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Ayer on non-cognitivism

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Ayer on non-cognitivism

kNoctis
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Posted 01/17/09 - 03:20 PM: Subject: Ayer on non-cognitivism	#1
In the book Language, Truth and Logic, A.J. Ayer argues that moral and value claims do not have a truth value. Unlike normal statements regarding matters of fact, moral claims are claims that have no propositional content. Moral claims such as 'murder is wrong' are expressions of feeling or sentiment that are equivalent to "oh no!". They don't make a claim about the world, and as such, don't express something that can be truth or false. However, the emotional reactions that Ayer is referring to can be classified as three different types: positive - e.g. 'awesome!', negative - 'fiddlesticks', or neutral - 'whatever'. But each of these reactions have, at its core, a propositional content that determines the particular type. This propositional core is the approval or disapproval the person bases her reaction on. Without it, there is no basis for disgust, elation, or apathy that comprises the form the reaction takes. This underlying factor is an assertion which definitely has a truth value - whether the person actually approves or disapproves. Ayer addresses this point by saying that, although one might assert their feelings about something at the same time they express them, there are times when a person expresses her feelings without asserting anything at all. However, he fails to provide any examples of this, and I can't think of any that pertain to moral claims. In fact, the exact opposite seems to be the case. Expressions of feeling regarding moral or value claims always seem to be accompanied by an underlying assertion, either expressed or not, that has a definite truth-value. Edited by kNoctis on 01/18/09 - 09:12 AM

brainpharte
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Posted 01/17/09 - 04:17 PM:	#2
But such assertions come down merely to "I approve of x" or "I disapprove of x." It doesn't strike me as getting anywhere to construe these as propositions to which we can assign truth values. The most we can know, if we assume that the speaker is not trying to deceive us, is that they approve or disapprove of x. So we can say that "Jones approves of x" is True, but we still can't assign a truth value to x. That is, we can assign truth values to claims that someone has made a certain value assertion, but we still cannot assign truth values to the value itself.
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

swstephe
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Posted 01/17/09 - 05:14 PM:	#3
So, "murder is bad", is just an emotional statement, so it isn't objectively true. It is only subjectively, and therefore relatively true. That's no big revelation, but I notice that the idea that "objective truth values are 'bad' and therefore 'invalid'" is also an emotional statement and is subject to its own consideration. Why not invalidate "objective=awesome!" vs. "subjective=fiddlesticks"? But subjective values have their roots in a rational preference for survival and evolved emotional attachments to actions that result in survival and prosperity which may be superior to experience. Murder is "wrong" because it objectively doesn't benefit us to allow it, our subjective emotions are just natural reinforcements of that fact.
Ethics is the measuring of morality. Morality is the measuring of good. Good is the measuring of benefit. Benefit is the measure of values.

SIR2U
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Posted 01/17/09 - 05:33 PM:	#4
Isn't apathy a lack of interest or enthusiasm about something? Surely if someone said "Lets kill him" and you answered "whatever" the lack of emotion you demonstrate would indicate neither approval nor disapproval.
Unknown Alanic wiseman. "Ignorance and bad teeth have at least one thing in common. Keeping your mouth closed makes them both less obvious"

kNoctis
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Posted 01/17/09 - 06:35 PM:	#5
brainpharte wrote: But such assertions come down merely to "I approve of x" or "I disapprove of x." It doesn't strike me as getting anywhere to construe these as propositions to which we can assign truth values. If anything, it shows that ethical statements do have a truth value. Considering that there are many who think they don't, I'd say it's fairly productive. Additionally, Ayer himself argues against cognitive ethical subjectivism, so if one has reason to reject his non-cognitivism, then his entire position is in disarray. swstephe wrote: Murder is "wrong" because it objectively doesn't benefit us to allow it, our subjective emotions are just natural reinforcements of that fact. The word "benefit" constitutes a value judgement and requires a defense. There are many people, particularly those who are suicidal, who would disagree that survival is beneficial. Plus, your analysis of murder is on a first order scale. Ayer's analysis is on a second order scale. To assert a value judgement as a defense for why people should value things begs the question. SIR2U wrote: Surely if someone said "Lets kill him" and you answered "whatever" the lack of emotion you demonstrate would indicate neither approval nor disapproval. Fair enough, although I suppose demonstrating neither approval or disapproval still asserts something that has a truth value - namely, that you neither approve or disapprove.

SIR2U
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Posted 01/17/09 - 06:47 PM:	#6
While it might be true or false whether you care or not, "whatever" can in no way be construed as a "moral or value claim".
Unknown Alanic wiseman. "Ignorance and bad teeth have at least one thing in common. Keeping your mouth closed makes them both less obvious"

makerowner
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 01/17/09 - 07:28 PM:	#7
You could use the same logic to show that statements about the rules of chess have no propositional content. Neither moral statements nor chess statements make claims about the world in the same way that "the cat is on the mat" does, but that doesn't mean there aren't true and false statements to be made within the system of morality or chess.
For philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know.

kNoctis
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Posted 01/17/09 - 07:36 PM:	#8
SIR2U wrote: While it might be true or false whether you care or not, "whatever" can in no way be construed as a "moral or value claim". Well I think that depends on how you interpret 'whatever'. If 'whatever' means, 'I don't care enough about x to approve or disapprove', then you're correct. It's a claim about my opinion regarding moral claims, and not a moral claim itself. However, if 'whatever', means 'x isn't something of which I approve or disapprove', then instead of being a claim about my opinion regarding moral claims, it's a claim about moral claims - insofar as moral claims are merely statements about what we approve and disapprove of. In the relevant context of this debate, I meant 'whatever' in the second way. If someone responds to a moral statement in the first way, then yes, they aren't making a moral statement. If someone asked me if I wanted to listen to Bach or Sinatra and I said 'I don't care' then my response would have been equivalent to the first defintion. If I said 'neither' then my response would be equivalent to the second.

SIR2U
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Posted 01/17/09 - 07:49 PM:	#9
knoctis, you wrote: However, if 'whatever', means 'x isn't something of which I approve or disapprove', I would take it that the following is an example of what you mean above. you wrote: If someone asked me if I wanted to listen to Bach or Sinatra and I said 'I don't care' then my response would have been equivalent to the first defintion. If I said 'neither' then my response would be equivalent to the second. Used in this sentense the "I don't care'" or "whatever" is not quite the same as my example. Here you have a choice and therefore you can, by your answer, be considered to be judging Bach to be better than Sinatra. By saying "whatever" you are judging them to be either equally good or bad so as to make no difference to you which is played.
Unknown Alanic wiseman. "Ignorance and bad teeth have at least one thing in common. Keeping your mouth closed makes them both less obvious"

dimitri
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Posted 01/17/09 - 09:43 PM:	#10
The main problem is the lack of precise language. The term value is rather confusing. Value is a subjective notion and it points at some subjective property of a thing. It may have sense only as a relative characteristic or an optional category: when you prefer something to something else (being obliged to choose) then you can say that the first thing you prefer to the second and the first one you value more. Or when you exchange things with others: your can talk of preferences and equivalencies of their values. In case of ethics it is better to use the word rule. And the rules of ethics (most of them), the most of which are of the categofy we call manners are just protective rules. They outline (to say metaphorically) a kind of zone, of the person's private space, where intrusion of others is forbidden. In a word we must understand better the mechanism of ethics, which has been mistified by too many wrong theories including the theory of virtue, categorical imperative, utilitarian theory...

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