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Are illogical worlds possible?

MoeBlee
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Posted 06/10/08 - 04:41 PM:	#51
nullity wrote: hmm...i am not sure what these objects is suppose to be. Then it would seem you are not at all familiar with semantics for classical logic. nullity wrote: I don t know the technical defintion. I think Impossible worlds are worlds where maybe there are more than two truth value So despite that you raised it as a TECHNICAL matter, you really don't know anything about it technically, thus leaving us only to trust that someone or another does. nullity wrote: .. etc .. Yes, that specifies it quite precisely.

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Posted 06/10/08 - 04:57 PM:	#52
MoeBlee wrote: Then it would seem you are not at all familiar with semantics for classical logic. I know the semantics of classical logic. I don't know what a "mathematical Object" is suppose to be in classical logic. What is it? MoeBlee wrote: So despite that you raised it as a TECHNICAL matter, you really don't know anything about it technically, thus leaving us only to trust that someone or another does. I don t really like what you are doing. If you think about it, you don't have an argument. You are relying on the fact (you assume) that I don't do research in this area. Is this not the "fallacy of authority"? This is a pathetic "attack" to give the illusion that you won a fight. This is not a solid argument. On the other hand, let's suppose I don't know anything about this at all. Why is it so hard to "pick up" what is needed to understand the main discussion in the area? Do you think the issue is so very hard that no one except the experts know? Can you not read? In either case, you don't look so good. MoeBlee wrote: Yes, that specifies it quite precisely. Non-normal worlds are world where the laws of logic are different are ‘logically impossible worlds.’ Does that satisfy you, or do you want a more precise defintion? Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 06/11/08 - 12:46 PM. Reason: illiteracy, flaming, quote tags.

aufbau87
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Posted 06/10/08 - 11:27 PM:	#53
nullity wrote: aufbau87 wrote: If you share the skepticism with Quine that the adverb 'Necessarily...' or 'Possibly...' is unclear, it will serve an exemplar case of insignificance that philosophers speak of this new kind of 'possibility' that would render the sentence 'It is possible that that there exist an illogical world' true. In other words, if we can make clear the notion of possibility in 'It is possible that there be an illogical world', then the sentence would be logically false. Otherwise, what are we talking about? In what sense, I would ask, is it 'possible', if 'possible' at all? The word "possible" is not a vague notion in the following context. That is, it is logical possible if it is not logical impossible under classical logic. "impossible worlds" have a technical meaning in comtempory metaphysical speculation. Namely, impossible worlds are real existing worlds, and that the tradition rule of classical logic do not hold in these worlds. This is why "impossible worlds" are also commonly called "non-normal worlds". As used in this technical sense, "impossible worlds" is use to denote, and reference. There is no problem with that usage. Illogical worlds are logically impossible -- that is the part of the point of talking of 'impossible worlds'. It is also evident that these impossible worlds are also physically impossible, since all physically possible events or circumstances are logically possible. I don't understand this awkward sense of 'possibility' you speak of such that it would be 'possible' for an illogical world to exist; it would not be logically possible and it would not be physically possible. What kind of possibility would it be? 'It is possible that there be an illogical world', then the sentence would be logically false. You can`t make this statement. The word "possible" is not clear. What is possble is defined by what is allowed by some set of rules. [/quote] The notion of 'possible' in this instance is clear in context, for I say afterward that the sense of possibility unlike logical and physical (which would allow my statement to be correct) is utterly unclear. Basically, I'm requesting clarification of this use of 'possibility' that is being introduced so as to make 'possible' 'impossible worlds'. As it stands, its severely lacking significance. Edited by aufbau87 on 06/10/08 - 11:33 PM

muxol
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Posted 06/10/08 - 11:30 PM:	#54
Indeed, we should stop wasting your time so that you have more of it for making unfounded and (self-admittedly!) uneducated philosophical remarks.

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Posted 06/10/08 - 11:38 PM:	#55
Gort wrote: One in which there exists a proposition P meaningful in that world such that both P and -P are true. Gort Don't give me that barado nicto crap, Klaatu! Yes, such a world is logically impossible and physically impossible. Any other sense of 'possibility' in which this world would 'possibly' exist? If so, I would be surprised to find any significant sentence being uttered to express it.

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Posted 06/11/08 - 04:09 AM:	#56
muxol wrote: Indeed, we should stop wasting your time so that you have more of it for making unfounded and (self-admittedly!) uneducated philosophical remarks. Is that what it is? You are dismissing me? If anything, pleases tell me what exactly is you point. you jump around, and making remark on this, and on that that. What exactly do you disagree with me on? I on the hand is just an uneducated layman, that you( a person with advanced learning?) can `t even maintain a coherent arguement with. I still maintain that impossible worlds( whatever people want to call it) are real, existing worlds, if possible worlds are real and existing worlds. Illogical worlds are logically impossible -- that is the part of the point of talking of 'impossible worlds'. It is also evident that these impossible worlds are also physically impossible, since all physically possible events or circumstances are logically possible. I don't understand this awkward sense of 'possibility' you speak of such that it would be 'possible' for an illogical world to exist; it would not be logically possible and it would not be physically possible. What kind of possibility would it be? i think impossible worlds are real, and existing worlds, if we admitt that possible worlds are real, and existing worlds. If we think hard on what we mean by "possible worlds". what we really mean are worlds that are such that any proposition in these worlds are true by classical logic . This seems to me to be an attempt of trying to ground/built worlds using "classical logic" . I know that there are non-classical logics, and that they are built on rejecting any number of axioms of classical logic. It would seem the case that: 1) if we want to use classical logic to "built" these "worlds"( possible worlds) using classical logic"( modal realism). and 2) if there is no preference of one type of logic to another( non-classical, and classical logic are in equal footing) then We should also believe that there are worlds that are built by non-classical logics. I want to call these worlds "impossible worlds" Edited by nullity on 06/11/08 - 04:25 AM

MoeBlee
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Posted 06/11/08 - 09:27 AM:	#57
nullity wrote: I don t know what "mathematical Object" is suppose to be in classical logic. What is it? The notion of "world" is captured by that of a model. A model is a mathematical object, whether defined as function or as a tuple structure with one or more of the components being a function. nullity wrote: I don t really like what you are doing. If you think about it. You don t have an arguement. You are relying on the fact( you assume) that i don t research in this area. Is this not the "fallacy of authority"? This is a pathetic "attack" to give the illusion that you won a fight. This is not a sold arguement. No, because I'm not taking a position on the matter. I'm just noting that, so far, you haven't given enough specification for me even to begin appreciating your proposal. As far as your position, it's not even that I'm debating against it, but rather noting that, so far, as they say, "there's no there there".

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Posted 06/11/08 - 09:33 AM:	#58
nullity wrote: Is that what it is? You are dismissing me? If anything, pleases tell me what exactly is you point. you jump around, and making remark on this, and on that that. What exactly do you disagree with me on? I on the hand is just an uneducated layman, that you( a person with advanced learning?) can `t even maintain a coherent arguement with. I still maintain that impossible worlds( whatever people want to call it) are real, existing worlds, if possible worlds are real and existing worlds. Illogical worlds are logically impossible -- that is the part of the point of talking of 'impossible worlds'. It is also evident that these impossible worlds are also physically impossible, since all physically possible events or circumstances are logically possible. I don't understand this awkward sense of 'possibility' you speak of such that it would be 'possible' for an illogical world to exist; it would not be logically possible and it would not be physically possible. What kind of possibility would it be? i think impossible worlds are real, and existing worlds, if we admitt that possible worlds are real, and existing worlds. If we think hard on what we mean by "possible worlds". what we really mean are worlds that are such that any proposition in these worlds are true by classical logic . This seems to me to be an attempt of trying to ground/built worlds using "classical logic" . I know that there are non-classical logics, and that they are built on rejecting any number of axioms of classical logic. It would seem the case that: 1) if we want to use classical logic to "built" these "worlds"( possible worlds) using classical logic"( modal realism). and 2) if there is no preference of one type of logic to another( non-classical, and classical logic are in equal footing) then We should also believe that there are worlds that are built by non-classical logics. I want to call these worlds "impossible worlds" Well, the way I see 'possible worlds', indeed its utility, especially in Kripke semantics, is that when we explicate things like 'Necessarily...' or 'Possibly...' we can be analysed to have said something about the possible worlds in which whatever '...' is supplanted with. So, we say 'Necessarily, if P then P'. What the concept of 'possible worlds' offers us is the following explication: 'For all logically possible worlds W, if P then P'; and in this way, we have a semantics for logical truth that basically does the work truth-tables could do for sentential logic. So, when you introduce possible worlds where logical truths are false, you can see why I'm puzzled; for possible world semantics is a system of rules meant to explicate logical truth itself by identifying them with truths that hold in EVERY logically possible world. To say there are possible worlds where this is violated is frankly changing the subject, speaking of a sense of 'possible' for which I am utterly bewildered about. That is why I reject your first statement, that if possible worlds exist or are real, then it follows there are illogical worlds. To me that is an equivocation over the word 'possible' or rather a covert use of it that is thus far unclear. Your second claim, "what we really mean are worlds that are such that any proposition in these worlds are true by classical logic," is equally puzzling. The sentence 'Lakers are in the finals in 2008' is true, however, it is not true by classical logic. The sentence is consistent with it, but not entailed by it. Likewise, any sentence that is logically indeterminate but physically (or factually) determinate is consistent with classical logic. The deviant logics you refer seem quite esoteric, and I would be interested in you explicating them. How could we deny '~(P.~P)'? Those types of laws of logic are schemata for sentences (declarative and eternal) that do not assert any one constituent propositions' truth -- it only asserts a compound's truth that is indeterminate to factual truths in every logically possible world. To want to talk about possible worlds in which it turns out that 'P.~P' is true, it is demanded that 'possible' is taken in a new sense than that of 'logically' or 'physically' possible worlds. Otherwise, you are lead to paradox. Also, your first premise denies your second. If we assume classical logic, then there is no other set of logical systems that contradict it that are possibly true; otherwise, of course, we are speaking emptily.

MoeBlee
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Posted 06/11/08 - 10:22 AM:	#59
nullity wrote: We should also believe that there are worlds that are built by non-classical logics. I want to call these worlds "impossible worlds" Intuitionistic logic, for example, is non-classical, but I don't know of a sense in which intutionistic models or the worlds that are components of such models are "impossible". Maybe you mean that impossible worlds are models of paraconsistent logics. If so, you need to tell us just what you mean by a model or worlds for paraconsistent logics. In sum, it may be that what you need to do to make your view explicable is to definitely state a paraconsistent logic and its semantics.

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Posted 06/11/08 - 11:53 AM:	#60
P.S. You might find something of what you have in mind here: http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.ndjfl/1039540763

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Posted 06/11/08 - 08:50 PM:	#61
MoeBlee wrote: The notion of "world" is captured by that of a model. A model is a mathematical object, whether defined as function or as a tuple structure with one or more of the components being a function. No, because I'm not taking a position on the matter. I'm just noting that, so far, you haven't given enough specification for me even to begin appreciating your proposal. As far as your position, it's not even that I'm debating against it, but rather noting that, so far, as they say, "there's no there there". You can` t say to me that i did not give enough specification on this matter. This is a reflect of your own character flaw. I did put out a thesis. If there was anything that was not clear, than you can ask for more detail, or specification. You on the other hand ask stupid questions on my personal life. Why is my personal life your business? What is soo "'technical' about the ontology of impossible worlds that one can t pick up after reading some journal articles? What the hell is "there s no there there" mean? Edited by nullity on 06/11/08 - 09:57 PM

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Posted 06/11/08 - 09:03 PM:	#62
Well, the way I see 'possible worlds', indeed its utility, especially in Kripke semantics, is that when we explicate things like 'Necessarily...' or 'Possibly...' we can be analysed to have said something about the possible worlds in which whatever '...' is supplanted with. So, we say 'Necessarily, if P then P'. What the concept of 'possible worlds' offers us is the following explication: 'For all logically possible worlds W, if P then P' and in this way, we have a semantics for logical truth that basically does the work truth-tables could do for sentential logic. Possible worlds as use in the above context are not semantics for classical logic, but "real" existing worlds. So, when you introduce possible worlds where logical truths are false, you can see why I'm puzzled; for possible world semantics is a system of rules meant to explicate logical truth itself by identifying them with truths that hold in EVERY logically possible world. To say there are possible worlds where this is violated is frankly changing the subject, speaking of a sense of 'possible' for which I am utterly bewildered about. That is why I reject your first statement, that if possible worlds exist or are real, then it follows there are illogical worlds. I could ask you what makes "possible worlds" possible? Why should worlds that obey classical logic have more of a privilage of existing? Why can `t worlds correspond to non-classical logic exist? Edited by nullity on 06/11/08 - 09:11 PM

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Posted 06/11/08 - 09:40 PM:	#63
MoeBlee wrote: Intuitionistic logic, for example, is non-classical, but I don't know of a sense in which intutionistic models or the worlds that are components of such models are "impossible". Like I said before, I like to call worlds that are built from these non-classical logic "impossible worlds." Names are used to denote, and reference. It is meaningless to ask why we call a certain thing by a certain name. The important thing is: if there are "existing " worlds that correspond to classical logic, then there ought to be "existing" worlds that corresponds to non-classical logic. Edited by Postmodern Beatnik on 06/17/08 - 05:29 AM. Reason: capitalization

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Posted 06/12/08 - 12:43 AM:	#64
nullity wrote: You can` t say to me that i did not give enough specification on this matter. This is a reflect of your own character flaw. I did put out a thesis. If there was anything that was not clear, than you can ask for more detail, or specification. er, to be honest, nullity, you have not given the details of the "illogical world" you proposed. And I'll tell you why you haven't. Because you can't. You can't because, ipso facto, it is inarticulable to you. That means you cannot articulate it because there are no details on your mind on how this world would appear. I will give you an example of someone articulating, in a coherent fashion, a logically possible world: Putnam's Brains in a Vat. Yes, I know. But before you start losing patience with the BIVs, and I apologize in advance if this has become a sing-song now, read it and see how Putnam put together a world that is coherent, at least for purposes of philosophical discussion, and that is defensible using reasoning though we may not agree with it.

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Posted 06/12/08 - 03:50 AM:	#65
MoeBlee wrote: P.S. You might find something of what you have in mind here: http://projecteuclid.org/DPubS?service=UI&version=1.0&verb=Display&handle=euclid.ndjfl/1039540763 Hmmm, interesting. I didn't know there was a special issue on this garbage. I honestly don't know why someone like Barwise wastes his time.

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Posted 06/12/08 - 06:06 AM:	#66
Caldwell er, to be honest, nullity, you have not given the details of the "illogical world" you proposed. And I'll tell you why you haven't. Because you can't. You can't because, ipso facto, it is inarticulable to you. That means you cannot articulate it because there are no details on your mind on how this world would appear. It is true. I did not know a damn thing about it until i did some research on it 4 or 5 post back with you on this thread. The following is going to be my new stardard arguement for this thread: i think impossible worlds are real, and existing worlds, if we admitt that possible worlds are real, and existing worlds. If we think hard on what we mean by "possible worlds". what we really mean are worlds that are such that any proposition in these worlds are true by classical logic . This seems to me to be an attempt of trying to ground/built worlds using "classical logic" . I know that there are non-classical logics, and that they are built on rejecting any number of axioms of classical logic. It would seem the case that: 1) if we want to use classical logic to "built" these "worlds"( possible worlds) using classical logic"( modal realism). and 2) if there is no preference of one type of logic to another( non-classical, and classical logic are in equal footing) then We should also believe that there are worlds that are built by non-classical logics. I want to call these worlds "impossible worlds" Edited by nullity on 06/12/08 - 06:21 AM

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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 06/12/08 - 06:36 AM:	#67
I am going to argue for an entire different position( and still argue for impossible words). Anyone want to play? Logic cannot tell us what exist, and what can`t exist. All this talk about "possible words" and "impossible" are actually all wrong. modal realism cannot be right. We can` t build real, existing worlds using classical logic, This comes from that fact that logic is not a descriptive science( experimental science like physics or chemistry). Logic, similar to ethics is a normative discipline. The law of excluded middle tell us that we ought not affirm both a proposition and its negation. To go about builting infinite number of worlds using some logic is to go from "what we ought to believe" to "what actually is the case" This is impossible. Edited by nullity on 06/12/08 - 06:51 AM

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Posted 06/12/08 - 06:59 AM:	#68
muxol wrote: Hmmm, interesting. I didn't know there was a special issue on this garbage. you are taking things too personal like a big baby. This is what a uneducate fool think of you. Edited by nullity on 06/12/08 - 07:59 AM

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Posted 06/12/08 - 07:52 AM:	#69
Anyone? it is meaningless to ask for any intrinsic nature to existence( or reality). By extension, it is meaningless is ask why things exist. Metaphysics, and by extension the ontology of possible(impossible) worlds are meaningless speculations. The reason is becuse there is not criterion we can use to determine if a answer is correct. There is not criterion to check for the intrinsic nature of existence( or reality). By extension, metaphysics, ontology, and possible( impossible worlds) are meaningless speculations. Edited by nullity on 06/12/08 - 08:06 AM

MoeBlee
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Posted 06/12/08 - 08:27 AM:	#70
nullity wrote: You can` t say to me that i did not give enough specification on this matter. Sure I can say that. nullity wrote: If there was anything that was not clear, than you can ask for more detail, or specification. That's what I did. I asked for specification of the logics you are talking about and their semantics. nullity wrote: You on the other hand ask stupid questions on my personal life. Why is my personal life your business? I didn't ask anything about your PERSONAL life. I don't give a damn about your personal life.

MoeBlee
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Posted 06/12/08 - 08:32 AM:	#71
nullity wrote: MoeBlee wrote: Intuitionistic logic, for example, is non-classical, but I don't know of a sense in which intutionistic models or the worlds that are components of such models are "impossible". Like i said before. I like to call worlds that are built fron these non-classical logic "impossible worlds". Names are used to denote, and reference. It is meaningless to ask why we call a certain thing by a certain name. Your answer does not address my point that you just quoted. And I didn't ask you anything about WHY things are named a certain way. nullity wrote: The important thing is: if there are "existing " worlds that correspondes to classical logic, then there ought to be "existing" worlds that corresponds to non-classical logic. WHICH non-classical logic. There are many kinds of non-classical logics. And what KIND of models for them do you have in mind?

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Posted 06/12/08 - 08:41 AM:	#72
MoeBlee wrote: Sure I can say that. That's what I did. I asked for specification of the logics you are talking about and their semantics. I didn't ask anything about your PERSONAL life. I don't give a damn about your personal life. You have to have the last word? Don t waste my time.

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Posted 06/12/08 - 08:50 AM:	#73
MoeBlee wrote: Like i said before. I like to call worlds that are built fron these non-classical logic "impossible worlds". Names are used to denote, and reference. It is meaningless to ask why we call a certain thing by a certain name. Your answer does not address my point that you just quoted. And I didn't ask you anything about WHY things are named a certain way. [/quote] your question is a bad question. why do we call "possible" possible? Your question is like asking why the rules of chess is the way it is. It is a unproductive question. WHICH non-classical logic. There are many kinds of non-classical logics. And what KIND of models for them do you have in mind? we ought to believe that all logic are in equal footing. As such, there should be real, existing worlds corresponding to each non-classical logics if there are worlds corresponding to classical logic. Suppose it is not the case, then one would be be in a position to justify why some logical system is perfered over other logical systems. Why some logical systems have worlds, and others don t. This is an impossible position to justify. Edited by nullity on 06/12/08 - 09:18 AM

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Posted 06/12/08 - 09:26 AM:	#74
i don't know how to use quote tags.

MoeBlee
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Posted 06/12/08 - 10:54 AM:	#75
nullity wrote: your question is a bad question. why do we call "possible" possible? That's not my question! And I just told you that, as you just again skipped over my response. Nor is it even analogous to my question. nullity wrote: we ought to believe that all logic are in equal footing. As such, there should be real, existing worlds corresponding to each non-classical logics if there are worlds corresponding to classical logic. Whatever "equal footing" means in this particular regard, for us to even examine your notions we should have at least one specific logic and a semantics for it that we can talk about. Otherwise "impossible" (note, your IMpossible, not just possible) world notion just reduces to saying that every logic has some kind of semantics or other.

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