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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

180 Proof
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Posted 07/19/09 - 01:11 PM:	#81
Stepping back from the semantic quibbles over Kant's vocabulary, the empirical implications of his claims (e.g. "Transcendental Aesthetic") have been shown to be false which invalidates Kant's entire "Transcendental Doctrine". Some of this ground has already beeen covered but I'd like to sum up with three objections to which I'd appreciate keda's response and Death Monkey's elaboration. i. Kant's ontology is wrong: space and time really exist independent of human experience, but only relative to masses in motion (there is no absolute, Euclidean metric to which all physical events conform: space curves locally and times are asynchronous for objects moving in non-uniform inertial frames). ii. Kant's epistemology is wrong: non-Euclidean space can not only be visualized, but measured (the sun, for example, warps local spacetime by approximately four seconds of arc per century) -- suggesting that Kant had the relation between what can be conceived and what can be visualized backwards. iii. Kant's cosmology is wrong: although the First Antinomy purports to show the impossibility of conceiving the universe as either finite or infinite in-itself (because both contradictory metaphysical absolutes can be argued and justified with equal force, it follows that neither can actually be proven), Einstein answered Kant by proposing a consistent non-Euclidean (Riemannian) universe that is finite but unbounded (i.e. without an edge in spacetime or "space and time"). Edited by 180 Proof on 07/26/09 - 03:57 AM. Reason: Counting negative numbers on my fingers ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

jtoma
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Posted 07/19/09 - 02:27 PM:	#82
WOrd. Excuse me...one.Phi 180 proof wrote: i. Kant's ontology is wrong: space and time really exist independent of human experience, but only relative to masses in motion (there is no absolute, Euclidean metric to which all physical events conform: space curves locally and times are asynchronous for objects moving in non-uniform inertial frames). Though space and time exist relative to masses in motion, this theme about motion correlates with a pattern in language. Masses in motion are truths considered in models frame by frame, and thus world by world, and relation by relation--motion. The pattern in language proceeds as analytic truth, established to exist independent of human experience intersubjectively, by agreement and convention. These propositions may be conceived to be external to us, yet they proceed by our rules. 180proof wrote: ii. Kant's epistemology is wrong: non-Euclidean space can not only be visualized, but measured (the sun, for example, warps local spacetime by approximately four seconds of arc per century) -- suggesting that Kant had the relation between what can be conceived and what can be visualized backwards. This is obscure, but better conception leads to better visualization and vice-versa. \\so screw how he had it 180 proof wrote: iii. Kant's cosmology is wrong: although the First Antinomy purports to show the impossibility of conceiving the universe as either finite or infinite in-itself (because both contradictory metaphysical absolutes can be argued and justified with equal force, it follows that neither can actually be proven), Einstein answered Kant by proposing a consistent non-Euclidean (Riemannian) universe that is finite but unbounded (i.e. without an edge in spacetime or "space and time"). Strictly, because 'contradictory metaphysical absolutes can be justified with equal force' is an argument only that contradictory propositions can both be true, which is an instance of evidence (not great evidence) for not accepting 'Pv-P' as axiomatic. Roughly, 'Pv-P' is axiomatic for each world in a frame, for some frames, but not for models. (In a model, if the truth of a proposition is represented by truth-value at some world in a frame, that proposition might be true at some worlds, and throughout some frames, but it is perfectly capable of being false in others). So Kant's cosmology may be interpreted as correct, if you allow it to apply to worlds or frames. (Truth in worlds is by assignment and truth functions, and truth in frames is by consistency thereof). But of course, as you point out, Einstein shows us that 'Pv-P' need to be true for models; though strictly, Kant did not forbid that as a possibility if you let universe's finitude be in a frame. But, if you think 'universe' too broad a term to have the same referent, in the appropriate context, as 'frame', then we can start arguing about Kant's fruitfulness. Again, if contradictory absolutes being justified with equal force causes the impossibility to conceive a world or some frame as infinite or finite, then that leaves room for the possibility of contradictory absolutes being both true by justification of equal force in models. Conceiving of truths about masses to be in motion (according to, perhaps, scientific data on the motion of masses), leads to visualizations of the truth-value of 'Pv-P' shifting across worlds and frames, but staying constant in models. ANd yes, of course, better visualizations of truth across worlds, frames, and models leads to better conceptions of truth. Truth in a model is like truth according to certain assumptions and rules. All truth in models is analytic, by the rules and the assumptions of that model. Of course, the rules and assumptions of the relevant physics attribute the constancy of the models. (To make a judgment you need a framework_). _________ Sorry for that. Keda, I don't mean to be rude, but perhaps you have not considered that Kant (or interpretations of Kant) may be incorrect. I am not saying that people are suggesting Kant is wrong, I haven't read enough for that; but perhaps, your view, rather than your regurgitation of the critique, would appreciated and it might help things move forward a bit. Nor am I implying that exegesis is not useful, for the fruitfulness of a certain regurgitation led to the considerations above. If that isn't the case, then I am sorry to have interrupted discussion slamming kant against peano (not that I know who either of them are). But I hope that we can get on to something. Edited by jtoma on 07/30/09 - 12:17 AM

Death Monkey
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Posted 07/20/09 - 07:00 AM:	#83
keda, Perhaps you could begin by explaining what you mean when you say, for example, that the number 0 could fail to exist? What would it mean to say that 0 does not exist? And in what way is this sense of "existence" of the number 0 required in order for mathematical statements about the number 0 to be true? This is something I've already suggested in post #72, namely that numbers are artifacts of our mode of knowledge through the senses. I don't understand what that is supposed to mean. Let's say you have a world. This world includes some guy, and a bunch of other physical matter that he interacts with. He gains knowledge of that other physical matter by interacting with it, with information about those interactions being fed into his mind via his various senses, such as vision, hearing, touch, taste, smell, balance, and so on. So where do numbers enter the picture? In my above scenario, do I have to establish that something exists that we can call a "number" in order for it to be possible for the person to gain knowledge of the world through his senses? Or does the specification that he is able to gain knowledge of the world through his senses somehow imply that something called a "number" must exist in that hypothetical world? What would the properties of such a number be? How does a world in which those numbers exist differ from one in which they do not? And most importantly, how do you arrive at the answers to those questions? If you had intellectual intuition, every property of the object would be immediately known, and no number would be needed to measure them. I don't understand what you mean by "intellectual intuition". Is this supposes to be a source of information about objects? Or a mechanism for judging the relaibility of sensory information? I don't understand what this could possibly be. Mathematics is essentially a science of space and time which are the necessary conditions under which any objects of the senses can be represented to us. Without them no sense perception would be possible. I don't see how you can justify that claim. Certainly our senses seem to function in terms of space and time, but I cannot see how this could be said to be necessary. I can certainly imagine a being whose senses work completely differently than ours, existing in a world in which what we call "space" and "time" have no relevance to anything. DM
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keda
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Posted 07/25/09 - 07:23 AM:	#84
Death Monkey wrote: So where do numbers enter the picture? In my above scenario, do I have to establish that something exists that we can call a "number" in order for it to be possible for the person to gain knowledge of the world through his senses? Yes, and in any case. All properties of physical objects take the form of numbers, both quantitatively and qualitatively. What do all senses have in common? The real measure of spatiotemporal distribution of forces. Attractive forces cannot be directly measured but are infered, as they cannot directly affect the senses, but through repulsive forces and the measure of extent, which is quantitative measure, namely size and duration. The qualitative measure is an intensive magnitude (e.g. loudness, hardness or greenness), which is the estimation of the repulsive force affecting the subject's internal state i.e. its intensity. I don't understand what you mean by "intellectual intuition". This was explained in post #70 I don't see how you can justify that claim. Certainly our senses seem to function in terms of space and time, but I cannot see how this could be said to be necessary. I can certainly imagine a being whose senses work completely differently than ours, existing in a world in which what we call "space" and "time" have no relevance to anything. It is not possible to imagine anything as not existing in space and time. The word image itself already implies some sort of spatial projection. Space is a necessity to distinguish objects from ourselves as well as objects from one another, and Time is a necessity for any sensation as it implies the alteration of the subject's internal state, which implies a temporals sequence.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

180 Proof
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Posted 07/25/09 - 04:38 PM:	#85
keda wrote: It is not possible to imagine anything as not existing in space and time. The limits of human imagination have no bearing on what exists or how it exists. "Transcendental Aesthetics" is merely anthropomorphic projection (i.e. folk psychology) taken as axiomatic, which as such we're not obliged to accept.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

keda
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Posted 07/25/09 - 04:52 PM:	#86
180 Proof wrote: The limits of human imagination have no bearing on what exists or how it exists. "Transcendental Aesthetics" is merely anthropomorphic projection (i.e. folk psychology) taken as axiomatic, which as such we're not obliged to accept. This is taken out of context. DM made a claim about him being able to imagine something which obviously at least must involve space, since images are spatial projections.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

jtoma
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Posted 07/25/09 - 10:44 PM:	#87
keda wrote: It is not possible to imagine anything as not existing in space and time. Who knows the context of the quote, but it is sensible. All knowledge known a posteriori is originally perceived using concepts of space and time. Our analytic knowledge affects our sense perception when we begin to describe causation, watching our causal system become the basis on which we perceive space and time. Now, even though we have scientific knowledge of causation telling us how to view space and time, we still cannot have any sense experience without space/time conceptualization. When all sense experience is in the context of space and time, can we imagine something out of the context of space and time? Yes, but only to the extent that we understand our condition. And no, because we would only understand what we are not (capable of space and timeless conception) on the basis of what we do understand about the way our concepts of space and time affect our perception in space and time. There is no possibility of ruling out that we are hardwired to conceptualize only in the context of space and time. There is no possibility of proving that we can comprehend (imagine, conceptualize) without the context of space and time, for we could not conduct an experiment without presupposing our concepts of space and time. proof-Kant didn't have relation of visualization to conception backwards, and neither do you, because it goes both ways. You are right that Kant went too far with his results from the first antimony, but aren't you going to far with your results from non-euclidean geometry? your concepts are acquired from perception in the context of space and time. you augment your concepts according to hardwired or inductively (empirically) learned rules of deduction. your augmented concepts aid your perception (for example, to explain phenomena not predictable by newtonian physics), sometimes even requiring perception-enhancing equipment like technology, whose causal basis we must assume as well. Just because we can't regularly perceive the difference between Einstein and Newton with your naked eye, doesn't mean that we don't have empirical evidence for the superiority of einstein's theory (so we must accept technological assumptions). I think that when humans see we conceptualize according to our sights. On the other hand, when we use concepts to describe causation we see in different ways (even if our sight is data on a computer, scientific notes, or technologically perceived physical phenomena). monkey wrote: I can certainly imagine a being whose senses work completely differently than ours, existing in a world in which what we call "space" and "time" have no relevance to anything. Really? You must have formidable intellectual intuition; jp. Tell me what happens in this being's world. Tell me what the being perceives in this world. Or is his 'sense' in the sense of a rock's, and then you would have your externally existing space and time just not be true in that world? Edited by jtoma on 07/25/09 - 11:00 PM

180 Proof
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Posted 07/26/09 - 12:50 AM:	#88
jtoma wrote: You are right that Kant went too far with his results from the first antimony, but aren't you going to far with your results from non-euclidean geometry? This may be so only if non-Euclidean geometry (vis-a-vis General Relativity) is consistent with Kant's "idealization of space and time", which, as far I can tell, it is not. Edited by 180 Proof on 07/26/09 - 04:09 AM. Reason: grammar ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

keda
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Posted 07/26/09 - 03:18 AM:	#89
180 Proof wrote: Stepping back from the semantic quibbles over Kant's vocabulary, the empirical implications of his claims (e.g. "Transcendental Analytic") Transcendental Analytic doesn't have any empirical implications. You're comparing apples and oranges here, but of course, Einstein happened to call the oranges apples, but a rose by any name is still a rose.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

180 Proof
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Posted 07/26/09 - 04:03 AM:	#90
keda wrote: Transcendental Analytic doesn't have any empirical implications. You're quite right. I meant "Transcendental Aesthetic" and have corrected that post. Thanks. I'm now fairly confident that apples are being compared to apples again.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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