you really believe that a person is fated to do X no matter what causes act on that person? A person is "fated to do X" if that person does not have the genuine ability not to do X. Kamerynn wrote: The hope that it will work is the acknowledgment that we don't know it will - there are too many variables that will determine your future actions and we can't see them all. Like I said to Makarismos, mere unpredictability is not equivalent to free will. Kamerynn, I generally enjoy engaging in good-faith exchanges of ideas with those who disagree with me. I sincerely hope that we can get back to that level of discourse.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kingt2
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2 of 2 people found this post helpful Posted 07/08/09 - 06:57 PM:	#54
aletheist wrote: Again, I would prefer to say that one's character is "influenced" by past events, rather than "caused" or "determined" by them, because I think that the agent has the final say in establishing his or her own character. I have a huge problem with this. If we are not born with this specific "me" agent--basically a form of homunculus--then it must develop. The only way for it to develop is qua interaction with external environment and the intake of thousands of stimuli that, coupled with physiology [that help determine how one will respond to stimuli, and how the brain will morph with the new info]. THAT is you. If you are simply born with the "me", how is it really "you" that is doing anything? Since you had no choice in who the first "you" was that would make them, right? So even if you are born with a little "me" agent, you have a problem--a very big one. One's character is certainly caused by things that are out of her control. Even if she consciously decides to changer her character, her reasoning behind doing so is based solely on information and influences that she gathered from the external world. Why would we do that? Materialism pretty much entails determinism, so that cuts off the debate right there. I disagree again. Even if materialism is true, some form of compatibilism is available. In fact, I'd say it's more resolved than if you offer some dualistic approach... But if determinism is true--if humans do not have the genuine ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances--then there are no "unrestrained actions". So? Your definition of "free" is too strict. Yes, if we do not have the genuine ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. I apologize for repeating myself, but this is still the fundamental issue. Mere unpredictability is not equivalent to free will. You have the ever-present ability to choose any of an infinite number of choices/decisions. The choices are there for the picking; determinism only holds that because of who you are, you will only choose what you want. To choose otherwise is not what you would do, so it is absurd to demand that you do something that you would not, right? Then why should we presuppose determinism, rather than libertarianism? Because libertarianism typically makes no sense... If determinism is true, then all of our actions are (effectively) involuntary. Sorry, but I think that this is incorrect as well. Our actions are our own, and we have complete control. We just aren't as "I" as we think we are. That is to say: I have complete control over what I decide to do; but I cannot decide to do other that what I decide to do. Because of who I am--which is out of my control--I will only choose to do such and such a thing. This is only involuntary if your definition of who "you" are has "you" as some sort of agent outside of the causal chain. See my thread for a further explanation of what I would argue for: http://forums.philosophyforums.com...findpost=574534#post574534 Edited by Kingt2 on 07/08/09 - 07:05 PM
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

aletheist
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Posted 07/08/09 - 07:14 PM:	#55
ecspose wrote: I think it's impossible to separate our will from all the coercive forces of our environment, so I am of the belief that they must be taken together as a whole. What this means for coercion, is that it emerges as a moral phenomena only in cases where the coercive factor has been exceeded by the mind. A coercion that we are unaware of, or willingly submit to, is not really coercive at that time. Unless the idea of coercion is understood by one or more parties involved, for all intents and purposes it doesn't exist, and is 'just another environmental factor'. This is an interesting definition of coercion, one that I think compatibilists would do well to adopt. As a libertarian, my initial response is that someone's awareness of coercion should not serve as the decisive factor for whether, in fact, coercion occurred. I might suggest something more along these lines: Coercion occurs when a human is prevented from having the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. ecspose wrote: Determinism does not detract from our choices, it only accounts for them. If it completely accounts for them, then how can it not "detract from our choices"? How could they be our choices at all? ecspose wrote: You have as much say as you want in your moral outlook, that doesn't mean 'you' are anything more than a collection of deterministic processes. But if "I" am merely "a collection of deterministic processes," then I have no say in my moral outlook; it has already been completely determined for me. ecspose wrote: So when there is a chance that a volcano will erupt, nothing will actually happen because a volcano has no causal power? Of course the volcano has causal power; but "chance" does not. The processes that lead up to an eruption are deterministic, except for any human actions that affect the situation; "chance" in this context is merely a synonym for "possibility" and reflects a state of uncertainty. ecspose wrote: No, because complete knowledge is impossible. My question was, would complete knowledge of all the factors that lead up to a human decision entail an infallible prediction of that choice? The fact that such complete knowledge is (presumably) impossible is beside the point. A determinist says yes; a libertarian says no, because no matter what those factors are, the agent retains the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kingt2
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Posted 07/08/09 - 07:20 PM:	#56
then I have no say in my moral outlook; it has already been completely determined for me. This is only a problem if you are defining "me" as anything other than who you are...If you are you, then wouldn't you expect to act as you do?
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

aletheist
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Posted 07/08/09 - 07:35 PM:	#57
Kingt2 wrote: One's character is certainly caused by things that are out of her control. Even if she consciously decides to changer her character, her reasoning behind doing so is based solely on information and influences that she gathered from the external world. But is that conscious decision itself completely determined by those causes that are out of her control? Kingt2 wrote: Even if materialism is true, some form of compatibilism is available. Compatibilism, by definition, affirms determinism; or at least that there is no conflict between determinism and free will. Kingt2 wrote: Your definition of "free" is too strict. Or yours is too flexible. That is what we are debating, after all. Kingt2 wrote: You have the ever-present ability to choose any of an infinite number of choices/decisions. The choices are there for the picking; determinism only holds that because of who you are, you will only choose what you want. To choose otherwise is not what you would do, so it is absurd to demand that you do something that you would not, right? But determinism also entails that who I am and what I want are determined, as well. This is what I am trying to get at when I say that free will requires the genuine ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. I do not have "an infinite number of choices/decisions" available to me if my next move was inevitable from the dawn of the universe; I have no choice in that situation. Kingt2 wrote: Because libertarianism typically makes no sense... This is your argument for presupposing determinism? Kingt2 wrote: I have complete control over what I decide to do; but I cannot decide to do other that what I decide to do. This is self-contradictory. If "I cannot decide to do other than what I decide to do," then I have no "control over what I decide to do." Kingt2 wrote: This is only involuntary if your definition of who "you" are has "you" as some sort of agent outside of the causal chain. Which just happens to be the libertarian position.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kingt2
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Posted 07/08/09 - 08:01 PM:	#58
First off: I'd like to say that if at any point I begin to sound pedantic or insulting, remember that I am not intending to be. I appreciate our discussion, and your taking time to respond to my arguments. Now then: aletheist wrote: But is that conscious decision itself completely determined by those causes that are out of her control? I think you are making it too convoluted. We are not calculators. I do not accept that the process is Input-->Output. Rather, the brain [and all other sorts of fun physiological things] stores all data and fabricates a personality. The brain uses this personality to make decisions, that is the function of the personality, to use past information to make better future decisions [among other uses, surely]. So while a bug landing on my arm doesn't determine a decision, a whole mess of things--the weather, a grade I got on my third grade spelling test, my girlfriend surprising me with exciting lingerie the night before, etc--all put me in a certain state, a certain "me". And because of who I am at that moment, I will make a specific decision. I cannot decide anything other that what I, myself, would decide; and since "I" at any given time, am the result of external factors and influences, my choices are determined by those same things. I suggest you look at my other thread to really understand where I am coming from. The short, though: Yea, you could say that my decisions are determined by causes that are out of my control. [But I refute that this is a problem in my thread]. *I would say I have no control over why* I come to choose something*. "I" certainly have control over what choices I make, I just don't have the power to change who I am, and what I would choose... Compatibilism, by definition, affirms determinism; or at least that there is no conflict between determinism and free will. Yep. Or yours is too flexible. That is what we are debating, after all. You are asking for freedom to transcend causality. A decision without a cause is, by definition, causeless. And thus, random. But determinism also entails that who I am and what I want are determined, as well. This is what I am trying to get at when I say that free will requires the genuine* ability to take more than one course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. I do not have "an infinite number of choices/decisions" available to me if my next move was inevitable from the dawn of the universe; I have no choice in that situation. From one perspective, I guess. How, exactly, does libertarian free will resolve the fact that every other thing in the universe is causal, with the exception of humans? [or perhaps random events, if you do not accept the view of determinism that says if you know all initial conditions, nothing is really random] I'd say I have as much control as I can have given the nature of the universe. A sea-anemone has no choice in whether or not he will recoil into his little rock cavern when approached by a stranger. I at least am able to deliberate and weigh decisions. I am conscious of a decision being made, and for all intents and purposes, it is "mine". To me, the fact that I have no control over who I am and how I make decisions is inconsequential in the grand scope of things. This is your argument for presupposing determinism? I am allowed observations, no? This is self-contradictory. If "I cannot decide to do other than what I decide to do," then I have no "control over what I decide to do." Eh. I have no power to change what it is "I" would do. I cannot act like someone else, because I am "me". Which just happens to be the libertarian position. Maybe we should focus on this, then: I am interested in knowing two things: 1: Does this agent have motives? If I accept that he is outside the causal chain, what motives lie behind his "final decisions" 2: How does something that exists outside of a causal chain affect something in one?
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

aletheist
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Posted 07/09/09 - 07:05 AM:	#59
Kingt2 wrote: I'd like to say that if at any point I begin to sound pedantic or insulting, remember that I am not intending to be. I appreciate our discussion, and your taking time to respond to my arguments. Likewise, thanks. Kingt2 wrote: Rather, the brain [and all other sorts of fun physiological things] stores all data and fabricates a personality. This presupposes materialism. If materialism is true, then determinism is (probably) true. If determinism is true, then compatibilism is (probably) true. Kingt2 wrote: I suggest you look at my other thread to really understand where I am coming from. I did--good stuff, given your presupposition of materialism. Kingt2 wrote: The short, though: Yea, you could say that my decisions are determined by causes that are out of my control. [But I refute that this is a problem in my thread]. It is a problem if we define free will as the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. Given that definition, if "my decisions are [completely] determined by causes that are out of my control," then I do not have free will. This is why I say that compatibilism requires redefining free will. Kingt2 wrote: You are asking for freedom to transcend causality. A decision without a cause is, by definition, causeless. And thus, random. No, I am claiming that decisions are caused by the agent and are not the involuntary result of deterministic and/or random processes. The decision itself is within the agent's control, even though most of the factors surrounding it are not. Kingt2 wrote: How, exactly, does libertarian free will resolve the fact that every other thing in the universe is causal, with the exception of humans? As I have stated previously, I believe that humans are unique causal agents; as far as we know, nothing else in the material universe exhibits consciousness, free will, rationality, a unified self, intrinsic value, and moral absolutes. We operate within the context of causal processes, to be sure, but we still make our own decisions; they are influenced by other causes, but not dictated by them. Kingt2 wrote: To me, the fact that I have no control over who I am and how I make decisions is inconsequential in the grand scope of things. I do not see how. If you have no control over how you make decisions, then how can they be yours? Kingt2 wrote: Does this agent have motives? If I accept that he is outside the causal chain, what motives lie behind his "final decisions" What exactly do you mean by "motives"? Desires? Reasons? Please clarify your question. Kingt2 wrote: How does something that exists outside of a causal chain affect something in one? Presumably by introducing a new cause that is not part of the original chain.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/09/09 - 08:56 AM:	#60
Kingt2 wrote: If we are not born with this specific "me" agent--basically a form of homunculus--then it must develop. The only way for it to develop is qua interaction with external environment and the intake of thousands of stimuli that, coupled with physiology [that help determine how one will respond to stimuli, and how the brain will morph with the new info]. THAT is you. If you are simply born with the "me", how is it really "you" that is doing anything? Since you had no choice in who the first "you" was that would make them, right? King2 completly sensible words. I agree with everything you have writen so far. The passage quoted is one I would particularly like Aletheist comments upon, as he did not seem to note it before.

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