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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

Makarismos
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Posted 07/18/09 - 07:01 PM:	#121
Perhaps we have a strong and inate sense of determinism? After all, it seems that it is only natural to ask what the cause of X was, and what the cause of the cause of X was, and the cause of that, and that etc. We have a strong sense that w are free, and a strong sense that every effect has a cause. The world only makes sense with both of these things in place.

aletheist
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Posted 07/18/09 - 07:30 PM:	#122
Kingt2 wrote: All nonsense to me... It makes no sense. Well, it makes perfect sense to me. Kingt2 wrote: You've--well, not specifically you, dualist libertarians in general--not shown how this agent makes a decision; you just say "he is capable of it. I am not sure what more you want/need. The agent weighs the various factors, and then makes a free choice. It really is that simple. Kingt2 wrote: If that is true, and this "me" is outside of the causal chain, then there are two parts to "you". There is the you that is unchanging and enduring. Meaning that at the moment of conception, that "you" was exactly as you are now. Then there is the part of you that takes in information and stores it; and I guess offers it up to the bigger "you" for decision making. This is not too far off. As a person (or "self"), I am outside of the (physical) causal chain; my body and brain are part of the (physical) causal chain, but are also subject to the causes that I originate with my free choices. Kingt2 wrote: According to your argument, "you" can't change as a result of things that happen to you in your life; which is clearly false. I find it to be clearly true. Some of my aspects and attributes may change, but something essential must stay constant, since I remain myself over time. I was born in Florida, I grew up in Kansas, I finished high school in New Jersey, I went to college in DC, I married my wife in Virginia, and I now live in Kansas again. Those events did not occur to different persons; they all occurred to me. Knowledge requires an enduring self; it has to be the same person who examines the data, envisages possible explanations, and evaluates which is most likely. Rationality requires an enduring self; it has to be the same person who grasps the premises, inferences, and conclusion of an argument. Moral responsibility requires an enduring self; it has to be the same person who deliberates an act, then commits it, and then faces the consequences. Kingt2 wrote: How does this agent have the ability to make decisions? I believe that libertarian free will is inherent in every person. Again, it is that simple. Kingt2 wrote: Assuming all of a persons inclinations are toward making decision X, what would motivate that "agent" from deciding on Z? What motivation would the agent draw upon to change that decision from X to Z? This hypothetical is too vague; however, under those circumstances, the agent probably would (freely) choose X. The agent would also usually have the live option to decide on neither X nor Z. How about this scenario: exactly 50% of the agent's desires are for X, exactly 50% are for Z, and doing neither is (for whatever reason) not a possibility. If determinism is true, how does the agent decide in that situation?
"Be attentive. Be intelligent. Be reasonable. Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/18/09 - 07:37 PM:	#123
MarchHare wrote: I'm still not sure how something that is uncaused can be unrandom. One more time: Those decisions are also not uncaused or random; they are directly caused or originated by the (free) agent. MarchHare wrote: The main philosophical issue that I can see is the issue of causality; too get rid of causal determinism, one would have to isolate the specific direct cause that was starting the new causal chain. That would be the free agent himself or herself.
"Be attentive. Be intelligent. Be reasonable. Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kingt2
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Posted 07/18/09 - 08:40 PM:	#124
OK, Aletheist: I think I understand what you are arguing for. I believe that I really understand the way in which you are using "I". But I have so many problems with it, still. Those same ideals can be used even if determinism is true. A compatibilist definition of "I" doesn't deny your conception of "me". I completely agree that there is some sort of enduring "I", but I would argue that it is because of two things that it is "enduring": (1) Because consciousness is linear and remembers it's past, so all past events are recorded and a unique life experience is created, but (2) Consciousness needn't be in libertarian universe to think of itself as a "me". The only thing enduring is the fact that "I" wake up every morning and it's "me" that goes to bed at night. But that is hardly sufficient to convince me that because "I" wake up in the morning and "I" go to sleep at night that there must be some extra-causal agent "me" to make my decisions. I'll have to admit an impasse here...I am convinced that if one thinks seriously about the degree to which who we are is determined by our experiences in life, that he will see just how critical our life's experiences really are. And how who we are and how we think determines our choices, and how there is absolutely no way that when you choose to do something, that you might have "done otherwise". All of the decisions I make, I make because they are what I want to do. If I choose to ride a carousel, and at the moment I decide--the moment of decision--to hop onto the pony, you freeze time, rewind back to that same instance, you are telling me that I would potentially decide "na, I think I'll sit this one out"? What possible reasoning could there be to justify that? *It would seem, then, that if at every* choice, I could potentially have taken any option, my decisions are basically random.** While I concede that there is some enduring "I" idea, there is no "I" apart from my experiences and input from my environment. And because of that who I am is determined by my personal, unique life experience. And I can't possibly do what "I" don't do, so I must act in accordance with "who I am".
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

ecspose
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Posted 07/18/09 - 08:46 PM:	#125
aletheist wrote: I agree, and appreciate you pointing this out. Of course, I believe that the undeniable experience that we all have of free will is powerful evidence for the reality of free will, and therefore casts considerable doubt on the alleged truth of materialistic determinism. When you say the 'reality of free will', I don't understand how you divorce 'reality' from 'experience'. Material determinism never intends to conflict with reality, or experience. Compatibilism requires this. When you say that free will is real, understand that you are not conflicting with the view of the compatibilist. Compatibilism by its very nature, requires harmony between these elements. ecspose wrote: Are all the possibilities of our action accessible by choice? That is to say, are there some things which we simply cannot choose despite the apparent physical possibility? aletheist wrote: I do not quite understand exactly what you are asking here. Can you please clarify? Maybe an example or two would help. Can a person make any choice that involves their actions, can they choose to go right or left at any given turn? There is no hidden meaning to the question, I mean things that appear at least superficially possible, meaning there is nothing outside of the person that should stop them. Are all choices accessible to us, or are there somethings we are prevented from choosing? I'm not talking about things that are obviously beyond our ability, like choosing to manifest physical objects and the like. How much access do we have to choice, can we choose what tastes or smells we like or dislike? Can we choose what we believe? Can we choose our personality? Again, just want to hear your thoughts on this. aletheist wrote: I should have said "material universe", which encompasses time, space, energy, and matter. I obviously do believe that there is more to reality than this. I use Material and Physical interchangeably. Your use of words here would not have changed my answer. The difference in our understanding, is that I do not believe there is more to reality than this, while you clearly do. Do I believe there may be more to reality than we understand? Yes, most definitely. Do I believe there are things which exceed the laws of nature? No, never. When we talk about physical 'Laws', we are talking about observed things from our reality. When our understanding of reality changes, our 'Laws' change. You can never break the laws of physics, you can only amend them. Physical determinism, is just the natural conclusion that reality can be understood.
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aletheist
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Posted 07/19/09 - 07:19 PM:	#126
Kingt2 wrote: I think I understand what you are arguing for. I believe that I really understand the way in which you are using "I". Kingt2 wrote: Those same ideals can be used even if determinism is true. A compatibilist definition of "I" doesn't deny your conception of "me". Right. Although libertarianism requires substance dualism, substance dualism does not require libertarianism. Substance dualism and determinism could conceivably both be true. Kingt2 wrote: I completely agree that there is some sort of enduring "I", but I would argue that it is because of two things that it is "enduring": (1) Because consciousness is linear and remembers it's past, so all past events are recorded and a unique life experience is created, but (2) Consciousness needn't be in libertarian universe to think of itself as a "me". The only thing enduring is the fact that "I" wake up every morning and it's "me" that goes to bed at night. This is all that "I" can be, if physicalism or even just property dualism is true--a mere amalgamation of memories, and the inevitable result of a vast series of deterministic causes. As you know, I find this to be completely inadequate; I do not think that it can plausibly account for our constant and immediate awareness of a unified self, nor the completely private and first-person nature of our experiences. Kingt2 wrote: I'll have to admit an impasse here... I agree; but then, it probably would have been overly optimistic to think that we could resolve the debate on a controversy that has been raging for many centuries! Kingt2 wrote: I am convinced that if one thinks seriously about the degree to which who we are is determined by our experiences in life, that he will see just how critical our life's experiences really are. And how who we are and how we think determines our choices, and how there is absolutely no way that when you choose to do something, that you might have "done otherwise". I am equally convinced that if one thinks seriously about the degree to which we have the ability (and responsibility) to make free choices, one will see just how critical our life's decisions really are, and how there is absolutely no way that when you choose to do something, you could not possibly have done otherwise. Kingt2 wrote: All of the decisions I make, I make because they are what I want to do. But is what you want to do at all up to you, or is it completely determined for you? If the latter, than you play no active role; you are just one link--or an arbitrarily defined grouping of links--in an enormous chain of causes that stretches back to the beginning of time. Kingt2 wrote: If I choose to ride a carousel, and at the moment I decide--the moment of decision--to hop onto the pony, you freeze time, rewind back to that same instance, you are telling me that I would potentially decide "na, I think I'll sit this one out"? What possible reasoning could there be to justify that? Frankly, this is looking at the situation in the wrong way. You cannot "freeze time" or "rewind back to that same instance." The issue is simply whether, at that moment, you had a genuine choice about whether or not to ride the carousel. Once you made that choice--one way or the other--it was in the past; and we can all agree that the past is "determined", in the sense that no one can choose it or change it. The fundamental question, really, is whether the present and the future are just as fixed as the past. Kingt2 wrote: *It would seem, then, that if at every* choice, I could potentially have taken any option, my decisions are basically random.** Epistemically, to another observer, maybe so; ontologically, to the person making the decisions, certainly not. Kingt2 wrote: While I concede that there is some enduring "I" idea, there is no "I" apart from my experiences and input from my environment. And because of that who I am is determined by my personal, unique life experience. And I can't possibly do what "I" don't do, so I must act in accordance with "who I am". My past is determined now, although much of it was shaped along the way by my free choices and their consequences; but "I" am not identical with my past. I cannot possibly have done what I did not do; but I could have done otherwise at that time.
"Be attentive. Be intelligent. Be reasonable. Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/19/09 - 07:57 PM:	#127
ecspose wrote: When you say that free will is real, understand that you are not conflicting with the view of the compatibilist. Compatibilism by its very nature, requires harmony between these elements. Except that, in order to make free will and determinism compatible, it is necessary to define free will differently from how libertarians do. Instead of the ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances, it becomes simply the ability to think or act in accordance with one's character, desires, etc. This is why my ongoing exchange with Kingt2 has shifted to the question of whether one's character, desires, etc. are fully determined, and whether one's decisions must always be in accordance with one's character, desires, etc. While libertarians certainly acknowledge that we have this kind of free will, we believe that it goes further than that--and must go further than that for the concept of moral responsibility to be genuinely meaningful. ecspose wrote: Can a person make any choice that involves their actions, can they choose to go right or left at any given turn? There is no hidden meaning to the question, I mean things that appear at least superficially possible, meaning there is nothing outside of the person that should stop them. Are all choices accessible to us, or are there somethings we are prevented from choosing? I'm not talking about things that are obviously beyond our ability, like choosing to manifest physical objects and the like. If I understand your question right, then the libertarian short answer is yes. ecspose wrote: How much access do we have to choice, can we choose what tastes or smells we like or dislike? Can we choose what we believe? Can we choose our personality? Again, just want to hear your thoughts on this. I have always acknowledged that there are limitations on our choices, even under the libertarian view. Taste and smell preferences strike me as having a more "hard-wired" physical basis, but we can still choose to try new things or even give things that we have disliked in the past another chance. Beliefs are trickier; we generally cannot choose them directly, but we can indirectly decide what evidence we will accept or investigate, and what standards we will use to evaluate it. Personality is certainly shaped by past events and experiences, none of which we can change now, and many of which were never within our control; but our free choices along the way did (and do) affect what events and experiences happened (and will happen) to us. ecspose wrote: Physical determinism, is just the natural conclusion that reality can be understood. That reality can be understood by humans, at least to some extent, is obviously a presupposition; an indispensable one, of course. But then, human behavior is often one of the most difficult aspects of reality to understand! Edited by aletheist on 07/20/09 - 09:20 AM
"Be attentive. Be intelligent. Be reasonable. Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/20/09 - 12:26 PM:	#128
aletheist, Substance dualist libertarianism holds that each and every person (or "self") is, fundamentally, an enduring non-physical entity with inherent causal power, and thus is the ultimate cause of his or her own decisions. Those decisions are not caused or determined by any prior chain of causes or events, although they may be (and usually are) influenced by such factors--in some cases, quite strongly. Those decisions are also not uncaused or random; they are directly caused or originated by the (free) agent, who has the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. This statement can only make sense if what you mean by "random" is not simply "non-deterministic". If that is the case, you need to specify what you do mean by random. As it is, I cannot make any sense out of what you are trying to say. First you say that the agent has the genuine ability to take more than one course of action given a set of circumstances. This means that the action that will be taken is not determined by those circumstances. Note that these circumstances include not only the state of affairs of the physical world, but also the state and very nature of your allegedly non-physical agent. This sounds to me like the very definition of random. If I told somebody that the agent was random, and they asked me what I meant, I would basically say exactly the above. That the action it takes is not determined by the state of affairs the world or itself. I suppose that they might appear to be random to an observer, simply because they are not perfectly predictable; but epistemic randomness does not entail ontological randomness. How they appear is irrelevant. The issue is that "ontological randomness" just means "not deterministic". The term "random" does not imply or entail anything more than "not deterministic". Nor can I see any meaningful way that it could entail more than that. Once you establish that something is producing effects randomly, what you have established is that for any given set of circumstances, it can produce any of some set of possible effects, where the circumstances can influence the relative probabilities of a particular event being produced, but cannot fully determine which event will be produced. How does this differ from your agent? More to the point, what does any of this have to do with "freedom"? Again, to say that the will is free is to say that it is free from something. What is it free from in your scenario that it is not free from in a purely deterministic model? Or in a non-deterministic model where you have random influences (for example, from quantum effects)? The agent weighs the various factors, and then makes a free choice. It really is that simple. It isn't that simple. The question is how it makes that choice. You seem to be trying to indicate that there is not mechanism, but that seems more like an excuse for avoiding the question than an actual explanation of what you're claiming. DM
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Kingt2
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Posted 07/20/09 - 02:34 PM:	#129
aletheist wrote: This is all that "I" can be, if physicalism or even just property dualism is true--a mere amalgamation of memories, and the inevitable result of a vast series of deterministic causes. As you know, I find this to be completely inadequate; I do not think that it can plausibly account for our constant and immediate awareness of a unified self, nor the completely private and first-person nature of our experiences. You don't think it's adequate? Why? It seems very adequate to me...You've left out an important part of your description. "I am a conscious amalgamation of memories, and the inevitable result of a vast series of deterministic causes." I have an awareness of my specific experiences of the universe. My awareness is of a flowing intake of stimuli from a single perspective [that is, a single eye-brain system, which easily accounts for why I have such a constant and immediate awareness of a unified self; I have no choice in the matter; that's what conscious is. I agree; but then, it probably would have been overly optimistic to think that we could resolve the debate on a controversy that has been raging for many centuries! Unless we assume that it is an unsolvable problem, we must assume that a resolution will come at some point, no? lol but I know what you mean, I agree. I am equally convinced that if one thinks seriously about the degree to which we have the ability (and responsibility) to make free choices, We cannot show that we have free-will based on the premise that we have responsibility for our actions. The very concept of responsibility was created as a result of the supposition of free will. Besides, as I've argued, responsibility isn't taken away in a compatibilist universe, in fact, it is likely more important. [see my thread "another attempt at compatiblism for my latest post, which refers to this very point ==> http://forums.philosophyforums.com...ilism-35859-2.html[/quote] ] one will see just how critical our life's decisions really are, and how there is absolutely no way that when you choose to do something, you could not possibly have done otherwise. What? It is critical that I be able to undermine my decisions by being able to choose something else for seemingly no reason at all? I think that it would be more critical to our responsibility that our decisions are exactly what we would do in a situation; a definite, set-in-stone decision reflects more accurately on who we are than one that could potentially have been any other decision. As I've noted before, just as I have no choice over who i become because I have no control over the conditions of my existence--what I perceive, when I perceive it, etc--a libertarian has no choice in who he is either, since who he is is apparently "assigned" to him at conception. Or do you argue that you were able to shape and form your own "me"? Then, if the libertarian has no choice in who he has become, then he can't really say to have any deeper a connection with his decisions than a compatibilist, in fact, he has less of a connection. Since his decisions can, given the opportunity, be changed without cause, his decisions do not reflect anything about him. A determinist/compatibilist, at least, makes decisions that display exactly who he is. But is what you want to do at all up to you, or is it completely determined for you? Both. What I want to do is determined by the infinitely complex causal cosmos. But it is also exactly what "I" want to do. Precisely because "I" am the result of this body's unique genetic make-up and unique perspective experience. I am conscious of my past, and of my decision making, and so I can "make" decisions. Whether or not my decisions are based outside of the causal chain is irrelevant, as long as I make decisions, and as long as I believe that I am making them freely, then I have free-will. If the latter, than you play no active role; you are just one link--or an arbitrarily defined grouping of links--in an enormous chain of causes that stretches back to the beginning of time. Incorrect. Remember, [b]By themselves, the events and stimuli that have "created" me, are as they are. They do not have any power to do anything, in fact, without my existence, a whole segment of causality is lost among them. However, with my existence comes a unique personal perspective which can take in experiences and stimuli and which can, as a result of my emergent personality, effect and affect the world around me. I am therefore and integral part of the chain and am a unique causal agent. The events which have shaped me into "me" cannot claim responsibility for my actions, since, without the connection between external stimuli and my physiology--which is to say "me"--there would be no actions to speak of. Frankly, this is looking at the situation in the wrong way. You cannot "freeze time" or "rewind back to that same instance." The issue is simply whether, at that moment, you had a genuine choice about whether or not to ride the carousel. Then yes. Even in a hard determinist's conceptualization of the universe I would have a genuine choice. As I've noted earlier, the external choices don't disappear simply because of the causal chain. I still have the options of (a) ride the carousel, or (b) don't ride the carousel. Just because the causal nature of the universe is such that I would always choose (a), doesn't mean that I didn't have a "choice". Do you want a choice about choices? How about a choice about choices about choices? Isn't it enough that I am faced with a choice, A or B, at time X I make a decision: A? I have made a decision which suits me. Why would I care about having the ability to have chosen B? The option was always there, I just didn't want it. As I said, you have to remember that it is a fact that we believe we have free will, which means that all of our choices are made with the assumption "free will is valid". So, if I choose A, it is because I want to choose A, I have decided to choose A. The ability to "have chosen" B is superfluous; unnecessary for free will. Epistemically, to another observer, maybe so; ontologically, to the person making the decisions, certainly not. If I can make any decision at any time, then how do any of my decisions actually reflect on me? I cannot possibly have done what I did not do; but I could have done otherwise at that time. If I've chosen A it is because I decided that A was the best choice, if I am able to choose B, then my reasoning is meaningless, and I should forgo it altogether and simply rely on that "me" agent which doesn't rely on my past experiences in order to make decisions.
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

aletheist
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Posted 07/20/09 - 05:29 PM:	#130
Death Monkey wrote: This statement can only make sense if what you mean by "random" is not simply "non-deterministic". If that is the case, you need to specify what you do mean by random. I denied very early in this thread that undetermined = random and proposed the following terminology way back in post #47. aletheist wrote: Determined = entirely caused (dictated) by prior events Agent-caused = caused by an agent, influenced (but not dictated) by prior events Random = neither caused nor influenced by prior events I hope that helps. Death Monkey wrote: Again, to say that the will is free is to say that it is free from something. What is it free from in your scenario that it is not free from in a purely deterministic model? Well, determinism, of course! More seriously, if all of my "choices" are entirely caused (dictated) by prior events, the vast majority of which occurred before I even existed, then I do not see how I am free at all; I am really just going through the (deterministic) motions. Death Monkey wrote: It isn't that simple. The question is how it makes that choice. I really do not know what else there is to add to what I have already said. It is not necessary to be able to explain exactly how a human agent makes free choices in order to affirm that a human agent does make free choices.
"Be attentive. Be intelligent. Be reasonable. Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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