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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori
180 Proof
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Posted 07/11/09 - 11:11 AM:
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#41
keda wrote:
Now if Kant says Euclidian geometry is synthetic, which he does, then that means he thinks its negation, non eucliean geometry is at least logically possible.


The problem with Kant's (or your) conception of Euclidean geometry begins with the claim that its "a priori" component is "spatial intuition" and yet Non-Eucliean geometries are formulated only by changing axioms, postulates, rules of construction, etc without (empirical) reliance upon the "a priori intuition of space", and thus can only be, in Kant's terms, a posteriori. If Euclidean geometry is a priori then how is it that a posteriori geometries (e.g. Non-Euclidean) are more precise, more accurate, frameworks for modelling phenomena? Or is it more plausible that Euclidean geometry is not derived from an "a priori intuition of space" (as mathematical constructivists/finitists argue)?

To my mind, non-Euclidean geometries only negate (i.e. logically contradict) Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic" (and thereby undermine his "Transcendental Doctrine").


Edited by 180 Proof on 07/11/09 - 02:25 PM. Reason: grammar ...

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

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Posted 07/11/09 - 12:35 PM:
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180 Proof wrote:


The problem with Kant's (or your) conception of Euclidean geometry begins with the claim that its "a priori" component is "spatial intuition" and yet Non-Eucliean geometries are formulated only by changing axioms, postulates, rules of construction, etc without (empirical) reliance upon the "a priori intuition of space", and thus can only be, in Kant's terms, a posteriori.

It doesn't turn into an a posteriori claim, when you negate an a priori synthetic one. It becomes a false posteriori synthetic one. Now what Einstein did was just using the language uptil then but changing the meaning of the words. Space no longer meant space in the sense it did before, nor time, but it became spacetime, an entirely new concept and likewise non-euclidean geometry became something else.

If Euclidean geometry is a priori then how is that a posteriori geometries (e.g. Non-Euclidean) are more precise, more accurate, frameworks for modelling phenomena? Or is it more plausible that Euclidean geometry is not derived from an "a priori intuition of space" (as mathematical constructivists/finitists argue)?

A posteriori geometries are just physical frameworks operating on top of an a priori geometry, a mathematical framework, which makes the former possible in the first place, so whatever the former does further than the latter, it can't do it without the latter.

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Posted 07/11/09 - 01:29 PM:
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keda,

Then look at it this way. The definition of a bachelor is an unmarried man. Does this mean that any unmarried men exist? No, because definitions do not define things into existence. Otherwise it is no longer a definition then, because it assumes something exists, which is a synthetic claim. It goes beyond the concept of merely being a bachelor in saying that a bachelor exists. The same is true about natural numbers. If you say something about a specific number, such as 0, it is no longer a definition, but a synthetic claim.

I disagree. You are mixing up two completely different meanings of the word "exists". In the case of unmarried men, saying that an unmarried man exists is to say that such a man is instantiated in reality. This is a contingent claim. It is not logically necessary that such a man is instantiated in reality.

However, to say that the natural number 0 exists just means that this number is a natural number. This is not a contingent fact, because the definition of the natural numbers stipulates that 0 is a natural number. Nor is there any need for 0 to have any sort of "independant" existence in order for this to be valid.

You say that the claim that a particular unmarried man is a bachelor is synthetic because it is logically possible that this particular unmarried man does not exist at all. The same argument does not apply for the claim that 0 is a natural number, because it is logically possible that 0 is not a natural number. You cannot argue that it is possible that 0 does not exist, because it is not even meaningful to talk about it existing in the sence that a man exists. 0 need not, and indeed cannot, have any existence beyond simply being a natural number, which by definition, it is.

It is a complex of judgments, one of which is singular, namely that 0 is a natural number, as I already pointed out.

That 0 is a natural number is specified by the definition of the natural numbers. It is not possible for 0 to not be a natural number without redefining what the natural numbers are. In other words, to claim that 0 is not a natural number, contradicts the definition of the natural numbers.

For example, if you do not agree that "5 + 7 = 12" is analytic, then explain to me how you know that it is true. You cannot claim that you can logically derive that it is true from some set of axioms, because then it would be analytic. And of course you cannot cite emprical evidence, because then it would not be a priori. You can try to cite "sensibility" as your source of information, but I don't see how you can justify such a claim.

I already provided a simplified a priori synthetic arithmetic with synthetic a priori addition. Its truth relies on the ability to intuit a sequence of representations in time, in order to count them as defined by the successor operation as I defined it, or summation in gerneral. Without this ability, it cannot be said to be true.

The ability to count, or even to intuit the concept of counting, depends on sensory experience. So if your simplified arithmetic really does depend on this intuition to make truth judgements about it, then it is actually a posteriori.

Fortunately, actual arithmetic has no such requirement. Its truths can be derived logically from the definitions of the arithmetic system in question.

Specifically, it uses the existential quantifier to explicate that both of the operations need third party object(s) to exist to obtain its truth value. The truth of this claim is ovely evident in that we use arithmetics purely in representation of time, such as after 5 and further 7 hours 12 in total has passed.

You are not talking about mathematics at all here. You are talking about physics. You are talking about using mathematics to make inferences about real objects. That is, of course, both synthetic and a posteriori.

After all, in the context of natural numbers we are not talking about existence in the sense of being instantiated in this world

Well I was talking about it in that sense, even if you didn't. The article you referenced didn't suggest either way.

Then what we are discussing is in no way a priori, because you cannot possibly have justification for claiming that natural numbers are instantiated in this world, so any statement that you interpret as requiring this in order to be true, cannot be justified either.

Fortunately, I need not assume that the numbers "5", "7", and "12" are actually instantiated in this world in order to derive that the statement "5 + 7 = 12" is true. If I did, I could not possibly claim that the statement is true.

I don't see your point. What does this "pure science of geometry" have to do with euclidean geometry? They are two completely different things. Euclidean geometry is what it is defined to be, regardless of whether some "pure geometry" exists, or whether it agrees with this "pure geometry" in any way.

Euclidean geometry is just a bunch of axioms. not something to be defined.

You just did define it. You defined it to be a bunch of axioms. That is what it is. And as such, statements about euclidean geometry that logically follow from those axioms are true by definition. It is not logically possible for them to not be true without changing what euclidean geometry is.

Euclid himself believed they were statements about reality, and not empirical but self evident, so he certainly believed it was a pure science.

That amounts to stating that those statements accurately describe reality, which in some case, to a limited extent, they do. But while that claim is synthetic, it is also clearly not a priori. If Euclid beleived that it was, then he was simply wrong.

Synthetic means true in virtue of something further than the meaning of its constituent concepts. which means that the concepts are insufficient to determine the truth value, however a contradiction arising from them would mean it is sufficient to determine the truth value, namely that it is false. Thus its negation must be true. The negation of a contradiction is a tautology or analytic judgment, which means its negation is a contradiction. Now if Kant says Euclidian geometry is synthetic, which he does, then that means he thinks its negation, non eucliean geometry is at least logically possible.

They are not logically possible within the context of euclidean geometry.

You could say that it is logically possible that reality conforms to non-euclidean geometry, in which case the axioms of euclidean geometry would not be true statements about reality. But that is another issue entirely.

Mathematical statements are analytic and a priori up until the point that you make the claim that these statements tell us something about reality. At that moment, they because synthetic. You seem to regard this step as given, as though we could not consider the statements independantly of any claims about reality, but I don't understand why you would hold this view. Nor do I understand how you could regard any claim about the applicability of a particular mathematical statement to reality as being a priori. I'm sorry, but the notion of "self evident" or "intuitively obvious" being sufficient justification, was discredited long ago. It just doesn't hold water.

There is no judgement about the applicability of any mathematical statement to reality that can be justified by anything other than empirical evidence. Anybody who claims otherwise needs to demonstrate that the justification they are citing is actually reliable and sufficient to make the judgement.


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180 Proof
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Posted 07/11/09 - 04:55 PM:
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#44
keda wrote:
It doesn't turn into an a posteriori claim, when you negate an a priori synthetic one. It becomes a false posteriori synthetic one.


I haven't claimed or implied any such thing. Please read my previous post. raised eyebrow

Now what Einstein did was just using the language uptil then but changing the meaning of the words. Space no longer meant space in the sense it did before, nor time, but it became spacetime, an entirely new concept and likewise non-euclidean geometry became something else.


You've stopped making sense, keda. Einstein's theories of Relativity are mathematical models not verbal propositions.

A posteriori geometries are just physical frameworks operating on top of an a priori geometry ...


confused

Most non-Euclidean geometries lack physical, or empirical, correlates, or like Euclidean geometry, have very specific conditions under which they apply to the physical world. As pointed out already:

Death Monkey wrote:
Mathematical statements are analytic and a priori up until the point that you make the claim that these statements tell us something about reality. At that moment, they (become) synthetic.


Edited by 180 Proof on 07/11/09 - 05:04 PM. Reason: Don't ask ...

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

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keda
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Posted 07/12/09 - 04:21 AM:
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#45
Death Monkey wrote:

You are mixing up two completely different meanings of the word "exists". In the case of unmarried men, saying that an unmarried man exists is to say that such a man is instantiated in reality.

I was using existence in the more general sense of instatiation at all. 0 is an instance of natural numbers, is a synthetic judgment and you are a bachelor is a synthetic judgment, because both are singular judgments.

It is not possible for 0 to not be a natural number without redefining what the natural numbers are.

My point is that definitions cannot instantiate numbers like 0, because then it is no longer a definition but a synthetic claim.

The ability to count, or even to intuit the concept of counting, depends on sensory experience.

How so?

You are talking about physics. You are talking about using mathematics to make inferences about real objects.

There is nothing physical about 5 hours + 7 hours is 12 hours. This truth is a priori synthetic.

you cannot possibly have justification for claiming that natural numbers are instantiated in this world

Why not?

You just did define it. You defined it to be a bunch of axioms. That is what it is.

Saying what something is, is not to define it. 'P is a statement' is not a definition. Lets say P="This is a blue flower". Does that mean that P is analytic? Of course not. What you are committing is a category error. Statements and axioms are not entities to be defined like "bachelor" and "natural number" that can be defined.

They are not logically possible within the context of euclidean geometry.

I'm talking about non euclidean geometry. If you mean that euclidean and non euclidean geometry (before it was redefined) cannot both be true, then yes, that is true, but I was not saying that. This is a pointless as saying "this flower is blue" in the context of "this flower is not blue" is is not logically possible, when I'm just saying "this flower is not blue" is logically possible.

Mathematical statements are analytic and a priori up until the point that you make the claim that these statements tell us something about reality. At that moment, they because synthetic. You seem to regard this step as given, as though we could not consider the statements independantly of any claims about reality, but I don't understand why you would hold this view

I'm not at all sure what this is suppose to mean.

Nor do I understand how you could regard any claim about the applicability of a particular mathematical statement to reality as being a priori. I'm sorry, but the notion of "self evident" or "intuitively obvious" being sufficient justification, was discredited long ago. It just doesn't hold water.

I'm not saying Euclides was right in his view, even though one could say he believer they were true synthetic a priori, but I'm not using his views as justification, just pointing out that he did not define the axioms in an analytic way.

There is no judgement about the applicability of any mathematical statement to reality that can be justified by anything other than empirical evidence. Anybody who claims otherwise needs to demonstrate that the justification they are citing is actually reliable and sufficient to make the judgement.

It is more reliable and justifiable than any empirical evidence, because it is something that must be presupposed for there to be any empirical evidence in the first place.

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Posted 07/12/09 - 04:34 AM:
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#46
180 Proof wrote:

I haven't claimed or implied any such thing. Please read my previous post. raised eyebrow

I mean false a priori synthetic one, not false a posteriori synthetic. Anyways, reading again I don't know what else you could have meant.

You've stopped making sense, keda. Einstein's theories of Relativity are mathematical models not verbal propositions.

Not sure what you are saying here, but whatever models he made, I'm just commenting on his naming conventions which may be the cause of confusion.


confused

Most non-Euclidean geometries lack physical, or empirical, correlates, or like Euclidean geometry, have very specific conditions under which they apply to the physical world. As pointed out already:


Einstein's theory was suppose to have an empirical correlate, which is why I called it an "a posteriori geometry".


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Posted 07/12/09 - 09:52 AM:
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keda,

I was using existence in the more general sense of instatiation at all. 0 is an instance of natural numbers, is a synthetic judgment and you are a bachelor is a synthetic judgment, because both are singular judgments.

As I just explained, the two situations are not comparable. "you are a bachelor" is a synthetic judgement because it is logically possible that you are not a bachelor. "0 is a natural number" is not synthetic, because it is not logically possible that 0 is not a natural number. The fact that it is a singular judgement is irrelevant.

By the way, it is not just with math that this is the case. For example, the statement "My cat is an animal" is synthetic, because it is possible that I may not have a cat at all. But the compound statement "either my cat is an animal, or I have no cat", is still analytic, because the only way that the first part could fail to be true, would be if I don't have a cat. Therefore, again, it is not logically possible for the statement to be false, in spite of the fact that it is a singular judgement.

Similarly, if I were to say something like "either 0 is a natural number, or 0 is not a natural number", that is trivially analytic. It is, in fact, just an example of the "x or NOT x" principle. Yet it, too, is a singular judgement.

It appears that you are making an unjustified generalization, rather than looking at why that generalization holds in the cases that you are generalizing from. You, yourself, explained that the reason why singular judgements are synthetic is because it is logically possible for such judgements to be false. If one can show that it is not logically possible for the judgement to be false, then you cannot assert that it is synthetic, regardless of whether it is singular or not.

It is not possible for 0 to not be a natural number without redefining what the natural numbers are.

My point is that definitions cannot instantiate numbers like 0, because then it is no longer a definition but a synthetic claim.

The definition of a set can, and indeed must, specify which elements are instantiated in that set. To say that this is not a definition is nonsensical, becuase it is nothing more than specifying what the set is.

You are apperantly fixated on the notion that the number 0 must have some sort of "real" existence (be instantiated in reality), in order to be able to make claims about it, and that therefore any claims about it are synthetic because it is logically possible that the number 0 is not instantiated in reality. But any statement that does require for it to be instantiated in reality not only is not an analytic truth. It isn't a true statement at all, because numbers are not part of reality.

The ability to count, or even to intuit the concept of counting, depends on sensory experience.

How so?

Becuase that is how the human brain works. You learn through sensory experience. The ability to reason, count, or even "intuit", is not some innate ability. It is something you have to learn how to do.

You just did define it. You defined it to be a bunch of axioms. That is what it is.

Saying what something is, is not to define it. 'P is a statement' is not a definition.

It's not a complete definition, because it does not specify what it is. It just specifies one thing about it, but that one thing is not sufficient to fully specify what it is.

However, saying that euclidean geometry is this particular collection of axioms, is sufficient to specify what it is.

Lets say P="This is a blue flower". Does that mean that P is analytic? Of course not. What you are committing is a category error. Statements and axioms are not entities to be defined like "bachelor" and "natural number" that can be defined.

I did not say that axioms are defined. In fact, I am not talking about definitions of entities at all. I am talking about definitions of terms. When I say that euclidean geometry is this particular set of axioms, all I am doing is defining the term "euclidean geometry" to refer to refer to that set of axioms. Likewise when I say "within euclidean geometry, parallel straight lines never intersect", I am just saying that the statement that "parallel straight lines never intersect" can be logically derived from the set of axioms that I refer to as "euclidean geometry". This is clearly analytic, as it makes absolutely no claims or assumptions about anything other than what those axioms state. It doesn't even assume that those axioms are "true" in any kind of universal or metaphysical sense.

Mathematical statements are analytic and a priori up until the point that you make the claim that these statements tell us something about reality. At that moment, they because synthetic. You seem to regard this step as given, as though we could not consider the statements independantly of any claims about reality, but I don't understand why you would hold this view

I'm not at all sure what this is suppose to mean.

I mean that a purely mathematical statement is just a statement about what does, or does not, logically follow from some set of axioms. The sentence "5 + 7 = 12" is a mathematical statement so long as it is only claiming that a particular relationship between those numbers logically follows from the axioms of artithmetic. The moment you interpret that sentence to mean something more than that, it is no longer a mathematical statement.

I'm not saying Euclides was right in his view, even though one could say he believer they were true synthetic a priori, but I'm not using his views as justification, just pointing out that he did not define the axioms in an analytic way.

I am quite aware that he did not. He incorrectly believed that what he came up with was universal in a way that it simply is not. But all that demonstrates is that what Euclid proposed was not just mathematics. It was also metaphysics and physics. Some of the physics was correct. Some was not. And as for the metaphysics, all we can really say about that is that it is unjustified.

Lumping together metaphysical and/or empirical claims with mathematical ones does not make purely mathematical statements synthetic. At best, you could attempt to argue that one cannot truly divorce mathematics from metaphysical or empirical claims. But if this is the case, then you cannot claim that mathematics is a priori either.

There is no judgement about the applicability of any mathematical statement to reality that can be justified by anything other than empirical evidence. Anybody who claims otherwise needs to demonstrate that the justification they are citing is actually reliable and sufficient to make the judgement.

It is more reliable and justifiable than any empirical evidence, because it is something that must be presupposed for there to be any empirical evidence in the first place.

Incorrect. I need not assume that mathematics is applicable to reality in order to have empirical evidence. In fact, quite the opposite is true. We had empirical evidence and judgements based on empirical evidence long before anybody thought up anything as abstract as mathematics.


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keda
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Posted 07/12/09 - 01:02 PM:
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#48
Death Monkey wrote:

As I just explained, the two situations are not comparable. "you are a bachelor"
is a synthetic judgement because it is logically possible that you are not a
bachelor. "0 is a natural number" is not synthetic, because it is not logically
possible that 0 is not a natural number. The fact that it is a singular
judgement is irrelevant.

No its not, but in fact its the other way around. As I explained in the case
with "my cat is an animal" is synthetic because it is a complex of judgments one of which is "this is a cat". Even if my cat cannot be a non animal, it is a synthetic judgment, because the negation is not a contradiction, since only one of the judgments have to be false to falsify the whole statement, and if there is no cat, the statement is false. The same goes for "0 is a natural number", because if 0 doesn't exist, the statement is false.

But the compound statement "either my cat is an animal, or I have no cat", is still analytic, because the only way that the first part could fail to be true, would be if I don't have a cat.

It is a synthetic because it is a compound judgment including that I exist.


Similarly, if I were to say something like "either 0 is a natural number, or 0 is not a natural number", that is trivially analytic. It is, in fact, just an example of the "x or NOT x" principle. Yet it, too, is a singular judgement.

It isn't a singular judgment. It is a disjunct judgment, and disjunct judgments do not have to contain their operands unlike conjunct judgments i.e:
P ^ Q
________
P
is valid but
P v Q
_______
P
is not. There even if P is singular P V Q does not have to be.


The definition of a set can, and indeed must, specify which elements are instantiated in that set.

Not true. The set of all cats, does not specify which elements are instantiated. I may have a cat or not but you cannot know this just by looking at the definition. You have to go beyond the definition and look for the instances.

To say that this is not a definition is nonsensical, becuase it is nothing more than specifying what the set is.

The set S contains only my cat, specifies what the set is, but it is not a definition, because it makes a singular judgment about there being a cat.

You are apperantly fixated on the notion that the number 0 must have some sort of "real" existence (be instantiated in reality), in order to be able to make claims about it, and that therefore any claims about it are synthetic because it is logically possible that the number 0 is not instantiated in reality. But any statement that does require for it to be instantiated in reality not only is not an analytic truth. It isn't a true statement at all, because numbers are not part of reality.

Thats a very complex way of saying that numbers are not real, but I don't see any arguments for this.

Becuase that is how the human brain works. You learn through sensory experience. The ability to reason, count, or even "intuit", is not some innate ability. It is something you have to learn how to do.

This got to be the most desperate argument you've come up with so far. When a math teacher demonstrates a proof on the whiteboard, it an a posteriori truth because you have to look at the whiteboard? If anything this would be self defeating argument because math would be a posteriori and therefore not analytic. Surely you didn't mean to say that reasoning is a posteriori?


I did not say that axioms are defined. In fact, I am not talking about definitions of entities at all. I am talking about definitions of terms. When I say that euclidean geometry is this particular set of axioms, all I am doing is defining the term "euclidean geometry" to refer to refer to that set of axioms.

That is just naming the set of axioms. In any case, if you are to define definition in such a broad way, you cannot say definitions are necessarily analytic truths because defining "Molly" to refer to my cat, presupposes the existence of a cat.

Likewise when I say "within euclidean geometry, parallel straight lines never intersect", I am just saying that the statement that "parallel straight lines never intersect" can be logically derived from the set of axioms that I refer to as "euclidean geometry". This is clearly analytic, as it makes absolutely no claims or assumptions about anything other than what those axioms state.

Granted although as such I don't see the relevance.

I mean that a purely mathematical statement is just a statement about what does, or does not, logically follow from some set of axioms. The sentence "5 + 7 = 12" is a mathematical statement so long as it is only claiming that a particular relationship between those numbers logically follows from the axioms of artithmetic.

If so I would type "A1 /\ A2... An => 5 + 7 = 12", and not just "5 + 7 = 12", and I don't agree with your definition of mathematical statement.

Lumping together metaphysical and/or empirical claims with mathematical ones does not make purely mathematical statements synthetic.

Again that was not my argument. As I said, I only said Euclid didn't think they were analytic because you seemed to argue they were.

Incorrect. I need not assume that mathematics is applicable to reality in order to have empirical evidence. In fact, quite the opposite is true. We had empirical evidence and judgements based on empirical evidence long before anybody thought up anything as abstract as mathematics.

You need mathematics because all objects of experience must be located in space and time. Even if this is done subconsciously without you thinking about it, it is necessary underlying framework for justifying the objective validity of your experience, and when for some reason this subconscious process is tricked and creates an illusion, you need to do the dirty work yourself, such as when a pen put in a glass of water appear not straight, you must apply optical physics along with geometry to conclude it in fact is straight.

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Posted 07/12/09 - 02:07 PM:
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#49
keda,

To say that this is not a definition is nonsensical, becuase it is nothing more than specifying what the set is.

The set S contains only my cat, specifies what the set is, but it is not a definition, because it makes a singular judgment about there being a cat.

Correct. This is an example of an attempt at a definition that includes the assumption that a synthetic proposition is true. It is easy to contruct such examples. But the definition of the natural numbers is not an example of this.

You are apperantly fixated on the notion that the number 0 must have some sort of "real" existence (be instantiated in reality), in order to be able to make claims about it, and that therefore any claims about it are synthetic because it is logically possible that the number 0 is not instantiated in reality. But any statement that does require for it to be instantiated in reality not only is not an analytic truth. It isn't a true statement at all, because numbers are not part of reality.

Thats a very complex way of saying that numbers are not real, but I don't see any arguments for this.

I cannot even imagine what it would mean to say that a number is real. Numbers are abstract concepts that we invented. The whole point of a number is that it is not something real, but instead a concept that we can use to describe certain properties of real things.

Becuase that is how the human brain works. You learn through sensory experience. The ability to reason, count, or even "intuit", is not some innate ability. It is something you have to learn how to do.

This got to be the most desperate argument you've come up with so far. When a math teacher demonstrates a proof on the whiteboard, it an a posteriori truth because you have to look at the whiteboard?

That depends. If you just take his word for the fact that the proof is correct, then of course that is an a posteriori judgement, because the your trust in him is based on empirical evidence.

On the other hand, if you understand the proof, and can therefore actually derive the truth of the statement from the axioms that specify what the statement means, then it is a priori, because no reference to sensory experience is needed to make that judgement.

If anything this would be self defeating argument because math would be a posteriori and therefore not analytic. Surely you didn't mean to say that reasoning is a posteriori?

Not only did I not mean to say it, but as a matter of fact, I did not say it. Perhaps you misunderstood.

My point was not that reasoning is always a posteriori, but that reasoning has to operate on information. And that information has to come from some where. It is not just innately there in your brain.

If you know how to perform deductive reasoning, then you can deduce analytic truths from axioms. The fact that you learned how to perform deductive reasoning through sensory experience is no problem, because the information that you are using to make the judgement is not from sensory experiences, and that is what is relevant.

However, when you use intuition to, for example, make the judgement that a particular mathematical principle applies to reality in some way, the information that you are using to make that judgement is coming from sensory experience, because your intuition is, itself, based on information from sensory experiences.

I did not say that axioms are defined. In fact, I am not talking about definitions of entities at all. I am talking about definitions of terms. When I say that euclidean geometry is this particular set of axioms, all I am doing is defining the term "euclidean geometry" to refer to refer to that set of axioms.

That is just naming the set of axioms.

Yes, that is exactly my point. And as such mathematical statements amount to nothing more than saying that a particular proposition logically follows from a particular set of axioms. The moment you assert that the statement is saying more than that, it is no longer just a mathematical statement. It is then a statement about reality, and thus clearly synthetic. But then it can no longer be a priori either.

In any case, if you are to define definition in such a broad way, you cannot say definitions are necessarily analytic truths because defining "Molly" to refer to my cat, presupposes the existence of a cat.

Yes, because that is not a definition. It is a synthetic claim plus a definition. But again, the definition of a mathematical system to be a set of axioms does not presuppose the existence of those axioms, because axioms are not things to which existence, in this sense, could even meaningfully be attributed in the first place. So for math this is not a problem.

Likewise when I say "within euclidean geometry, parallel straight lines never intersect", I am just saying that the statement that "parallel straight lines never intersect" can be logically derived from the set of axioms that I refer to as "euclidean geometry". This is clearly analytic, as it makes absolutely no claims or assumptions about anything other than what those axioms state.

Granted although as such I don't see the relevance.

The relevance of what? The relevance of my argument is that this is an analytic mathematical statement. If you mean that you do not see the relevance of such statements, then that is fine. In a sense, you could say that all analytic statements are irrelevant, in the sense that they do not, and cannot, possibly tell you anything about the real world. Not without making synthetic assumptions first.

I mean that a purely mathematical statement is just a statement about what does, or does not, logically follow from some set of axioms. The sentence "5 + 7 = 12" is a mathematical statement so long as it is only claiming that a particular relationship between those numbers logically follows from the axioms of artithmetic.

If so I would type "A1 /\ A2... An => 5 + 7 = 12", and not just "5 + 7 = 12",

It's a matter of context. If I say "5 + 7 = 12" without giving any units to those quantities, the typical assumption would be that I am making a general mathematical statement, in which case the first part is a given. For example, if I said "5kg + 7kg = 12kg", that would clearly be both synthetic and a posteriori.

and I don't agree with your definition of mathematical statement.

That's fine. You don't have to. But that is just a matter of semantics. The important thing is that you recognize the distinction between what I am calling mathematical statements, and the metaphysical statements that you refer to as mathematical statements.

You see, I absolutely agree that what you call "mathematical statements" are synthetic. Where we disagree here is your claim that they are a priori.

You need mathematics because all objects of experience must be located in space and time. Even if this is done subconsciously without you thinking about it, it is necessary underlying framework for justifying the objective validity of your experience, and when for some reason this subconscious process is tricked and creates an illusion, you need to do the dirty work yourself, such as when a pen put in a glass of water appear not straight, you must apply optical physics along with geometry to conclude it in fact is straight.

You're not talking about what I would call mathematics here at all. You're talking about intuitive reasoning that can be described mathematically.


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Posted 07/13/09 - 12:57 AM:
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Death Monkey wrote:

Correct. This is an example of an attempt at a definition that includes the assumption that a synthetic proposition is true. It is easy to contruct such examples. But the definition of the natural numbers is not an example of this.

If specifying what the set is, is not the reason why it is nonsensical to say it is not a definition, then what is?

I cannot even imagine what it would mean to say that a number is real. Numbers are abstract concepts that we invented. The whole point of a number is that it is not something real, but instead a concept that we can use to describe certain properties of real things.

What properties does numbers describe?

On the other hand, if you understand the proof, and can therefore actually derive the truth of the statement from the axioms that specify what the statement means, then it is a priori, because no reference to sensory experience is needed to make that judgement.

Now this sounds more reasonable. Even if you did learn reasnoing by means of sensory experience as you said, you can still derive a priori truths using it. Why not counting?

If you know how to perform deductive reasoning, then you can deduce analytic truths from axioms. The fact that you learned how to perform deductive reasoning through sensory experience is no problem, because the information that you are using to make the judgement is not from sensory experiences, and that is what is relevant.

See this is the type of information, I would say can be derived from counting. 5+7=12 can be determined by counting together 5 and 7 which can be counted without refering to anything in sensory experience.

However, when you use intuition to, for example, make the judgement that a particular mathematical principle applies to reality in some way, the information that you are using to make that judgement is coming from sensory experience, because your intuition is, itself, based on information from sensory experiences.

Not necessarily. If reality can only be concieved according to mathematical principles, due to how you percieved it, then they apply to reality without basing it on sensory experience, but rather on the way your perception works.

The moment you assert that the statement is saying more than that, it is no longer just a mathematical statement. It is then a statement about reality, and thus clearly synthetic. But then it can no longer be a priori either.

the reason which you still haven't explained.

The relevance of what?

of the parallell postulate following from the axioms of euclidean geometry. Sure it is an analytic statement, but it doesn't mean that the parallell postulate itself is an analaytic truth. It is simply not relevant to what I said.

For example, if I said "5kg + 7kg = 12kg", that would clearly be both synthetic and a posteriori.

How so? what a posteriori evidence could disprove it?

The important thing is that you recognize the distinction between what I am calling mathematical statements, and the metaphysical statements that you refer to as mathematical statements.

They are not metaphysical, but are truths about the necessary conditions of experience.

You're talking about intuitive reasoning that can be described mathematically.

Not sure what that is suppose to mean.

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