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Arguments for moral objectivism
for the existence of (a) true categorical prescriptive proposition(s)

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Arguments for moral objectivism

emanswen
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Posted 10/07/08 - 06:22 AM: Subject: Arguments for moral objectivism	#1
Hello, I am sure this is a bit of a tired old question in this forum, but can somebody please tell me what the main/strongest arguments are that are supposed to support the claim that there is at least one true categorical prescriptive proposition (categorical imperative)? That is, I want to know the main/strongest arguments for the claim that there is at least one true proposition, which takes the following form: CI. Any subject, S, in a certain set of circumstances, C, ought to do X, as opposed to propositions of the following form: HI. Any subject, S, in a certain set of circumstances, C, ought to do X, if S is trying to achieve Y. I think this amounts to a question about the main/strongest arguments for moral objectivism (the view that there exist mind-independent moral facts), although I find these metaethical labels a bit confusing, which is why I tried to spell out my question more explicitly above. Any advice on where I can find these arguments will be much appreciated.

Cuthbert
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Posted 10/07/08 - 06:56 AM:	#2
It may be a tired old question, but it's not often so clearly put. I think one of the arguments concludes that there's no prima facie reason to think m.o. is false, viz: Consider the sentence: C2 Some object, X, is some colour, Y. People do use sentences of the form C2. They seem generally to agree that such sentences can be true or false. They don't seem to be insincere in their belief. There seem to be no reasons why they might be mistaken. So there is some evidence that there can be such true sentences and (so far) no reason is offered why there cannot be such. Now the same observations apply to sentences of the form C1. It's not the most persuasive argument in the world. It's a dressed down version of what you get in conversations like this: - 'I borrowed £100 from my confused elderly aunt. Now you say I ought to pay it back, even though she's forgotten about it. I ought to pay it back, if I want to achieve what? If I want to repay a debt? OK, but suppose I don't want to repay the debt...' To which the reply is: 'You ought to pay it back if nothing. You just oughta, because you owe it.' That is, in ordinary moral discourse it's assumed that there can be true categorical imperatives. If you opt out of categorical imperatives, you opt out of the moral discussion. (Some people think that might be a good thing.) Well, it's a start. Perhaps I oughta try harder. But only if I wanna do better I guess.

emanswen
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Posted 10/10/08 - 04:08 AM:	#3
I am familiar with that argument, and I think it can be fairly convincing depending on one's epistemological views and whether or not one is naturally inclined to believe that there are true categorical prescriptive propositions or not. For example, if S believes that, 1. Snow is white, and S believes that she is justified in believing 1, then, if S believes that, 2. Any subject, who borrows $100 from her confused elderly aunt, ought subsequently to repay the money, then, depending on S's epistemology, S's justification for 2 may not be any worse than her justification for 1, so S would appear be justified in believing 2. Epistemological issues aside, this argument is only convincing if one already believes (with conviction comparable to the conviction in one's other justified beliefs, like 1) that there are true categorical prescriptive propositions. The argument is not convincing to someone who lacks the belief that there are any true categorical prescriptive propositions to begin with. For example, one might believe that 2, but be unsure if 2 really does express a categorical imperative or whether it really expresses an incomplete hypothetical imperative, lacking its "if. . ." clause (e.g., "Any subject who borrows $100 from her confused elderly aunt, ought subsequently to repay the money, [if she does not want to feel guilty], or, [if she wants others to see her in a favorable light], etc.). I am interested to know about arguments that are supposed to convince someone who lacks the belief that there are any true categorical prescriptive propositions that there are such true propositions. I know that Kant is the one who introduced the categorical/hypothetical imperative terminology; did he actually give an argument to show why there is a true hypothetical imperative, or is the reasoning similar to that above? What was his argument?

Kien
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Posted 10/11/08 - 05:35 AM:	#4
As I understand Kant he's really relying on some kind of intuitionism. He says that categorical imperatives are 'categorically rational' while hypothetical imperatives are 'hypothetically rational'. Since the 'nature' of humans are part rational, they will be able to recognize what is rational and what is not. If you do not see the authority of categorical imperatives then you are 'rationally blind'. People that can't see the existence of such categorical imperatives are impaired in much the same way as people who are colorblind. I don't think that he has ever said anything like that, but that is what his followers would have us believe. Check out Michael Smith 'The Moral Problem' where he tries to argue for much the same thing (though not a Kantian I think). When push comes to shove they all claim that people who can't agree, must be in denial or missing something that would enable them to see the truth. A 'Smith' example of a situation where you should do something 'categorically': Suppose you know that what is in a glas is not beer, but poison. A man walks in and wants a drink. He thinks that's beer and so intends to pour it down. From a hypothetical point of view that is what the man should do rationally. But we know that that is not what he should do. This other 'should' from the third person view is - supposedly - the categorical imperative. Anyone can see that he shouldn't do it, and if you can't something is wrong with you. And anyone can see that he should do it from a hypothetical point of view. It appears that we have imperatives that are not hypethetical and that their authority even beats the authority of hypothetical imperatives. I'm not convinced but rather than telling you why, I'm more interested in your thoughts on this example of a categorical imperative. Edited by Kien on 10/11/08 - 05:03 PM

unenlightened
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Posted 10/11/08 - 02:04 PM:	#5
I haven't tried to articulate this before, but I have an intuition of a naturalist argument... 1. No man is an island. We exist always in relationship to others and to an environment. Even Robinson Crusoe has a relationship to his own past, to his absent society and to the island. 2. Relationship has certain requirements in order to function. For example, The boy who cried Wolf illustrates the necessity of truthfulness in communication. Dishonesty destroys the trust that is necessary to communication, and therefore one ought not to lie. Similarly, violence and exploitation destroy communication and relationship. So every man's death diminishes me, because I only exist in relationship. Excommunication is the ultimate sanction for wrongdoers. From here, I think the categorical imperative more or less follows as a generalisation of the reqirements of relationship, that is mutuality. I don't know, does this make any sense to anyone?
The observer is the observed. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Kien
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Posted 10/11/08 - 05:13 PM:	#6
Hmmm I don't really see the connection between 'no man is an island' and 'communication is valuable'. In fact I don't see what the island part has to do with anything. If one can have a 'relationship' to objects like islands, and memories of the past, then yes one is never alone. But surely that does not prevent a person from isolating oneself from other living and breathing persons? Insofar as communication is valuable to me I better be truthful, but what about the instances where it's not? What if I don't want to communicate?

emanswen
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Posted 10/11/08 - 06:19 PM:	#7
Kien wrote: As I understand Kant he's really relying on some kind of intuitionism. He says that categorical imperatives are 'categorically rational' while hypothetical imperatives are 'hypothetically rational'. Since the 'nature' of humans are part rational, they will be able to recognize what is rational and what is not. If you do not see the authority of categorical imperatives then you are 'rationally blind'. People that can't see the existence of such categorical imperatives are impaired in much the same way as people who are colorblind. I don't think that he has ever said anything like that, but that is what his followers would have us believe. Not having read his writings on the subject, I cannot criticise Kant directly, but, as you present him, in the absence of further argument supporting the claim that the denial of the existence of any true categorical imperatives amounts to irrationality, he seems simply to be making a bald assertion, begging the question against the moral sceptic/non-objectivist/whatever. . . The claim that denial of the existence of any true categorical imperatives amounts to irrationality is precisely what is in question here. Kien wrote: Check out Michael Smith 'The Moral Problem' where he tries to argue for much the same thing (though not a Kantian I think). When push comes to shove they all claim that people who can't agree, must be in denial or missing something that would enable them to see the truth. A 'Smith' example of a situation where you should do something 'categorically': Suppose you know that what is in a glas is not beer, but poison. A man walks in and wants a drink. He thinks that's beer and so intends to pour it down. From a hypothetical point of view that is what the man should do rationally. But we know that that is not what he should do. This other 'should' from the third person view is - supposedly - the categorical imperative. Anyone can see that he shouldn't do it, and if you can't something is wrong with you. And anyone can see that he should do it from a hypothetical point of view. It appears that we have imperatives that are not hypethetical and that their authority even beats the authority of hypothetical imperatives. It is possible that I do not have an entirely accurate grasp of what the terms "hypothetical imperative" and "categorical imperative" mean, but here is how I would interpret your example: The man believes that: 1. If I want to satisfy my desire for a drink, then I ought to drink the liquid in the glass. This is a hypothetical imperative, and is true (as long as his desire is for "a drink," not "a drink, which will not kill me"). We would say that: 2. The man ought not to drink the liquid in the glass. You are saying that 2 is a categorical imperative. I would argue that it is an incomplete hypothetical imperative, the complete form being something like, 2a. If the man wants to stay alive (and this desire is stronger than his desire for "a drink"), then the man ought not to drink the liquid in the glass. unenlightened wrote: 2. Relationship has certain requirements in order to function. Could you please explain more precisely what this means? In what sense can a relationship function or not function? What would a non-functioning relationship be?

unenlightened
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Posted 10/11/08 - 08:48 PM:	#8
Sorry, I've confused things with a metaphorical island and a literary one in the same paragraph, and other vaguenesses. I haven't much time so I'll come back to it later. I'm trying to get at a language that will apply to the environment as well as to other humans. We have a relationship of interdependence with life - everything has to eat each other for instance. So even the castaway has a duty in his relations not to be greedy and wilfully destructive. The whole point is that one never can isolate oneself, and one is therefore always subject to the requirements of relationship, which involve considering the other, be it human or nature. The isolation of a separate self is the 'knowledge' that came with the apple, but it is a trick of the mind; we are not separate.
The observer is the observed. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Kien
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Posted 10/12/08 - 04:35 AM:	#9
@emanswen: You nailed it. What Smith thinks is a categorical imperative is really a hypothetical imperative in disguise. An imperative must always be acknowledged from a first person point of view, not a third person point of view. Otherwise it would mean that it is NOT rational to drink something that you think is drinkable. That's crazy talk. If the person does not have the relevant belief that 'the liquid in the glass is poison', then he can not be ratinally justified in not drinking when he wants to drink (all things being equal). This is the debate between instrumental/hypothetical rationalism and intrinsic/categorical rationalism. The core belief in all rationalism is that the 'oughtness' is somehow part of the facts. The bald assertion is that 'oughtness' is somehow independent of one's beliefs or desires. Smith would have us think that we ought to do things irregardless of what we believe. Kant would have us think that we ought to do things irregardless of what we desire. What is their argument? Rational intuitionism. In their defense hypothetical rationalism also appeals to some kind of rational recognition, but it is far more clear to me (and probably most people) that 'some actions are better in regards to fullfilling my wants while others are not', than 'some actions are simply better'. Look into books about intrinsic/categorical rationalism to see the arguments for yourself, but I don't think you'll find anything that doesn't boil down to what has been posted here. They must simply show some situations where everyone can agree that one ought to do it irregardless of one's desires or beliefs, and to Smith's credit he at least gives us some simple and understandable ones.

unenlightened
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Posted 10/12/08 - 04:41 PM:	#10
emanswen wrote: Could you please explain more precisely what this means? In what sense can a relationship function or not function? What would a non-functioning relationship be? I guess if I say something that makes no sense to you, that is a non-functioning relationship. So, (if I don't want to be wasting my time and yours), I ought to do my best to communicate clearly. There seems to me to be a possibility that the conditional part of such a statement could either be reduced to something that is trivially acceptable, or, even better, that one could effectively eliminate it by considering its negation. If you want to stay alive, you should eat nutritious food. If you don't want to stay alive, you should kill yourself immediately. Therefore you should under no circumstances eat at Mcdonalds. If I want to communicate something, I should speak honestly. If I don't want to communicate anything, I should be silent (because even dishonesty communicates something). Therefore I should communicate honestly. I don't think this quite works, but I am trying to get at something in the nature of being alive and aware, that requires a certain kind of relationship of its nature. If you are part of the living world, then you ought to be respectful of the living world. Does that say something?
The observer is the observed. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

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