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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

ecspose
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Posted 07/07/09 - 08:47 PM:	#41
So far as I can tell there are a number of arguments that keep being repeated: 1. Determinism means no moral responsibility. No, determinism does not affect moral responsibility. It is inconsequential that everything might happen along a pre-set course. From the perspective of the individuals involved, it is of no meaning. We do not have access to that pre-determined course. The greater our access to that course, the greater our responsibility in the events to come would be. There is no way for anything to exist, except through direct cause and effect. We can not think we are special and somehow violate the rule of cause and effect through our minds. Our choices, and our experiences, are a result of a cause-and-effect network so much bigger than we could imagine. Hidden choices we call chances, and chances involving our minds we call choices. They are one and the same. There is only one path for nature and man, but that path is also inversely accountable to create an experience called choice. There is another dimension to reality, on one side we have beings living and experiencing, and on another side we have things simply happening. Consciousness is emergent. 2. No determinism, means no moral responsibility. The thought behind this, is that if our actions are not determined, then they must be random. Being random there is no blame to place as they are simply fluctuations of the universe. To avoid this conclusion some would argue that our actions are neither determined nor random, being instead part of some obscure third category that is neither random, nor determined. It is yet to be shown whether this third category of "causal agent" goes beyond word play. The compatibilist would argue that the deterministic structure of events is equal to all involved, and does not impart any individual advantage to morality, on any side of any situation. 3. Compatibilism means dualism, (or theism). No, there is no indication thus far that compatibilism favours a theist or non-theist attitude. Compatibilism can explain things to be as they are, despite any intra-causal influences. As always, the logical discussion of anything defying logic is an excercise in pointlessness at best. aletheist wrote: The definition of free will that I posted and characterized as libertarian is "the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances"--not the ability to take any course of thought or action under any circumstances. Choice is chance, chance is choice. They are both just a way of estimating what will happen, when in fact only one thing will happen. The next card you draw might be a Jack, or it might be a Deuce. However the card you will draw is already there waiting, no matter your awareness to it. The same thing in whether you will choose a green shirt or a blue shirt. All the factors that lead up to your decision are in place. You only remain ignorant to them. Random does not mean uncaused, it means an order that is not understood. Possibility means the same thing as chance: unknown, not undetermined.
Self replication leads to self replication

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/07/09 - 10:45 PM:	#42
aletheist wrote: ...that does not remove the false dichotomy; by saying that "undetermined" and "random" are equivalent, you still leave out the "third way" that I have been advocating, which I will now call "agent-caused" for the sake of giving it a name. By your definition, would this somehow fall under "determined", rather than "undetermined"? I guess you could say that the agent's actions are determined by the agent, but this is not how "determinism" is generally understood. Makarismos suggested calling this same concept "causal and undetermined". Firstly, that the agent's actions are determined by the agent, or are "agent-caused" actions, is something that both the compatibilist and incompatibilist should be said to believe. It's easy to lose sight of the issue, which is the will itself, not actions, although actions that result from a "free" will can be said to be free as well. I only point this out because it makes the phrase "agent caused" much harder to understand, and it causes the analysis to regress; if the will is itself agent-caused, then the determination of the will is itself an action. Is that action free? Does it result from a will that is, in turn, also agent-caused? How far does the regression go? Secondly, I still don't understand how a thing can be not determined and yet not be not determined. This seems like a subject for the law of non-contradiction thread. If something is both not determined and yet not undetermined, I can't see any option but for that thing to not exist (that is, there can be no such thing). The phrase "causal and undetermined" is one that I cannot make hide nor hair of, unless it simply means a will that is undetermined, but determines actions. If that's the case, then it isn't really a 3rd category, but the first one (the one I referred to as the "philosopher's definition" near the beginning of the thread). Otherwise, I hit the linguistic-understanding wall that I'll call the law of non-contradiction. aletheist wrote: We are in complete agreement on this (I think). The question is whether I have any genuine say in "my own moral outlook." If not, that is what I mean by "determinism"; if so, that is what I mean by "free will" (or "causal agency"). The two are mutually exclusive. I suspect that there is a lot that is hidden behind the word "genuine," as though such a word is an indication that a lack of determination is already being assumed. For me, a genuine choice is one that I'm fully responsible for (i.e., not coerced into). So, for me, I am certainly responsible for my moral outlook; I'm responsible for changing it should it not be a good outlook. If I were abused as a child, I am responsible for not being an abusive parent. aletheist wrote: But whether you punish me is not up to you; it has already been determined. But whether I do something that you consider "evil" is not up to me; it has already been determined. So has your assessment of what is "good" and "evil". Both of those don't refute that you're responsible for being an accomplice. Despite causal density (actually, because of causal density), actions will still be taken in an attempt to dissuade such behavior. That such punishment is itself determined is beside the point; it is determined because the people that compose society have an (determined) interest in self-preservation, which includes dissuading theft as well as dissuading people from the violent actions that went along with this particular instance of theft (e.g., holding people at gun point). The sort of punishment that goes along with that is only rational in instances in which the person to be punished is an accomplice and not the victim of blackmail. aletheist wrote: "Given the truth of determinism," anything that can affect my future actions has already been determined, along with my future actions themselves. Of course, I do not grant the truth of determinism, but this does not entail that "nothing can affect [my] future actions;" it just means that nothing can completely dictate my future actions for me--I still have a say (to some extent) in what I will do. I have "the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances." That any punishment imposed on you does not itself dictate your future actions is to be expected. There are many determining variables that will come into play regarding your future actions; punishment is expected to be only one of these. It is hoped that it will "tip the balance," so to speak. I suppose that in some cases, it does. Punishment is also supposed to be preventative; the idea that one might be punished is meant as yet another variable expected to shape people's actions. All of this is consistent with, and even requires, determinism. @ecspose: I find it interesting how the assertion "consciousness is emergent" slips in at the end of #1 in your summary. Not that I have any contention with that idea (on the contrary, I'm sympathetic to the notion). It just seems a little "out of the blue." Although it's a decent summary, there's a few things I'd like to focus on. "Choice is chance, chance is choice." For me, this isn't the case, but I've already made that fairly clear. I suppose that your point is that our ignorance of our choice's determined nature is what makes it seem like a choice. I contend that it in fact is a choice even if we're aware of all of the determining variables involved, as long as it's something that we're responsible for, meaning that punishment could have an effect in the case of an immoral choice. "Random does not mean uncaused, it means an order that is not understood." People certainly use that word to refer to something with causes that are to complicated to be exhaustively understood, but they also use it, as I do, by extension, to mean things that would not even have such a cause. Consider the following example: Smith: "The die isn't weighted but perfectly balanced. If you roll it, you will get a random number." Jones: "Actually, the number that comes up isn't really random, it is determined by the die's initial position and the physics involved in the throw, as well as by the properties of the surface it hits." This is a fairly normal conversation (albeit with a rather picky Jones... perhaps he's a physicist), but with two different uses of the word "random." One use (Smith's) simply refers to the appearance of being undetermined, or perhaps it simply refers to being determined but too complex for us to know the outcome ahead of time. The other use (Jones') has to do with it "not really being random" because random means undetermined. As we know, words have multiple uses, and both of these seem just fine in normal conversation (although, we can imagine this turning into a real heck of an argument, which would be unfortunate because both actually agree to all substantive points and are simply using the word "random" differently). In terms of the free will debate, Smith's use is not sufficient for discussion. The mere appearance of being undetermined would not mean anything significant to whether will is free. If it is to be free, it must not just appear to be free; an incompatibilist would seize the opportunity to point out that it really isn't free in that case. A compatibilist isn't bothered by the will not really being free from determination. She only cares about it being free from a certain kind of morally relevant determination that removes responsibility. Edited by Kamerynn on 07/07/09 - 11:07 PM
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

mway
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Posted 07/07/09 - 11:05 PM:	#43
ecspose wrote: So far as I can tell there are a number of arguments that keep being repeated: 1. Determinism means no moral responsibility. No, determinism does not affect moral responsibility. It is inconsequential that everything might happen along a pre-set course. From the perspective of the individuals involved, it is of no meaning. We do not have access to that pre-determined course. The greater our access to that course, the greater our responsibility in the events to come would be. There is no way for anything to exist, except through direct cause and effect. We can not think we are special and somehow violate the rule of cause and effect through our minds. Our choices, and our experiences, are a result of a cause-and-effect network so much bigger than we could imagine. Hidden choices we call chances, and chances involving our minds we call choices. They are one and the same. There is only one path for nature and man, but that path is also inversely accountable to create an experience called choice. There is another dimension to reality, on one side we have beings living and experiencing, and on another side we have things simply happening. Consciousness is emergent. No where in the above paragraphs have you explained why Determinism does not mean no moral responsibility. It is consequential knowing that everything is on a pre-set course. The consequences are part of the pre-set course. It would be possible for humanity to destroy the concept of morality and responsibility, as that is what they are (abstract concepts). For you to be correct, morality would require universal axiom(s). Did morality exist five billion years ago? ecspose wrote: 3. Compatibilism means dualism, (or theism). No, there is no indication thus far that compatibilism favours a theist or non-theist attitude. Compatibilism can explain things to be as they are, despite any intra-causal influences. As always, the logical discussion of anything defying logic is an excercise in pointlessness at best. Choice is chance, chance is choice. They are both just a way of estimating what will happen, when in fact only one thing will happen. The next card you draw might be a Jack, or it might be a Deuce. However the card you will draw is already there waiting, no matter your awareness to it. The same thing in whether you will choose a green shirt or a blue shirt. All the factors that lead up to your decision are in place. You only remain ignorant to them. Random does not mean uncaused, it means an order that is not understood. Possibility means the same thing as chance: unknown, not undetermined. Once again: Combatibilism requires free will. Free will requires that human beings are somehow different to other patterns of matter in the universe (unless they posit that rocks for example have the same free will as humans). To assert that humans are different, then you have to explain what it is that makes them different (something that has never been shown). This logic shows atleast that combatibilists must accept dualism. I have also written in numerous other posts that dualist logic is the same as theist logic (or should I say lack there of).
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Kamerynn
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Posted 07/07/09 - 11:28 PM:	#44
mway wrote: Combatibilism requires free will. No, compatibilism consists of the proposition that free will and determinism are compatible. It requires no metaphysical assumptions; it is incompatibilist notions that require a lack of determination. Any responsible reading of compatibilist literature should convey that notion to you. mway wrote: Free will requires that human beings are somehow different to other patterns of matter in the universe (unless they posit that rocks for example have the same free will as humans). To assert that humans are different, then you have to explain what it is that makes them different (something that has never been shown). It has never been shown how humans are different from rocks!? You can't be serious. Rocks, for starters, aren't rational. Therefore, they cannot be moral agents. They do not have sensations. Therefore, they cannot be moral patients. And, that's just for starters... the differences between humans and rocks are many and varied. I find it hard to believe that this is the first you've heard about it. mway wrote: This logic shows atleast that combatibilists must accept dualism. I have also written in numerous other posts that dualist logic is the same as theist logic (or should I say lack there of). I suppose the hidden premise in what you're loosely calling "logic," here, is the idea that the only possible difference between humans and rocks is the mind. That hidden premise has been shown to be false; there are many other differences. In addition, dualism isn't the only philosophy that recognizes the existence of mind. Look up epiphenomenalism, identity theory, functionalism, and emergentism (or biological naturalism).
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Makarismos
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Posted 07/08/09 - 04:49 AM:	#45
To disambiguate a couple of phrases: Causal and undetermined: an event is caused by another event, and yet that event is not determined by the cause. Think of a man switching on a machine: flicking the switch might cause the result of whatever the machine has been designed to do, and yet the action of flicking the switch does not dictate the shape of the machines actions. This is a useful distinction as it is not possible to tell if the universe is completely determined, or casual but undetermined.

aletheist
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Posted 07/08/09 - 06:17 AM:	#46
ecspose wrote: No, determinism does not affect moral responsibility. It is inconsequential that everything might happen along a pre-set course. From the perspective of the individuals involved, it is of no meaning. We do not have access to that pre-determined course. The greater our access to that course, the greater our responsibility in the events to come would be. You contradict yourself in the last two sentences of that paragraph. If our responsibility is proportional to our access to the pre-determined course, and we have no such access, then we have no responsibility. ecspose wrote: Choice is chance, chance is choice. They are both just a way of estimating what will happen, when in fact only one thing will happen. No, a choice actually causes something to happen; chance causes nothing, because it is nothing--it is not a "thing" at all, and therefore has no causal power. ecspose wrote: The next card you draw might be a Jack, or it might be a Deuce. However the card you will draw is already there waiting, no matter your awareness to it. True, but I do seem to have a say about whether and when I draw a card at all. ecspose wrote: The same thing in whether you will choose a green shirt or a blue shirt. All the factors that lead up to your decision are in place. You only remain ignorant to them. But would complete knowledge of those factors entail an infallible prediction of the choice that I was about to make?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/08/09 - 07:15 AM:	#47
Kamerynn wrote: Firstly, that the agent's actions are determined by the agent, or are "agent-caused" actions, is something that both the compatibilist and incompatibilist should be said to believe. What I probably should have said is that the agent's decisions (or choices) are caused by the agent and not fully determined by anything else, although various factors do have influence. Does that change your response at all? Kamerynn wrote: Secondly, I still don't understand how a thing can be not determined and yet not be not determined. This is the problem with your insistence that undetermined = random. I reject this equivalence since a choice that is agent-caused is neither determined nor random. Can we agree on the following terminology for the sake of clarity? Determined = entirely caused (dictated) by prior events Agent-caused = caused by an agent, influenced (but not dictated) by prior events Random = neither caused nor influenced by prior events Kamerynn wrote: I suspect that there is a lot that is hidden behind the word "genuine," as though such a word is an indication that a lack of determination is already being assumed. For me, a genuine choice is one that I'm fully responsible for (i.e., not coerced into). And I still have a hard time understanding how you can be "fully responsible" for any choice that is completely determined by causes other than you acting as a free agent. Kamerynn wrote: That such punishment is itself determined is beside the point; it is determined because the people that compose society have an (determined) interest in self-preservation, which includes dissuading theft as well as dissuading people from the violent actions that went along with this particular instance of theft (e.g., holding people at gun point). The sort of punishment that goes along with that is only rational in instances in which the person to be punished is an accomplice and not the victim of blackmail. How can the concepts of "dissuading" and being "rational" have any meaning if everything is determined? We are all just cogs in an enormous machine. Free will, reason, and self-consciousness are all illusions. Kamerynn wrote: There are many determining variables that will come into play regarding your future actions; punishment is expected to be only one of these. It is hoped that it will "tip the balance," so to speak. Hope is also an illusion. Nothing we do can alter our fate; it is already determined!
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/08/09 - 01:32 PM:	#48
Aletheist wrote: Kamerynn wrote: Secondly, I still don't understand how a thing can be not determined and yet not be not determined. Determined = entirely caused (dictated) by prior events Agent-caused = caused by an agent, influenced (but not dictated) by prior events Random = neither caused nor influenced by prior events And I still have a hard time understanding how you can be "fully responsible" for any choice that is completely determined by causes other than you acting as a free agent. I have sympathy for both of your points, and believe that you are both rejecting hypothesises that you believe to be contrary to your cause in order to save these points. Kamerynn, a thing may be caused by something without the outcome of the event being determined. Now, within certain parameters we can of course predict the likelihood of a particular event occurring, or not occurring. The regularity of the universe allows us to theorise about certain laws and predict future events based upon this. There is a limit to the theoretical possibility of this prediction, and perhaps even a limit to the strictness with which future events are already mapped out. I do not believe that this fact damages your point, that for an agent to 'own' an action, they must have caused it, and when they perform an action, they do so based upon their past. The past of an agent was beyond the agents control, and so in this sense the agent is not free to chose to act free from constraints: but these are the kinds of "constraints" which are required if the action is to to belong to the agent at all. Aletheist, you quite rightly point out that we should only be held responsible for things that we have chosen to do. It would make no sense to blame a man for the crimes of his father, to kill a man because his mother owed money. Generally speaking, such reasoning was thrown out years ago as unfair and inadequate for addressing moral concerns. When an agent performs an action, they do so in a way influenced by their character, and their character was at least caused (if not determined entirely) by events over which they had no choice. The question is; "Can a human mind consciously chose to channel the effects which caused it in to an action different from those effects, and if so, to what extent can this occur?. Is it possible to be given water, and to make wine? If we assume a material mind, then we assume what is essentially a vastly complex machine, so complex that it cannot be accurately modelled (and by cannot, I mean that the laws of physics would prevent an accurate model of the human mind that could allow predictions of future choices/states). It seems that the freedom for you falls in to this window of unpredictability. An individual is a bundle of causes, potential energy waiting to be expelled. From the point of view of this ticking time bomb it makes perfect sense to say that unrestrained actions are free. Any action is simply previous effects becoming future effects. From the point of view of a completed neuroscience, or an all knowing daemon things might be quite different: the human in question would act only because of what came before. If libertarian freedom can be found, it must be down to the minds ability to re wire its own inputs, and channel these effects in to causes which are desired by the individual. The trouble is that the desires of the individual are initially caused by effects caused to this system, and so if one is acting upon ones desired then one is acting upon a path previously laid down. If one disregards desire, and opts for reason instead, then the path seems even more pre determined that that of desire. It seems to be impossible for a mind to be physically caused, and also capable of the redirection of its own inputs in to outputs that are both undetermined and belonging to the agent. A non material mind has the benefit of being more mysterious, but equally fails to explain such a possibility. Aletheist wrote: How can the concepts of "dissuading" and being "rational" have any meaning if everything is determined? We are all just cogs in an enormous machine. Free will, reason, and self-consciousness are all illusions. Do these consequences really follow from determinism? If the human mind is ‘just’ a machine, and the outcomes of our initial circumstances can effect a dramatic and impossible-to -predict result, then does it follow that freedom is an illusion? Aletheist wrote: Nothing we do can alter our fate; it is already determined! But it might be, we simply cannot say. If the future is determined, we have no way of finding out in principal, and so it doesn’t seem to matter. Further, only actions based upon our character are our own property, and so involuntary actions cannot be free. We are left with agent caused actions, undetermined by past events: and these are find if taken from the perspective of the individual, and seem contradictory if taken from the perspective of the universe.

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Posted 07/08/09 - 01:52 PM:	#49
aletheist wrote: What I probably should have said is that the agent's decisions (or choices) are caused by the agent and not fully determined by anything else, although various factors do have influence. Does that change your response at all? The above simply brings things full circle. You wish to say that things can be influenced, but deny that this influencing factor is one of many that determines the outcome. I am left with the idea that the will is not determined. That is, once again, you've contradicted the notion you set out originally: that the will is neither determined nor undetermined (nor a combination of the two). Again, you've stated that it in fact is a combination of the two, and you don't seem to be aware of that fact. Either the will is fully determined or it isn't; either a part of the will is undetermined or it isn't. aletheist wrote: This is the problem with your insistence that undetermined = random. I reject this equivalence since a choice that is agent-caused is neither determined nor random. Can we agree on the following terminology for the sake of clarity? Determined = entirely caused (dictated) by prior events Agent-caused = caused by an agent, influenced (but not dictated) by prior events Random = neither caused nor influenced by prior events If only it were that easy and we could simply state that the will is influenced and not determined (agent-caused), and that such a thing doesn't mean it is, to an extent, undetermined. As you should be able to see, you're trying to sneak in a notion of it being, in part, undetermined without admitting to that move. Consider the following from Makarismos: "Think of a man switching on a machine: flicking the switch might cause the result of whatever the machine has been designed to do, and yet the action of flicking the switch does not dictate the shape of the machines actions." Ask yourself: what does dictate the shape of the machine's actions? Flicking the switch and turning the machine on is what puts the machine into action. The make-up of the machine, and perhaps its environment, determines its actions now that it has been turned on. Nowhere do we see something that isn't determined. Yes, turning it on only influenced its actions and didn't, itself, determine them. What we mean by that is it was only one factor. All factors are required for a complete picture of how the machine's actions are determined. That one factor is only an influence does not create some middle ground - some ground of not determined and yet not not determined - for us to metaphysically escape into. Again, a thing is either determined or it isn't; the law of non-contradiction seems to apply, and nothing as of yet discussed has been able to escape it. aletheist wrote: And I still have a hard time understanding how you can be "fully responsible" for any choice that is completely determined by causes other than you acting as a free agent. I never stated that fully responsible people aren't free agents. You simply don't agree with the manner in which I say they're free; you believe, even though you don't seem to know it, that the only possible freedom is freedom from causation, at least to some extent. Freedom from causation is an illusion, and it isn't required for our moral notions. The humorous thing is, you only pretend that you can't see how people can be responsible in a causally dense universe. You only pretend that morality cannot function in such place. You know very well that we make moral judgments, and do so easily. You know very well that we can assign responsibility when it's warranted or mitigate/eliminate responsibility in cases of coercion. You are simply pretending, for the sake of argument, that such distinctions cannot normally be made because of causal density. We make such judgments all the time, even on parents who abuse their children because they, as children, were abused. I've already drawn out how punishment is rational in cases that lack coercion and irrational in cases that include coercion. Punishment only works - is only practical - in cases in which there is no coercion. Causal density is irrelevant. aletheist wrote: How can the concepts of "dissuading" and being "rational" have any meaning if everything is determined? We are all just cogs in an enormous machine. Free will, reason, and self-consciousness are all illusions. How could they have any meaning if not everything is determined? Do you really not understand what "rational" means because determinism has clouded your vision? Can you really not imagine people actually using reason simply because they have learned to reason? Again, if you examine your actual beliefs carefully, you'll realize you're only pretending to not understand. Of course you know what reason is. That we reason the way we do does not refute the fact that we reason. aletheist wrote: Hope is also an illusion. Nothing we do can alter our fate; it is already determined! Punishment is an influencing factor, meaning it is just one of the factors that will determine how you act in the future. Are you denying that, given determinism, punishment cannot act as a cause that has effects? How is that consistent with determinism? Do you really believe that a person is fated to do X no matter what causes act on that person? That isn't determinism, that's theism. Again, you're just playing around. You know damn well that punishment is consistent with determinism. The hope that it will work is the acknowledgment that we don't know it will - there are too many variables that will determine your future actions and we can't see them all. However, we can add yet another variable. So what's the illusion? That punishment has a causal influence, given determinism? That we really don't lack knowledge of all the variables and so we cannot hope? Is it the feeling itself that's an illusion?
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

ecspose
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Posted 07/08/09 - 04:46 PM:	#50
Kamerynn Kamerynn wrote: @ecspose: I find it interesting how the assertion "consciousness is emergent" slips in at the end of #1 in your summary. Not that I have any contention with that idea (on the contrary, I'm sympathetic to the notion). It just seems a little "out of the blue." wink I feel like you are right to question my use of words here. I only meant consciousness emerges from physical happenings, as an emergent property of the universe. Thank you for averting any confusion with the formal use of "Emergent Consciousness", which I dare say is not instrumental in this discussion. Kamerynn wrote: I contend that it in fact is a choice even if we're aware of all of the determining variables involved, as long as it's something that we're responsible for, meaning that punishment could have an effect in the case of an immoral choice. I don't mean to say that a choice is not a choice, only that it is similar to a chance in every single way, except that it occurs inside a mind. To believe in determinism, one must accept that chances are really just an illusion. If chances are illusions, then choices must be too, for the same reason that only one course of events will happen. Just because we have not determined what that course is, inside our minds or outside, does not mean it isn't determined. Just because our 'choices' are determined, does not make them any less choices. I assert there are no other kinds of choices. Kamerynn wrote: In terms of the free will debate, Smith's use is not sufficient for discussion. Unless, as you say "it simply refers to being determined but too complex for us to know the outcome ahead of time." I think that use is interchangeable with it "it's not really random", (where random is thought to be undetermined). In fact, I am in general disagreement with the use of random as anything but too complex to know the outcome. Kamerynn wrote: A compatibilist isn't bothered by the will not really being free from determination. She only cares about it being free from a certain kind of morally relevant determination that removes responsibility. Yes, and this aspect I have hardly touched on so far. To me it seems like the discussion has hardly moved beyond the idea of free-will in the broadest sense, never mind the morally obligant sense. What is free will when it comes to moral responsibility? I think the answer is simply being allowed to do as you choose. I think it's impossible to separate our will from all the coercive forces of our environment, so I am of the belief that they must be taken together as a whole. What this means for coercion, is that it emerges as a moral phenomena only in cases where the coercive factor has been exceeded by the mind. A coercion that we are unaware of, or willingly submit to, is not really coercive at that time. Unless the idea of coercion is understood by one or more parties involved, for all intents and purposes it doesn't exist, and is 'just another environmental factor'. mway mway wrote: No where in the above paragraphs have you explained why Determinism does not mean no moral responsibility. It is consequential knowing that everything is on a pre-set course. The consequences are part of the pre-set course. It would be possible for humanity to destroy the concept of morality and responsibility, as that is what they are (abstract concepts). For you to be correct, morality would require universal axiom(s). Did morality exist five billion years ago? Morality could have existed five billion years ago, if there was a life form capable of experiencing it. I don't know where you are going with this concept of morality, but I will try again to explain my position. If everything is pre-determined, that does not exclude you from making a choice. Nor does it exclude your choice from being pre-determined. Or any choice that you might make about your choice, or make about making about your choice, and so on, for infinity. It's all built into determinism, just because you have a mind and can make decisions, does not mean you can escape it. Determinism creates your body, your mind, and every thought in it. The thoughts are still yours, and you are still who you are. Morality is just another one of our 'choices'. Determinism does not detract from our choices, it only accounts for them. mway wrote: Combatibilism requires free will. Free will requires that human beings are somehow different to other patterns of matter in the universe (unless they posit that rocks for example have the same free will as humans). To assert that humans are different, then you have to explain what it is that makes them different (something that has never been shown). Actually that's an insightful observation. It is known that other things in the universe move and change shape. If our bodies and minds are just another order of this same 'movement of stuff', and our movements are (for the most part) conscious (at least to ourselves), then what is saying other processes of movement are not conscious to themselves? And accountable to a different perception of 'existence'? When the wind blows, for all we know it 'decided' to blow in whatever way the wind experiences things. This notion is open to debate, but is not crucial to the idea of Compatibilism I posit here. Humans and animals are different from other patterns, in that there is an interconnected network of senses working together to create a conscious illusion. This particular arrangement may not be unique, but is at least distinctive enough from other patterns of matter/energy, to be considered different. mway wrote: I have also written in numerous other posts that dualist logic is the same as theist logic (or should I say lack there of). I will have to agree with you there! Note - The existence of a mind does not necessitate dualist logic. The mind is a function of the brain, in my definition. Makarismos Makarismos wrote: Determinism: the idea that every single event is both caused by a preceding events/s, and its outcome is determined by these events. Casualty would suggest the same, but with the proviso that nothing is decided for certain. With respect to your definition of causality, I don't see what that leaves. If I understand, you are saying some things are 'partially determined', but what might that other part be? Makarismos wrote: To disambiguate a couple of phrases: Causal and undetermined: an event is caused by another event, and yet that event is not determined by the cause. Every use I have made of "causal" so far, has been intended as "causal and determined". I understand what you are saying that a switch is just a switch and could be hooked to any machine, but in the case of any individual machine, is it not determined the exact effect the switch will have, right down to the last detail? aletheist aletheist wrote: The question is whether I have any genuine say in "my own moral outlook." If not, that is what I mean by "determinism"; if so, that is what I mean by "free will" (or "causal agency"). The two are mutually exclusive. You have as much say as you want in your moral outlook, that doesn't mean 'you' are anything more than a collection of deterministic processes. I agrue that free will cannot break determinism, and that determinism cannot break free will. I believe this is at he heart of the compatibilist position. aletheist wrote: You contradict yourself in the last two sentences of that paragraph. If our responsibility is proportional to our access to the pre-determined course, and we have no such access, then we have no responsibility. It's not really a contradiction, it's an additional factor. In the first part I said determinism does not affect our responsibility, meaning if you were responsible you still are, if you weren't then you still aren't. Then I mentioned that we do not have access to that course of events, but if we did, our responsibility would increase. Our responsibility would increase with our knowledge of future events. This is on top of whatever responsibility we did or did not have otherwise. aletheist wrote: No, a choice actually causes something to happen; chance causes nothing, because it is nothing--it is not a "thing" at all, and therefore has no causal power. So when there is a chance that a volcano will erupt, nothing will actually happen because a volcano has no causal power? aletheist wrote: True, but I do seem to have a say about whether and when I draw a card at all. Yes of course, but your ultimate choice in all this, is just another draw of another card. That is what the metaphor describes. aletheist wrote: But would complete knowledge of those factors entail an infallible prediction of the choice that I was about to make? No, because complete knowledge is impossible. Please see my other post in this thread that goes into more detail about prediction.
Self replication leads to self replication

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