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Can reason defend itself?

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Can reason defend itself?
jwdink
Johnnie

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Posted 08/03/07 - 05:23 PM:
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#51
If I continued to make my post again without including my definition of faith and used only yours, would you then proceed to answer why the statement is not justified without using metaphors of invisible unicorns? (That made me laugh, by the way, since it refers to my avatar -- Invisible Pink Unicorns.)


Holy Crap!! That's weird. I didn't actually notice that when I used the analogy. Ha.

Regarding the rest of your argument: yeah, perhaps you're right. Some statements could be justified by self-evidence. Thus, it would seem improper to call an acceptance of these axioms faith.

I suppose I could argue that " the entirety of an object's qualities are what define the object itself" is a proposition we must accept on faith... I'm really not sure. The entire thing is so counter-intuitive, it's hard to actually go through the motions of "rejecting reason".
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Posted 08/04/07 - 01:29 PM:
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#52
jwdink wrote:
NBR, as I suggested before, I really don't think we disagree all that much. We both agree that reason is best approach to uncertainty. We both agree discussion cannot occur without it. And we both agree that it can't be defended with some axiomatic proof, nor it is demonstratably certain. We also agree that that is okay.

I think the main problem in communication we are having is how we're using "reason". You give examples of newtonian physics, etc. etc. I believe I was conceptualizing something much more fundamental than this. For instance, we trust that things tend towards consistency. The sun will continue to rise every day. We trust that things can not be both "A" and "not A". Etc. Etc. I was calling things like these the most foundational points of reason. If you have a better name for them, I would be glad to adopt it. At any rate, these things are by definition unjustifiable, and that's perfectly alright. As such, I was characterizing our trust in them as a sort of faith. This idea, apparently, was uncongenial to you. Why is this? I am not equating it with religious faith. I merely call it that because there is no justification for our trust in it.


Let me suggest that reason does not rest on axiomatic proof, but rather on asking the questions—What are my goals here? What are the alternatives? What can I say about how the goals relate to the alternatives?

From this approach to reason, you will get very different, and more uncertain answers than those you insist upon.

Our rational problem is not is some principle certain, but rather what principles, in light of our knowledge, represent the best choices. And our best choices depend in part on our goals.

For example, if our sole goal is never to make an error, then holding no statement as true or false, or even probably true or false, is an excellent choice. In this way, we shall not ever make an error. Of course, if we have goals such as wanting to eat a satisfying dinner, satisfying our thirst, getting rid of pain, etc, then we shall not find the view of holding no statement even probably true or false particularly helpful.

Let me start with your statement as an axiom “We trust that things can not be both "A" and "not A".” I notice in post #51, you suddenly go—oops, maybe there are self evident principles of which non-contradiction is one.

I suggest that the use of reason in my sense would not have caused this bizarre reversal.

If you used reason, you would ask, why should I concede these points as self evident. Consider some specific possibilities:

Consider vague terms—bald, a pile etc. Now is something bald or a pile or not? There are certainly case where we will be uncertain—is it “A is both both a pile and not a pile” or that it is both bald and not bald—or to say it is uncertain. There are advantages and disadvantage to each approach. That is what is under discussion. In terms of Renzo’s argument the questionable assumption is that "A quality must remain constant in the same object so long as the object is unchanged." This ignores the possibility that we do not what the quality is, unchanged or not.

Consider the sentence “This statement is false.” Now, is this statement true of false. There are a number of solutions to this problem—including that the statement is meaningless. Which solution works better in solving the problems that interest you? This is the rational question. Again, in terms of Renzo’s argument the questionable assumption is that "A quality must remain constant in the same object so long as the object is unchanged," Our question must be what is the quality in the first place?

In both cases, our approach is not to assume an axiom, or to accept it as self-evident, but rather to ask, what goals are satisfied by our alternative choices, and what goals do we wish to achieve.

For a lot more possibilities try: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

If we actually apply reason in my sense, and include fallibalism as law of reason—you will not fall into saying “Oops, there are self evident laws” and instead say what you should say from my viewpoint—what are the advantages and disadvantages of adopting this principle, and what are the alternatives?

(BTW—I think the law of non-contradiction is advantageous for most purposes—but this not remotely the same thing as saying it is self evident under all circumstance.)

But such possibilities can only be arrived at through reason—having abandoned it, you shift from “axioms are always wrong” to “yeah, what do you know some axioms really are self evident”.

Now you say that “The sun will continue to rise every day.” Has anyone ever asserted this as a principle of reason? Who?

There is a principle of induction, but now one ever thought such a principle was certain rather than merely probable.

Now some authors such as Hume, have tried to show that a principle of induction is not even probable. (What Hume, in fact, demonstrated was the very old principle that the principle of induction was not certain. Whether he demonstrated it was not probable in all circumstances is trickier.)

Similarly, Popper tried to show that we could evaluate scientific theories without using, to his mind, a false principle of induction.

So apparently induction is not an axiom of reason, but rather a principle that intelligent people can question, and can question with the use of, well, reason.

Still Hume’s principle is great if I have no goal other than to avoid error. But let us consider that I am lying in bed and am incredibly thirsty, and wish to satisfy my thirst. What is the best alternative:

1) Eat my pillow.
2) Get up and jump up and down on one foot.
3) Lie there and hope it stops.
4) Go get a glass of water.

I would suggest that 1) and 2) are really bad ideas, 3) might work and 4) is the best alternative, though it might not work. What do you think and why? Hume provides no reason to think that 1) and 2) are not just as good as 4). This seems to me a result of failure to consider our goal, a failure to consider the alternatives, and insistence, like yours, that only certainties and proofs matter.

Now let me review my position. Reason does not provide certainty or proof. Reason might provide best choices. However best choices are the result of 1) goals; 2) alternatives; and 3) using some but not all principles of reasons—we can abandon reason a plank at a time, but not it toto.
NBR
jwdink
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Posted 08/04/07 - 04:51 PM:
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#53
NBR, I guess I see where our misunderstanding took place. We just have very different things in mind when we speak of "reason". To yours, faith and axioms just aren't very good descriptors. I'm just not sure whose idea of reason is more accurate.

Reason as "a strategy in approaching a situation" might not conflict too badly with my conclusion, it just subverts my argument for that conclusion. After all, if this strategy can vary so much, its not particularly objective, is it? Then again, I think you're really arguing that it just depends on the situation, but in each situation, there is an optimal approach. In this case, however, I can continue to be stubborn and insist that there's no way of being certain that a reasoning strategy will be optimal in a particular situation. Thus, how is the reasoning strategy you choose for a particular situation justified? What could we base this justification on?

Eh?


Edited by jwdink on 08/04/07 - 05:07 PM
Taffer
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Posted 08/10/07 - 03:36 AM:
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#54
jwdink wrote:

Regarding the rest of your argument: yeah, perhaps you're right. Some statements could be justified by self-evidence. Thus, it would seem improper to call an acceptance of these axioms faith.


You could even say "axiom" means a principle which is self-evidently true, and cannot be demonstrated without using that principle in the demonstration.
jwdink
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Posted 08/10/07 - 08:28 AM:
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#55
Taffer wrote:


You could even say "axiom" means a principle which is self-evidently true, and cannot be demonstrated without using that principle in the demonstration.


You could.

But I'm still skeptical, after having thought about it. Just because certain things are self-evident to all humans doesn't mean they aren't just faith that's hard-wired into our biology. I still have to insist on my original hunch at the beginning of the thread: no justification can begin without faith in something, and this faith, though apparently reasonable, may only appear so because of human dispositions.

As for the "goal oriented" definition of reason, well, I respond to that in a similar way. Whatever goal you decide on, and whatever method you choose towards reaching that goal, is based on faith.

So I'm stubborn, I guess.
Taffer
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Posted 08/11/07 - 12:52 AM:
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#56
"Mental acceptance of and confidence in a claim as truth without proof supporting the claim"

says wikipedia dictionary in the first entry on faith. But technically, that is a meaningless statement. If we swap "proof" for "proof from self-evident principles" then some things we believe to be true are classified as faith-based, and some things aren't. Then the statement is meaningful.

I say technically meaningless, because when most people in real life say "proof" they really mean "proof from self-evident principles".

Edited by Taffer on 08/11/07 - 01:08 AM
jwdink
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Posted 08/11/07 - 11:27 AM:
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#57
I'm not sure what you mean here. I would argue that this mental acceptance of axioms is faith because there is nothing to support the axioms. Could you clarify what you're trying to say?
Taffer
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Posted 08/11/07 - 11:55 AM:
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#58
jwdink wrote:
I'm not sure what you mean here. I would argue that this mental acceptance of axioms is faith because there is nothing to support the axioms. Could you clarify what you're trying to say?


I was saying that the wikipedia (and doubtless many others) definition of faith was meaningless. By that I mean, they might as well have said "faith is uhefef jhdfsh gooby". If, however, "proof" is interpreted as "proof from intuitively self-evident principles", then the definition is meaningful. Another interpretation of "proof" which some people (a physicist, say) might use which would make the definition meaningful would be "empirical evidence of a sufficiently high order".
jwdink
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Posted 08/11/07 - 01:15 PM:
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#59
How come you think it's meaningless? Sorry if I'm being dense here.
NoSoul
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Posted 08/11/07 - 01:27 PM:
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#60
jwdink wrote:
Can reason defend itself?

...I've noticed it often comes down to the fact that they have faith in reason above all things, even a deity. They try to believe this deity is a rational concept, but if they are convinced otherwise, then, as this guy did, they must rethink their beliefs.

It raises the question, for me, however, as to what would happen if someone just decided to put faith in God above faith in reason? So that even if God is an irrational concept, they don't have to care, because they believe in him prior to reason.



I have long thought reason & intuition are essential complements to each other. Reason & logic simply feel better than irrationality. At least in a certain sense. At the limits of reason, conclusions & premises begin to contradict each other, things stop cohering so well, and you are forced, IMO, to resort to intuition to sort things out. The question of reason giving itself reason is a clear paradox, an example of Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem if you will. To resolve it requires stepping outside of reason, and resorting to intuition. This is paradoxical, but IMO it's necessary.

IMO, and this can be no more than IMHO, people who wander beyond this, venture beyond common sense & proper intuition when they begin asserting -- using logic & reason btw! -- that, since there's no absolutely coherent or consistent base for reason, therefore all is irrational, and by extension, any belief in any old irrational thing whatsoever is just fine. This is the essence of Postmodernism, IMO, which is the perversion of paradox thinking, e.g. the abandonment of commonsense intuition, which gives to us naturally, a-priori, when we may be reasonable/use reason, and when we must admit we can't use it.

The problem with theists & other superstitious & supernatural thinking, very simplistically, is that they either don't use their intuition properly, or perhaps don't have the same kind of intuition faculties that I & others like me have. That's the best I can properly defend this, I think.
Firmly tie the mind, resembling a mad elephant, to the strong pillar of its perceptual content, with the rope of contemplative inspection, and gradually tame it with the hook of discrimination.

-- Buddhist Handbook, Salamander Press

To the poet and sage, all things are friendly and hallowed, all experiences profitable, all days holy, all men divine. - Nietzsche/Emerson
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