How is this assessment consistent with the citation I provided in my first post which made specific reference to having the power to abstain from affirming or denying?  It seems that the proper use of the free will is to wait until a proposition is known clearly and distinctly, but to judge prior to that would be a misuse of the free will.  That being the case, knowledge comes to those who are prudent prior to judging, but the act of judging itself is a matter left to the free will and the amount of analysis prior to judgment is up to the person.  I don't see how you can distill away free will as being a necessary  component for obtaining knowledge based upon the quote provided previously.

This does sound right as you've explained it because it was Descartes' belief that the existence of the self was not subject to doubt, meaning one is compelled to believe it.  The question then remains when is something distinctly and clearly known to such a level that it is not longer subject to doubt.  It would seem that the will would be critical in suspending judgment so that a decision would not be made too soon.  It also seem that the will would  be critical in deciding what other information/evidence were needed before making a judgment.  Most knowledge cannot be deciphered a priori like the cogito, so I'm assuming that to some extent the will must be used to go out and gather additional evidence for whatever proposition that one is considering.