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Cartesian Free Will and Knowledge

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Cartesian Free Will and Knowledge

reincarnated
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Posted 10/04/09 - 01:03 AM:	#51
Hanover wrote: Clearly DesCartes is linking the ability to know with the ability to choose. He describes the process as (1) you must first understand something clearly and distinctly, and (2) you must judge the thing and decide if it is correct. The act of judging is an act of the will. This process seems to me to be correct. So, my question is whether it even makes sense to say that you "know" something if you lack a free will? This begs the question. Why assume that things like "choice", "judging" and "will" necessarily imply "free will" of the metaphysical libertarian variety? Of course it makes sense to say that one knows something in absence of this kind of "free will". (Propositional) knowledge is simply justfied true belief - it has nothing whatsoever to do with free will (of either the compatibilist or metaphysical libertarian variety). Hanover wrote: That is, if your knowledge regarding a particular item is in your brain solely due to deterministic causes, and it is there without having gone through any libertarian judgment process, is there any way to say that the item of knowledge in your brain at that time is any more likely true or not true? The implications being that without libertarian free will, we can know nothing about the world. If its a true justified belief, then its knowledge by definition. If its not a true justified belief, its not knowledge by definition. Simple as that. Free will does not come into the equation.
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Posted 10/05/09 - 07:05 AM:	#52
reincarnated wrote: This begs the question. Why assume that things like "choice", "judging" and "will" necessarily imply "free will" of the metaphysical libertarian variety? Of course it makes sense to say that one knows something in absence of this kind of "free will". (Propositional) knowledge is simply justfied true belief - it has nothing whatsoever to do with free will (of either the compatibilist or metaphysical libertarian variety). First of all, welcome back! Second, my argument dealt more with what DesCartes was saying than what must be the case. However, since I agree with DesCartes on this issue, I'll defend it as well. My response to your argument is that you have begged the question by simply asserting knowledge = justified true belief without addressing the question of "what do you mean by 'justified'"? Traditionally, the answer to that question is answered by simply stating that if the agent subjectively feels justified in his belief, then it constitutes knowledge. If that feeling of justification can arise purely from deterministic causes unrelated to objective truth, then the justification one has will in no predictable way be linked to the truth. This argument is a restatement of the Gettier objection. For example, if I say that I have a justification that there is a rock in front of me based upon my observation of the rock, but, at the same time, I concede that my perception of the rock is caused purely by deterministic forces that cannot reliably be said to have any link to reality, then I am left with the conclusion that I cannot have a legitimate justification for the existence of the rock, or for anything, ever. That is to say, a belief in determinism entails a belief in the inability to claim that any one justification is any more likely true than any other justification. In truth, when asked why you believe the rock is before you, you should respond, "because I am forced to believe as such." To say, "because I see it," implies a correlation between what determinism requires you to think exists and what actually exists. It is logically inconsistent to hold that (a) your justifications are the result of observation and reason and (b) your justifications are the result of deterministic forces, UNLESS you hold that our deterministic world (but not necessarily all deterministic worlds) happens to be contructed in such a way that logic and reason lead to the truth. If you do hold that we have this wonderfully contructed deterministic world where we can reliably state that reason and logic provide truthful justifications, then you'll have to explain how you've arrived at such a truth, despite the fact that not all deterministic worlds are logically required to be so constructed.
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Posted 10/05/09 - 07:45 AM:	#53
Hanover wrote: My response to your argument is that you have begged the question by simply asserting knowledge = justified true belief without addressing the question of "what do you mean by 'justified'"? Traditionally, the answer to that question is answered by simply stating that if the agent subjectively feels justified in his belief, then it constitutes knowledge. If that feeling of justification can arise purely from deterministic causes unrelated to objective truth, then the justification one has will in no predictable way be linked to the truth. This argument is a restatement of the Gettier objection. It does not matter whether the "justification" is linked to the "truth" in some predictable way or not - this is not a condition of knowledge. Hanover wrote: For example, if I say that I have a justification that there is a rock in front of me based upon my observation of the rock, but, at the same time, I concede that my perception of the rock is caused purely by deterministic forces that cannot reliably be said to have any link to reality, then I am left with the conclusion that I cannot have a legitimate justification for the existence of the rock, or for anything, ever. Why do you think that your perception of the rock "cannot reliably be said to have any link to reality"? What do you mean by "reliably" here? (If you mean "infallibly" then I agree with you - nobody can claim access to infallible propositional knowledge. But we do not require that our justifications lead to infallible knowledge - how could we, since such a thing is unattainable - so infallibility doesn't enter into it.) Hanover wrote: That is to say, a belief in determinism entails a belief in the inability to claim that any one justification is any more likely true than any other justification. Why? I don't see how this follows at all. Hanover wrote: In truth, when asked why you believe the rock is before you, you should respond, "because I am forced to believe as such." To say, "because I see it," implies a correlation between what determinism requires you to think exists and what actually exists. No, it simply implies that I believe there is a correlation between what I believe I see and what exists. Hanover wrote: It is logically inconsistent to hold that (a) your justifications are the result of observation and reason and (b) your justifications are the result of deterministic forces, UNLESS you hold that our deterministic world (but not necessarily all deterministic worlds) happens to be contructed in such a way that logic and reason lead to the truth. Not at all. I may be mistaken in my justified belief that X (in which case I do not possess knowledge that X), I am not insisting that all my justified beliefs are necessarily true. Thus there is no constraint which requires that logic and reason necessarily leads to truth. Hanover wrote: If you do hold that we have this wonderfully contructed deterministic world where we can reliably state that reason and logic provide truthful justifications, then you'll have to explain how you've arrived at such a truth, despite the fact that not all deterministic worlds are logically required to be so constructed. Ditto my above reply. I am not saying that all my justified beliefs constitute knowledge. Only the ones that happen to be true constitute knowledge. There is no entailment of truth in my justified beliefs. If there were, I could claim infallible knowledge, which is impossible.
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Posted 10/05/09 - 10:04 AM:	#54
reincarnated wrote: It does not matter whether the "justification" is linked to the "truth" in some predictable way or not - this is not a condition of knowledge. All that you're saying here is that you've defined "knowledge" in such a way as to make it unnecessary that justifications be linked to the truth. I'm challenging that defintion for the same reasons as Gettier. You are left with the curious case of having a true belief based upon a completely invalid justification and referring to it as knowledge. For example, if while driving home, I see a guy who I think is Joe walking down the street toward my home, and I surmise that Joe is on his way to my house, and, after arriving home, Joe arrives at my home soon thereafter, did I have a "justified true belief" that Joe would soon be at my home? Suppose I later learn that the person was not Joe who I saw, but Joe coincidentally came over anyway? The problem with calling this latter example "knowledge" is that it was based upon untrue yet justified true belief. Why do you think that your perception of the rock "cannot reliably be said to have any link to reality"? What do you mean by "reliably" here? (If you mean "infallibly" then I agree with you - nobody can claim access to infallible propositional knowledge. But we do not require that our justifications lead to infallible knowledge - how could we, since such a thing is unattainable - so infallibility doesn't enter into it.) Reliability is a statistical term. I will accept that there's no certainty in life, but we do generally accept that some things are more likely true than other things. If you are saying that your perception of the the rock is probably related to reality, then you will need to qualify your statement and let me know the statistical liklihood that your comment is correct. For example, is there a 10-20% chance that you are correct, or is your comment more likely than not (>50%) correct. If all you are saying is that your comment regarding the rock is possibly true, then you've said nothing at all about the world. Why? I don't see how this follows at all. No, it simply implies that I believe there is a correlation between what I believe I see and what exists. If you believe that (1) determinism is true, and (2) there is a correlation between what you believe you see and what exists, then you are asserting (whether you want to or not) that the world is designed in such a way that your perceptions correlate to reality. This statement is true because #1 is primary and all controlling. That is, #2 was caused by #1 because #1 causes everything. For you to say that you've arrived at #2 through living life and noticing correlations among various things and having drawn conclusions based upon those observations, then you are suggesting a source of knowledge through observation and logic, which may or may not be true because it is completely subservient to #1. Unless you are willing to posit as a given that the deterministic forces are designed in such a way as to create a correlation between observation and truth, then you cannot assert with any degree of liklihood that what you experience is true. Not at all. I may be mistaken in my justified belief that X (in which case I do not possess knowledge that X), I am not insisting that all my justified beliefs are necessarily true. Thus there is no constraint which requires that logic and reason necessarily leads to truth. This last sentence is quite confusing. For your sentence to have been written more precisely, it would have read, "Thus there is no logical constraint which requires that logic and reason necessarily leads to truth." That is, you're saying that logic does not entail that logic leads to truth. Ditto my above reply. I am not saying that all my justified beliefs constitute knowledge. Only the ones that happen to be true constitute knowledge. There is no entailment of truth in my justified beliefs. If there were, I could claim infallible knowledge, which is impossible. There is a fundamental difference here in what we're saying. I agree that our perceptions may deceive us, but I'm not allowing that we lack entirely the ability to assess the validity of our perceptions or our reason. For example, when we are persuaded from one opinion to the other, either due to being introduced to new evidence or to a previously not considered argument, I would submit that we actually have the ability to engage in a meaningful evaluation that will bring us closer to the truth. Should (1) the deterministic forces control our evaluation process, and (2) these forces cannot be said to have any degree of reliability in terms of leading us to the truth, then we cannot say that there is any meaningful evaluation process. If you are going to argue that you believe that the deterministic forces exist in such a way that they cause you to observe and to reason in such a way as to accurately obtain the truth, then what is your justification for having such a belief?
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Posted 10/05/09 - 11:28 AM:	#55
Hanover wrote: All that you're saying here is that you've defined "knowledge" in such a way as to make it unnecessary that justifications be linked to the truth. If truth was a precondition for justification, then knowledge would simply be justified belief (since all justified beliefs would be necessarily true). But truth is not a precondition for justification, which is why knowledge is justified TRUE belief and not just justified belief. That’s not just my definition, it’s the commonly accepted definition of (propositional) knowledge. Hanover wrote: I'm challenging that defintion for the same reasons as Gettier. You are left with the curious case of having a true belief based upon a completely invalid justification and referring to it as knowledge. For example, if while driving home, I see a guy who I think is Joe walking down the street toward my home, and I surmise that Joe is on his way to my house, and, after arriving home, Joe arrives at my home soon thereafter, did I have a "justified true belief" that Joe would soon be at my home? Suppose I later learn that the person was not Joe who I saw, but Joe coincidentally came over anyway? The problem with calling this latter example "knowledge" is that it was based upon untrue yet justified true belief. You should answer that yourself. It is possible to hold a belief which one holds to be justified at one point in time, only to then reject that belief as being unjustified at a later point in time due to new information. In light of the fact that you retrospectively know that you were mistaken when you thought you saw Joe walking down the street, do you still consider your belief that you saw him justified? Hanover wrote: Reliability is a statistical term. I will accept that there's no certainty in life, but we do generally accept that some things are more likely true than other things. If you are saying that your perception of the the rock is probably related to reality, then you will need to qualify your statement and let me know the statistical liklihood that your comment is correct. For example, is there a 10-20% chance that you are correct, or is your comment more likely than not (>50%) correct. If all you are saying is that your comment regarding the rock is possibly true, then you've said nothing at all about the world. I have no idea what the percentage is. How would you propose that we calculate it? Hanover wrote: If you believe that (1) determinism is true, and (2) there is a correlation between what you believe you see and what exists, then you are asserting (whether you want to or not) that the world is designed in such a way that your perceptions correlate to reality. No. I said “I BELIEVE there is a correlation”. Your (correct) argument thus becomes: “If you believe that (1) determinism is true, and (2) there is a correlation between what you believe you see and what exists, then you are asserting (whether you want to or not) that the world is designed in such a way that you BELIEVE your perceptions correlate to reality.” And yes, that is true – I do believe the world is “designed” (in quotes because I do not take this to imply a designer) in such a way that I believe my perceptions correlate to reality. Of course, I may be wrong in that belief – maybe they don’t correlate to reality. Hanover wrote: This last sentence is quite confusing. For your sentence to have been written more precisely, it would have read, "Thus there is no logical constraint which requires that logic and reason necessarily leads to truth." That is, you're saying that logic does not entail that logic leads to truth. Not all truths are accessible by logic alone. In fact, very few are. Hanover wrote: There is a fundamental difference here in what we're saying. I agree that our perceptions may deceive us, but I'm not allowing that we lack entirely the ability to assess the validity of our perceptions or our reason. For example, when we are persuaded from one opinion to the other, either due to being introduced to new evidence or to a previously not considered argument, I would submit that we actually have the ability to engage in a meaningful evaluation that will bring us closer to the truth. Should (1) the deterministic forces control our evaluation process, and (2) these forces cannot be said to have any degree of reliability in terms of leading us to the truth, then we cannot say that there is any meaningful evaluation process. How do you assess the validity of your perceptions or your reason? If by being introduced to new evidence or to a previously not considered argument (as you suggest), then this is entirely compatible with a 100% deterministic universe. How then does it follow that we cannot say there is any meaningful evaluation process? Hanover wrote: If you are going to argue that you believe that the deterministic forces exist in such a way that they cause you to observe and to reason in such a way as to accurately obtain the truth, then what is your justification for having such a belief? Because the process of being introduced to new evidence or to a previously not considered argument (the example you gave of assessing the validity of my perceptions and reason) is compatible with a 100% deterministic universe. We are able to undertake such evaluations regardless of whether the universe is deterministic or not, ie determinism or the lack of it is NOT a precondition for being able to assess the validity of my perceptions and reason.
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Posted 10/06/09 - 05:32 AM:	#56
reincarnated wrote: If truth was a precondition for justification, then knowledge would simply be justified belief (since all justified beliefs would be necessarily true). But truth is not a precondition for justification, which is why knowledge is justified TRUE belief and not just justified belief. That’s not just my definition, it’s the commonly accepted definition of (propositional) knowledge. If truth were a precondition for justification, then knowledge would be a True Justified Belief (TJB). I suppose it would be unnecessary to say that it would be TJTB, simply because if the justificication were true, then it would necessarily follow that your assertion about the world would be true. I also recognize that your definition is not novel, but it's not universally accepted as there have been important objections to it. You should answer that yourself. It is possible to hold a belief which one holds to be justified at one point in time, only to then reject that belief as being unjustified at a later point in time due to new information. In light of the fact that you retrospectively know that you were mistaken when you thought you saw Joe walking down the street, do you still consider your belief that you saw him justified? The question is what is "knowledge" So, when I saw a person I believed to be Joe walking down the street, I had a justification to believe that Joe was coming over to my house. Since Joe actually was coincidentally coming to my house, I was correct. I therefore, at that moment, had actual knowledge of Joe coming over to my house. At that moment, according to your denifition of knowledge, I knew Joe was coming over. My response to this quandry is to say that I did not know that Joe was coming over to my house at any time because my justification was not objectively correct, although I subjectively believed it. I have no idea what the percentage is. How would you propose that we calculate it? The real question is whether it can be calculated at all. No. I said “I BELIEVE there is a correlation”. Your (correct) argument thus becomes: “If you believe that (1) determinism is true, and (2) there is a correlation between what you believe you see and what exists, then you are asserting (whether you want to or not) that the world is designed in such a way that you BELIEVE your perceptions correlate to reality.” And yes, that is true …quot; I do believe the world is “designed” (in quotes because I do not take this to imply a designer) in such a way that I believe my perceptions correlate to reality. Of course, I may be wrong in that belief …quot; maybe they don’t correlate to reality. You are saying (1) you have no idea how likely it is that a rock actually exists simply because you see it, and (2) you believe the world is designed in such a way that your perceptions correlate with reality. From #2, I must assume you believe that it is more likely than not that the rock exists based upon your preception of it. So, assuming (a) you believe that determinism is true, then what is your justification for #2. It seems that (a) requires you to say that your justification must ultimately be to whatever question I ask, "I believe what I believe because the deterministic forces of nature compel me to," which is hardly what we typically consider to be a rational justification. Not all truths are accessible by logic alone. In fact, very few are. That's not what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that you cannot logically argue that a logical argument does not lead to a logical conclusion. How do you assess the validity of your perceptions or your reason? If by being introduced to new evidence or to a previously not considered argument (as you suggest), then this is entirely compatible with a 100% deterministic universe. How then does it follow that we cannot say there is any meaningful evaluation process? Because the evaluation process cannot reliably be correlated to the decision you have reached. All that can be said is that your conclusion was the result of various natural events that led to a certain end. You're caught in a deterministic loop, where causes beyond your control control your every thought and cause you to believe that there was a correlation between the evaluation process and the conclusion that you've reached. All that you can argue is what you must argue, regardless of its truth, in a deterministic world.
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Posted 10/06/09 - 07:34 AM:

#57

Hanover wrote:
I also recognize that your definition is not novel, but it's not universally accepted as there have been important objections to it.

There have been objections, all of which I consider misguided. If you’d like to post an example of such an objection I will gladly show how the alleged objection does not stand up to scrutiny.

Hanover wrote:
The question is what is "knowledge" So, when I saw a person I believed to be Joe walking down the street, I had a justification to believe that Joe was coming over to my house. Since Joe actually was coincidentally coming to my house, I was correct. I therefore, at that moment, had actual knowledge of Joe coming over to my house. At that moment, according to your denifition of knowledge, I knew Joe was coming over. My response to this quandry is to say that I did not know that Joe was coming over to my house at any time because my justification was not objectively correct, although I subjectively believed it.

Since you now recognise that your justification was incorrect, you now acknowledge that you did not in fact have knowledge at that time – you only believed that you had knowledge. But your belief that you had knowledge was mistaken, based as it was on a justification which you now acknowledge to be incorrect.

All we can ever have is a belief that we possess knowledge, we can never know for certain that we have knowledge, because we do not have access to infallible truth.

Hanover wrote:
The real question is whether it can be calculated at all.

Precisely. So why do you talk of percentages, as if they have objective meaning in this case?

Hanover wrote:
You are saying (1) you have no idea how likely it is that a rock actually exists simply because you see it, and (2) you believe the world is designed in such a way that your perceptions correlate with reality.

No, wrong again. (2) should be “you believe the world is designed in such a way that you BELIEVE your perceptions correlate with reality.”

Hanover wrote:
From #2, I must assume you believe that it is more likely than not that the rock exists based upon your preception of it. So, assuming (a) you believe that determinism is true, then what is your justification for #2. It seems that (a) requires you to say that your justification must ultimately be to whatever question I ask, "I believe what I believe because the deterministic forces of nature compel me to," which is hardly what we typically consider to be a rational justification.

Let X = “my perceptions correlate with reality”. My justification for (2) is that I DO, in fact, believe that X, thus it seems reasonable to suppose that the world is designed in such a way that I believe that X.

Hanover wrote:
That's not what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that you cannot logically argue that a logical argument does not lead to a logical conclusion.

We are discussing access to truth – and logical arguments leads us to very few truths about the world. Thus whether logical arguments lead to logical conclusions or not is hardly relevant.

Hanover wrote:
Because the evaluation process cannot reliably be correlated to the decision you have reached. All that can be said is that your conclusion was the result of various natural events that led to a certain end. You're caught in a deterministic loop, where causes beyond your control control your every thought and cause you to believe that there was a correlation between the evaluation process and the conclusion that you've reached. All that you can argue is what you must argue, regardless of its truth, in a deterministic world.

The evaluation process can be assessed based on logical soundness. As long as I use a logical argument, I reach a logical conclusion – determinism or no determinism.

Please enlighten us - how do YOU assess truth?

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Posted 10/06/09 - 10:48 AM:	#58
reincarnated wrote: There have been objections, all of which I consider misguided. If you’d like to post an example of such an objection I will gladly show how the alleged objection does not stand up to scrutiny. The Gettier objection that I raised previously, which specifically relates to having knowledge based upon an unsound justification that you subjectively beleive to be sound. Since you now recognise that your justification was incorrect, you now acknowledge that you did not in fact have knowledge at that time – you only believed that you had knowledge. But your belief that you had knowledge was mistaken, based as it was on a justification which you now acknowledge to be incorrect. You're harping on the irrelevant part of the example, which is that you later learned that your justification was invalid. I'll remove that to make my point. You NEVER learn that the guy who looked like Joe was not Joe and you forever believe that the reason you correctly concluded that Joe was on his way over to your house was that you saw him (or so you thought) walking toward your house. My question is did you KNOW that Joe was coming over prior his arrival? It seems you did under your definition because: (1) you had a reasonable justification, (2) Joe was truly coming over, and (3) you believed it. My point is that you didn't know he was coming over. You just happened to guess correctly based upon bad information. Precisely. So why do you talk of percentages, as if they have objective meaning in this case? If we concede that we have no way of determining whether our justifications have any degree of validity (regardless of what those justifications may be), then we have no justification to rely upon that justification. You can't say (1) I believe that rocks exist because I see them, and (2) I don't believe that my perceptions are more likely true than not. You must assert some degree of reliability to #2 or else you can't assert to believe anything. Additionally, if we assume (3) determinism is true, then we cannot negate #2 by declaring that we have a justification for our belief in the validity of our perceptions, because #3 trumps everything and requires that we admit that we believe only what the laws of nature require us to, not what the rules of logic, reason, perception, and whatever else incline us toward. No, wrong again. (2) should be “you believe the world is designed in such a way that you BELIEVE your perceptions correlate with reality.” Let X = “my perceptions correlate with reality”. My justification for (2) is that I DO, in fact, believe that X, thus it seems reasonable to suppose that the world is designed in such a way that I believe that X. What is your justification for X? My point is that your ultimate justification in a deterministic world is "because I have to." "Because I have to" is an invalid justification, although it is in fact the most fundamental basis for all justifications in a deterministic universe. You cannot say that you are relying upon your perceptions to determine that there is a rock in existence if you admit that the real reason you believe there is a rock is "because I have to." Please enlighten us - how do YOU assess truth? The same way you do, although I do not have the fundamental problem of believing as I do "because I have to" because I do not adhere to determinism.
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Posted 10/07/09 - 04:22 AM:	#59
Hanover wrote: The Gettier objection that I raised previously, which specifically relates to having knowledge based upon an unsound justification that you subjectively beleive to be sound. This one I have already addressed. Let me explain the reasoning in more detail: Some truths MAY be objective and absolute, and unchanging with time, but things like beliefs and justification are subjective and in many cases these qualities DO change over time. I can never know infallibly that some X is true, thus when I claim knowledge that X all I am really saying is that I believe that I know that X (on the basis that I believe that X, I believe my belief that X is justified, and I believe that X is true). Ultimately, it all comes down to beliefs. No matter what example of propositional knowledge you care to offer, I could come up with a plausible alternative explanation which shows that there is in fact no knowledge in that particular case (for example you claim that you know that Joe was at your house – there are alternative explanations such as maybe Joe’s twin and not Joe was at your house; maybe you simply dreamt or hallucinated that Joe was at your house). Thus, the most we can ever claim is that we believe that we know that X (it may turn out that we were mistaken). Now apply this to the case of you believing that you saw Joe walking towards your house. Based on that belief, you form what you consider to be the justified belief that Joe is going to visit you. Lo and behold, Joe does visit you, thus you now claim that you knew that Joe was going to visit you. But your claim is still a belief – what is actually the case is that you BELIEVE that you knew that Joe was going to visit you (based on what you believe is a justified true belief). Whereas in fact you later learn that it was NOT Joe whom you saw on the street, hence you come to realise that your belief (that Joe was going to visit you) was in fact NOT justified, and you then revise your claim – now you recognise that your earlier claim to knowledge (that Joe was going to visit you) was MISTAKEN, and in light of the new evidence you acknowledge that you now (believe that) you did NOT know that Joe was coming to visit you. It is often difficult to get one’s head around this, but it does make perfect sense when one sees knowledge, and justification, as matters of belief rather than as matters of fact. We can never know the fact infallibly (we can never infallibly know that X, we can never have infallible justification for a belief that X), all we can ever do is to believe that we know, or to believe that our beliefs are justified. Since you now recognise that your justification was incorrect, you now acknowledge that you did not in fact have knowledge at that time – you only believed that you had knowledge. But your belief that you had knowledge was mistaken, based as it was on a justification which you now acknowledge to be incorrect. Hanover wrote: You're harping on the irrelevant part of the example, which is that you later learned that your justification was invalid. I'll remove that to make my point. You NEVER learn that the guy who looked like Joe was not Joe and you forever believe that the reason you correctly concluded that Joe was on his way over to your house was that you saw him (or so you thought) walking toward your house. In which case, you forever believe that you knew that Joe was coming to your house. But BELIEVING something is true does not mean it IS true. Let X = “I knew that Joe is coming to my house”. Just because you believe that X, does not mean that X is true. In the example, you were mistaken in your justification, therefore you are also mistaken in believing that you possess knowledge, its just that you never find out your mistake. Hanover wrote: My question is did you KNOW that Joe was coming over prior his arrival? It seems you did under your definition because: (1) you had a reasonable justification, (2) Joe was truly coming over, and (3) you believed it. My point is that you didn't know he was coming over. You just happened to guess correctly based upon bad information. No, based on the information you provided, you did NOT know that Joe was coming over prior to his arrival, you only BELIEVED that you knew (but unbeknownst to you, you were mistaken in that belief, because also unbeknownst to you, you were mistaken in your justification). See above explanation. Hanover wrote: If we concede that we have no way of determining whether our justifications have any degree of validity (regardless of what those justifications may be), then we have no justification to rely upon that justification. You can't say (1) I believe that rocks exist because I see them, and (2) I don't believe that my perceptions are more likely true than not. You must assert some degree of reliability to #2 or else you can't assert to believe anything. Additionally, if we assume (3) determinism is true, then we cannot negate #2 by declaring that we have a justification for our belief in the validity of our perceptions, because #3 trumps everything and requires that we admit that we believe only what the laws of nature require us to, not what the rules of logic, reason, perception, and whatever else incline us toward. Consistency and coherency. We have no way of validating our justifications in any absolute sense (with reference to some kind of absolute standard), but we can validate our justifications based on how consistent and coherent they are when we fit them in with the rest of our world-model. I don’t know about your world-model, but in mine I tend to accept the evidence of my eyes IF that evidence fits in with my experience of the world and IF I have no good reason to doubt the evidence of my eyes. Thus if I see a rock in front of me then (all other things being equal) I will believe there is a rock in front of me. I cannot put a figure on my belief (I cannot say I am 50% sure or 90% sure), all I can say is that I believe there is a rock in front of me. Hanover wrote: What is your justification for X? My point is that your ultimate justification in a deterministic world is "because I have to." "Because I have to" is an invalid justification, although it is in fact the most fundamental basis for all justifications in a deterministic universe. You cannot say that you are relying upon your perceptions to determine that there is a rock in existence if you admit that the real reason you believe there is a rock is "because I have to." In a deterministic world, if I believe that X then this is only because it is pre-determined that I believe that X. The reasons why I believe that X are also part of that deterministic chain of cause and effect. Thus to say I am forced to believe that X, and that’s all there is to it, is to miss the point entirely. The REASON why I am forced to believe that X is BECAUSE of the chain of cause and effect which includes the REASONS why I believe that X. Hanover wrote: The same way you do, although I do not have the fundamental problem of believing as I do "because I have to" because I do not adhere to determinism. Its no problem, I can assure you. I have no problem accepting that I "have to do" what I want to do - why would I want to do otherwise than what I want to do (the very suggestion makes no sense and is illogical)? The real problem is the one that you face if you reject determinism – if your choices are neither determined nor random, then what are they?
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Hanover
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Posted 10/07/09 - 07:52 AM:	#60
reincarnated wrote: In which case, you forever believe that you knew that Joe was coming to your house. But BELIEVING something is true does not mean it IS true. Let X = “I knew that Joe is coming to my house”. Just because you believe that X, does not mean that X is true. In the example, you were mistaken in your justification, therefore you are also mistaken in believing that you possess knowledge, its just that you never find out your mistake. You're asserting that justifications must be objectively correct to be valid, but justifications are subjective by definition. Only truth is objective. It is therefore correct to say that if I believed there to be a rock based upon a subjective justification, but there wasn't in truth a rock, then my belief is invalid. It is, however, incorrect, and misses the point of the Gettier objection, to assert that an item of knowledge is invalid because my justification was objectively wrong. Justification need not be true for one to have knowledge. If you insist that my justification be objectively true, and I have no way of knowing whether it is, then I would have no reason to believe anything and could never have knowledge. No, based on the information you provided, you did NOT know that Joe was coming over prior to his arrival, you only BELIEVED that you knew (but unbeknownst to you, you were mistaken in that belief, because also unbeknownst to you, you were mistaken in your justification). Since the truth of an event is always unknowable, it is always correct to assert that I only believe to know anything. However, if we stipulate as a premise that Joe is coming over (i.e. we stipulate to the Truth), and I then form an incorrect justification that happens to arrive at the truth, then under JTB theory, I would "know" that Joe was coming over. Again, this "incorrect" justification talk means that someone other than me has created a "correct" justification, which means that you're objectifying the justification element. Consistency and coherency. We have no way of validating our justifications in any absolute sense (with reference to some kind of absolute standard), but we can validate our justifications based on how consistent and coherent they are when we fit them in with the rest of our world-model. I don’t know about your world-model, but in mine I tend to accept the evidence of my eyes IF that evidence fits in with my experience of the world and IF I have no good reason to doubt the evidence of my eyes. Thus if I see a rock in front of me then (all other things being equal) I will believe there is a rock in front of me. I cannot put a figure on my belief (I cannot say I am 50% sure or 90% sure), all I can say is that I believe there is a rock in front of me. You'll have to clarify here because I'm not sure if you're saying (1) there is no such thing as an objective justification, or (2) there is such a thing as an objective justification, but we just can't know it. If it's #2, then you'll have to explain, because it seems almost contradictory to suggest we absolutely cannot know something absolutely. . The REASON why I am forced to believe that X is BECAUSE of the chain of cause and effect which includes the REASONS why I believe that X. No, the reason why you believe your beliefs are guided by reason is because you are forced to.
"Nothing is impossible for the man who will not listen to reason." John Belushi, "Animal House" "I have opinions of my own --strong opinions-- but I don't always agree with them." G.W. Bush

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