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Compatibilism
How free-will and determinism can co-exist

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Compatibilism

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 10:14 AM:	#91
ecspose wrote: But to answer your question, yes, every single thing within a limited scope, could hypothetically be predicted. Not perfectly mind you, but so close to perfect the difference would be negligible. What significance do you suppose this holds for us? The question was whether the prediction would be infallible; i.e., perfect. You seem to be saying yes and no at the same time; not infallible, but so close to infallible that no one could tell the difference. But the prediction would either be infallible (correct for an infinite number of scenarios) or not (incorrect at least once). And I should have qualified that what I meant by "factors" are the physical/observable ones; my contention is that someone who only had access to those, even all of them, would nevertheless be unable to predict my decisions infallibly. ecspose wrote: Would you say that every time you feel hungry or thirsty you are being coerced? Of course not. Am I compelled to eat something every time I feel hungry? Am I compelled to drink something every time I feel thirsty? ecspose wrote: How many genuine options for existence do you suppose we actually have? How do you tie this with your idea of being prevented from taking more than one course. Do you have a choice that you are born? Do you have a choice that you will die? Again, the point is not that I am free to take any course of thought or action under any circumstances; clearly, this is not the case. The situation in which I find myself may be (and often is) largely beyond my control, but the choices that I make within that situation are mine. ecspose wrote: According to your description, coercion is seemingly everywhere. If determinism is true, yes; but then, I deny determinism. ecspose wrote: Should we liberate people from the cultural influences that helped shape them? What about the biological influences? Biological and (especially) cultural influences are largely the result of the vast number of free choices that other humans have already made throughout history, and are still making every day. ecspose wrote: At what point do we magically we say we are "in control" of what we are? There is nothing "magic" about it. We make free choices, and thus affect who we are and who we will become, from the very beginning. Although we are never in complete control, we also never have no say whatsoever. ecspose wrote: We can make decisions about ourselves, but it still comes from "us", and at some point we are not accountable for our own origin. True enough, but we are accountable for all of our subsequent choices. My origin does not determine my decisions; I do. ecspose wrote: We have to engage reality at the level we experience it at. From our experience we make choices. It doesn't really matter what's going on behind the scenes. For an unreflective person, this is certainly true. But then, an unreflective person will almost always assume that he/she has genuine free will--that his/her choices are his/her own, not dictated by other causes--and live accordingly.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 10:24 AM:	#92
Makarismos wrote: If you are a immaterial soul, and you existed before your own birth, then why does this give you more choice? Just to be clear, I believe that my existence began at the moment of my conception; I did not exist before that. Makarismos wrote: You did not chose your own soul? You did not chose your own 'personality'/'character' which resulted from this soul? You were infact created before you had a choice about what you were going to be. Obviously, it would be nonsense to say that I chose anything before I existed. Please see my previous post, in response to ecspose, for some further comments on this.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

ecspose
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Posted 07/12/09 - 03:09 PM:	#93
ecspose wrote: According to your description [of coercion], coercion is seemingly everywhere. aletheist wrote: If determinism is true, yes; but then, I deny determinism. Interesting qualifier. I would then ask, according to your understanding, at what point does coercion occur? What distinction are you making between events where you have genuine ability to take more than one action in, and events where you do not? Do you not have a genuine ability to choose in spite of coercion? How does coercion exist at all? aletheist wrote: Again, the point is not that I am free to take any course of thought or action under any circumstances; clearly, this is not the case. The situation in which I find myself may be (and often is) largely beyond my control, but the choices that I make within that situation are mine. You seem to be saying that you don't have control over your initial state, or all the factors of your subsequent circumstance, but accepting all this there is an element (with which you are only satisfied in describing as 'you', and is immune to reduction), that is genuinely free to make real any possibility that involves your actions, and operates outside of material determinism. Would you say this is a fair summary of your position? aletheist wrote: The question was whether the prediction would be infallible; i.e., perfect. You seem to be saying yes and no at the same time; not infallible, but so close to infallible that no one could tell the difference. But the prediction would either be infallible (correct for an infinite number of scenarios) or not (incorrect at least once). It would not be infallible only because a situation allowing for complete understanding of events would be theoretically impossible. But if we forget that for a moment, and assume a small and simple universe, then yes every choice you make could be predicted. If your brain was modeled down to the last neuron, and an identical 'you' was put in a separate universe with no influences from our universe, and then you yourself were put in an identical and separate universe, and every atom and subatomic state was identical at the point you were placed there, then yes every decision and action that you make would be the same as the identical you in the identical universe. If the copy of you was placed at a sooner point in time, then it would be known in advance what you would do. Large concessions have been made to allow this scenario, and I question whether it has robbed meaning from the question as it was originally intended. ecspose wrote: Would you say that every time you feel hungry or thirsty you are being coerced? aletheist wrote: Of course not. Am I compelled to eat something every time I feel hungry? Am I compelled to drink something every time I feel thirsty? This is more of a thought experiment, but have you tried to not eat when you are hungry, and not drink when you are thirsty? You may put it off for a period of time, but it seems awfully coincidental to me that you were never compelled to eat or drink yet you did in fact eat and drink every time you (involuntarily) became 'influenced' to do so. You eat and drink not just because you involuntarily feel inclined to do so, but because you understand the consequence if you do not. So do consequences beyond our control constitute coercive forces? If not why not? ecspose wrote: We have to engage reality at the level we experience it at. From our experience we make choices. It doesn't really matter what's going on behind the scenes. aletheist wrote: For an unreflective person, this is certainly true. But then, an unreflective person will almost always assume that he/she has genuine free will--that his/her choices are his/her own, not dictated by other causes--and live accordingly. Quite right. For the reflective person, the issue would primarily be the question of where their self starts and their environment ends. Further reflection may indicate there there is no boundary, putting the question to rest. If we ever gain the ability to accurately predict the course of future events, it may become an issue again only because we will actually have to deal with the dual nature of the determined-free-will. aletheist wrote: It would help me if you (or anyone else) would comment on post #76. Does it provide a fair summary of the compatibilist position? Is my ultimate/proximate distinction appropriate? aletheist in post #76 wrote: Here is the compatibilist position, as I understand it: c1. Even if everything is completely determined, I am still the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions. c2. If I am the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions, then I have free will and moral responsibility. c3. Therefore, even if everything is completely determined, I still have free will and moral responsibility. Fairly accurate, the only change I would make is the wording in c2: "Even though I may be only the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions, I still experience free will and moral responsibility."
Self replication leads to self replication

Kingt2
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Posted 07/12/09 - 04:38 PM:	#94
aletheist wrote: I had to think about this for a while. Do I agree that I "wouldn't choose anything different were the scenario to be repeated"? Is it a "fact" that I "will choose the same thing given an infinite number of identical situations"? You might be surprised--I lean toward saying yes. However, as you might expect, I want to make a couple of qualifications that I think are crucial. Let's see 1. The fact that I would always make the same choice in a perfectly identical situation does not entail that it is necessary for me to do so; i.e., it is not impossible for me to do otherwise. It sounds like you might agree with this; in which case, I think that compatibilists would do well to stop disputing the libertarian definition of free will and focus instead, as you seem to have done, on the question of whether the "self" that makes choices is completely determined. Which leads me to . . . first, I think an actual definition of free will needs to be agreed upon. No one seems to agree that the other is speaking of anything meaningful. Then, I do believe that it is not necessary for you to act the way you do, it is simply the case that you do. I do believe that it is impossible for you to act otherwise, though. I'll expand in response to your next point. 2. If another "self" were placed in the exact same scenario, including all of the precise prior causes/influences that I had experienced up to that point, then it is possible that a different choice would be made (every time). Well: 1. If another person--I'll not use the world self--were to have experienced the exact same things you have, yes, they would come out differently, and may make different choices. However, I contend that this is because of their physiology, not because they are some other extra-causal agent. 2: All you've argued here is that if a different person were to be asked the same question, they might make a different choice. What I'm saying is that who you are is determined by what things you've taken in, and how they've meshed with your physiology. I'm saying that, given a choice, a person will always, no matter what, make the same decisions. I think that it would be important for us to discuss what you mean when you speak of "agents". More to the point, I believe that another "self" could not possibly have had all of the precise prior causes/influences that I had experienced up to that point, because another "self" would have made at least some different choices all along the way. Another self's "OWN WILL" would necessarily be different from mine. I agree with you that it is not possible for another person to have the exact same prior influences. For an infinite number of reasons. The person could be taller, and thus have a different perspective, could be better looking, and thus have people react more amicably toward him, could have brown hair instead of blonde, could have tons of pimples in high school, anything. However, that has nothing to do with any extra-causal agent; more-so it has something to do with the deterministic nature of the universe. His physiology creates for him different scenarios, and different experiences. Your last sentence, I completely agree with. There seems to be a kind of chicken-and-egg phenomenon at work here. Our experiences cause/influence our subsequent choices, but our choices also cause/influence our subsequent experiences. Which come first--the choices, or the experiences? My view is that each and every human is born (conceived, actually) as a unique "self" with the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. Genetic and environmental factors that are not within our control--a great many of which result from the free choices of other humans--impose some constraints on this freedom, to be sure. However, they mainly tend to reduce the number of possible courses of thought or action, rather than our ability to choose one in a particular situation. And I disagree...You are incapable of real decision making [or thought, really] as a zygote, but are capable of taking in stimuli and reacting to your environment. Even as an infant, you basically function qua instinct, while you take in massive amounts of information about where you are, and what's going on. You are never the same "you", ever. Always changing, always different, the only reason you feel that you are the same is because the vessel is the same, and you remember all those changes. Yes, though, our choices do influence our subsequent experiences. That is why I'm a compatibilist, because our choices do matter to who we are. I only argue that we don't have control over our personalities, that who we are is determined by our environment. As explained above, that is not how I define "I". My self-identity does not change over time. I am the same person today that I was in my mother's womb, even though all of my physical attributes--except, presumably, my DNA coding--are different. Is someone who has amnesia or Alzheimer's or brain damage a different person than before? I'd say your self identity surely does change over time. Sure, you keep many of the same tendencies and personality traits, but that is only because those things are part of your personality, something that is determined, and very hard to change. You are very different than you were in your pre-teen years, I can guarantee that. Heck, I'm twenty, and I already feel like a different person than I was at 12-13 years old. That is because while my physiology doesn't change--that which doesn't really matter to "who I am" as much as--my mind changes dramatically. The way I act, carry myself, everything, changes as I gain new experiences. And while some parts of me remain the same, thousands of little nuanced things are changing all the time, ever shaping a new "me" to make new decisions, based on those the old me's made. Your experiences are inputs to your decisions, but the decision itself is yours. Your experiences do not determine your decisions. I'd really like you to refer to my posts about what you mean by this. In what sense are they "mine"? More appropriately, in what sense am "I" different than the experiences that have made me "me"? How much more "me" can you get, past all of my experiences and nuances. Your "personality" (as you have defined it) is not you. If the basis for all of my decisions is entirely "out of my control", then I am not responsible for those decisions. What else could you be besides your personality--who you are? You sure are responsible. Whether or not you have control over who you become, "you"--the human person--are still making decisions, and hold all the responsibility. Just because a serial killer had no control over the development of his sociopathic personality, doesn't mean that "he" doesn't still dream of wearing people's skin. Responsibility is a human constructed term, which means it can be applied in whatever way we see fit. I don't think it's too hard to imagine that we could still hold people responsible for their actions, whether or not they had control over "who they are". My point is that: Since the things that one might argue "take away" his responsibility are the same things that define who he is, "he" is responsible. I still contest your characterization of the "me-agent" as something "extra". I am the "me-agent"; it is not part of "me", or a subset of "me"--it is "me". My "self" is not my body, or my brain, or the "aggregate" of my experiences, or anything else that I have; it is who I am. But you've yet to define how it is you. The "me-agent" has to be capable of making decisions, right? So what does it base it's decisions on? How are you anything more than the aggregate experiences and influx of stimuli throughout your life? You've said the "me-agent" is "who I am", but what does that mean? I contend that "who you are" is a direct result of trillions of factors, none of which you have any control over. "who you are" is dynamic, and changes with new information and experiences. Like I said, you are certainly not the same person as you were at ten years old. Perhaps I recognize that my "personality" (as you have defined it) is insisting that I do something that I know to be morally wrong, but I choose to do the right thing instead. How could this be praiseworthy if it was the inevitable consequence of factors beyond my control? How could doing what my "personality dictates" be blameworthy? Besides, even if a choice that "contradicts what the personality is insisting" is irrational or otherwise inexplicable, that does not mean that it is impossible--which is what determinism entails. Both of those are purely subjective terms, which can be applied in any way we want. "praiseworthy" makes sense only because we've given it a definition, if we want to, we can still call someone's actions praiseworthy. Say a person decides to run out into traffic to save a child from being struck by a car. That is a very brave and praiseworthy thing to do, no? How does the fact that the person would have done it regardless change anything? Its not as if she is a robot, which cannot think or feel; all of her life's experiences led her to the point where doing it was something she had to do. Saving the child was a result of who she is. It is the act that is praiseworthy, and because who she is dictated that she do the thing, her actions are surely praiseworthy. You are looking at it with a far too minimalistic expression of the concept. It's not that "the fates dictated that she run into traffic, and she played no role in it" but rather: All of her life's experiences and the trillions of factors that make her "her" created a woman who, at the site of a child in the middle of the road, weighed her options and decided that the thing was worth the risk. She, the thinking person, may not have had control over why she finally decided to save the child, but isn't it enough that she did?
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 06:26 PM:	#95
ecspose wrote: I would then ask, according to your understanding, at what point does coercion occur? What distinction are you making between events where you have genuine ability to take more than one action in, and events where you do not? Do you not have a genuine ability to choose in spite of coercion? How does coercion exist at all? If libertarianism is true, then coercion (as I have defined it) is rare indeed--cases like when someone else grabs your hand and forces it to hit someone or push a button or whatever. As you point out, even if someone has a gun to your head, you still have the live option to refuse to comply and accept the consequences. Moral evaluation of your decisions and actions in such cases would be based on your reasons for behaving as you did. I fully realize that my definition of coercion is not the one in common usage; I only offered it in the hope that it would help to clarify my point that if determinism is true, then every choice is (in this sense) coerced. ecspose wrote: You seem to be saying that you don't have control over your initial state, or all the factors of your subsequent circumstance, but accepting all this there is an element (with which you are only satisfied in describing as 'you', and is immune to reduction), that is genuinely free to make real any possibility that involves your actions, and operates outside of material determinism. Would you say this is a fair summary of your position? That sounds pretty close. I am a bit concerned about the notion of "any possibility"; again, the idea is that you can choose more than one possibility under a given set of circumstances, not any possibility under any circumstances. ecspose wrote: If your brain was modeled down to the last neuron, and an identical 'you' was put in a separate universe with no influences from our universe, and then you yourself were put in an identical and separate universe, and every atom and subatomic state was identical at the point you were placed there, then yes every decision and action that you make would be the same as the identical you in the identical universe. This does not answer the question that I asked. For starters, in my view the whole concept of an identical "me" is nonsense; every "self" is entirely unique and cannot be reproduced. My real question was more like this: If you somehow knew all of the physical properties and laws of the universe at a given instant of time, would you be able to predict--completely without error--what every human would do next? The determinist says yes; the libertarian says no. ecspose wrote: This is more of a thought experiment, but have you tried to not eat when you are hungry, and not drink when you are thirsty? Yes, I have fasted on more than one occasion. ecspose wrote: You may put it off for a period of time, but it seems awfully coincidental to me that you were never compelled to eat or drink yet you did in fact eat and drink every time you (involuntarily) became 'influenced' to do so. But I usually get to choose when I eat or drink, and I often get to choose what I eat or drink. I have the genuine ability to take more than one course of action in those circumstances. ecspose wrote: You eat and drink not just because you involuntarily feel inclined to do so, but because you understand the consequence if you do not. So do consequences beyond our control constitute coercive forces? If not why not? But I still have more than one course of action available to me. I can choose to eat and drink, and thus keep living; or I can choose to starve myself, and thus end up dying. I suppose that if I were dropped alone in the middle of a desert with no food or water, I would have no choice about eating or drinking (or dying); but even then, I could decide to lie down and simply wait for the inevitable, or to start walking in a particular direction and hope for the best. ecspose wrote: For the reflective person, the issue would primarily be the question of where their self starts and their environment ends. Further reflection may indicate there there is no boundary, putting the question to rest. That has obviously not been my reflective experience. ecspose wrote: Fairly accurate, the only change I would make is the wording in c2: "Even though I may be only the proximate cause of my own thoughts and actions, I still experience free will and moral responsibility." Thanks for the feedback. I find it interesting that you apparently prefer to say that we experience free will and moral responsibility, rather than that we have free will and moral responsibility. Is this distinction important to the compatibilist position? Are these attributes only apparent and subjective, rather than real and objective, if determinism is true?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

aletheist
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Posted 07/12/09 - 08:10 PM:	#96
Kingt2 wrote: first, I think an actual definition of free will needs to be agreed upon. No one seems to agree that the other is speaking of anything meaningful. Would you like to suggest one that you think I will (or at least should) accept? Kingt2 wrote: Then, I do believe that it is not necessary for you to act the way you do, it is simply the case that you do. I do believe that it is impossible for you to act otherwise, though. How are these two statements not contradictory? If it is not necessary for me to do X, how can it be impossible for me not to do X? If not-X is impossible, then X is necessary. Kingt2 wrote: If another person--I'll not use the world self--were to have experienced the exact same things you have, yes, they would come out differently, and may make different choices. However, I contend that this is because of their physiology, not because they are some other extra-causal agent. You have missed the whole point of my example. What I was saying is that if you could somehow go back in time and, at the precise moment of my conception, replace my "self" with another "self", that person--with the same physiology, the same genetic makeup, the same initial environment, etc.--would make some different choices than I did over the course of his lifetime. He would be a different person from the very beginning, and not because of anything physical. Kingt2 wrote: I think that it would be important for us to discuss what you mean when you speak of "agents". Okay. Do you have some specific questions? Kingt2 wrote: Your last sentence, I completely agree with. It is always nice to find at least one point of agreement in an exchange like this. Kingt2 wrote: You are never the same "you", ever. Always changing, always different, the only reason you feel that you are the same is because the vessel is the same, and you remember all those changes. But the vessel is not the same--the body and brain certainly change over time, and yet my "self" somehow endures. Kingt2 wrote: Yes, though, our choices do influence our subsequent experiences. That is why I'm a compatibilist, because our choices do matter to who we are. I only argue that we don't have control over our personalities, that who we are is determined by our environment. But if who I am is determined by my environment, then what I choose is also determined by my environment--not by me. The bottom line here is that we obviously have very different--probably irreconcilable--concepts of the "self". Kingt2 wrote: You are very different than you were in your pre-teen years, I can guarantee that. Heck, I'm twenty, and I already feel like a different person than I was at 12-13 years old. You seem to be talking about your personality traits, rather than your personal identity. Of course you have changed--hopefully you have matured mentally and emotionally, as well as physically--but you are still the same person. Kingt2 wrote: I'd really like you to refer to my posts about what you mean by this. In what sense are they "mine"? I am not sure exactly what you are asking here. Your decisions are "yours" because "you" made them. Kingt2 wrote: More appropriately, in what sense am "I" different than the experiences that have made me "me"? How much more "me" can you get, past all of my experiences and nuances. You cannot merely be the sum of your experiences, because before you could have any experiences, you first had to exist. Kingt2 wrote: What else could you be besides your personality--who you are? You defined "personality" as "the ongoing, changing result of constant intake of experiences and external stimuli as they shape and form the brain." Given this definition, I deny that my "personality" is the totality of who I am. I have a personality; I am a person. Kingt2 wrote: You sure are responsible. Whether or not you have control over who you become, "you"--the human person--are still making decisions, and hold all the responsibility. I do not see how. If you "have no control over who you become," then you have no control over any decisions that you supposedly make; so why should you be held responsible for them? Kingt2 wrote: Just because a serial killer had no control over the development of his sociopathic personality, doesn't mean that "he" doesn't still dream of wearing people's skin. So what? If determinism is true, why is he culpable for something over which he had absolutely no control? Kingt2 wrote: Responsibility is a human constructed term, which means it can be applied in whatever way we see fit. I don't think it's too hard to imagine that we could still hold people responsible for their actions, whether or not they had control over "who they are". My point is that: Since the things that one might argue "take away" his responsibility are the same things that define who he is, "he" is responsible. If materialism and determinism are true, then responsibility is a concept that has been constructed by causes that are beyond human control. The serial killer has no choice but to carry out multiple murders, and society has no choice but to hold him responsible for that behavior, because all of it really only amounts to the necessary rearrangement of matter and energy within space and time. I am who I am, and there is nothing that I can do about it, because "I" am just an amalgamation of atoms engaged in the mindless and purposeless interplay of chance and necessity. Kingt2 wrote: But you've yet to define how it is you. Again, I do not understand what you are asking here. Kingt2 wrote: Like I said, you are certainly not the same person as you were at ten years old. I most certainly am the same person. Like I said--who else could I possibly be? Kingt2 wrote: Both of those are purely subjective terms, which can be applied in any way we want. "praiseworthy" makes sense only because we've given it a definition, if we want to, we can still call someone's actions praiseworthy. Apparently we also disagree on whether right and wrong are objective. Could a society legitimately define murder as "praiseworthy"? How about rape or child molestation? I suppose that it could--in fact, it necessarily would, if that was how it was determined. Humans have no say in the matter, because they are just matter. Kingt2 wrote: Say a person decides to run out into traffic to save a child from being struck by a car. That is a very brave and praiseworthy thing to do, no? How does the fact that the person would have done it regardless change anything? How was it "brave and praiseworthy" if the person had no real choice about it? How would it have been "cowardly and blameworthy" if she had instead pushed the child into the car's path, given that she had been determined to do so from the beginning of the universe? Kingt2 wrote: Its not as if she is a robot, which cannot think or feel; all of her life's experiences led her to the point where doing it was something she had to do. Saving the child was a result of who she is. It is the act that is praiseworthy, and because who she is dictated that she do the thing, her actions are surely praiseworthy. What if it was a robot that saved the child, because it was specifically programmed for that very purpose? How is that relevantly different? Would we praise the courage of the robot? I submit that we would praise whoever did the programming, because that is who would have been responsible for the robot's praiseworthy behavior--not the robot itself. I continue to appreciate the ongoing discussion, although I sense that we may be approaching an impasse.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

Kingt2
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Posted 07/14/09 - 01:54 PM:	#97
aletheist wrote: Would you like to suggest one that you think I will (or at least should) accept? I'd have to work on that...Definitions are tricky It'd have to be something like: The ability for an agent to act in such a way that his actions are not mandated by external [coercive] forces. And I believe my argument in the other thread adheres to this definition, since all of the forces that determine his decisions are the ones that make him who he is, that is to say: he is all of those things, they are internal. How are these two statements not contradictory? If it is not necessary for me to do X, how can it be impossible for me not to do X? If not-X is impossible, then X is necessary. I just meant that "necessary" is such a strong word. Technically speaking, sure, it is necessary for you to do X; but speaking realistically and through my own experience, I would do X because I "choose" to do X, that is, X seems to me to be the best option. So while it is technically a necessity, it is the choice that I would make anyway. Really, I'm saying it's necessary because it is the choice I make. You have missed the whole point of my example. What I was saying is that if you could somehow go back in time and, at the precise moment of my conception, replace my "self" with another "self", that person--with the same physiology, the same genetic makeup, the same initial environment, etc.--would make some different choices than I did over the course of his lifetime. He would be a different person from the very beginning, and not because of anything physical. The term "self" as you've used it is meaningless. What would someone replace? I'm saying that you are only "you" because of your biology and because of how you've experienced this whole "existence" thing. "you" would be a completely different person had your parents decided to move to zimbabwe and raise you with an african tribe. You would not be "you" at all; except for maybe some quirks related to your biology and your interactions with your parents. Okay. Do you have some specific questions? Sure. How would you define an "agent" as you use the term? I'd like to know what you mean when you speak of the "me-agent". But the vessel is not the same--the body and brain certainly change over time, and yet my "self" somehow endures. I assure you, you have not "endured" You have builded on. You've kept some parts of your personality, developed others, and gained new ones. You are, I hope, a completely different person than you were at the age of ten. Your mind works differently, you have different thoughts, you've had new experiences, you've grown and changed. Our "selves" are changing all the time. I am not the same me that I was a moment ago, because that me did not know the things that I have come to know in those few moments. Granted, he'd be pretty similar, but my point is that we are not rigid things, we are dynamic. But if who I am is determined by my environment, then what I choose is also determined by my environment--not by me. The bottom line here is that we obviously have very different--probably irreconcilable--concepts of the "self". I argue that your concept of self is not really meaningful, or even absurd. We are who we are because of our environment, the conditions of our lives shape who we are. I'm saying that it is senseless to divorce "myself" from "the things that made me, me", and that those things are not the big bad coercive outside forces that would make our decisions un-free. They are, rather, the forces that have determined who I am, and because of them, I make certain decisions. These decisions are of my own volition, the only thing unfree about it is that I was unable to determine who I am and how I make decisions. I argue that that is necessary for free will; that such a demand is greedy. You seem to be talking about your personality traits, rather than your personal identity. Of course you have changed--hopefully you have matured mentally and emotionally, as well as physically--but you are still the same person. If everything about me changes, how am I the same person? What is an illusion is the idea of an enduring "identity". Obviously there will be a linearity to how I develop. And obviously much of who I am will remain the same, or similar; but that does not mean that there is some "essence" to who I am. I am not sure exactly what you are asking here. Your decisions are "yours" because "you" made them. Don't "I" make them in the deterministic world, too? You cannot merely be the sum of your experiences, because before you could have any experiences, you first had to exist. I would argue that my existence began at the same time my experiences began. They may not have been conscious ones, but then again, the majority of our experiences aren't. You defined "personality" as "the ongoing, changing result of constant intake of experiences and external stimuli as they shape and form the brain." Given this definition, I deny that my "personality" is the totality of who I am. I have a personality; I am a person. You are more than who you are? I do not see how. If you "have no control over who you become," then you have no control over any decisions that you supposedly make; so why should you be held responsible for them? Why not? We made up the idea of responsibility anyway. Really, though, because regardless of whether or not you had control over who you've become, it is still who you are. A thief is still a thief. Whether or not he initially chose to become a thief does not take away the fact that he dreams of stealing people's things, and then actually does. So what? If determinism is true, why is he culpable for something over which he had absolutely no control? The only thing he had no control over is "who" he became. "He" has all the control over his decisions possible; his control is only lost if we say that "he" is some agent that can exist outside of causal reality. If "he" is sitting inside of his head watching himself act in ways that he doesn't want to. That surely isn't the case. If materialism and determinism are true, then responsibility is a concept that has been constructed by causes that are beyond human control. The serial killer has no choice but to carry out multiple murders, and society has no choice but to hold him responsible for that behavior, because all of it really only amounts to the necessary rearrangement of matter and energy within space and time. I am who I am, and there is nothing that I can do about it, because "I" am just an amalgamation of atoms engaged in the mindless and purposeless interplay of chance and necessity. The serial killer, the person, has choices to make. He can either choose not to kill people, or choose to do so, repeatedly. "He" chooses to kill people because that is who he is. Imagine: Two people. One is a "me-agent" with free will as you describe it. He makes a choice to kill someone. Why do we hold him responsible? Answer: Because it his nature that, when faced with the decision of killing or not, chose to kill. The other person is a guy whose "personality"--as I've described it--has been shaped causally. He, too, makes the apparent choice to kill someone. Do we hold him responsible? I say: Yes. Because he was not forced to kill. He did so under his own command. Because he is not responsible for his personality is irrelevant. He is stuck with his personality. He was not fighting it off at the time of the murder, being a murderer is part of who he is. He believed that it was the correct decision to kill someone, and so decided to do so. That is reprehensible. He doesn't get the free-and-clear because he wasn't able to carefully align every nuance of reality to assure that he grew to be morally responsible. It is evident that he is not morally responsible, and so should be punished. The point is that if both people make reprehensible decisions, without being coerced by anything that is not "them", then they ought to be held responsible. You are divorcing "who the person is" from them simply because "who they are" was the result of deterministic events, that is unjustified. I most certainly am the same person. Like I said--who else could I possibly be? The person who you are now. The "you" of ten years old is certainly a part of you, now; but you are definitely not the same person. You are invoking some sort of essence, a meaning which is pretty much meaningless. Apparently we also disagree on whether right and wrong are objective. Could a society legitimately define murder as "praiseworthy"? How about rape or child molestation? I suppose that it could--in fact, it necessarily would, if that was how it was determined. Humans have no say in the matter, because they are just matter. There have without a doubt been times in history where killing is praiseworthy. Where human sacrifices were not only accepted, but were seen as "gifts to the Gods"; Murder, as a Divine gift. How was it "brave and praiseworthy" if the person had no real choice about it? How would it have been "cowardly and blameworthy" if she had instead pushed the child into the car's path, given that she had been determined to do so from the beginning of the universe? This is where the main problem is: The person has the choice. The person makes all of the choices he makes. All his decisions are his. I only argue that who "he" is is determined. His choices are determined by who he is, yes. But they are determined only in the sense that "he will make them because that is who he is." I'd say that one is justified in being proud if "the way he is" leads him to do something very brave. So what if he had no control over who he came to be, it doesn't change the fact that he is who he is, and that he is brave. [since being brave doesn't have any real meaning behind it besides doing something despite knowing it's danger.] Assume that you are the person who saves the child. You certainly think that you are doing so out of your own volition. You may fear death, and that may make you more brave because despite the possibility of death, you saved the child from the street. It is part of who you are, then, that when faced with such a dilemma, you decide to save the child. That is brave. And regardless of how you became you, that bravery is still part of who you are. You still ought to be considered a brave person. It's not that your decisions are out of your control, it's that you are a certain person because of certain things, and that you have no other choice but to act in a way that is consistent with who you are. I continue to appreciate the ongoing discussion, although I sense that we may be approaching an impasse. Perhaps. We will see. I'd like to continue a bit, if you are willing.
The most exciting phrase to hear in science, the one that heralds new discoveries, is not 'Eureka!' but 'That's funny...' -Isaac Asimov

allanquartz
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Posted 07/14/09 - 08:08 PM:	#98
Ratheius Netheros wrote: As for the consequences, I am saying a person held by gunpoint and a person who made the choice are different. The person who made the choice free from "typical" constraints did so because of how their brain works, or intrinsic causal relationships. This means ultimately that their actions are a reflection of their character. We find people guilty on the basis of this character because they would likely be a threat in the future. Isn't it also true that you would have no choice but to find these people guilty if there is no free will? People are guilty because they are guilty, not because of any threat, perceived or otherwise. In a determined universe the guilty were always going to go to jail, whether they committed a crime or not.

ecspose
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Posted 07/15/09 - 12:12 AM:	#99
aletheist wrote: If libertarianism is true, then coercion (as I have defined it) is rare indeed--cases like when someone else grabs your hand and forces it to hit someone or push a button or whatever. As you point out, even if someone has a gun to your head, you still have the live option to refuse to comply and accept the consequences. Moral evaluation of your decisions and actions in such cases would be based on your reasons for behaving as you did. I fully realize that my definition of coercion is not the one in common usage; I only offered it in the hope that it would help to clarify my point that if determinism is true, then every choice is (in this sense) coerced. We both agree that adding determinism to the human experience necessitates what can easily be construed as 'coercion'. Both our definitions of coercion seem to be built around the idea of preserving free will, within the context we have defined it. In complete contrast to your idea, I would say that if someone were to grab your hand and force it to do something, that's where coercion ends, it's no longer even applicable because you didn't do anything. One thing we should both be able to agree on, is that we do experience free will. I'd say this is the foundation for any (serious) argument supporting free will, it's the one priori that is irreducible. aletheist wrote: That sounds pretty close. I am a bit concerned about the notion of "any possibility"; again, the idea is that you can choose more than one possibility under a given set of circumstances, not any possibility under any circumstances. Are all the possibilities of our action accessible by choice? That is to say, are there some things which we simply cannot choose despite the apparent physical possibility? aletheist wrote: This does not answer the question that I asked. For starters, in my view the whole concept of an identical "me" is nonsense; every "self" is entirely unique and cannot be reproduced. My real question was more like this: If you somehow knew all of the physical properties and laws of the universe at a given instant of time, would you be able to predict--completely without error--what every human would do next? The determinist says yes; the libertarian says no. If you knew all the physical properties of the universe, you would not only predict what would happen, but you would experience the past future and present together as one. "All" and "Universe" are pretty inclusive. I don't believe that there is anything beyond this. Whether this is because your definition of universe is smaller than mine, or my definition of self is smaller than yours, I can't say. We are probably just chasing each other's tail. aletheist wrote: Thanks for the feedback. I find it interesting that you apparently prefer to say that we experience free will and moral responsibility, rather than that we have free will and moral responsibility. Is this distinction important to the compatibilist position? Are these attributes only apparent and subjective, rather than real and objective, if determinism is true? Like I mentioned above, this is a foundation. This much we can be sure of, we do experience free will despite whatever wording as to whether we really 'have' it or not. Obviously I can't speak for every person supporting an idea of compatibilism, but I think this is logical. It is my belief that experience itself is objective, while different aspects can be said to be subjective. Basically the things that we can consider (preferences) are subjective while those things that are irrevocably true (pain hurts) are objective. I accept that my distinction might not hold up against careful scrutiny. It may be that the only thing objective at all is experience itself, but no particular detail.
Self replication leads to self replication

aletheist
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Posted 07/15/09 - 09:29 AM:	#100
Kingt2 wrote: It'd have to be something like: The ability for an agent to act in such a way that his actions are not mandated by external [coercive] forces. And I believe my argument in the other thread adheres to this definition, since all of the forces that determine his decisions are the ones that make him who he is, that is to say: he is all of those things, they are internal. Except that if determinism is true, all "internal forces" are the necessary results of "external [coercive] forces". In this sense, all human actions are "mandated by external [coercive] forces," so by your definition, no humans have free will. Kingt2 wrote: I just meant that "necessary" is such a strong word. Technically speaking, sure, it is necessary for you to do X; but speaking realistically and through my own experience, I would do X because I "choose" to do X, that is, X seems to me to be the best option. It sounds like your own experience tells you, realistically, that you have (libertarian) free will. Why are you so intent on denying this strong intuition? Kingt2 wrote: So while it is technically a necessity, it is the choice that I would make anyway. Really, I'm saying it's necessary because it is the choice I make. That would be true only if the choice you make is free (in the libertarian sense). If your choice is determined, then you make it because it is necessary, not the other way around. Kingt2 wrote: I'm saying that you are only "you" because of your biology and because of how you've experienced this whole "existence" thing. I am well aware that this is what you are saying. As you know, I disagree. Kingt2 wrote: "you" would be a completely different person had your parents decided to move to zimbabwe and raise you with an african tribe. You would not be "you" at all; except for maybe some quirks related to your biology and your interactions with your parents. I would have made different decisions and had different experiences, but I would still have been "me". Kingt2 wrote: How would you define an "agent" as you use the term? I'd like to know what you mean when you speak of the "me-agent". To me, an agent is simply someone who has the genuine ability to take more than one possible course of thought or action under a given set of circumstances. If determinism is true, then there is no such thing as an agent. I cannot help you with "me-agent"; that is your term, not mine. Kingt2 wrote: I assure you, you have not "endured" I assure, you, I have endured. Your repeated assertions to the contrary are not going to convince me. Kingt2 wrote: You are, I hope, a completely different person than you were at the age of ten. How can one person be two different persons at two different times? Apparently we have different definitions of "person", as well. Kingt2 wrote: I am not the same me that I was a moment ago, because that me did not know the things that I have come to know in those few moments. Are you saying that you are what you know? Kingt2 wrote: Granted, he'd be pretty similar, but my point is that we are not rigid things, we are dynamic. Are you the same person who read my last comment? If not, what happened to that person? Kingt2 wrote: I argue that your concept of self is not really meaningful, or even absurd. Right back at you. Kingt2 wrote: These decisions are of my own volition, the only thing unfree about it is that I was unable to determine who I am and how I make decisions. "The only thing"? What "volition"? Kingt2 wrote: If everything about me changes, how am I the same person? This is a great question! Your mistake is thinking that everything about you changes. There has to be something permanent that makes you "you". If everything physical about you changes, then there has to be something non-physical about you that does not change. Kingt2 wrote: What is an illusion is the idea of an enduring "identity". Why do you assume that it is an illusion? Why not seriously consider the possibility that the idea of an enduring identity is reality, and the whole notion of materialistic determinism is the illusion? Kingt2 wrote: Don't "I" make them in the deterministic world, too? In the materialistic-deterministic world, "you" are just an arbitrary amalgamation of particles obeying mindless, purposeless physical laws. Kingt2 wrote: I would argue that my existence began at the same time my experiences began. But without any prior experiences, who were "you" at that precise moment? Kingt2 wrote: Why not? We made up the idea of responsibility anyway. No, if materialistic determinism is true, then the idea of responsibility is the inevitable result of mindless, purposeless physical laws. Kingt2 wrote: "He" has all the control over his decisions possible Which is effectively none at all. Kingt2 wrote: The serial killer, the person, has choices to make. He can either choose not to kill people, or choose to do so, repeatedly. "He" chooses to kill people because that is who he is. "He" does not choose anything. His "choices" are already determined for him. Kingt2 wrote: Imagine: Two people. One is a "me-agent" with free will as you describe it. He makes a choice to kill someone. Why do we hold him responsible? Answer: Because it his nature that, when faced with the decision of killing or not, chose to kill. Absolutely not! We hold him responsible because he chose to kill when he could have done otherwise. Kingt2 wrote: The other person is a guy whose "personality"--as I've described it--has been shaped causally. He, too, makes the apparent choice to kill someone. Do we hold him responsible? I say: Yes. I say: Why? The key difference here is that the choice is only "apparent" (your word). Kingt2 wrote: Because he was not forced to kill. He did so under his own command. Because he is not responsible for his personality is irrelevant. He is stuck with his personality. He was not fighting it off at the time of the murder, being a murderer is part of who he is. He believed that it was the correct decision to kill someone, and so decided to do so. That is reprehensible. Again, why? He was not the ultimate cause of his belief, his choice, or his action; all of those things were determined for him. In a sense, there is no "him" to be responsible; calling the particular group of atoms that constitute "him" a single entity is arbitrary. Also, according to you, the person who committed the murders no longer exists a moment later; so why punish a different person, who happens to be associated with the same physical body? Kingt2 wrote: There have without a doubt been times in history where killing is praiseworthy. Where human sacrifices were not only accepted, but were seen as "gifts to the Gods"; Murder, as a Divine gift. Yes, of course. Do you have a problem with that? If so, why? Kingt2 wrote: I'd say that one is justified in being proud if "the way he is" leads him to do something very brave. So what if he had no control over who he came to be, it doesn't change the fact that he is who he is, and that he is brave. [since being brave doesn't have any real meaning behind it besides doing something despite knowing it's danger.] I am sorry, but this just makes less and less sense to me. I have absolutely nothing to do with who I am, but I should be proud of who I am anyway? And your definition of bravery seems rather impoverished to me. Kingt2 wrote: It's not that your decisions are out of your control, it's that you are a certain person because of certain things, and that you have no other choice but to act in a way that is consistent with who you are. But if "you have no other choice but to act in a way that is consistent with who you are," then "your decisions are out of your control"! Kingt2 wrote: I'd like to continue a bit, if you are willing. I honestly do not see where else there is to go from here, although I would be interested in getting your feedback on my post #76. Did I give a fair summary of the compatibilist position? Do you agree with my ultimate/proximate distinction?
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

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