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Argument against compatibilism

Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/01/07 - 05:40 PM: Subject: Argument against compatibilism	#1
I have difficulty seeing the point of view of compatibilists, such that I wonder how anyone can be a compatibilist at all. So to ferret out the point of view I propose an argument against it. First I'll define free will: the ability to control one's own actions. For those who don't know, compatibilism is the belief that determinism and free will (the type of which allows one to be morally responsible for one's actions) are compatible (a free willed action is the result of a person's inner brain states, which are determined via e.g. chemical reactions). To me this belief seems like nonsense. I'll illustrate why I believe this with the following argument: Suppose Doctor Nefarious constructs a device that emits rays controlling a person's inner brain states. The device forces certain brain states upon its victim, and the victim has no power to alter those inner brain states. Suppose Doctor Nefarious wants to use the device to get back at two people he hates: James and Bob. Doctor Nefarious uses the device so that Bob murders James. Bob has no control over what his inner brain starts are, and Bob has no control over what these inner brain states will result in (murder). At no point does he have control of anything he does when he commits the crime. Yet compatibilism seems to say that this man is morally responsible for his actions. The compatibilist might object saying this is a false analogy. The inner brain states here were forced upon him by an artificial device, whereas if the inner brain states come about naturally then the individual has free will. A rebuttal might be there is no relevant difference if the inner brain states came about naturally or artificially. Why? In either case the inner brain states are forced upon people outside their control, and what the inner brain states result in (e.g. murder) is also beyond a person's control. At no point does the person have control of anything he or she does. So how can compatibilism possibly be true? Edit (5.24.TH.2007): included definition of free will Edited by Tisthammerw on 03/29/08 - 02:27 PM. Reason: Compensated for an apparent bug that replaced my apostrophes with funny characters
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180 Proof
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0 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 03/01/07 - 08:04 PM:	#2
Tisthammerw wrote: So how can compatibilism possibly be true? Doesn't the question itself presuppose "compatibilism"? Aren't you assuming that there's an alternative truth-value possible, and thus alternative judgements and actions which can follow from them? 1. If "compatibilism" is false then we are either completely controlled or completely self-controlling. 1A. If we are completely controlled (i.e. determinism) then we are not responsible for our actions. Not responsible for our actions, whether or not we hold ourselves (and others) responsible is not within our control; we are determined to act "as if" we (and others) are responsible. (Determined by what? Controlled by what? In a causally closed universe physical laws themselves, I think, suffice.) 1B. If we are completely self-controlled (i.e. indeterminism) then we are not responsible for our actions since no conditions obtains which determine that "my" actions to belong to "me." Pure volition without spatial/ temporal (i.e. ontological) or psychological (i.e. memories) boundaries. There is an "I" but no discernible (i.e. determinate) "me". The "I" may be responsible but not "me". ("Reality is a dream" ...) 2. If "compatibilism" is true then we're both controlled & self-controlling, or better yet: conditionally self-controlling. Conditional self-control implies that one can always act otherwise than one does or will -- but within limits.Thus, conditionally we are responsible for our actions; outside of said conditions, however, we're not. These conditions are ecologically-historically-socially-psychologically situated (i.e. contingent) matters of fact and not logically necessary -- we can't logically deduce or metaphysically (e.g. "transcendentally") derive them. It seems, Tisthammerw, just by asking the question you presume one could answer otherwise than one will, that is, if persuaded by your argument "You're right, I can't see how it's true", not persuaded "It's true and here's how ...", or "I don't know what you're talking about." Tell me: how can one question "compatibilism" without assuming that it's true (even if one doesn't comprehend how it could be)? 3. If "compatibilism" is neither true nor false then we're in need of another (e.g. nonanthropomorphic) way of conceptualizing self-consciousness (i.e. subjectivity). Don't worry, Tisthammerw, "possibly true" doesn't entail "necessarily true" ... Edited by 180 Proof on 03/02/07 - 02:34 PM. Reason: ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

quantity
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Posted 03/01/07 - 11:16 PM: Subject: is it fair to suggest this:	#3
that unless we have an understanding of our actions being our own; or conversely, if we can recognize ourselves as being controlled, then we cannot presuppose our access free-will. perhaps free-will is something that we must work towards as opposed to just accepting as the truth, regarless of whatever obstacles may become apparent that would hinder this free-will, from mind-control to knowledge-control. Edited by quantity on 03/01/07 - 11:54 PM

PriamsPride
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 03/01/07 - 11:35 PM:	#4
180 Proof, your disjunction between 1A and 1B is an assumption. You assume that "no conditions obtains which determine that 'my' actions to belong to 'me.'" I really don't see any argument for this claim at all. As a matter of fact, I stanchly believe that the disjunction you have set up between 1A and 1B, the disjunction that so many people seem so willing to accept, is false. The problem with this belief is that it arises from an analytic philosophy that tells itself that it is the only way to do philosophy. Analytic philosophy is actually at a loss to explain the free-will which allows my actions to be my own, because it always looks straight past this selfhood. If my actions belong to me, then I must first belong to myself, and if I am to belong to myself, I must choose who I am. But, you ask, how can I choose who I am if I cannot be who I am now and who I am to choose at the same time? Let me put it another way (and I have used this argument before in a different thread): The way I am is z. I chose to be z. Before I chose z, I was y. I chose to be y. Before I chose y, I was x. And so on. Here you have the problem that arises when you attempt to analytically take possession of your actions. You will find that your actions come from some infinitesmal self that vanishes into nothing when you try to look at it. The deep fault, here, is that the way I am is the way I always was. When I choose to change who I am, I am not actually changing who I am at all; rather, I an changing to a different facet of my own being. The agent must at all times be equal to himself, or else he will no longer be an agent, because he will no longer have selfhood. Perhaps this sounds fishy to you, but that is because it is a sort of existential method of philosophy that seeks to be present to the truth, rather than to analyze the truth. Kierkegaard has a good explanation of the self at the beginning of his work Sickness Unto Death. He says that the self actually begins as an inert relationship within a person between the poles of freedom and necessity, infinite and finite. The inert self is a bare relationship of these poles to each other. Before you can be a self at all, you must occupy a ground that has access to the infinite, but is not the infinite itself. I would call this the human mind. But this self cannot truly be free to act, cannot truly touch the infinite until it has related itself to itself. It must become a self to itself, facing itself. It must declare to itself that it is, indeed, an agent. I would call this self-awareness. When you become self-aware, you are continuously choosing to be a self, to be an agent. You are continuously choosing to choose. Sentient life does not choose. My cats follow their instincts in all situations, but I, being self-aware, knowing that I am a knower, choosing to be a chooser, cannot but choose to act at every single moment of my life. Were I to choose not to be a chooser, I would be committing an act of contradiction, because you cannot choose non-choice, just as you cannot be non-being. Perhaps this has become a little to metaphysical and hand-wavy, but there really is not a more adequate way to describe the free agent. If there were, it would probably have been discovered by now. I don't doubt that I'll be brushed off for the fact that my argument here is not an analytic one. But anyone who is willing to brush off my argument for that reason, must be prepared to admit to himself that his mind is closed to any alternate method of philosophy. And wouldn't that be ironically anti-philosophical?

NoSoul
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Posted 03/02/07 - 01:41 AM:	#5
Courts of law use mental competency etc. as criteria for judging whether someone is responsible for their action. If someone murders but can be shown to have been controlled by Dr. Nefarious, it's much the same as someone who can be shown to be suffering from some psychological malady which effectively crippled their free will to control themselves (posttraumatic stress disorder, battered wife syndrome, schizophrenia, etc.). If such cannot be shown in court (whether actually [ontologically] true or not), then that person will probably be convicted as responsible & guilty.
Firmly tie the mind, resembling a mad elephant, to the strong pillar of its perceptual content, with the rope of contemplative inspection, and gradually tame it with the hook of discrimination. -- Buddhist Handbook, Salamander Press To the poet and sage, all things are friendly and hallowed, all experiences profitable, all days holy, all men divine. - Nietzsche/Emerson

Nonblack Raven
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Posted 03/02/07 - 08:39 AM:	#6
Suppose that Doctor Nefarious has a machine that monitors brain states, though not with perfect accuracy. The evil doctor discovers that Bob is planning to murder James with a 95 percent likelihood, but the brain state readings do not absolutely assure that Bob wonâ€™t back out at the last minute. Scenario 1: Doctor Nefarious monitors Bobâ€™s brain states but does not interfere in any way. Bob does murder James. Scenario 2. Doctor Nefarious monitors Bobâ€™s brain states, and discovers that Bob has made a last minute decision to not murder James. Doctor Nefarious activates his brain state forcing device and Bob now murders James as a result. Are you suggesting that there is no difference in the moral responsibility of Bob in the two scenarios?
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Posted 03/02/07 - 01:27 PM:	#7
Sorry, but what kind of argument is this? 'X says that he was capable of acting freely, so he was capable of acting freely'?! Bite the bullet of determinism, and incompatibilism, saying this: People are responsible for their actions. Sounds controversial? Not really. Law court A has solid evidence by which person P can be convicted. Person P pleads guilty, but cites the defense that said event could not have happened any other way. Law court A replies yes, but with the evidence at hand, neither could this trial. Rather, this is better - "It couldn't have happened any other way, but he is the same he that committed the crime - there is not some 'him' that is different from the 'him' that stands before us, and has its autonomy supressed by determinism. Our intuitions lead us to feel pity, this is because it's foul luck for you to be put in prison whilst we walk free; our brain states have not or will not compel us to commit crimes. But determinism is true, and there is no such thing as luck." The emotions of pity were determined anyway?! NoSoul wrote: Courts of law use mental competency etc. as criteria for judging whether someone is responsible for their action. If someone murders but can be shown to have been controlled by Dr. Nefarious, it's much the same as someone who can be shown to be suffering from some psychological malady which effectively crippled their free will to control themselves (posttraumatic stress disorder, battered wife syndrome, schizophrenia, etc.). If such cannot be shown in court (whether actually [ontologically] true or not), then that person will probably be convicted as responsible & guilty.

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Posted 03/02/07 - 04:57 PM:	#8
Tisthammerw wrote: [snip argument--see O.P.] So how can compatibilism possibly be true? The difference is that the mind control device is actually causality and the "victim" is capable of becoming aware of its influence and above all using it to influence himself, his future self, with his present actions. So, it would be like the victim taking control of the device and using it for his own ends.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/02/07 - 05:40 PM:	#9
Matt Gregory wrote: The difference is that the mind control device is actually causality and the "victim" is capable of becoming aware of its influence and above all using it to influence himself, his future self, with his present actions. So, it would be like the victim taking control of the device and using it for his own ends. But that's the problem: the person appears to have no control at all if determinism is true. Compatibilism says that a person's act of free will arises form inner brain states (wants and desires). There appears to be no relevant difference if the inner brain states come about via between Doctor Nefarious or natural causes. The initial inner brain state: determined by forces outside a person's control (processes that predate the brain) What the inner brain states result in: determined by forces outside a person's control (the laws of chemistry--a person cannot change them) There is no relevant difference between Dr. Nefarious and natural processes because in both cases the inner brain states are forced upon people outside their control, and what the inner brain states result in is also beyond a personâ€™s control. At no point does the person have control of anything he or she does.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

Tisthammerw
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Posted 03/02/07 - 05:55 PM:	#10
Nonblack Raven wrote: Suppose that Doctor Nefarious has a machine that monitors brain states, though not with perfect accuracy. The evil doctor discovers that Bob is planning to murder James with a 95 percent likelihood, but the brain state readings do not absolutely assure that Bob wonâ€™t back out at the last minute. Scenario 1: Doctor Nefarious monitors Bobâ€™s brain states but does not interfere in any way. Bob does murder James. Scenario 2. Doctor Nefarious monitors Bobâ€™s brain states, and discovers that Bob has made a last minute decision to not murder James. Doctor Nefarious activates his brain state forcing device and Bob now murders James as a result. Are you suggesting that there is no difference in the moral responsibility of Bob in the two scenarios? That depends on whether determinism is true in your scenarios. If determinism is true, there is no relevant difference between the two scenarios. He had no control over what his inner brain states would be, and no control what they would result in (as I explained in the first post). Why should Bob be held morally accountable in scenario 1 if his brain states and his actions are outside of his control? If determinism is false and free will exists however, there just might be a difference in moral responsibility.
Knowing is half the battle; the other half is a really big gun.

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