Can we be morally good without God?: Philosophy Forums

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Can we be morally good without God?

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Can we be morally good without God?

180 Proof
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 12/08/08 - 12:33 AM:	#21
Banno wrote: What Tis is providing are of course stipulative definitions. Such definitions are neither right nor wrong; but they can be accepted or discarded ... I want to point out how Tis' project fails from the outset. No on is obliged to accept the definitions provided; and there are profound reasons not to. What follows is wind. I should have read this post before I bothered below. Wosret wrote: There is no categorical imperative for anyone to behave in anyway. Unless you would like to identify it. Not just moral imperatives either. Can you identify a categorical imperative to favor truth over lies, or reason over unreason? Ditto. Tisthammerw wrote: The existence of God provides a clear answer to the question of "Who or what says how we ought to behave?" No referent answers to your definition of god, Tist, no such god has been demonstrated to exist, and thus in no determinate sense answers the question above. If moral principles are binding independently of whether we believe them to be so, who or what says how we ought to behave? Our individual actions and shared practices are reflexive and as such optimize/suboptimize our social capacities for further action or practice. Optimizing social capacities (i.e. in sum: character/agency) is what, I think, makes behavior "moral". Like the rules of grammar with respect to language, "moral principles" are only aposteriori generalizations (i.e. inductions) and not deductive truthes. Also, as grammar is regularized by generations of communities of speakers and not decided by individuals, morals are emergent properties of social systems (i.e. cultural processes). "Moral principles" -- so derived -- are no more "subjective" "relative" or "arbitrary" than grammatical rules (or other heuristics); they are ontologically contingent but as objective as any other human artifact. "Foundationalism" simply does not obtain. My contention is that atheism has no good answer to this question. Astute, Tist. Especially since "atheism" does not entail any morality (epistemology or metaphysics) whatsoever. Btw, if I were a theist I would still accept the answer provided above but with the Kierkegaarian proviso of anticipating "revealed" circumstances in which "the teleological suspension of the ethical" obtains. My "god's commands" would provide an exception to "moral principles" just as "divine interventions" in the world are exceptions to the natural order. Acknowledging these exceptions, of course, would be "acts of faith" ... "What about God's commands being arbitrary if He was the foundation of morality?" Nothing. But the hypothetical is unwarranted: (1) "objectivity" has not been shown to entail foundationalism, (2) "moral objectivity" has not been shown to entail any foundation, (3) and no "god-as-defined-in-the-OP" has been shown to exist in order to provide a foundation to/for anything. The ramifications of any answer to the above question amounts to a shrugged "So what?". Edited by 180 Proof on 12/17/08 - 02:24 AM. Reason: Why bother with X if X's reasons are explicable? And if X's reasons are inexplicable then why bother with X?
The question isn't "What do I believe?" but rather "What do I least disbelieve?" Absence of necessary evidence is evidence of necessary absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

CypressMoon
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Posted 12/08/08 - 01:35 AM:	#22
180Proof wrote: Our individual actions and shared practices are reflexive and as such optimize/suboptimize our social capacities for further action or practice. Optimizing social capacities (i.e. in sum: character/agency) is what, I think, makes behavior "moral". Like the rules of grammar with respect to language, "moral principles" are only aposteriori generalizations (i.e. inductions) and not deductive truthes. Also, as grammar is regularized by generations of communities of speakers and not decided by individuals, morals are emergent properties of social systems (i.e. cultural processes). "Moral principles" -- so derived -- are no more "subjective" "relative" or "arbitrary" than grammatical rules (or other heuristics); they are ontologically contingent but as objective as any other human artifact. "Foundationalism" simply does not obtain. I agree with what you say here, for the most part. What I'm interested in is your response that I emboldened. I know that it is really an untenable position, given your reasoning, and my response to it might not incarnate any will to entertain something so "subjective, relative, or arbitrary". But, in my opinion, humility is the virtue that propels moral behavior. The humility I speak of is an epistemological humility, or rather, a mind-world humility. In essence, we are rule-bound thinkers and actors (agents). The ontological "knowing" (quotes because knowing cannot ontologize) is a failure of the operations of humility. The vast, richly complex universe, (literally) beyond words that confronts the the contingently rule-bound mind should shock, and paralize someone. In a way, I have an admiration for catatonics. The thing is, this particular humility has been undervalued. This, in my opinion, is the seed of all evil, and all humanity. Some thoughts... Do what you will with them.
"IN THE spring, Tipasa is inhabited by gods and the gods speak in the sun and the scent of absinthe leaves, in the silver armor of the sea, in the raw blue sky, the flowercovered ruins, and the great bubbles of light among the heaps of stone." - Albert Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays A good determinant of success is when people start buying your shit.

reincarnated
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Posted 12/08/08 - 01:48 AM:	#23
The source of our morality - how we believe we ought to behave - is influenced and determined by a complex combination of forces – there is no single source of our morality (such as “culture” or “society” or “individual” ). Trying to find a single source as the foundation for all of our moral beliefs I believe is a mistake. I can certainly tell you how my moral beliefs originate. They are shaped by: (a) My assumption that other humans have broadly similar feelings, needs, wants, desires, and rights, to my own and (b) My personal intuitions about what I believe would be right or wrong if I were on the receiving end and (c) My understanding of what types of behaviour would be considered reasonable and acceptable within a society of such like-minded individuals, given (a) and (b) above. For example, I do not believe it would be right for anyone to inflict unnecessary pain on me (b). Since I assume that other humans have broadly similar feelings to my own (a), I must conclude that it would therefore not be right for me to inflict unnecessary pain on others.
Facts are meaningless. You could use facts to prove anything that's even remotely true! (Homer Simpson)

Wosret
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Posted 12/08/08 - 01:59 AM:	#24
180 Proof wrote: Our individual actions and shared practices are reflexive and as such optimize/suboptimize our social capacities for further action or practice. Optimizing social capacities (i.e. in sum: character/agency) is what, I think, makes behavior "moral". Like the rules of grammar with respect to language, "moral principles" are only aposteriori generalizations (i.e. inductions) and not deductive truthes. Also, as grammar is regularized by generations of communities of speakers and not decided by individuals, morals are emergent properties of social systems (i.e. cultural processes). "Moral principles" -- so derived -- are no more "subjective" "relative" or "arbitrary" than grammatical rules (or other heuristics); they are ontologically contingent but as objective as any other human artifact. "Foundationalism" simply does not obtain. Well put. This is basically what I have been trying to say, only far more intelligibly, and clearly put. As clearly as this is, and although I think I know the answer, I feel that I would like it explicitly stated, to be completely sure. You both mention that morality is inductively derived, from experience and circumstance, and is am emergent property of a social system, and not contingent on any single individual (I liked your suggestion of ecology, a little better, as it was more encompassing, and appealing to my vegan eyes), but -- I would like to ask: do you agree that what is and isn't a moral action is evaluated by the affect this action will have on other agents in the world? From this, do you agree that with reason and evidence we can demonstrate that somethings are moral and others immoral with regard to the goals and aims a moral system serves, and thus if we are faced with two conflicting societies, with two conflicting moral systems, one can be demonstrated to be categorically superior to the other for serving the purpose a moral system exists to serve? I apologize if my question is a bit of a convoluted mess.
"Grant me the power to Revolutionize the World" - Tenjou Utena. "I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

CypressMoon
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Posted 12/08/08 - 02:01 AM:	#25
reincarnated wrote: The source of our morality - how we believe we ought to behave - is influenced and determined by a complex combination of forces – there is no single source of our morality (such as “culture” or “society” or “individual” ). Trying to find a single source as the foundation for all of our moral beliefs I believe is a mistake. I can certainly tell you how my moral beliefs originate. They are shaped by: (a) My assumption that other humans have broadly similar feelings, needs, wants, desires, and rights, to my own and (b) My personal intuitions about what I believe would be right or wrong if I were on the receiving end and (c) My understanding of what types of behaviour would be considered reasonable and acceptable within a society of such like-minded individuals, given (a) and (b) above. For example, I do not believe it would be right for anyone to inflict unnecessary pain on me (b). Since I assume that other humans have broadly similar feelings to my own (a), I must conclude that it would therefore not be right for me to inflict unnecessary pain on others. Reason H. Logic! What have I done? In essence you agree with 180Proof on the culturally contingent "moral principles". You're a living agent of his explanations. This is untenable. I've started a riot.
"IN THE spring, Tipasa is inhabited by gods and the gods speak in the sun and the scent of absinthe leaves, in the silver armor of the sea, in the raw blue sky, the flowercovered ruins, and the great bubbles of light among the heaps of stone." - Albert Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays A good determinant of success is when people start buying your shit.

reincarnated
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Posted 12/08/08 - 02:17 AM:	#26
CypressMoon wrote: In essence you agree with 180Proof on the culturally contingent "moral principles". You're a living agent of his explanations. Could be. To me, the important issue is: Why would I NEED God to tell me what is morally right or wrong - based on some arbitrary "God decision" - unless my own moral beliefs (based on the foundation already discussed) are so distorted or corrupt as to be considered morally wrong? (and this is where I believe the usefulness of God-created morality came in - when early human societies were so immature, lawless, morally corrupt and disorganised that they needed the imposition of "Holy moral laws" to put them on the right track). It seems to me that to feel that one needs to fall back on some "higher being" to determine arbitrarily what is morally right and wrong shows a fundamental lack of moral values or character of one's own.
Facts are meaningless. You could use facts to prove anything that's even remotely true! (Homer Simpson)

180 Proof
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Posted 12/08/08 - 03:22 AM:	#27
Wosret wrote: You both mention that morality is inductively derived, from experience and circumstance, and is am emergent property of a social system, and not contingent on any single individual (I liked your suggestion of ecology, a little better, as it was more encompassing, and appealing to my vegan eyes) ... I don't think there's anything in what I sketched above that excludes natural ecology which encompasses every social ecology; I simply wanted to focus on the latter since the only "nature", Tist, can accept is that of his imaginary friend. I would like to ask: do you agree that what is and isn't a moral action is evaluated by the affect this action will have on other agents in the world? Not directly. Rather I think how the moral agent is affected (i.e. optimized) by her own behavior IN THE CONTEXT OF how relationships between agents, groups, institutions & nature are affected (i.e. sustainably developed) by aggregate behaviors can be evaluated historically & comparatively. From this, do you agree that with reason and evidence we can demonstrate that somethings are moral and others immoral with regard to the goals and aims a moral system serves, and thus if we are faced with two conflicting societies, with two conflicting moral systems, one can be demonstrated to be categorically superior to the other for serving the purpose a moral system exists to serve? First, I don't think "moral systems" have "goals and aims" any more than languages or evolutionary processes do. Second, I don't think "categorical" (i.e. context-free) distinctions or relations make sense. Lastly, social ecologies are not directly comparable except with respect to their respective sustainability within the natural ecology in which they're embedded; the more sustainable the ecological-fit between the social/natural levels the more "moral". Does being more "moral" confer superiority? No more than being more healthy or being more fluent in Mandarin confers superiority. There is only a difference in degree not kind between conflicting social ecologies because both are embedded in a shared ecological background (i.e. nature). reincarnated wrote: Why would I NEED God to tell me what is morally right or wrong ... Yeah, I don't see how any inexplicable X explains anything that needs explaining (e.g. morality). Another "mystery" Tist won't bother unraveling for me ...
The question isn't "What do I believe?" but rather "What do I least disbelieve?" Absence of necessary evidence is evidence of necessary absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Peregrinus
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Posted 12/08/08 - 03:36 AM:	#28
Are the terms 'Moral Epistemology' & 'Moral Ontology', as used by Tisthammerw, valid?

CypressMoon
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Posted 12/08/08 - 03:44 AM:	#29
180 Proof wrote: Yeah, I don't see how any inexplicable X explains anything that needs explaining (e.g. morality). Likewise, I don't see how any inexplicable X can be believed to not exist. The tools you're using to explain the emergent properties of a social system, including causes for beliefs - like morality - are emergent from that same historically, and culturally contingent social system... meaning the tools of reason and logic are "founded" upon pre-suppositions. And in fact, this heroic confidence you have in these tools, is oblivious to the work of idealistic systemacy - in which case, thier whole goal was to unify all knowledge, to bring the systems together as one. Only as one, can the pre-suppositions emerging from a from a social structure be solidified as true. As we know, this is BS because a unification is impossible. I don't see how you can, or rather, why you would want to stop people believing in an inexplicable (transcendent, and by this virtue sense-less) X, when the system of total knowledge is logically impossible, making your pre-suppositional foundations as novel as those popularly associated with belief.
"IN THE spring, Tipasa is inhabited by gods and the gods speak in the sun and the scent of absinthe leaves, in the silver armor of the sea, in the raw blue sky, the flowercovered ruins, and the great bubbles of light among the heaps of stone." - Albert Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays A good determinant of success is when people start buying your shit.

reincarnated
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Posted 12/08/08 - 03:59 AM:	#30
CypressMoon wrote: Likewise, I don't see how any inexplicable X can be believed to not exist. Its quite easy, really. I ask myself "Does X ultimately explain anything which cannot be explained in absence of X? Is there any evidence for the existence of X? Does the concept of X make coherent and rational sense?" To all of these questions, my answer is "no" - hence I see no need to believe that X exists. CypressMoon wrote: The tools you're using to explain the emergent properties of a social system, including causes for beliefs - like morality - are emergent from that same historically, and culturally contingent social system... meaning the tools of reason and logic are "founded" upon pre-suppositions. Not on presuppositions. On rational and coherent reasoning. It stands to reason that a social system comprising a collection of individuals will be more stable, more cohesive, more successful, if the individuals within that system follow certain rules or laws which govern how they ought to behave to each other (as opposed to having no rules or laws of behaviour at all). CypressMoon wrote: I don't see how you can, or rather, why you would want to stop people believing in an inexplicable (transcendent, and by this virtue sense-less) X, when the system of total knowledge is logically impossible, making your pre-suppositional foundations as novel as those popularly associated with belief. Why would anyone want or need to believe in some inexplicable X when that X does not explain anything that cannnot be explained in absence of X? Why does your "system of total knowledge" need to be possible? I fail to see the relevance.
Facts are meaningless. You could use facts to prove anything that's even remotely true! (Homer Simpson)

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