btracz wrote:
A better understanding is gained by knowing how "facticity," that is, the simply reality of things-in-themselves, relates to bad faith. Sartre's metaphysics has dualist underpinnings in the sense that the subject (the will) is absolutely and unconditionally free in a way that contrasts from objects (things-in-themselves).

Bad faith for Sartre is acting against your own set values (this actually compares to Kant's moral philosophy in the sense that both marvel at the subject's ability to make laws by itself, for itself). Thus, the whole murder scenario, Sartre would say, would depend on your own convictions. Killing somebody (see Camus' The Stranger) might be bad or might not be bad depending on the mental attitude of the subject towards the object (recall also that in Being in Nothingness that "the other" is distinctly an object as described in the section entitled "Concrete Relations with Others"). Thus, killing might be moral for you at a given time, but not moral for me at another time.