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Challenges to Skeptical Arguments

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Challenges to Skeptical Arguments
treysuttle
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Posted 07/09/09 - 10:54 AM:
Subject: Challenges to Skeptical Arguments 		quote post
#1
The most philosophically persuasive skeptical arguments generally claim that one must know that something - some 'scenario', is not the case, in order to know that some other fact is the case. The rationale being that if the scenario holds, e.g. one is a bodiless brain in a vat, then one cannot know whatever mundane fact is in question, e.g. that one has hands. To affirm the possibility of being in such a scenario while affirming that one knows that one has hands results in what Keith DeRose calls an 'abominable conjunction'. > I may be a BIV, if I am a BIV then I do not know that I have hands (and) I know that I have hands < It clearly seems that such conjunctions are unacceptable and ultimately favor the skeptical conclusion.

(For those who might think that abominable conjunctions are not worthy of defense, this seems to be just the approach that Moorean replies to skepticism take).

I think a closer inspection of this kind of skeptical argument uncovers a potentially fatal presupposition held by the skeptic that is rarely challenged. I take it as practically uncontroversial that if one is a BIV then one does not know that one has hands (one cannot know something that is false). But, from this, it does not follow that the mere possibility of being a BIV excludes one from knowing that one has hands. To have knowledge requires that one at least have a justified true belief. It seems to me that one can have a JTB that one has hands, while not knowing that one is not a BIV. In other words, and I do take this to be controversial, one can have knowledge while at the same time one might be mistaken about whatever is claimed to be knowledge. The push here is against the very high standard (requiring absolute certainty) that has been passed down to us via Descartes, and consequently I think ought to be rejected by anyone interested in combating skepticism.

The meat of my proposal lies in what I see as the skeptic's likely response to my suggestion. The skeptic might consider a 'relevant alternatives' approach to justification. In order to have sufficient justification for a belief, one has to know that certain alternatives, which would undermine one's justification, do not hold. Whatever justification one might offer in support of not being a BIV is compatible with being a BIV. Because being a BIV would undermine any justification that one might have for knowing that, say, one has hands, one cannot know that one has hands.

My response to the skeptic is that in order for being a BIV to truly be a relevant alternative, the skeptic must provide a substantitive argument in support of actually being a BIV. In other words, the mere logical possibility alone of being a BIV is not strong enough to undermine the substantive evidence that one has in favor of knowing that one has hands...furthermore, not strong enough to undermine the knowledge itself (assuming it is true that one has hands). Consider the following analogy:

It is logically possibible that you are dreaming right now. If you are dreaming, then you do not know that you are sitting in front of your computer right now (or phone, or whatever).

But the mere logical possibility that you are dreaming right now goes no distance towards undermining your knowing that you are in front of your computer right now (if you are in front of your computer right now and you are not dreaming).

It's only if you are dreaming that such a scenario would undermine your evidence. What the skeptic needs is a substantive argument in favor of actually being a skeptical scenario.
oag
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Posted 07/09/09 - 11:55 AM:
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#2
All you are really saying is that a person needs a God's eye view to settle the question.

When you say that a person can have knowledge there is no argument. The argument comes in when someone tries to suggest that a person can have knowledge that they simply can't have.

In an episode of Star Trek TNG a holographic representation of Moriarty became self aware and wanted to escape the holodeck and roam freely about the universe. He was subsequently fooled by the addition of another layer of programming which allowed him to believe he had done just that and become "real". In his mind he was now a flesh and blood being and no longer computer generated. From Picard's POV Moriarty was still a hologram in a computer cube simulation of our universe. We are always and forever Moriarty. Unless the program gives us some indication that it is only a program we will never know the difference between our universe and Picard's. For all intents and purposes they are identical. From a God's eye POV, the viewer or Picard's POV, we know that they are not. However, Picard can't actually know that he is not a computer generated character inside a computer cube on someone else's desk. It also doesn't make a single bit of difference to him if he is or is not. Nor does it make a difference to Moriarty.

Humans don't like "I don't know". We set out to rectify that at every turn. Some humans refuse to accept "We can't ever know". That is the truth of it though. We all have to accept it.
Incision
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Posted 07/09/09 - 12:19 PM:
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#3
I imagine a skeptic would not say that if it's logically possible, then we don't know it's false; rather, that if it's epistemically possible, then we don't know it's false. Logical possibilities can be actually false, and, I suppose, known to be.

So I take the skeptic to be arguing that, as an intuitively obvious truth, it's epistemically possible that I'm a brain in a vat. Etc.

If you're pushing for contextualism, then you might be able both to explain why that's false (in the relevant context), and why it seems true. By ordinary standards I know I have a hand, so I know I'm not a brain in a vat, but there could always be stricter standards according to which I don't. The skeptic is just insisting on the wrong standard.

If you could make the case for contextualism, it looks like you would have a good response to skepticism.
jmafoko
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Posted 07/09/09 - 02:02 PM:
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@
>>The push here is against the very high standard (requiring absolute certainty) that has been passed down to us via Descartes, and consequently I think ought to be rejected by anyone interested in combating skepticism.

Maybe! But don't you think that the skeptic wins by our very act of "lowering the standards"? Changing definitions doesn't solve the problem (very common with Wittgenstein philosophers), it just shifts the problem from one thing to another. If a skeptic says there is no absolute knowledge and then you turn around and redefine the word "absolute knowledge", you don't win, he does. (It's a knock out! Out of the arena.)

As to answering the skeptic (of which I used to succumb to myself) I think, divine revelation is the way out. This I mean we need someone outside our situations to tell us our sitution in real. Now you say that won't count as JTB. Agreed. Let us call it unjustified true belief.

Just gets me thinking what if Universal Person walks us outside the building (if we are not BIV, or shows us photos or whatever miracles and wonders) and we see others inside the building, wouldn't that count as justification of the belief? Just thoughts.

@incision
What if the BIV creates a perfect context that we have hands? I am reminded of The Matrix movie here, such that, if the matrix didn't have glitches (ghosty towns, people not feeling real, being hacked into, etc) would Neo have descovered the real world?

Also if the context is conclusive to my beliefs, does that make my beliefs true? I have heard people use parsimony arguments (Occam's razor) to counter skepticism (or justify their materialism) which I find unsatifying. Are hypotheses with fewer premises true?

Edited by Incision on 07/09/09 - 05:48 PM. Reason: illiteracy
wuliheron
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Posted 07/09/09 - 02:05 PM:
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The argument reminds me a scene from "The Lion King" where a character argues that the past does not matter. A baboon then hits him over the head with a stick and when the character complains the baboon replies, "It is in the past, what does it matter!"

You can apply this is same approach to the skeptic's need for a substantive argument. If he says something demonstrable is not substantive enough just hit him over the head with a stick. If he then complains, just ask him for substantive proof that it ever happened.
jmafoko
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Posted 07/09/09 - 02:48 PM:
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The skeptic is not saying experiences (e.g. hitting him on his head) are not substantive. He only objects to their causes (origin, am I BIV or not?). He asks the the question, Is the world just a result of my mind activity (idealism) or a material thing outside my mind? He claims no one can ever know this question, and exclaims, Deja vu! (because he already told us knowledge is impossible).

One recent objection to skepticism is one based on pragmatism. Maybe it can be related with what wuliheron says above. The question is, what type of life will a skeptic lead if he doesn't believe knowledge attainable? Of course some people can argue he might live the hypothetico-empirical life (i.e., he will use whatever hypothesis works for him for a time just like science). But I wonder what state of mind he will need to be in to use airlines? There ought to be some amount of faith, not just mere hesitation in choosing one hypothesis over the other.

Edited by Incision on 07/09/09 - 05:52 PM. Reason: illiteracy
oag
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Posted 07/09/09 - 03:32 PM:
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jmafoko wrote:
There aught to be some saught of faith, not just mere hesitation in choosing one hypothesis over the other.
In the end that is all there is in choosing one hypothesis over the other because none of them can be conclusively proven. The only argument the objectivist can give for the existence of objective reality is justified belief. That is a long way of saying faith.

The argument always comes back to why belief in OR is more justified than BIAV. Some objectivists take it too far though and declare OR undeniable. That is where BIAV rears its ugly head every time. It allows for denial of OR. It isn't that BIAV is more likely. Most would agree that it is not. It just accounts for the Cartesian doubt about OR and points out that in the end we have to answer, "We don't know and we never will".
wuliheron
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Posted 07/09/09 - 03:37 PM:
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That is precisely the point I was trying to make.

Skeptical assertions about the nature of life, the universe, and everything (whether positive or negative) cannot be demonstrably related to experience. Hence, they fail the skeptic's own criteria.
treysuttle
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Posted 07/10/09 - 12:12 AM:
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Incision: I'm not willing to grant the skeptic epistemic possibility. That is way too strong for a BIV type scenario. Yes, logical possibilities can, and often do, turn out false. 'Logical possibility' is itself a slippery notion. I take it to mean something that we can coherently imagine to be the case (as opposed to epistemic possibility - which implies that what would or would not be known (skeptical scenario) might actually be the case)....that's about as much weight as I give to the skeptics position. I see the skeptic as claiming that any logical possibility (scenario that we might coherently imagine to be the case) that would undermine a knowledge claim, must be known to be false in order to know that claim. If I am a BIV, then I don't know that I have hands. According to the skeptic, that being a BIV is a logical possibility is sufficient to undermine my knowing that I have hands. I think what I require of the skeptic is something along the lines of epistemic possibility...of which logical possibility alone is not enough to substantiate. Of course, my view here is intertwined with my metaphysical position and interpretation of modality. One might I suppose hold that logical possibility is sufficient for epistemic possibility. I think the skeptic probably should argue that it is.

Of course, if I am a BIV then I don't have knowledge. But if I am not a BIV, then the mere possibility of being a BIV is irrelevant to my having knowledge (or at least the skeptic owes us an argument for why a logical possibility is relevant). Maybe one might say 'sure, you can have knowledge, but you could never know that you have knowledge without knowing that you are not a BIV'. I think I can live that....temporarily anyways.

I don't think the skeptic favors wrong standards (although her standards are surely higher than 'normal' epistemic standards). I agree with the skeptics argument....I just don't think the range of implications that she draws out of it are sound.

imafoko: I agree, we can't just change the meaning of our terminology...or at least if we do, we have to concede that we have done so. One thing I am trying to become more sensitive to are possibilities of equivocation when we are inquiring about knowledge. Now, I don't have a definition of absolute knowledge....but by 'certainty' I take the skeptic to mean something like 'you are certain of p if you know p and you could not be mistaken about p'. I think that is something like Descartes' notion of 'indubitability'. But, certainty is not required for knowledge. Or at least if you think so, then you are a pretty strong skeptic.

I think it is fine if we shift the problem, but we need to be aware that we are doing so. The skeptic...at least the formidable one, is going to work very hard to keep the problem on 'certainty'. Here I think she has the day. But as soon as we are willing to back off a bit from certainty, her situation becomes a bit more complex. And, as I suggested, when we explicitly realize that some forms of possibility that suggest error do not exclude us from having knowledge, the skeptic has a real problem. Minimally, it puts the burden of proof on her (which traditionally the burden of proof has been on the anti-skeptic). Maximally...I think she has to offer a plausible reason for believing that we might actually be BIVs (that would surely undermine my knowing that I have hands!).....she can begin with showing that it is even physically possible that we are BIV's. That is a monumental task in itself.

Edited by treysuttle on 07/10/09 - 12:39 AM
sqeecoo
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Posted 07/10/09 - 02:08 PM:
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As a skeptic, I agree. I don't like these particular skeptical arguments either. They way depend too much on the definition of "knowledge". Putting too much weight on the words you use always ends up in pointless semantic discussions, since there is no one "true" definition of knowledge, and every definition ultimately rests on undefined terms.

However, my problem with your reply to these skeptical arguments is that it's not clear which "alternatives" are supposed to be "relevant" and which arguments are "substantive". It seems to me that such a theory of justification will have to rely way to much on intuition or dogma to say which alternatives are "relevant" or what the "range of implications" is. This basically shuts down rational discussion.



A much better skeptical challenge, in my opinion, is this one I mentioned a while ago:
The simplest way of evaluating the success of a theory of justification (induction, contextualism, whatever) is to ask the following question:
"Having justified a belief using this method, has our position improved in any way?"

Let's say you start with an unjustified belief A, like "all ravens are black". You then justify it in some way, like using induction, fundational beliefs, or by giving some kind evidence or whatnot (let's put aside the problems with the practical application of these methods). What is achieved by this, other then shifting the question to the reasons you have given and the viability of the methods (induction, foundationalism) you have used? In what way is your position better, now that you have moved the problem from previously unjustified belief A to "induction is reliable" or "this belief is foundational", or something else? What's the advantage you have gained in relation to your starting position, namely that of examining an unjustified belief?

Even more generally, the question justificationists (those that argue that justification is a viable method in rational inquiry) should answer is:
"Can justification do anything else then shift the question elsewhere, and can anything be gained by this?"

This is equally applicable whether you are aiming for certainty or not.
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