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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

Makarismos
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Posted 07/06/09 - 10:32 AM: Subject: could I ever be truly free?	#31
aletheist wrote: Can you please clarify the distinction that you are making between "caused by" and "decided by"? Can you please clarify the distinction that you are making between "set in motion" and "dictate"? Similar distinctions I suppose. The difference between "caused by" and "decided by" are the same as they would be in normal language. Think of a billiard ball (A) hitting another billiard ball (B), and knocking it in to a pocket. We can look at this chain of events and say that either event of A hitting B (event X) determined the outcome C. We can look at the same set of events and say that C was caused by event x, but event X did not have to cause C. The fact that the ball went in to the pocket was a result for which other factors came in to play (the lay of the table, atmospheric conditions, the size of the pocket etc). In real world examples their are so many variables that we simply can not perform a mathematical equation to predict the future. aletheist wrote: True enough. We are also not free to choose all aspects of our present and future circumstances, either. Quite. aletheist wrote: As I have already acknowledged, one's past certainly influences one's choices; but does it completely determine who one is and what one will become? Firstly Does it matter? We have no way of finding out. Secondly; what else would go in to the mix? If it is me that makes a choice, then the act of choosing must have been done by me, and in this respect any action is certainly caused by my character. The true question we are looking at is "could I chose to be a different person than I am", and I would say that yes, this is possible. I would qualify this by saying that you would only change because of the combinations of external inputs in to your conciousness over your lifetime, plus extraneous factors such as your genes, the situation you find yourself in, the ease of changing your life etc. As it is impossible to account for all of these details, we can effectively ignore the implications of determinism for use in ethical debate. aletheist wrote: But what you are describing does not sound entirely like compatibilism to me, because compatibilism--as I understand it--affirms determinism, while your view seems to include at least some elements of the libertarian position. That is why I am asking for some further clarification. I would add a further note of caution in this debate, which will perhaps help to clarify my position further. when a philosopher asks a question like "could I ever be truly free?" he is using language in a strange and unusual way. The word free, when applied to a person in prison, or a wild west ranger is easily understood. "I am free now", means that one has no bookings, i.e can do anything they want to do for a few moments. When we ask the question posed, we use the word "free" in a way suggested by its usual use, but one which stretches the meaning of the word beyond what is logically possible. One might be better to respond the the question "could I ever be truly free?", with the abrupt answer "If you could never be truly free, then the word 'free' is meaningless". Forget compatabilism, determinism, libertarianism - look to the use of the word, and notice how we philosophers have warped it for this debate. Edited by Makarismos on 07/06/09 - 10:54 AM

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/06/09 - 10:38 AM:	#32
aletheist wrote: You are still insisting that the only alternative to "entirely determined" is "somewhat random". You are ignoring the libertarian thesis that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices that are neither determined nor random, nor merely some combination of the two. In the above, you assert that if the will is not entirely determined, that does not mean that it is somewhat random. Then, you go on to admit that there is a combination of it being both determined and random, admitting that it is somewhat random. What I'm saying is that it being somewhat random, which you've just admitted that it is (while denying it, strangely enough), does not amount to a coherent notion of "free will." aletheist wrote: Only by presupposing the compatibilist definition of "freely". If determinism is true, then neither the blackmailer nor the one blackmailed (nor anyone else, under any circumstances) is acting "freely" in the libertarian sense. And that shows how the libertarian sense is lacking: it cannot account for the mitigated/eliminated responsibility that results from being blackmailed along with the transfer of that responsibility to the blackmailer. It seems that philosophers have, once again, gotten themselves into a muddle, while the layman is unimpeded and can make the obviously correct moral judgment. aletheist wrote: It is a subset of general freedom from external limitations on choices. Again, I am not saying that there are no such limitations; rather, I am denying that those limitations are comprehensive, such that we never have any genuine choices, which is what (compatibilist or incompatibilist) determinism entails. This is precisely where compatibilism becomes incoherent to me. If my actions are completely determined--if the material universe is such that it was inevitable for me to provide the bank codes--what difference does it make, morally, whether I was cheerful about it or had a gun in my face? I have no free will in either scenario. And why should the perpetrators be punished for doing something about which they had no choice? Oh, I guess because the prosecutor, judge, jury, and corrections officers have no choice, either. It makes a difference how we judge you in such a case because it will determine whether how we react is going to have the intended results. If you were blackmailed, and hence did not act freely, then punishing you as though you did, and are the evil sort of person that cheerfully helps bank robbers, will not be effective. There is nothing for it to be effective against; it hasn't been shown that you are an evil sort of person whose actions will be detrimental to society, so what would be the purpose of punishing you? If you were an actual accomplice (e.g., you called the bank robber ahead of time, told him to meet you by the vault for the code, and agreed upon your payment) then society ought to treat you both similarly (punish you both) in an attempt to dissuade such behavior in the future. We could phrase things in utilitarian or deontological terms as well. For example, you could universalize your saving of lives by giving the bank code, but you could not universalize being an accomplice to bank robbery. We should want to say that saving lives by giving the code maximizes happiness (to the best of your ability, given the circumstances). Robbing banks, or being an accomplice to bank robbery, does not (a character utilitarian might tell you a lot about the undesirable character traits of bank robbers, but not of people blackmailed by them). The idea that the compatibilist notion "is a subset of general freedom from external limitations on choices" is false because of the inclusion of the words "general freedom." The freedom is not general, but specific to certain kinds of causes (i.e., coercive ones); every event, even in the will, still has its cause, so we aren't talking about a "general freedom from external limitations on choices." There are still external limitations, just not a certain kind of limitations. Coercive causes (or "limitations") transfer (at least some of the) responsibility while others do not. Edited by Kamerynn on 07/06/09 - 10:53 AM
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

aletheist
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Posted 07/06/09 - 01:16 PM:	#33
Kamerynn wrote: In the above, you assert that if the will is not entirely determined, that does not mean that it is somewhat random. Then, you go on to admit that there is a combination of it being both determined and random, admitting that it is somewhat random. What I'm saying is that it being somewhat random, which you've just admitted that it is (while denying it, strangely enough), does not amount to a coherent notion of "free will." Huh? Please read my statement more carefully. aletheist wrote: You are ignoring the libertarian thesis that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices that are neither determined nor random, nor merely some combination of the two. (emphasis added) I have not admitted what you seem to think I have admitted; in fact, I have said exactly the opposite. Kamerynn wrote: And that shows how the libertarian sense is lacking: it cannot account for the mitigated/eliminated responsibility that results from being blackmailed along with the transfer of that responsibility to the blackmailer. Sure it can. It is hard (incompatibilist) determinism that cannot do this. The libertarian view would recognize the reason for the blackmailed person's choice and assign moral responsibility to the blackmailer accordingly. In addition, the victim had the live option of refusing the blackmailer's demand and (possibly) suffering the consequences. Kamerynn wrote: It makes a difference how we judge you in such a case because it will determine whether how we react is going to have the intended results. But if determinism is true, then how we react is not up to us, nor are the results (intended or not); in fact, there is no such thing as intention. Kamerynn wrote: There is nothing for it to be effective against; it hasn't been shown that you are an evil sort of person whose actions will be detrimental to society, so what would be the purpose of punishing you? But if determinism is true, then my "evilness" is not my fault, and I should not be punished regardless. Kamerynn wrote: If you were an actual accomplice (e.g., you called the bank robber ahead of time, told him to meet you by the vault for the code, and agreed upon your payment) then society ought to treat you both similarly (punish you both) in an attempt to dissuade such behavior in the future. But if determinism is true, then society has no say in how it treats anyone, and the notion of "dissuading" anyone is meaningless. Kamerynn wrote: We could phrase things in utilitarian or deontological terms as well. But if determinism is true, then these approaches are irrelevant; I will do whatever I have been determined to do. Kamerynn wrote: The idea that the compatibilist notion "is a subset of general freedom from external limitations on choices" is false . . . Coercive causes (or "limitations") transfer (at least some of the) responsibility while others do not. Like I said, the libertarian view can account for this without difficulty, but does not needlessly limit free will merely to non-coercion.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/06/09 - 01:32 PM:	#34
Makarismos wrote: Think of a billiard ball (A) hitting another billiard ball (B), and knocking it in to a pocket . . . The fact that the ball went in to the pocket was a result for which other factors came in to play (the lay of the table, atmospheric conditions, the size of the pocket etc). But what accounts for A moving in the first place? Usually, the free choice of a human agent, whom we credit with knocking B into the pocket by means of hitting A with a cue stick. The agent decided the angle and force with which to hit A, which caused A to move until it hit B, which caused B to move until it fell into the pocket. The agent set things in motion, and deterministic processes dictated the rest. Makarismos wrote: Firstly Does it matter? We have no way of finding out. Right. If determinism is true, and our powerful intuition of having genuine (libertarian) free will is really just an illusion, how could we ever know this? Practically speaking, everyone lives under the assumption that we do have genuine (libertarian) free will. Ironically, it seems that we have no choice about this; but the insistence of so many that determinism is true shows that we can, in fact, believe otherwise. Makarismos wrote: As it is impossible to account for all of these details, we can effectively ignore the implications of determinism for use in ethical debate. This sounds like you are saying that we might as well assume the libertarian view when it comes to ethics, even if determinism is true. Is that what you mean? Makarismos wrote: I would add a further note of caution in this debate, which will perhaps help to clarify my position further . . . Forget compatabilism, determinism, libertarianism - look to the use of the word, and notice how we philosophers have warped it for this debate. Duly noted. Thanks for your comments.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/07/09 - 08:09 AM:	#35
aletheist wrote: But what accounts for A moving in the first place? Usually, the free choice of a human agent, whom we credit with knocking B into the pocket by means of hitting A with a cue stick. I would never be so rash as to suppose that all things are initially caused by a human mind. I might be so rash as to claim that the human mind is caused in large part by processes which may be deterministic. aletheist wrote: Right. If determinism is true, and our powerful intuition of having genuine (libertarian) free will is really just an illusion, how could we ever know this? Practically speaking, everyone lives under the assumption that we do have genuine (libertarian) free will. But I don't think that people do live under this illusion. Libertarian free will seems to suggest that a human being is able to do whatever they want to do, completely free from their situation and their past. It must be noted that people do send their children to school, as they realise that schooling is required if one is to learn to read: our past clearly affects the options we have. You might object that the libertarian position admits of an influence from ones past in the actions that one performs, and merely insists that there is a third ingredient: and perhaps this third ingredient is neither random nor determined, but casual and un-determined? aletheist wrote: Ironically, it seems that we have no choice about this; but the insistence of so many that determinism is true shows that we can, in fact, believe otherwise. The trouble is that we have two entrenched positions, both with compelling evidence, and philosophers insist upon taking one position and dismissing the other premise to do so. Yes, we do have a powerful compelling 'illusion' of free will (though perhaps not the the same illusion suggested by libertarianism), but we also have an easy grasp of the idea of necessity, and casual closure. When dismissing the idea of determinism, we assume that there is a hugely compelling argument that suggest that if determinism is true, then free will can not follow. It must be understood that that initial argument is not compelling, but only a play on words. Therefore there is no need whatsoever to chose between determinism and everyday free will. aletheist wrote: This sounds like you are saying that we might as well assume the libertarian view when it comes to ethics, even if determinism is true. Is that what you mean? Almost. I think that we ought to think of ourselves as being responsible for our own actions, because regardless of the circumstances of our initial causation, we are but our own selves, and must take responsibility in order to function. Further, from the perspective of ones own self, it makes no sense to say that one is not free due to ones childhood, or friends, or an idea in a book. I would consider myself free, despite the fact that I must accept that my past has entirely created me. It may be because of that past that I act in that way, but to use such descriptions as a dodge for moral responsibility is a reductive fallacy in itself.

aletheist
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Posted 07/07/09 - 09:08 AM:	#36
Makarismos wrote: I would never be so rash as to suppose that all things are initially caused by a human mind. Neither would I; my apologies if I implied otherwise. Makarismos wrote: Libertarian free will seems to suggest that a human being is able to do whatever they want to do, completely free from their situation and their past. The definition of free will that I posted and characterized as libertarian is "the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances"--not the ability to take any course of thought or action under any circumstances. Makarismos wrote: When dismissing the idea of determinism, we assume that there is a hugely compelling argument that suggest that if determinism is true, then free will can not follow. The whole debate hinges on how we define "determinism" and (especially) "free will". If determinism means that everything that happens does so necessarily, and free will is defined as above (by me), then the two are clearly incompatible concepts.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/07/09 - 11:09 AM:	#37
The proclamation that something that isn't determined is not random doesn't help; something is either determined or it isn't. By "random" I mean "undetermined." This is an incredibly common construal of "random." You can disagree with this construal if you wish; splitting such a hair won't save your position from the fact that an undetermined will removes responsibility for actions resulting from it. Again, if my will, even in part, doesn't result from my own moral outlook, then it isn't even my will. Be as prescriptivist about "random" as you wish; you won't get past the substantive point by ignoring it and playing word games. Just to be clear: if something is not determined, it is undetermined. Undetermined simply means "not determined." You can't simply assert that something is neither determined nor undetermined and expect people to respond, "ah, now I get it," because it doesn't make sense. aletheist wrote: You are still insisting that the only alternative to "entirely determined" is "somewhat random". You are ignoring the libertarian thesis that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices that are neither determined nor random, nor merely some combination of the two. There's the quote that you asked me to read more carefully. How does picking on my use of "random" refute my substantive point? The idea that choices are neither determined nor random makes them... what? So, they aren't determined and they aren't undetermined; I suppose, then, that they don't exist. However, you say that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices. Do you see the problem? aletheist wrote: But if determinism is true, then how we react is not up to us, nor are the results (intended or not); in fact, there is no such thing as intention. But if determinism is true, then my "evilness" is not my fault, and I should not be punished regardless. But if determinism is true, then society has no say in how it treats anyone, and the notion of "dissuading" anyone is meaningless. But if determinism is true, then these approaches are irrelevant; I will do whatever I have been determined to do. The above is all false. If determinism is true, then how we punish you affects how you act in the future. Whether you argue that your evilness is not your fault is of no consequence. You say that "these approaches are irrelevant," and that you'll do whatever you have been determined to do. Read what I wrote more carefully; those approaches are a part of what determines what you will do (that's the point). I'm not sure how that isn't clear; are you suggesting that nothing can affect your future actions, given the truth of determinism? How does that make sense? Far from being inconsistent with determinism, punishment actually requires it to make sense. aletheist wrote: Like I said, the libertarian view can account for this without difficulty, but does not needlessly limit free will merely to non-coercion. That has yet to be seen; that choices are neither determined or undetermined makes choices nonsense. Because of that, I find it hard to believe that "the libertarian view" can account for anything "without difficulty." As far as I can tell, Occam would roll over in his grave because of such an unnecessary and incoherent notion. Edited by Kamerynn on 07/07/09 - 12:52 PM
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

aletheist
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Posted 07/07/09 - 01:46 PM:	#38
Kamerynn wrote: By "random" I mean "undetermined." This is an incredibly common construal of "random." Is it? If so, I did not take it that way, so thank you for the clarification. However, that does not remove the false dichotomy; by saying that "undetermined" and "random" are equivalent, you still leave out the "third way" that I have been advocating, which I will now call "agent-caused" for the sake of giving it a name. By your definition, would this somehow fall under "determined", rather than "undetermined"? I guess you could say that the agent's actions are determined by the agent, but this is not how "determinism" is generally understood. Makarismos suggested calling this same concept "causal and undetermined". Kamerynn wrote: Again, if my will, even in part, doesn't result from my own moral outlook, then it isn't even my will. We are in complete agreement on this (I think). The question is whether I have any genuine say in "my own moral outlook." If not, that is what I mean by "determinism"; if so, that is what I mean by "free will" (or "causal agency"). The two are mutually exclusive. Kamerynn wrote: If determinism is true, then how we punish you affects how you act in the future. But whether you punish me is not up to you; it has already been determined. Kamerynn wrote: Whether you argue that your evilness is not your fault is of no consequence. But whether I do something that you consider "evil" is not up to me; it has already been determined. So has your assessment of what is "good" and "evil". Kamerynn wrote: I'm not sure how that isn't clear; are you suggesting that nothing can affect your future actions, given the truth of determinism? "Given the truth of determinism," anything that can affect my future actions has already been determined, along with my future actions themselves. Of course, I do not grant the truth of determinism, but this does not entail that "nothing can affect [my] future actions;" it just means that nothing can completely dictate my future actions for me--I still have a say (to some extent) in what I will do. I have "the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances." Kamerynn wrote: As far as I can tell, Occam would roll over in his grave because of such an unnecessary and incoherent notion. Of his own free will? (Sorry, just trying to keep it light here.)
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/07/09 - 01:52 PM:	#39
aletheist wrote: Neither would I; my apologies if I implied otherwise. Then what did you mean? aletheist wrote: The definition of free will that I posted and characterized as libertarian is "the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances"--not the ability to take any course of thought or action under any circumstances. Given that you like red, and feel like wearing a red shirt, are you more free if you chose a red shirt or a blue shirt? This question makes no sense, because - so long as you have the option to freely chose - such a choice is considered free anyway. Are you more free if you could have decided to lock yourself in to your car? Negative freedom (the number of options hypothetically open to you) is a concept of freedom which I believe you (and most philosophers involved in this debate) are taking beyond its applicable realm. aletheist wrote: The whole debate hinges on how we define "determinism" and (especially) "free will". Determinism: the idea that every single event is both caused by a preceding events/s, and its outcome is determined by these events. Casualty would suggest the same, but with the proviso that nothing is decided for certain. The principal of uncertainty prevents us from deciding which is the 'true' state of the universe, so practically it matters not. Ethically we should consider the individuals desires, and the obstacles to these desires being fulfilled. This is a way of finding meaning in the term 'freedom'. If a man wants an apple, and he eats an apple, we would not say he was less free because he did not chose an orange. We would not say he was less free because the notion of freedom relates to what he did, or what he might yet do, but not to what he did not do. It is rather my view, that this whole debate hinges upon how you define yourself. If you define yourself as the sum of a impossibly large number of historical effects, and your actions as the effects of their causes, then I see no problem with the claim that you get to chose your actions. If you define yourself as separate from history, as somehow transcendent to this plane of existence, then I can see why you might think that the idea necessity robs you of all that separateness. aletheist wrote: If determinism means that everything that happens does so necessarily, and free will is defined as above (by me), then the two are clearly incompatible concepts. Yeah, strict determinism is not compatible with the idea of arbitrary choice in multiple universes/identical instances. But then, if I defined a triangle as a square circle, I would be a fool to complain that Euclid was wrong about geometry. I am agnostic to the reality of hard determinism, but its existence is irrelevant to any question of my freedom to believe otherwise. Freedom does not require this feature in its usual use. Edited by Makarismos on 07/07/09 - 02:05 PM

aletheist
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Posted 07/07/09 - 05:06 PM:	#40
Makarismos: You have not convinced me (so far), but I appreciate your thoughtful approach to this interesting topic. Makarismos wrote: Then what did you mean? Only that in the specific example involving billiard balls, it is usually a human agent who sets them in motion by means of a free choice. Makarismos wrote: Given that you like red, and feel like wearing a red shirt, are you more free if you chose a red shirt or a blue shirt? I am not sure that "more free" makes any sense in this context; either I was free (genuinely capable of choosing red or blue) or not free (completely determined to wear red or blue). Again, it is not the choice itself that makes us free, it is the ability to choose. Makarismos wrote: Determinism: the idea that every single event is both caused by a preceding events/s, and its outcome is determined by these events. That every event has a cause is true by definition. The question is: Are human decisions entirely caused by preceding events, or does the human play a causal role as a free agent? Makarismos wrote: We would not say he was less free because the notion of freedom relates to what he did, or what he might yet do, but not to what he did not do. No, the notion of freedom relates to what he could and can do. If what he did was inevitable, then he did not have free will.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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