While this is true, that does not discredit the fact that some statements are self-evident and require no proof outside themselves. You agreed with me in concept, just not in the particular.

I understand how you can insert another premise which would once again attempt to prove the conclusion. But my question is about why it is necessary to do so as opposed to accepting the conclusion as internally consistent.

Please, explain.

Actually, we do not agree at all. I was suggesting that there are a variety of circumstances where it is rational to use reason--and this is a key to the question can reason defend itself. If it is rational to use reason, then reason is defended.

Further, reason is not simply a type of belief that it is rational to use reason. You seem to me have lost track of the difference between the question--how shall we best approach uncertainty--a question with a potentially rational answer--and assuming any uncertainty or probability makes reason uncertain and no better than...well what exactly?--because the alternatives are exactly what we have to examine.

A discussion or argument with another person is only possible if we agree on something--definitions of terms, rules of inference etc. Other wise, I could reply to you "Etion shredlu canw quzxw!" And add--I have refuted you! Without such reasonable requirements as agreement on the meaning of words and rules of inference, it is not just that reason cannot defend itself, but rather than any discussion or argument is impossible. You have confused the conditions for argument or discussion itself, with the conditions for defending reason.

Now if you think the above are equally worthwhile with respect to more reasoned alternatives, and think you would be happy to accept all of them, then by all means reject reason. If not, think very carefully about why you reject them, and realize that reason is more rational than some possible alternatives.

Other examples of this would be, for instance, the Theory of Contradiction or Aristotle's First Principle. The former states "Either there is something, or there is nothing." The latter states "For the same characteristic simultaneously to belong and not belong to the same object in the same way is impossible."

These are two more examples of self-evidence because any doubt in these at all would be based on an inherent inconsistency. If that is the case, why would this not justify reason? If any doubt at all is illogical or inconsistent, then why would one doubt it to begin with?

It seems to be the only option. Therefore, the two above statements should defend themselves.

There seems to be a lot of ambiguity here in the definition of faith. You seem to agree that the statement is logical, obvious, and simple. To me, that is diametrically opposed to faith, since there is really no reason to doubt. How are you defining faith in this case?

And, even if it is still assumed the premises cannot be known with certainty, that still does not address the Theory of Contradiction and First Principle shown above, as they still defend themselves, independently of other elements.

Renzo wrote:


I see your definition of faith is "a proposition without justification." How, then, is this common concept between the two propositions I stated earlier without justification?

"A quality must remain constant in the same object so long as the object is unchanged."

How is this a statement of faith? Where can doubt exist? Can you give me an example where the statement is false?

If you can disprove the statement or provide an example where it is inconsistent of itself, then I will believe it is a matter of faith. But until a proposition supported by reason can be falsified in practice, why should it be considered a statement of faith?