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Argument for God - I
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Posted 03/04/05 - 08:00 PM:
Subject: Argument for God - I
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#1
This thread is the result of the dialogue between me and sensabile in http://forums.philosophyforums.com/thread/13960.

In a famous article in the Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas lists five "ways to prove God". He also addresses the two main objections to a belief in God, but this is the scope of other threads. In this thread (and in two others about to be posted), the idea is to examine the argument being presented in order to find some flaw. Though no argument can ever "prove" God (strictly speaking, i.e., deductively) -- as Aquinas says in the article prior to this one -- we can certainly infer that God (or someThing like Him, for those who don't like the name) must exist, as the arguments below will show. Therefore, if no flaw can be found, the argument will have done its job.

In this first thread, I will conflate the first three ways. They are all based on some sort of "Cosmological Argument":

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.


The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.


The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.


Though the three arguments are quite similar, they are not equivalent; they are broadly based on the Aristotelian arguments for the Unmoved Mover.

More threads about this (or close enough - threads addressing the impossibility of an infinite past are sometimes called "Cosmological Arguments", somewhat imprecisely; the two kinds of arguments are related but not identical):

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/thread/14021

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/thread/9257

http://forums.philosophyforums.com/thread/7244

"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal

"The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years
PhilW
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Posted 03/04/05 - 09:02 PM:
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The third seems the most convincing. Can you give us a brief explanation of the meaning of "efficient cause" in the second? I've read Aristotle's distinctions between the various types of causes, but they never seem to stick...

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Posted 03/04/05 - 10:25 PM:
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I think the force of this argument is simply that without an unmoved mover we have an infinite regress of causation. Now, if you are perfectly comfortable with an infinite regress, then this argument isn't compelling. But for someone attracted to the art of logic, an infinite regress is an abomination and thus these arguments are appealing.

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Posted 03/04/05 - 11:15 PM:
Subject: that silly monk & his syllogisms ...
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#4
first argument -- an unwarranted assumption that "what it is in motion is put in motion" (aka fallacy of hasty generalization). raised eyebrow

second argument -- what caused "the first efficient cause"? if, as the argument contends, no thing is the cause of itself, then it follows that "the first efficient cause" cannot be "first" ... just as there is no first point on the circumference of a circle (which is bounded rather than an unbounded infinity) confused

third argument -- contradiction: no being consists of its own necessity yet god is the necessary being. rolling eyes

If faith is irrational, then it is rational to dismiss "faith-based claims" out of hand.

If faith is rational, then "faith-based claims" must be testable and/or sound -- but they are neither.

If faith is a-rational, then "faith-based claims" are inexplicable and thus cannot explain anything.
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Posted 03/05/05 - 07:48 AM:
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PhilW wrote:
The third seems the most convincing. Can you give us a brief explanation of the meaning of "efficient cause" in the second? I've read Aristotle's distinctions between the various types of causes, but they never seem to stick...


I think Aristotle's examples are the best. Consider a house, under the theory of four causes:

Material cause -- bricks, windows, etc. etc.
Efficient cause -- the man (or men) who build it.
Formal cause -- the "Platonic idea" of the house, the "template", what makes it be what it is.
Final cause -- to be used in habitation.

Efficient causes are the agents; the beings or entities which actually do the job of causation.

***

180Proof, did you notice the definition of "motion" as used by Aquinas?

"For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality."

It doesn't seem like a hasty generalization, to say that what is actual was once potential. For "permanent actuality" means "necessity".

As for your other contradictions, Aquinas is careful to qualify his statements, usually in the first sentence. Hence, Proof 2:

"In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes"

and Proof 3:

"We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be"

Aquinas is trying to prove (or rather to point at) metaphysical reality through empirical data. One can disagree with the entire notion of doing it, but one can't say that he is contradicting himself, for his premises start from empirical data (he does not begin with a metaphysical premise "no being consists of its own necessity", as you say, he just observes this in nature).

"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal

"The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years
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Posted 03/05/05 - 06:24 PM:
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Concerning the first argument in the opening post, I am puzzled as to why Aquinas decided that: "..this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover..."

What puzzles me, and this may be my own misunderstanding, is that this part of the argument supposes the existence of 'movers.' In as much as the staff has the potential to move, the hand actualizes this potential, the hand is the mover.

But, the hand, too, only has the potential to move (the hand does not move of its own); the arm is the actualizer. But the arm also only has the potential to move, the body is the actualizer. The body only has the potential to move, certain chemical reactions are the actualizers.

Now, Aquinas argues: if there was not a first mover then there would be no subsequent movers. But, have I not demonstrated above that there are no subsequent movers. In fact, empiricism would suggest that there is just an infinite sequence of potentiality.

I guess my question is: What evidence suggested to Aquinas that there are 'movers' in as much as they are strictly agents of actualization and not just capable of being agents of actualization?

Clay is fired to make a pot.
The pot's use comes from emptiness.
-Translated from Tao Te Ching
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Posted 03/05/05 - 06:55 PM:
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doosy wrote:

I guess my question is: What evidence suggested to Aquinas that there are 'movers' in as much as they are strictly agents of actualization and not just capable of being agents of actualization?


I don't know if I understand your question correctly, but it seems quite clear (empirically) that there is "movement" in the world. Some things are actual, and not simply potential (i.e. not "just capable of being agents of actualization"). Given that some things are actual, we need actual agents of actualization (not merely potential agents of actualization) to explain their actuality.

In your example, there is no need for agents inasmuch as we are talking of potentials (the staff has the potential to move, the hand has the potential to move the staff, etc. etc.). But once we see a staff actually moving, there must be something actualizing this movement (or else the staff is the unmoved mover, itself).

Now, Aquinas argues: if there was not a first mover then there would be no subsequent movers. But, have I not demonstrated above that there are no subsequent movers. In fact, empiricism would suggest that there is just an infinite sequence of potentiality.


I don't understand why you say this. Empiricism -- to me at least -- seems to show that there are plenty of actual movement going on in the world. That's what "empiricism" means, after all -- drawing inferences from actual events, not from potential events.

In other words, you are not attacking Aquinas' reasoning, but his premise. His argument is:

P1: Actual movement requires an agent of actualization (metaphysical premise)
P2: There is actual movement in the world (empirical premise)

Conclusion -- there must be an agent of actualization (in relation to all movement).

You (apparently) don't dispute this reasoning, or the metaphysical premise (which constitute the bulk of his words), you just dispute P2. Is that correct?

"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal

"The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years
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Posted 03/06/05 - 12:48 AM:
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In as much as 'actual movement in the world' presupposes a mover. So, I guess I dispute the metaphysical premise. And my reasoning was that this cannot be deduced from experience. But, since it is a metaphysical claim, I guess an empirical argument won't cut it... confused

How does one defend or argue such a metaphysical statement? I do have a feeling that P1 presupposes the conclusion of the argument, so I desperately grin want to argue it. Did Aquinas' have any particular reasoning that supported this claim?

Clay is fired to make a pot.
The pot's use comes from emptiness.
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Posted 03/06/05 - 07:29 AM:
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doosy wrote:
In as much as 'actual movement in the world' presupposes a mover. So, I guess I dispute the metaphysical premise. And my reasoning was that this cannot be deduced from experience. But, since it is a metaphysical claim, I guess an empirical argument won't cut it... confused

How does one defend or argue such a metaphysical statement? I do have a feeling that P1 presupposes the conclusion of the argument, so I desperately grin want to argue it. Did Aquinas' have any particular reasoning that supported this claim?


Metaphysical premises are usually either self-evident, or their denial leads to a contradiction. Aquinas' claim is "But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality". This is standard Aristotelian metaphysics, and (as Aristotle said) these categories (actuality vs. potentiality) are hard to define -- which is a hint of self-evidentiality, if there is such a word (!). If these categories are indeed self-evident, then the claim in the argument is also self-evident, or in other words, anyone who understands the concepts involved will agree with the claim. The problem is rather how to make someone grasp an undefinable concept -- and it can be done (as Aristotle said) when one considers a variety of cases. (Standard methodology when contemplating undefinable concepts such as "being" and "goodness").

Check http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metap... for a good discussion of these Aristotelian categories. And let me know if you still dispute the claim after that smiling face.

"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal

"The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years
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Posted 03/06/05 - 07:02 PM:
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I do not have problems with the definitions of the categories 'actuality' and 'potentiality' but I disagree with his notion of "what is actual is prior in substance to what is potential."

This is how I understand the argument:
1) A block of wood has the potential to be a table.
2) A block of wood carved into a table has actualized that potential.
3) A block of wood also has the potential to be a bowl. In such, this is the potential to be a not-table. (a bowl is not a table.)
4) "Anything that is capable of being is capable of not being." (from the link)
A block of wood has the potential for being and not-being (a table).
5) "Anything that is capable of not-being is perishable."
6) "Mere potentiality is perishable."
7) ... (eternal=nonperishable; actualities (table) are nonperishable; actualities are eternal, eternal is prior in substance to perishable...)
8) Actuality is prior in substance to potentiality.

**Please let me know if I have misrepresented this argument in any way.

My problem with this argument is that the actuality (table) is a strictly human category, while the potentiality is a much more subtle and universal category. For example, say I encounter a species of extra-terrestrial intelligent slugs. These slugs (lacking all forms of human decency and etiquette grin ) do not culturally and socially require the actuality 'table.' I could talk to the slugs about a block of wood (certain chemical composition, mass, etc.); we could even chat about a carved block of wood. But, I could not talk to the slug about a 'table.'

In this regard, I do not see the comparison between the two categories as valid. In making the above logical argument, it is assumed that the categories 'actuality' and 'potentiality' are comparable. I do not feel this is the case.

I am very interested to get this straight in my head, so please inform me whether or not I have gotten the argument right.

Clay is fired to make a pot.
The pot's use comes from emptiness.
-Translated from Tao Te Ching
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