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Are �claims to existence� meaningless statements?
Meaninglessness, assumptions, and Descartes� Cogito

Are �claims to existence� meaningless statements?

The_Rational_Animal
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Posted 03/23/08 - 12:32 PM: Subject: Are �claims to existence� meaningless statements?	#1
First, some useful definitions: Statement: an intelligible sentence of natural language Meaningless statement: a statement which contributes nothing significant or relevant which can neither foster agreement or disagreement; that is, possessing an indeterminate truth value Claim to existence: a statement which assign no other properties to an object except the property of existence (e.g. I exist) Firstly, let’s establish that all simple statements of natural language contain some ‘claim to existence’, whether that claim is itself implicit or explicit. The reason for this is that all statements must contain a subject, explicit or implicit with a specific context; otherwise that statement is inherently meaningless. This is a fact because a sentence without an explicit subject, or context from which one can be inferred, is unintelligible. If I walk up to a random person on a sidewalk and say the word “red”, an utterance completely without a subject, it has no objective meaning. If all statements must contain a subject, that subject must exist as an object, abstract or concrete; that is an imperative. We cannot discuss something which does not exist because to discuss such would be unintelligible. Discussions of something rely upon that something possessing properties, individuality, a definition which specifies such; otherwise, we are discussing a nothingness, a zero-state which cannot be described using natural language (because all natural language is positive because the subject of any natural statement must exist). If a subject A exists in any sentence which is not a ‘claim to existence’, this can be explicitly stated as “A exists”. But what about the subject in the sentence “A exists”? “A exists” is already in an explicit ‘claim to existence’ form. A must exist for “A exists” itself to contain meaning. So what about the resulting statement, from “A exists” to “A exists” to “A exists”? In fact, another ‘claim to existence’ must be derived. So is any ‘claim to existence’ an infinite regress, an impossibly long chain of assumptions of A’s existence? Even if A has properties and is known to exist, the ‘claim to existence’ is still without meaning: it expresses a tautology and thus contributes nothing significant or relevant which can neither foster agreement or disagreement (definition of a meaningless statement). Statements, however, which are not ‘claims to existence’ are not meaningless because the truth value of the subject’s existence can be provisionally assumed. That is, “if A exists, then it is red.” Attributing the property of red to A makes A existent because A now has a property and with any property comes a definition and with a definition comes existence. However, ‘claims to existence’ must confirm the truth value of the subject’s existence, they cannot provisionally assume it because existence by itself is not a property. One cannot find a noun of natural language in a dictionary to find a part of its definition “it exists”. To say “A exists” is meaningless because in order to talk about A, we need to assume that sentence is true before saying it. But we cannot assume it is true because speaking of A’s existence is a regress. Thus, ‘claims to existence’ cannot have truth value and are meaningless. I developed this view as an attempt to refute Descartes’ Cogito. To say “I think” has the implicit ‘claim to existence’ for “I” (“I exist”.) It is as valid provisional assumption to say “if I think, then I exist” (the “therefore” in the Cogito denotes a conditional relationship). The nature of Descartes’ argument permits reversibility. In the reverse order (“if I exist, then I think”,) a ‘claim to existence’ is formed. As a conditional statement, the truth value of the compound statement depends upon its antecedent’s truth value. However, ‘claims to existence’ cannot have a truth value, so the conditional itself has no truth value. It is an invalid argument. Without its greatest strength, its reversibility, Descartes’ Cogito can be refuted using any number of arguments such as the incorrigibility of mind, First Cause, or any other which could not have worked before. Are these assessments possible? Or have they already been thought of and refuted? Edited by The_Rational_Animal on 03/23/08 - 04:31 PM
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Timothy
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Posted 03/23/08 - 08:00 PM:	#2
Rational Animal wrote: Meaningless statement: a statement which contributes nothing significant or relevant which can neither foster agreement or disagreement; that is, possessing an indeterminate truth value I would rather say that a meaningless statement is one which cannot have a truth value. There are meaningful statements whose truth value is indeterminate, such as mathematical or physical conjectures. On the other hand statements like "Nothingness is hungry" and "The sdt dher Klfg" are meaningless, for semantical and also syntactical reasons. Trivial statements, such as tautologies, are meaningful insofar as they have a (trivial) truth value. Rational Animal wrote: If all statements must contain a subject, that subject must exist as an object, abstract or concrete; that is an imperative. We cannot discuss something which does not exist because to discuss such would be unintelligible. Not so. Following Russell's theory of descriptions, we can discuss wheter or not the present king of France is bald. That is, the statement "The king of France has such and such property" can, and in fact has, a truth-value. Paraphrasing it into first-oder logic, "the present king of France has such and such" would imply that "There is a king if France" AND he has such and such properties. However, since there is no present king of France, the assumption about its existence is false, thus making the whole conjunction false. Yet this falsehood means that there is a meaning to the sentence. Rational Animal wrote: . A must exist for �A exists� itself to contain meaning. The meaningful sentence "there is an even prime not equal to 2" is a claim to existence. Yet there's no such prime, thus making the sentence false. But meaningful nonetheless. Rational Animal wrote: The nature of Descartes� argument permits reversibility. In the reverse order (�if I exist, then I think�,) a �claim to existence� is formed. I don't think Descartes' argument allows for this reversion. For his cogito point is supposed to prove its existence (to have it as a consequence, not as an antecedent being assumed to be true)
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Posted 03/24/08 - 12:58 PM:	#3
I'm not going to argue any further because this argument is like a Pandora's box for the basis of Objectivist philosophy. But I do disagree with your last point. I do honestly believe the Cogito relies upon its reversibility. There is a good reason for beginning with the premise ‘I think’, which brings the question not only about the existence of the ‘I’, but about the nature of that ‘I’. Descartes wants to argue that thinking and existence are very closely connected, in the case of a self that thinks. After addressing the question of his existence, the thinker of the meditation will address the question of his own essence or nature. He will argue in the end, ‘I am essentially a thing that thinks’. An essential property of a thing is a property which that thing is bound to have, a property that it cannot lack. Perhaps an essential property of a cat is that it is an animal. Perhaps an essential property of a yeti is that it is an animal. Notice, from the last example, that we can talk about the essential properties of things without being committed to the existence of the things. Nevertheless, truths about essence have implications for existence: if a cat exists, it must be an animal; if a yeti exists, it must be an animal. If it were not an animal, it would not be a cat. If it were not an animal, it would not be a yeti. If Descartes’ argument that the ‘I’ of the Meditations is essentially a thinking thing is successful, then the implication is similar: if I exist, I must be thinking. If Descartes’ argument about his essence is correct, he will be able to argue in either direction. I think, therefore I am (cogito ergo sum). And, I exist, therefore I think. (I am essentially a thinking thing.) This symmetry will be central to Descartes’ vision of what it is to be an ‘I’, a soul, or self, or mind: I am if and only if I think. Notice that if this thesis about essence is correct, it will have the consequence that ‘I exist’ is not only incorrigible but also evident: if I exist, then I will think, and therefore (by the Cogito) I will believe that I exist.
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Posted 03/24/08 - 01:44 PM:	#4
Rational Animal wrote: I'm not going to argue any further because this argument is like a Pandora's box for the basis of Objectivist philosophy. As you like it Rational Animal wrote: If Descartes� argument that the �I� of the Meditations is essentially a thinking thing is successful, then the implication is similar: if I exist, I must be thinking. I see your point. But it seems to bypass the role of doubt in the cartesian meditations. The logical order of the methodological doubt in the meditations leaves no clear and distinct idea standing, except for one: the fact that I must exist because of my act of doubting. Let's assume, with Descartes, that there's an evil demon deceiving me about everything I previously thought was true (including mathematics). It cannot be the case that I don't exist, insofar as he's deceiving me. He thus cannot deceive me about my own existence. But it is only when thinking that I can acknowledge my existence (3rd paragraph, second meditation). After disproving his previous doubts about perception (by proving that god exists and that he does not deceives me), it is then added that I'm also a res extensa as much as I'm a res cogitans. That many other activities that before were questioned are now epistemologically allowed (experiencing). Hence one's own existence implies that I have to be thinking as much as it implies that I have to be drinking wine. Descartes' Meditations must be taken as a whole when assesing Descartes' views (not only the first and second meditations). The "essential" feature of thinking is not ontological, but (epistemo)logical: it is the sole activity from which my existence is deduced clearly. Thus I disagree that Descartes' argument allowing a reversibility, as well as the meaningless status of claims to existence. Edited by Timothy on 03/24/08 - 01:53 PM
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Posted 03/24/08 - 03:39 PM:	#5
timothy wrote: The "essential" feature of thinking is not ontological, but (epistemo)logical: it is the sole activity from which my existence is deduced clearly. Taking this statement as a summary of your response, it does not strike me as obviously meaningful (i.e. it's a sentence with no referent in reality). It sounds like someone playing on the term "essential", which mean "most important; defining". Obviously, a defining characteristic is some aspect of the identity of a number of existents. For a really clear case, the essential characteristic of a tripod is having 3 legs. If you consider just one tripod, its identity covers many facts, such as the three legs, being 6 ft. tall, made of metal, it's painted yellow, and has rubber feet. Not all of that is true of tripods in general. Concepts are open-ended, which means that new existents subsumed under the concept can be created, so in a world where all previous tripods had been made with wooden legs, one could truthfully say that all tripods have three wooden legs. But "wooden" is non-essential, and when the first metal tripod was born, it too was a tripod. So: an essential property is an aspect of the identity (essence) of all units designated by a concept. And it's not just some aspect, it is the most important, defining aspect, which we focus on in identifying the concept. I think this is why we don't talk of "essences", because it makes it too easy to migrate between "essences" and "essential", without seeing that despite some similarity, they are different. Edited by The_Rational_Animal on 03/24/08 - 03:45 PM
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Posted 03/24/08 - 06:52 PM:	#6
My point is that it is not true, in Descartes, to say that If I exist, I must be thinking. It could be the case that I exist, yet I'm not thinking about anything. However, it cannot be the case that I think and that I do not exist (which is all Descartes' point). Hence, there is NO reversibility associated to the cogito argument. You think there's such a reversibility because you assume that since the essence of the "I" that exists is thinking, then all it does is thinking whenever it exists. On the second meditation, that "I'm a thinking thing", or res cogitans, means that until THAT point, all that I can conceive clearly and distinctly is that I must exist insofar as I think; not that I'm "essentially" a thinking being that, therefore, has to think as long as it exists. This is not true, while the converse is true, i.e. that I must exist insofar as I'm thinking. Later on the meditations, he goes all the way to say that he also exists when he is not thinking (by proving the existence of god, and that he's not deceiving me, etc etc). Edited by Timothy on 03/25/08 - 06:44 PM
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Posted 03/24/08 - 07:02 PM:	#7
On a side note, Rational Animal wrote: ...it does not strike me as obviously meaningful (i.e. it's a sentence with no referent in reality). All Gobs are Twots as long as no Gob is a no-Twot. True, i.e. meaningful, yet with no clear referent to reality. Perhaps your criterion of meaning should be dispensed with?
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Posted 03/24/08 - 08:27 PM:	#8
Interesting stuff. If I walk up to a random person on a sidewalk and say the word �red�, an utterance completely without a subject, it has no objective meaning. May I make mention that language seems to have the 'requirement'(?) that ideas are expressed between two or more separate entities? If the correct idea is expressed that allows for both to understand what the sentence 'red' means, then the subject of the utterance of 'red' has been fullfilled. So, based from your viewpoint, what happens with "I think, therefore the dog exists?"

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Posted 03/25/08 - 08:39 AM:	#9
Cadrache wrote: May I make mention that language seems to have the 'requirement'(?) that ideas are expressed between two or more separate entities? If the correct idea is expressed that allows for both to understand what the sentence 'red' means, then the subject of the utterance of 'red' has been fullfilled. So, based from your viewpoint, what happens with "I think, therefore the dog exists?" Saying "red" out of context (without an implicit subject) is not a sentence or statement (according to my definition) because any sentence must have a subject, whether implicit or explicitly known. If neither know the implicit subject, it is not a sentence and is meaningless, which is the case for the example I gave. If some piece of communication allows both parties to know what the subject is by its context (say if I pointed to a red rose), then a meaningful sentence/statement would be formed. "I think, therefore the dog exists" is not an example which can be discussed with the claims I make. "I think" is a valid sentence because, although it provisionally assumes the existence of "I", that assumption is validated when we assign the "thinking" property to it, bringing it into existence. I only argue against Descartes' Cogito as it is in the reverse order, namely "I exist, therefore I think", because the needed antecedent is a 'claim to existence' (see definition), which I postulate is necessarily meaningless as a regress. If I misunderstood your response, please let me know.
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Posted 03/25/08 - 06:26 PM:	#10
I think it would be very interesting to actually debate the central point of your thread. Otherwise, why create it in the first place?
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Posted 03/26/08 - 01:58 PM:	#11
Timothy wrote: I think it would be very interesting to actually debate the central point of your thread. Otherwise, why create it in the first place? Ad libitur, Timothy wrote: I would rather say that a meaningless statement is one which cannot have a truth value. There are meaningful statements whose truth value is indeterminate, such as mathematical or physical conjectures. On the other hand statements like "Nothingness is hungry" and "The sdt dher Klfg" are meaningless, for semantical and also syntactical reasons. Trivial statements, such as tautologies, are meaningful insofar as they have a (trivial) truth value. I do agree with this point; I should have given more thought to that definition. But it does little refute the claims; even if the truth values of 'claims to existence' are "indeterminate", they are still impossible because no conclusion can be reached from the regress that they create. I took indeterminate not to mean "of ambiguity" but of "unable to be determined" or, in other words, "a state where it cannot be determined". Timothy wrote: Not so. Following Russell's theory of descriptions, we can discuss wheter or not the present king of France is bald. That is, the statement "The king of France has such and such property" can, and in fact has, a truth-value. Paraphrasing it into first-oder logic, "the present king of France has such and such" would imply that "There is a king if France" AND he has such and such properties. However, since there is no present king of France, the assumption about its existence is false, thus making the whole conjunction false. Yet this falsehood means that there is a meaning to the sentence. This is a good objection, one I have thought about. But in my argument, 'claims to existence' do not assign properties other than the property of existence. That is, in Russell's claim, where "the present King of France is bald" is assigning two properties: "existence" and"bald", as you say, a conjunction. But in 'claims to existence', only one property is being asserted. There is no conjunction because there is only an atomic statement which has a truth value which cannot be determined (indeterminant) because it is a regress. Russell's theory of descriptions is right; but it does not knock down the argument. I should revise the sentence "A must exist for 'A exists' itself to contain meaning" to "A must be provisionally assumed for 'A exists' to contain meaning" because as it stands now is definitely wrong. The latter sentence reflects the argument more exactly anyhow. Timothy wrote: The meaningful sentence "there is an even prime not equal to 2" is a claim to existence. Yet there's no such prime, thus making the sentence false. But meaningful nonetheless. This is not a 'claim to existence' as given by the definition above. In such 'claims to existence', subjects are allowed to be modified by adjectives (e.g. a yellow chicken eats), as is in this sentence. This sentence cannot be rearranged in a way which could attribute the two adjectives "not equal to 2" and "even" to the same subject "prime" (or at least not in a way that I can think of that is grammatically correct). The subject ("prime (number)") cannot be given any "property" except existence in a 'claim to existence'. The adjectival modification "not even to 2" disqualifies it because that is a property other than existence, which is akin to the "the present King of France is bald" example. Edited by The_Rational_Animal on 03/26/08 - 02:06 PM
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Posted 03/26/08 - 06:44 PM:	#12
Rational Animal wrote: I do agree with this point; I should have given more thought to that definition. But it does little refute the claims; even if the truth values of 'claims to existence' are "indeterminate", they are still impossible because no conclusion can be reached from the regress that they create. I took indeterminate not to mean "of ambiguity" but of "unable to be determined" or, in other words, "a state where it cannot be determined". Not meaning to refute anything just yet, let's focus on what meaninglessness and truth-value indeterminacy have in common. Let's take your use of "indeterminate" as "unable to be determined", i.e. "a state where it cannot be determined". What sort of impossibility is this? Physical? Mental? Logical? Let's say that I conjecture the following: No galaxy other than ours has a planet where life prevails. Surely, the truth-value of this statement is currently impossible to determine for physical reasons. Yet it is meaningful. Let's conjecture that being a bat it's like being a blind mouse. Let's assume that Nagel is correct, and that we cannot possibly know what it's like to be a bat. Then my conjecture has no determined truth-value, yet it is meaningful. Rational Animal wrote: But in my argument, 'claims to existence' do not assign properties other than the property of existence. We can safely remove the conjunction by eliminating the "being bald" predicate. So formalized, where Fx stands for "x is the present king of France" and Bx for "x is bald", formerly we had: (Ex)(Fx & [(Ay)(Fy -> y=x) & Bx]): There is a (unique) king of france that is bald Dropping the "bald" predicate, we now get: (Ex)[Fx & (Ay)(Fy -> y=x)]: There is a (unique) king of france Since ~(Ex) such that Fx, then the above formula is false (due to the rules of conjunction's truth value). Yet meaningful. Drop the uniqueness part, remaining only with (Ex)Fx and still you'll find it is a false claim whose falsehood implies its meaningfulness. Rational Animal wrote: This is not a 'claim to existence' as given by the definition above. Why not? "there is an even prime not equal to 2" is saying that: (an even prime number not equal to 2) exists Name such a number, as to make it clear that it is the subject of a predicate. Let's name it "A". Naming it so avoids the problem of having to characterize it via other predicates. It is a number called "A". We can explain what we mean by "A" by stating the properties it has. But we can call it just "A", as we could call the actual president of the U.S "George" or as we could call the least natural number "1". So we're thus saying: A exists Which is a claim to existence according to your definition. Yet it is a mathematical fact that A doesn't exists, i.e. "A exists" is false. Its falsehood implies it's meaningfulness. Edited by Timothy on 03/26/08 - 07:57 PM
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Posted 03/27/08 - 04:34 PM:	#13
Timothy wrote: Not meaning to refute anything just yet, let's focus on what meaninglessness and truth-value indeterminacy have in common. Let's take your use of "indeterminate" as "unable to be determined", i.e. "a state where it cannot be determined". What sort of impossibility is this? Physical? Mental? Logical? Let's say that I conjecture the following: No galaxy other than ours has a planet where life prevails. Surely, the truth-value of this statement is currently impossible to determine for physical reasons. Yet it is meaningful. Let's conjecture that being a bat it's like being a blind mouse. Let's assume that Nagel is correct, and that we cannot possibly know what it's like to be a bat. Then my conjecture has no determined truth-value, yet it is meaningful. Logical. A regress in this case is parallel to a regress in any area of philosophy. No truth, true or false, can be extracted from a regress; this is a matter of language. Infinities do not exist naturally, hence the infinite regress is not possibly physical or mental. A 'claim to existence' is meaningless because the sentence which is being said (“A exists”) must be true in order for A to exist and thus be talked about meaningfully. But the “A exists” must be true for “A exists”, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. Timothy wrote: Since ~(Ex) such that Fx, then the above formula is false (due to the rules of conjunction's truth value). Yet meaningful. My claims are not interested in discussing whether certain sentences are true or false. What it is interested in is questioning whether it is linguistically possible to discuss whether the single property of existence can be applied to any subject of a sentence without a regress formed by the repeated assumptions of existence of that subject. I don’t know why we’re stuck on Russell’s example. My statement that we cannot talk about something meaningfully that does not exist (addressed in my last post) was plainly wrong; we can do so by provisionally assuming it does in fact exist. But in a 'claim to existence', the only property given to that subject is existence, which must be assumed in speaking of it (Russell cannot even disagree with that). So thus, what does a 'claim to existence' mean? Nothing. That is what I speak of, it is not the truth value of the subject which makes the difference, it is the formation of the claim: the statement which the subject is used in. Timothy wrote: Yet it is a mathematical fact that A doesn't exists, i.e. "A exists" is false. Its falsehood implies it's meaningfulness. The same misunderstanding. It does not matter linguistically, in my argument, that ‘A’ (‘an even prime number not equal to 2’) is mathematically known to not exist. It is simply that if we form the sentence ‘A exists’, we must presume the existence of ‘A’ to talk about it meaningfully. Like I said, it does not matter if ‘A’ exists, just as it does not matter that the present King of France exists to talk about him. But if we assume ‘A’ exists before we say "A exists", the formation of "A exists" adds no meaning to anything, because it’s like doing a formal proof and assuming A when A is the conclusion one is trying to reach. ‘A’ could be “an even prime number not equal to 2” or “the city of San Francisco”, it does not matter what the status of the subject's existence is. It is the semantics of the statement form which is called into question. Like in Ayn Rand's famous "existence exists", a personal favorite of Objectivists. Obviously "existence" exists, but to say "existence exists" is absurd according to my view. So I must, in some way, reform this statement that my argument can agree with.
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Posted 03/27/08 - 11:40 PM:	#14
Logical. A regress in this case is parallel to a regress in any area of philosophy. No truth, true or false, can be extracted from a regress; this is a matter of language. Infinities do not exist naturally, hence the infinite regress is not possibly physical or mental. A 'claim to existence' is meaningless because the sentence which is being said (�A exists�) must be true in order for A to exist and thus be talked about meaningfully. But the �A exists� must be true for �A exists�, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. I don't understand this argument. For one thing, I don't see how "A exists" is any different than "snow is white." "Snow is white" must be true if snow is white, too. So thus, what does a 'claim to existence' mean? Nothing. That is what I speak of, it is not the truth value of the subject which makes the difference, it is the formation of the claim: the statement which the subject is used in. I don't understand what you mean by 'truth value of the subject.'

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Posted 03/28/08 - 01:27 AM:	#15
The_Rational_Animal wrote: I developed this view as an attempt to refute Descartes� Cogito. To say �I think� has the implicit �claim to existence� for �I� (�I exist�.) Are these assessments possible? Or have they already been thought of and refuted? For these worries see Kant's criticism of the Cogito: "What is referred to as the Cartesian inference is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my existence immediately" (Critique of Pure Reason, A355) The_Rational_Animal wrote: Thus, �claims to existence� cannot have truth value and are meaningless. Kant was also the one to say that existence isn't a predicate, which I think is what you're getting at . If existence is not a predicate then it can neither be truly nor falsely predicated of a subject. Now, I agree with you: To say that something is the case or that some state of affairs obtains is to presuppose an existence claim. But couldn't you also say, inversely, that every existence claim is substantiated by the assertion of a state of affairs which itself DOES have a truth value? For example, if Descartes says, "I exist" he is asserting a state of affairs -- thought is going on, for example...

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Posted 03/28/08 - 12:28 PM:	#16
7 wrote: I don't understand this argument. For one thing, I don't see how "A exists" is any different than "snow is white." "Snow is white" must be true if snow is white, too. "Snow is white" is not a 'claim to existence' according to definitions above. If we say "snow is white", we say "the snow exists" and "the snow is such and such". To say "snow exists" is to assert a truth that must be assumed before making that statement, hence proves, or demonstrates the truth of, nothing. 7 wrote: I don't understand what you mean by 'truth value of the subject.' Sorry, this is my shorthand for "truth value of the existence of the subject." maya_kronfield wrote: Kant Yes, Kant! I am saying essentially the same thing as Kant, that one cannot assign the existence of an subject as a property meaningfully. I am taking this view a step farther, however, to deny the possibility of meaning in any statement which takes the form "X exists" or "X is" or "existing X is", where X is any noun of language.
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Posted 03/28/08 - 01:13 PM:	#17
"Snow is white" is not a 'claim to existence' according to definitions above. If we say "snow is white", we say "the snow exists" and "the snow is such and such". To say "snow exists" is to assert a truth that must be assumed before making that statement, hence proves, or demonstrates the truth of, nothing. I understand that "snow is white" is more than a claim to existence. You'd said earlier: "(�A exists�) must be true in order for A to exist" as if this were a special feature of claims to existence. What I meant is that it's just disquotation and you can say the same thing about any other statement. Also, I don't grasp what you mean in the part of the quotation above I've bolded. Can you elaborate upon that argument, please? Sorry, this is my shorthand for "truth value of the existence of the subject." For the sentence "Pegasus exists" what is the difference between the truth value of the sentence and that of the subject, as you use the terms?

The_Rational_Animal
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Posted 03/28/08 - 01:33 PM:	#18
7 wrote: I understand that "snow is white" is more than a claim to existence. You'd said earlier: "(“A exists”) must be true in order for A to exist" as if this were a special feature of claims to existence. What I meant is that it's just disquotation and you can say the same thing about any other statement. Except that in any other statement except a 'claim to existence' a property other than existence is being assigned. If I say "The apple is red", I am provisionally assuming the existence of the apple. But the fact that I assign redness as a property to that apple signifies that it exists because it now has properties (namely, existence and redness). Remember that no object without properties can exist. 7 wrote: Also, I don't grasp what you mean in the part of the quotation above I've bolded. Can you elaborate upon that argument, please? "Snow exists" is comprised of the subject "snow" and the verb "to exist". In order to talk about snow, it must be assumed it exists (it must be assumed because there is always a possibility that snow does not, in fact, exist, even though there is an inductively strong case that it does). The fact that snow exists can be modeled with the sentence "snow exists". This must be assumed beforehand. But if it is being assumed beforehand, what truth can the original statement "snow exists" have? It's essentially making a begging the question fallacy because the conclusion must be assumed true as a premise. 7 wrote: For the sentence "Pegasus exists" what is the difference between the truth value of the sentence and that of the subject, as you use the terms? Recall from previous posts that the truth value of the subject's existence is of no value to a "claim to existence". "Truth value of the subject" means whether it is true or false that the subject exists (as given by other arguments). "Truth value of the sentence (or statement)" is different from "truth value of the subject" in sentences that are not 'claims to existence' (e.g. snow is white). But the two are identical in 'claims to existence' (e.g. Pegasus exists) because they make the exact same claim (e.g. that Pegasus exists).
_____________________ "Coito Ergo Sum" (I have sex, therefore I am) ~Ray Descartes

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