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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

aletheist
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Posted 07/15/09 - 09:42 AM:	#101
ecspose wrote: One thing we should both be able to agree on, is that we do experience free will. I'd say this is the foundation for any (serious) argument supporting free will, it's the one priori that is irreducible. I agree, and appreciate you pointing this out. Of course, I believe that the undeniable experience that we all have of free will is powerful evidence for the reality of free will, and therefore casts considerable doubt on the alleged truth of materialistic determinism. ecspose wrote: Are all the possibilities of our action accessible by choice? That is to say, are there some things which we simply cannot choose despite the apparent physical possibility? I do not quite understand exactly what you are asking here. Can you please clarify? Maybe an example or two would help. ecspose wrote: "All" and "Universe" are pretty inclusive. I don't believe that there is anything beyond this. I should have said "material universe", which encompasses time, space, energy, and matter. I obviously do believe that there is more to reality than this.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Death Monkey
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Posted 07/15/09 - 09:48 AM:	#102
aletheist, Except that if determinism is true, all "internal forces" are the necessary results of "external [coercive] forces". In this sense, all human actions are "mandated by external [coercive] forces," so by your definition, no humans have free will. This does not follow. There are no external agencies forcing my brain to perform the processes that constitute "making choices". My brain's processes are contstrained by the laws of physics, but this is not an example of some external agency forcing me to make a particular choice. The laws of physics are not some "thing" that somehow forces matter to behave the way it does. They are a description of the nature of matter. To argue that my will is not free because it is constrained by its own nature, is nonsensical. How could anything not be constrained by its own nature? If the will not even being constrained by its own nature is a necessary criteria for your conception of free will, then your conception of free will is nonsensical to begin with. DM
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aletheist
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Posted 07/15/09 - 11:00 AM:	#103
Death Monkey wrote: To argue that my will is not free because it is constrained by its own nature, is nonsensical. How could anything not be constrained by its own nature? If the will not even being constrained by its own nature is a necessary criteria for your conception of free will, then your conception of free will is nonsensical to begin with. I do not believe that I have ever argued for this. I have consistently defined free will as the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action (not any course of thought or action) under a given set of circumstances (not any circumstances whatsoever). I have acknowledged that my choices are constrained and otherwise influenced by various factors, many of which are not within my control, and my own nature is certainly one of those. However, if that nature is completely determined by mindless, purposeless, material processes, then every "choice" that I make is also completely determined by mindless, purposeless, material processes--not by "me". Keep in mind, I reject the assertion that "I" am my brain or that "I" consist entirely of matter.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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Posted 07/15/09 - 11:37 AM:	#104
aletheist wrote: ..Keep in mind, I reject the assertion that "I" am my brain or that "I" consist entirely of matter. How does the immaterial mind help you? I do not see that it could.. Either the immaterial is also casual and determined, or else it is not. If it is not, then it does not follow from what you want. If it is, then it seems to be subject to the exact same deterministic processes as the material. Either way, there is no extra freedom.

Kingt2
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Posted 07/15/09 - 02:21 PM:	#105
aletheist wrote: Except that if determinism is true, all "internal forces" are the necessary results of "external [coercive] forces". In this sense, all human actions are "mandated by external [coercive] forces," so by your definition, no humans have free will. You misunderstand. Seeing a grandparent die as a child does not actively affect any one point in your life. The experience, and how your brain deals with it psychologically, help to shape your psyche. Then, that experience--that external experience--becomes an internal force. You can only experience something as "My experience of the thing", and so that experience becomes a part of who you are, a now "internal" force that is to some degree responsible for the way in which you act. I'm not sure how you could deny that. Anyway, those internal forces, which include all conscious experiences, all unconscious information, all physiology, are what make you up. They are responsible for how you act. To deny that you act a certain way because of what you've experienced in your life would be nonsensical. Do you deny that you would act the same way you do now if you had been born in Ghana? My point here is that these internal forces are really just how you've experienced the things in your life, and how they helped to make you, "you". An external force would be a guy holding a gun to your head; or maybe a woman needing to get an abortion if something horrible goes wrong with the pregnancy. It sounds like your own experience tells you, realistically, that you have (libertarian) free will. Why are you so intent on denying this strong intuition? My experience tells me that I make choices. I don't deny that I do; I simply argue that, had my life been different, I would make different ones. But given that i've lived the life I do, I can't possibly act in any way that is not how I would act in that situation. That would be true only if the choice you make is free (in the libertarian sense). If your choice is determined, then you make it because it is necessary, not the other way around. It's really both. Assuming the deterministic nature of the universe, my choice is necessary from a causal point of view. However it is only "necessary" in the sense that, in order to be consistent with the causal chain, it must be made. That causal chain, I argue, is in fact the same causal "things" that make me "me". The choice is necessary because if I am to act the way "I" would act, I must make decisions that "I" would make, given my "state". I would have made different decisions and had different experiences, but I would still have been "me". In what way? You would think differently, act differently, speak differently, know different people, know different things, carry yourself differently, have different tastes; the list goes on. How can you argue that you would still be "you"? Here, again, is where I note the use of essence, a completely vacuous term. If you and that other person who lives in Africa can both be "you", then why can't I? I look different, act different, etc, but how do you know that I'm not the same "Me" as you are? To me, an agent is simply someone who has the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. If determinism is true, then there is no such thing as an agent. I cannot help you with "me-agent"; that is your term, not mine. That's entirely circular reasoning, then. "Free will is the ability for an agent to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances." "Oh, wow! What's an agent?" "An Agent is someone who has the ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances." "Well, then I guess free will is true!" You can't presuppose libertarian free will to prove free will... Sure there is an agent in determinism. We can affect the causal chain. That is to say, all of the things in my life which have made me "me" could not have, by themselves, made the causal effects that I make every day. Thus, I am an agent of cause in the system. How can one person be two different persons at two different times? Apparently we have different definitions of "person", as well. Of course, you are the same vessel. But nearly everything about you is likely different. I'm saying that your mind, how you think of yourself, and how you think in general is different, and thus, you are not the "same". Are you saying that you are what you know? I am not my thoughts, but surely they have something to do with it, eh? Are you the same person who read my last comment? If not, what happened to that person? I am not the "same" as I was a moment ago. Same "person"--it is often difficult to find the right words, limitations of speech and all that--but surely not the "same". Except that my concept of self is based in reality. My concept of self involves real things, real events, and some [I cannot argue all] provable points. For example, it is easily shown--and probably unanimously accepted--that childhood events help to form [sometimes even drastically] our personalities. My concept of self invokes nothing metaphysical or spiritual; only that the combination of physiology and external stimuli work to create an entire "personality" which we cannot ourselves refer to as anything different than "I". You haven't even really defined yours yet... [quote]"The only thing"? What "volition"? I haven't yet ceased to argue that we make decisions and that those decisions are legitimately desired by us. That what I choose to do is something that I personally want to do [or decide that i have to do]. That is "volition". And I argue that we have this "volition" because we are a certain way, and the things we experience shape that certain way. I argue that "I" make choices of my own volition, but that I can not choose to "be" any other than what I am, and so I cannot choose anything other than what I would choose at that point. This is a great question! Your mistake is thinking that everything about you changes. There has to be something permanent that makes you "you". If everything physical about you changes, then there has to be something non-physical about you that does not change. This is an argument that I'm not sure would hold up. I'm quite sure that everything about me has changed since my conception. Since my birth. Maybe even since I was three or four. Certainly after that there may be some tendencies or other small things that have endured, but surely I continue to change more and more. And I'm sure that you can agree that I have changed entirely [heck, even my DNA has changed slightly due to mutations and such] since my conception. So then: If I have changed entirely since my conception, when did I become the "me" that endures. If we are to assume that I am "me" since conception, then it can't be true that "I" must endure. And if we do not say that "I" am me since conception, then it isn't necessary for I to endure. So, to me, the idea of an enduring "me" seems nonsensical. Why do you assume that it is an illusion? Why not seriously consider the possibility that the idea of an enduring identity is reality, and the whole notion of materialistic determinism is the illusion? See above In the materialistic-deterministic world, "you" are just an arbitrary amalgamation of particles obeying mindless, purposeless physical laws. Incorrect. "I" I am a life-form which takes in external stimuli and responds to them physically and psychologically forming a complex set of tendencies [and even capable of reflecting on the way these things happen]. "I" I am a life-form that cannot act in any way that is not in accordance with the nature of my species, and I certainly cannot act in a way not consistent with how I've developed; but I have feelings, I have ideas, I have desires, etc. I make choices. I make them for conscious and unconscious reasons, and it's these reasons which are resultant from external things being experienced by the internal mind. don't forget: we still make decisions in my view. A decision IS made, whether or not I could have physically chosen otherwise. But without any prior experiences, who were "you" at that precise moment? "who" was I? I, too, agree that "I" became "me" at conception, but only because at that point the causal chain began for what would be "me". Of course, there are an infinite amount of factors that went into my existence prior to my conception: like my father's diet and the health of his sperm, my mothers anti-bodies, how stressed my parents were that day, etc; but none of those things directly affected what would be "me". At conception, anything there-after would have an effect on who I would become. "He" does not choose anything. His "choices" are already determined for him. You aren't really grasping this. No offense intended, of course, I'm not saying you aren't capable of it, I'm saying that you aren't getting what I'm arguing for. You think you make choices, right? You might sit down and think about your options for a bit, take your time, make sure you're making the best decision you possibly can. So we can agree that, in reality, choices are made, correct? However, in reality, is there ever a point where a person can make a decision at time X, then have time stop and rewind, so that any experiences gained after time X have been taken away, and then made a different decision at time X, again? So we can then also agree that any choice we have to make will, ultimately, only have ONE decision. When we make those decisions it is because we want to make them; my decision is what I've decided. To say that I could go back to that same instance and change what I've decided for no apparent reason is to undermine my thought process. Scenario: I think deliberately about what to do in a situation, and make decision A at time X. If I rewind time to the exact moment of time X, where I would have finally had myself convinced that A is the right choice--as was evident in the fact that I actually did decide that it was already, you are saying that some sort of "agent" could waltz in and say, no, wait. I know that I've already figured this out and want to go with A, but "I choose C!" I say that that is absurd. Absolutely not! We hold him responsible because he chose to kill when he could have done otherwise. We hold him responsible because, given the choice between killing and not killing, he chose to kill; despite the lack of coercive external forces demanding that he kill. If the only forces demanding him to choose to kill are those forces that make up "who he is", then he is still guilty. Again, why? He was not the ultimate cause of his belief, his choice, or his action; all of those things were determined for him. In a sense, there is no "him" to be responsible; calling the particular group of atoms that constitute "him" a single entity is arbitrary. Also, according to you, the person who committed the murders no longer exists a moment later; so why punish a different person, who happens to be associated with the same physical body? Are you the ultimate cause of your actions? Why do you work where you do? If you were the ultimate cause of your actions, wouldn't you be doing exactly what you wanted? Or is it rather that you make decisions that you are not the ultimate cause of all the time, and in fact you cannot be the ultimate cause for you decisions because you always have "reasons" for them. There is no such thing as an "ultimate" cause in any real sense. Yes, of course. Do you have a problem with that? If so, why? No. lol, that is a fine example of the subjectivity of things. I am sorry, but this just makes less and less sense to me. I have absolutely nothing to do with who I am, but I should be proud of who I am anyway? And your definition of bravery seems rather impoverished to me. You have no control over who you are in your model, either. Why should you be proud? All your "me-agent" does, really, is offer some sort of "final say"; did "you" get to choose who "you" are? But if "you have no other choice but to act in a way that is consistent with who you are," then "your decisions are out of your control"! How does this make sense? If my decisions are under my control in so far as they remain consistent with what who I am, then how are they out of my control? If "under my control" means "made by 'me'" then any decision that remains constant with "who I am" and is "made by me" is certainly under my control. #76 I'll take a look
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

Kingt2
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Posted 07/15/09 - 03:55 PM:	#106
To the incompatibilist, free will and moral responsibility require that I have inherent causal power, such that my choices are uniquely mine and are not completely determined by prior events. To the compatibilist, it is sufficient that my choices are consistent with my desires, even if those desires--and therefore the resulting choices--are completely determined by prior events. I'm going to agree here, but with the qualification that I agree as far as I understand what you've written. Though, I believe that it is far to simplistic a description. I would argue that even a compatibilist can argue that my choices are uniquely mine, despite the fact that my desires are determined by prior events. Those events, by themselves, can do nothing. They are meaningless and have only a limited effect on the environment. However, with the introduction of a person, those events can be experienced, and the particular experience of those events combined with that person's unique physiology will together result in a person's decision making. Thus, while the reasons behind the decision are completely determined, one cannot deny the existence of a causal agent. And my decisions are--necessarily--uniquely mine.
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

aletheist
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Posted 07/15/09 - 05:10 PM:	#107
Rather than rehash the same ground that we have already covered more than once, I will limit my comments to just a few specific points. Kingt2 wrote: Here, again, is where I note the use of essence, a completely vacuous term. Where did I ever use that term? Since you brought it up, how would you define it? Why do you find it vacuous? Kingt2 wrote: That's entirely circular reasoning, then. "Free will is the ability for an agent to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances." "Oh, wow! What's an agent?" "An Agent is someone who has the ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances." "Well, then I guess free will is true!" You can't presuppose libertarian free will to prove free will... I never tried to do that. You asked me how I define an agent, and I told you. My definitions are such that an agent is nothing more or less than someone who has (libertarian) free will. That does not prove anything, and was never intended to do so. Because you and I define free will differently, we also define an agent differently. Kingt2 wrote: We can affect the causal chain. That is to say, all of the things in my life which have made me "me" could not have, by themselves, made the causal effects that I make every day. Thus, I am an agent of cause in the system. But you are a determined agent, not a free agent. If A causes B, and B causes C, is it not the case that A causes C? B is nothing more than an intermediate step in the causal chain. To me, that is insufficient to call B an agent. Otherwise, why not call A an agent, as well? Why not call each individual experience that you have had an agent? Why not call the sun an agent, since without it you would not even exist, much less make causal effects every day? Kingt2 wrote: Of course, you are the same vessel. But nearly everything about you is likely different. How can I be "the same vessel" if "nearly everything about [me] is likely different"? And if nearly everything about me is likely different, then almost certainly something about me is still the same. Kingt2 wrote: Except that my concept of self is based in reality. Reality as you believe it to be. You could be mistaken, no? Kingt2 wrote: My concept of self invokes nothing metaphysical or spiritual It begs the question to presuppose that a "concept of self" that "invokes nothing metaphysical or spiritual" is somehow more likely to be true. Kingt2 wrote: So then: If I have changed entirely since my conception, when did I become the "me" that endures. You are begging the question yet again. Kingt2 wrote: If we are to assume that I am "me" since conception, then it can't be true that "I" must endure. Huh? Kingt2 wrote: I, too, agree that "I" became "me" at conception, but only because at that point the causal chain began for what would be "me". Of course, there are an infinite amount of factors that went into my existence prior to my conception: like my father's diet and the health of his sperm, my mothers anti-bodies, how stressed my parents were that day, etc; but none of those things directly affected what would be "me". At conception, anything there-after would have an effect on who I would become. This just seems like a completely arbitrary distinction, given materialistic determinism. The causal chain for what would be "you" began at the inception of the material universe. Kingt2 wrote: You aren't really grasping this. No offense intended, of course, I'm not saying you aren't capable of it, I'm saying that you aren't getting what I'm arguing for. No, I am pretty sure that I get it--remember, I complimented you both here and in the other thread on your presentation of the compatibilist position. I simply disagree with you. Kingt2 wrote: You have no control over who you are in your model, either. Why should you be proud? All your "me-agent" does, really, is offer some sort of "final say"; did "you" get to choose who "you" are? In my model, I do have (some) control over what I do. If I choose to do something self-sacrificing, but genuinely could have done otherwise, it seems to me that such behavior would be legitimately praiseworthy.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/15/09 - 05:42 PM:	#108
Kingt2 wrote: I'm going to agree here, but with the qualification that I agree as far as I understand what you've written. I do appreciate the feedback. Kingt2 wrote: Though, I believe that it is far to simplistic a description. I like to keep things as simple and straightforward as possible. I believe that doing so can often bring helpful clarity, even if the result is finding out that one's understanding of the subject matter--especially the opponent's position--is incorrect, or perhaps just inadequate. Frankly, the kind of lengthy back-and-forth in which we have been engaging lately gets tiresome after a while--not because the topic is no longer interesting, or because of any personal animosity, but mainly just because we get so deep into picking apart the minutiae that we lose sight of the more fundamental issues. I am as guilty of this as anyone. Kingt2 wrote: I would argue that even a compatibilist can argue that my choices are uniquely mine, despite the fact that my desires are determined by prior events. Well, okay. As you know, we pour different meanings into the words "choices" and "uniquely mine". If you take out "are uniquely mine", I do not believe that the incompatibilist position is significantly compromised.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

play
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Posted 07/15/09 - 06:21 PM:	#109
ecspose wrote: Who's to say whether our choices are a result of billiard ball physics, or if billiard ball physics are assembled around our choices. What I mean is, who is to say whether a thing happens because we choose it to, or whether our choice is a result of things happening? Information is processed before it reaches conscious attention. Your brain sends a signal to move your arm a split second before you feel you made the choice to move it. The only difference between choosing to move your arm and a reflex is your brain letting your conscious attention know what's about to happen and that gives the illusion of an ego that has a choice in the matter. There is no free will because there simply isn't a will. There isn't a "chooser." There is no ghost in the machine. Like an optical illusion of two lines being different lengths when you've measured and know they are the same length. We will persistently see the lines as different lengths and we will persistently feel like an ego behind the eyes, even when we know they are both illusions.
There once was a man who said so, "It seems that I know that I know. But what I would like to see Is the I that knows me when I know that I know that I know."

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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/16/09 - 12:00 PM:	#110
aletheist, I do not believe that I have ever argued for this. I have consistently defined free will as the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action (not any course of thought or action) under a given set of circumstances (not any circumstances whatsoever). We already have a word for that. Random. If the given circumstances result in two possible choices, one which has a 10% chance of being made, and the other 90%, then your conditions are met. But how is that any more "free" that if only one choice would be made under those circumstances? That's just adding a random influence into an otherwise deterministic system. And if the will is deterministic, then when you declare that it is not free because it can only make one choice under a given set of circumstances, you are claiming that it is not free because it is constrained by its own nature. I have acknowledged that my choices are constrained and otherwise influenced by various factors, many of which are not within my control, and my own nature is certainly one of those. However, if that nature is completely determined by mindless, purposeless, material processes, then every "choice" that I make is also completely determined by mindless, purposeless, material processes--not by "me". Wrong. If your nature is completely determined by material processes, then you are material processes. So the "not by me" part above is clearly incorrect. As is your characterization of those forces as being "mindless" and "purposeless", because you are not mindless or purposeless. Keep in mind, I reject the assertion that "I" am my brain or that "I" consist entirely of matter. Irrelevant. Even if there is something other than matter involved, the above still applies. If you are a deterministic process, then your choices are not determined by mindless, purposeless processes rather than "you". They are determined by a combination of mindless, purposeless processes, and a mindful, purposeful process that is you. DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.

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