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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/05/09 - 06:10 PM:	#21
mway wrote: It's ok, I always expect the people who are pro free will to get defensive (it is hard for people to let go of self importance). Compatibilism is irrational. It says we live in a world of causality, and yet somehow every human (and not any other species or object) has the ability to break this causal chain. Nothing more needs to be said, as this basically becomes the same as any religious argument. Why do you believe that coercion requires breaking a causal chain? Or, are you just responding without bothering to read what your responding to, once again? Can you provide any references for compatibilists who believe that being free requires breaking a causal chain?
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

mway
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Posted 07/05/09 - 06:10 PM:	#22
aletheist wrote: Free will--according to both the libertarian and compatibilist definitions--does appear to be limited to humans, and not shared by any other known species. Consciousness, rationality, the unified self, intrinsic value, and moral absolutes also appear to be unique to humans. Do you disagree? I believe these things apply to other species, but on different levels. I believe elephants have some form of consciousness for example. aletheist wrote: This is a presupposition on your part, including the implied "only" between "brains" and "react". Can you give any arguments against this? My presupposition is based on years of research and experimentation. All of which returned no reason to assume anything more (i.e. dualism). alethiest wrote: This is not how anyone is defining free will in this thread, as far as I can tell. I was explaining how we are bound to the past. If freedom is uncaused, then theoretically we would be able to decide anything (including things that do not involve the past). You said yourself it is the (genuine) ability to choose. If you think free will exists, then you can easily prove it by exercising it. If you want to ride the boat with the people that claim we are only some what free in our choices then you are still pertaining to dualism. If I rip out your frontal lobe your decision making (reactive) process will change. Did I just remove some of that magical stuff that enabled free will?
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ecspose
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Posted 07/05/09 - 10:46 PM:	#23
Ratheius Netheros wrote: If everything was known about the world, we could predict what someone would do. If we told them what they would do, they might change it. We could predict that, too. That's all determinism is saying. You would never be able to know what you will do, only what you would have done. Just having knowledge of future events is enough to change them. In order to calculate what you would do after gaining knowledge of the future events, you would have to run another simulation. Gaining knowledge of these results would change the outcome yet again. So there is no way to truly know what you will do, even with the most advanced simulation. You can gain knowledge of what other people will do, but only if you have absolutely no influence on them, or the environment where they are. Essentially knowing is also being powerless. Furthermore, to calculate future events as accurately as possible, an identical simulation would have to be run. For one thing, this means that the amount of things which can be simulated will always be smaller than the amount of things possible. So there will always be a factor of non-calculated events. Not only that, but a completely identical simulation might not even be possible. This introduces yet more uncertainly into predicted results. All this combines to make a 'dark spot' in any possible predictions. Even if a prediction is 99.9% accurate, the smallest chance is enough for essentially any outcome. Based on the idea that not everything can be calculated, there is enough room for 'hidden' forces at play. So long as their net action doesn't violate "possible" outcomes, any mechanism could be at work. Personally I can't imagine what besides ordinary causality, but it does leave room for elaborate deceptions of the metaphysical. mway wrote: If human "choices" are not governed [entirely] by causality, then logically you must posit some dualist perspective. As far as I can tell, no one here supporting compatibilism has suggested that human free will is somehow exempt from causality. Personally I support physical monism. Free-will is being unhindered from your preferences, that is not to say your preferences are uncaused. Free will does not mean having control over every aspect of reality, including your own nature. Free will is being allowed to do as you would. Not somehow being able to do something you simply cannot do. mway wrote: I believe these things apply to other species, but on different levels. I believe elephants have some form of consciousness for example. How very gracious of you, after all that talk of putting people in the center of the universe, to include elephants as a life form having "some form of consciousness". There is no magical boundary where an animal becomes 'conscious', just like there is no magical stuff that enables free will. Even a bug has to make decisions. I think you are giving too much credit to the idea of free-will. (and to consciousness)
Self replication leads to self replication

mway
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Posted 07/05/09 - 11:13 PM:	#24
ecspose wrote: Free-will is being unhindered from your preferences, that is not to say your preferences are uncaused. Please give any kind of basis for assuming that preferences are unhindered. Can you list an experiment (even a thought experiment) that would show this? As I said above, this is the same as any dualist argument. You are a theist right?
Lame is to Wav, as the Brain is to Reality.

ecspose
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Posted 07/05/09 - 11:58 PM:	#25
mway wrote: Please give any kind of basis for assuming that preferences are unhindered. Can you list an experiment (even a thought experiment) that would show this? As I said above, this is the same as any dualist argument. You are a theist right? Okay, preferences unhindered is when I want to get a drink of water, and someone is not stopping me from doing it. Preferences hindered, is when I want to get a drink of water and someone is stopping me from doing it. Preferences ridiculous, is when I want a drink of water and one appears in my hand. Free will is being able to do as you would, within the environment you are in. Yes there is an element of coercion in everything we do, but that doesn't challenge the idea of free will, if anything puts it into perspective. You have to be kidding to ask if I am a theist.
Self replication leads to self replication

Kamerynn
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Posted 07/06/09 - 02:57 AM:	#26
aletheist wrote: Who said anything about "random, uncaused will"? A number of people previous to my post, and now a number afterwards, were discussing free will as a lack of causation on the will. You've mentioned it as well (addressed below) in terms of "whether 'choices' are entirely the result of deterministic processes." aletheist wrote: But if everything is determined, then the presence or absence of coercion is also determined. The whole concept of coercion becomes meaningless. The debate is not over cause and effect per se; there are obviously deterministic processes at work in the material universe. The question is whether human "choices" are entirely the result of deterministic processes. Firstly, conceiving of the will as being "not entirely determined" is what I've been addressing all along (despite the "not entirely" clause): that even an element of randomness can make us free rather than removing responsibility. Again, there is no reason to believe that to be the case, and that's substantively no different than the "philosopher's definition" that has been discussed. You could change all instances of "uncaused/random will" in previous posts to "somewhat uncaused/random will," and all of those points would still apply. Secondly, there is no good reason for believing that the concept of coercion "becomes meaningless" even if the will of, say, the blackmailer is fully determined. I can distinguish a case of one being blackmailed from a case in which one acts freely. As far as I can tell, only philosophers have trouble distinguishing action caused by blackmail from action that is free from blackmail. Examples are easy to come by and easy to assess, and normal people, including lawyers, have no trouble dismissing the philosopher's irrelevant rambling about uncaused wills and determinism. aletheist wrote: I think that having the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances is very much part of the common sense notion of free will. Yours is a special case of this more general definition. Freedom from coercion is a very common compatibilist notion and a very common non-philosophical use, as I've already drawn out. I fail to see how it's "special." Having a "genuine ability to" choose between actions is what coercion is about. When blackmailed, one has a choice between giving the false bank codes or watching the robbers kill innocent victims because of one's failure to do so. While cheerfully giving a stranger the codes under no duress leaves one culpable, factors such as having a gun in one's face, or having other innocent lives at stake, mitigate or eliminate culpability. After all these years, I'm still surprised that many philosophers don't find this to be relevant, citing determinism as a reason. aletheist wrote: You are making a false dichotomy by insisting that the only two options are determinism and "freedom from all causation, i.e., randomness." By recognizing humans as unique causal agents, the libertarian rejects both of these. Again, the notion that the will can be "somewhat random" is no better; the extent to which our will does not follow from our own moral outlook is the extent to which it isn't even our will. Such a thing is, thankfully, not required for the phrase "free will" to function in our language as it already does (as mentioned, it would ensure that it no longer functions in such a manner).
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

aletheist
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Posted 07/06/09 - 06:15 AM:	#27
mway wrote: I believe these things apply to other species, but on different levels. What evidence can you cite for this belief? mway wrote: I believe elephants have some form of consciousness for example. On what basis? And what about the other characteristics that I mentioned? Do elephants have free will? Are they rational? Do they experience a unified self? Do they have intrinsic value? Do they recognize moral absolutes? mway wrote: Can you give any arguments against this? My presupposition is based on years of research and experimentation. All of which returned no reason to assume anything more (i.e. dualism). All of which likely presupposed no reason to assume anything more. Scientific "research and experimentation" can only provide natural/material explanations for natural/material phenomena. mway wrote: I was explaining how we are bound to the past. Another presupposition on your part. mway wrote: If freedom is uncaused, then theoretically we would be able to decide anything (including things that do not involve the past). Who says that "freedom is uncaused"? What does that mean? The libertarian definition of free will requires the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. This is not the same as having the ability to take any course of thought or action whatsoever. mway wrote: You said yourself it is the (genuine) ability to choose. If you think free will exists, then you can easily prove it by exercising it. I just did, by posting this particular response, rather than ignoring your comments or writing something else. Of course, the determinist will claim that I had no choice in the matter--that my "decision" was really just an illusion. How would we ever find out (empirically) which one of us is correct?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/06/09 - 06:38 AM:	#28
Kamerynn wrote: Firstly, conceiving of the will as being "not entirely determined" is what I've been addressing all along (despite the "not entirely" clause): that even an element of randomness can make us free rather than removing responsibility. You are still insisting that the only alternative to "entirely determined" is "somewhat random". You are ignoring the libertarian thesis that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices that are neither determined nor random, nor merely some combination of the two. Kamerynn wrote: Secondly, there is no good reason for believing that the concept of coercion "becomes meaningless" even if the will of, say, the blackmailer is fully determined. I can distinguish a case of one being blackmailed from a case in which one acts freely. Only by presupposing the compatibilist definition of "freely". If determinism is true, then neither the blackmailer nor the one blackmailed (nor anyone else, under any circumstances) is acting "freely" in the libertarian sense. Kamerynn wrote: Freedom from coercion is a very common compatibilist notion and a very common non-philosophical use, as I've already drawn out. I fail to see how it's "special." It is a subset of general freedom from external limitations on choices. Again, I am not saying that there are no such limitations; rather, I am denying that those limitations are comprehensive, such that we never have any genuine choices, which is what (compatibilist or incompatibilist) determinism entails. Kamerynn wrote: While cheerfully giving a stranger the codes under no duress leaves one culpable, factors such as having a gun in one's face, or having other innocent lives at stake, mitigate or eliminate culpability. This is precisely where compatibilism becomes incoherent to me. If my actions are completely determined--if the material universe is such that it was inevitable for me to provide the bank codes--what difference does it make, morally, whether I was cheerful about it or had a gun in my face? I have no free will in either scenario. And why should the perpetrators be punished for doing something about which they had no choice? Oh, I guess because the prosecutor, judge, jury, and corrections officers have no choice, either.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Makarismos
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Posted 07/06/09 - 08:27 AM:	#29
aletheist wrote: You are still insisting that the only alternative to "entirely determined" is "somewhat random". You are ignoring the libertarian thesis that humans are causal agents who can make genuine choices that are neither determined nor random, nor merely some combination of the two. This seems to be the primary point of disagreement, so let us start here. We have two suggested choices; completely determined, or random. I might add a third which would be causal yet undetermined (as in caused by but not 'decided' by, if that makes sense). In the completely determined universe you see no room for "free will", and you agree that actions which are random do not belong to anyone, and are therefore not acts of will: so what third choice do you have? I would suggest causal yet undetermined is your only remaining option. An action by myself might be set in motion by events of my past, but the events of my past did not dictate that I would react in an exact pre described way to those causes. This is a view which modern science largely agrees, as no one who knows anything about quantum physics is still arguing for laplace's demon. Under this model our actions are still either down to experiences, genetics, social linguistic influences, or (if we wish to consider this) the human soul, divine inspiration etc. It makes no odds which of these is involved, but we must accept that these things act as inputs to the human being, and the human who receives these inputs eventually acts. Their actions will not be plotted out for them, though we might be able to predict some behaviour accurately (as we indeed can with human beings). It may be that the human being in question can influence its own environment, but it must be accepted that they can only work with what they are given. a child raised by wolves will not unaided learn tennis, or how to read, or how to speak. I would conclude that under this model, we are free in the every day sense of the word "free" regardless of the fact that we are entirely indebted for our every thought, action, desire, and situation, to the very universe which made us what we are. It seems that we are free to do as we want, but we are not free to chose a different past for ourselves. Our pasts make us who we are, and so if it us who is doing the choosing, then we are doing so because of the person our pasts have made us in to. It is a remarkable feature of this debate that it could be construed as a battle between the passive fatalists, and the bull headed ubermensch. In any such argument wisdom tends to lie in the middle. Compatabilism is in the middle.

aletheist
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Posted 07/06/09 - 09:19 AM:	#30
Makarismos wrote: We have two suggested choices; completely determined, or random. I might add a third which would be causal yet undetermined (as in caused by but not 'decided' by, if that makes sense). Can you please clarify the distinction that you are making between "caused by" and "decided by"? Makarismos wrote: An action by myself might be set in motion by events of my past, but the events of my past did not dictate that I would react in an exact pre described way to those causes. Can you please clarify the distinction that you are making between "set in motion" and "dictate"? Makarismos wrote: It seems that we are free to do as we want, but we are not free to chose a different past for ourselves. True enough. We are also not free to choose all aspects of our present and future circumstances, either. Makarismos wrote: Our pasts make us who we are, and so if it us who is doing the choosing, then we are doing so because of the person our pasts have made us in to. As I have already acknowledged, one's past certainly influences one's choices; but does it completely determine who one is and what one will become? Makarismos wrote: In any such argument wisdom tends to lie in the middle. Compatabilism is in the middle. But what you are describing does not sound entirely like compatibilism to me, because compatibilism--as I understand it--affirms determinism, while your view seems to include at least some elements of the libertarian position. That is why I am asking for some further clarification.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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