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Ayer on non-cognitivism

radiohead269
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Posted 01/29/09 - 08:33 PM:	#101
makerowner wrote: radiohead269 wrote: Murder is right is a false statement, and so is 'murder is wrong' because there is no state of being that corresponds to either of these. I understand the convention "murder is wrong" perfectly well, but since there is no state of being that correspond to it, the statement is not true in any way. What "state of being" corresponds to "three is a number"? You're probably going to answer "the convention that 'three' is a number' " or something along those lines, but that doesn't answer the question of why "murder is wrong" doesn't correspond to a convention. "Murder is wrong" IS a convention. It's just not a truth. Just as "the television is on the table" is a state of being, "murder is wrong" is not a state of being. "The community thinks murder is wrong" IS a state of being, and in most communities is probably true. But that statement is NOT the same statement as "murder is wrong." Far from it.

makerowner
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Posted 01/30/09 - 07:48 AM:	#102
radiohead269 wrote: What "state of being" corresponds to "three is a number"? You're probably going to answer "the convention that 'three' is a number' " or something along those lines, but that doesn't answer the question of why "murder is wrong" doesn't correspond to a convention. "Murder is wrong" IS a convention. It's just not a truth. Just as "the television is on the table" is a state of being, "murder is wrong" is not a state of being. "The community thinks murder is wrong" IS a state of being, and in most communities is probably true. But that statement is NOT the same statement as "murder is wrong." Far from it. "State of being" is rather a problematic term, don't you think? In any case, you've again given no indication of why linguistic statements are different from moral ones. You accepted, with some reservations, that "three is a colour" is false; what is the difference between "three is a colour" and "murder is right" that allows the former to be true or false but not the latter? Since I expect that you're yet again not going to answer this question, this is about all I have to say on the subject.
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radiohead269
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Posted 01/30/09 - 09:05 AM:	#103
makerowner wrote: "State of being" is rather a problematic term, don't you think? I don't see any problems with the term. State of being refers to the same thing as 'is'which IS another word whose meaning I roughly understand. makerowner wrote: In any case, you've again given no indication of why linguistic statements are different from moral ones. You accepted, with some reservations, that "three is a colour" is false; what is the difference between "three is a colour" and "murder is right" that allows the former to be true or false but not the latter? Actually strictly speaking "three is a number" is not a linguistic truth, it is a conceptual truth, and I gave the elaboration of what it means above. What three is a number really means is "there exists a number greater than two and less than four." This statement is true. The linguistic claim is that 'such a number is called three.' This is a convention. Another way of saying the same thing is 'The community refers to the number greater than 2 but less than 4 as 'three." This statement is true. A corresponding conventional truth about morality would be 'The community believes that murder is wrong / considers murder wrong / calls murder wrong / categorizes murder as wrong." And depending on a community, this statement can be true. But as I've said a few times now, this is not the same claim as "Murder is wrong." The claim murder is wrong is equivalent to the statement that "there exists a number greater than two and less than four" except that the latter is true - it is true regardless of what any community happens to think about it - and the former is false - no action can be a priori wrong or right.

ManiacJack
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Posted 01/30/09 - 09:53 AM:	#104
radiohead, do you find abstract entities to be non-existent? Does logic exist in your view? How is saying anything is illogical any more concise than saying something is immoral?
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radiohead269
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Posted 01/30/09 - 10:05 AM:	#105
ManiacJack wrote: radiohead, do you find abstract entities to be non-existent? Does logic exist in your view? How is saying anything is illogical any more concise than saying something is immoral? Re: abstract entities, if you want to say that the contents of our thoughts 'exist' so long as we understand the word exist to be analogous to the way we use it when we refer to physical entities, I am ok with that. But they don't 'exist' in any way outside of our thoughts, obviously. Logic would be the same way. Logic is a construction which is why we have 8,000 logicians with 8,000 different opinions about what is logical and what is not. There is no real answer to this. This is quite different from the case of physical entities, which DO exist fully and really and do so without regard to whatever we have to say about it. What do you mean by concise? I'm not sure I understand your question there.

JB
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Posted 01/30/09 - 02:01 PM:	#106
A posteriori, we might recognize both 1) descriptive and 2) normative truths, such normative conclusions always drawn from mixed premises (both descriptive and normative). For descriptive truths, we seek correspondence via conformity with facts. For normative truths, we seek conformity with right desires, defining what ought to be sought. A priori, we might recognize both 3) verbal truth and 4) the truth of understanding (per se nota). To the extent primitive terms like goodness appear indefinable, transcending the categories that make definition possible, we state their meanings in axioms of self-evident propositions, propositions known to be true through definition of their terms, propositions whose predicates are not entailed by their subjects, hence the distinction between verbal tautologies and per se nota analytical propositions. The above-recognitions would be consistent with a minimalist deontology. If we reject these distinctions, for example, because we think a given per se nota proposition is problematical (perhaps because a term seems incoherent), then we must grapple with the difficulty of relativity. For the most general of moral precepts, like "murder is wrong," which are almost universally held, in whatever way they might be variously justified by those who hold them, the difficulty of relativity remains problematic from a theoretic perspective but not so much from a practical perspective. Such precepts are held, almost universally, emerging as they have from the manifold and multiform shared values that we associate with our somewhat universal human condition. So, paraphrasing Reformed Nihilist from my vague recollections, to the extent our evaluative posits are attributes of a universal human condition, then, even though they may be relative (which per JB's view one needn’t concede, necessarily; cf. above re: minimalist deontology), still, they would avoid much of the difficulty normally associated with such relativity by virtue of being remarkably consistent, despite their relativity. So, again, these posits thus would remain relative from a theoretic perspective but not so much so from a pragmatic perspective. When you think about it, this, and not some foundational, authoritative deontology, accounts for the resonance and shared respect we do enjoy for such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the US Constitution, the Declaration of Independence and such. Even if one holds to a thoroughgoing absolutist perspective, is it not evident that all of humankind does not share the same metaphysical conceptions, that all foundationalists don't appeal to the same foundations, and that all authoritarians don't point to the same authorities? Problems with justification remain. Best regards, JB
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ManiacJack
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Posted 02/03/09 - 10:13 AM:	#107
radiohead269 wrote: Re: abstract entities, if you want to say that the contents of our thoughts 'exist' so long as we understand the word exist to be analogous to the way we use it when we refer to physical entities, I am ok with that. But they don't 'exist' in any way outside of our thoughts, obviously. Logic would be the same way. Logic is a construction which is why we have 8,000 logicians with 8,000 different opinions about what is logical and what is not. There is no real answer to this. This is quite different from the case of physical entities, which DO exist fully and really and do so without regard to whatever we have to say about it. What do you mean by concise? I'm not sure I understand your question there. Radiohead: sorry it took me a while to reply. The physical entities you refer to are not absolute in the way you presume them to be. Your ontological narrative is tied to the language you use, but not limited. People find the definition of 'exist' to be different than that of others, but this is of no consequence to that which exists/subsists. What I'm saying is that 'ducks' don't exist more or less than 'numbers', but that in simply naming things you add them to ontology. For example, The japanese notion of blue is more of a blue-green color, and under such a system of understanding, one might say that the sky and grass are the same color [this is hypothetical]. Or, more to the point, logicians will disagree as to how many objects are on the table as one logician counts sets of objects as objects themselves. And, they do not disagree with the logics, but the premises of the systems. You seem to be stating that objects of sensation are more real than objects of thought. It is a dangerous path to assume that you are less real than your context. Everything you presume to know is of your mind, not of the external world. Adjectives like 'hot and cold' are not actual, real modifiers. They are two ends of a spectrum you can perceive. Much like red and blue are opposites in regards to wavelength. Neither red or that blue are primary colors, however. There are three primary colors. The trick is seeing the three rather than the two. Cheers!
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radiohead269
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Posted 02/03/09 - 10:56 AM:	#108
ManiacJack wrote: Radiohead: sorry it took me a while to reply. The physical entities you refer to are not absolute in the way you presume them to be. Your ontological narrative is tied to the language you use, but not limited. People find the definition of 'exist' to be different than that of others, but this is of no consequence to that which exists/subsists. What I'm saying is that 'ducks' don't exist more or less than 'numbers', but that in simply naming things you add them to ontology. For example, The japanese notion of blue is more of a blue-green color, and under such a system of understanding, one might say that the sky and grass are the same color [this is hypothetical]. Or, more to the point, logicians will disagree as to how many objects are on the table as one logician counts sets of objects as objects themselves. And, they do not disagree with the logics, but the premises of the systems. Their existence may not be "lesser" in a quantifiable way, but their existences are radically different. Again, ducks are objects out in the world running around and having little duck babies. Numbers (and universals in general) are just concepts in our heads and nothing we can do will change that. ManiacJack wrote: You seem to be stating that objects of sensation are more real than objects of thought. It is a dangerous path to assume that you are less real than your context. Everything you presume to know is of your mind, not of the external world. There's a lot of confusions here. The fact that I become conscious of the external world through my mind doesn't mean the external world is all in my head. However, concepts are completely in my head - they are just thoughts. I can't encounter a thought on the supermarket shelf, but I can certainly encounter an apple or a mouse there.

ManiacJack
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Posted 02/03/09 - 01:14 PM:	#109
radiohead269 wrote: Their existence may not be "lesser" in a quantifiable way, Then what is 'objective' about your distinctions? but their existences are radically different. Again, ducks are objects out in the world running around and having little duck babies. Numbers (and universals in general) are just concepts in our heads and nothing we can do will change that. What are 'universals'? Are you not speaking of the 'objective' now? There's a lot of confusions here. The fact that I become conscious of the external world through my mind doesn't mean the external world is all in my head. However, concepts are completely in my head - they are just thoughts. I can't encounter a thought on the supermarket shelf, but I can certainly encounter an apple or a mouse there. What makes you think what is in your head is aside the external world? Solipsism? BTW, 'duck' is a concept. I don't think I could produce a noun that is not, but if you would like to try, be my guest.
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radiohead269
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Posted 02/03/09 - 01:20 PM:	#110
ManiacJack wrote: Then what is 'objective' about your distinctions? What are 'universals'? Are you not speaking of the 'objective' now? What makes you think what is in your head is aside the external world? Solipsism? BTW, 'duck' is a concept. I don't think I could produce a noun that is not, but if you would like to try, be my guest. I'm not sure what you're claiming or asking me with any of these questions, except for the universals one. Can you please rephrase?

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