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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori
jtoma
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Posted 08/11/09 - 10:35 PM:
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#131
Since I am not sure if we attained any closure, permit me one more comment. One might take my representation of keda's content to be looking for a good way to talk about the synthetic a priori.

In the longer dialogue of my last post, I took keda to be of the position that our a priori knowledge was temporal and not spatial. I sought to show that a priori knowledge could be spatial, whether by representing mental space and objects or by using empirically acquired concepts of space and objects. I also maintain that Representation implies conception, so I think you conceive of both mental and empirical objects as being in space and time. My argument is that because one conceives of objects as being in space and time, one may also choose to conceive of objects as being in space-time, so long as space-time is conceivable. Imagination is conceptually bound. I mean, physically, you might only have materials and land, but you must have the concept of a house if you build one. Can you imagine beyond the concepts you have? ONe imagines beyond his concepts if one learns a new proposition (this is what I mean by synthetic). But here, 'beyond his concepts' just means by some rule that had not been experimented with. If you consider or learn a new proposition, then you are following a rule: even if that rule isn't logical, it must be the rule that got you to the proposition. If this rule has not yet been experimented with, then an expression of a the proposition representing it is synthetic. My observation about the 'stuff with which imagination operates' was that what I consider a rule is not necessarily what you consider a rule--e.g. if you were a vegetarian, so the rule that guides my imagination might be a a dated or primal version of yours. This means that the quality of imagination changes because of the evolution of conceptual apparatus. Einstein's theory would be an evolved form of Newton's conceptual apparatus, expressed in symbolic form. This new apparatus could serve the basis for imagination of objects in space-time, when such conception is practical, for exmaple, what a trained eye sees data that verifies noneuclidean geometry.

So, mainly, synthetic propositions represent the first instance of reasoning according to a new rule. I want to say that your definition of 'rule' should be very loose: whatever got you where you are. I also want to say that your definition of 'new' will determine the frequency of synthetic propositions.

The last feature of my argument is that all knowing is a priori because it happens in your head. Some a priori knowledge has bits of empirical origin.

gloss on W foundations 338:
"There are four sounds in 'oben'". This sentence is the result of an experiment with the goal of knowing the number of sounds in 'oben', achieved by counting the letters in the word. The proposition representing this experiment (that 'oben' has four letters) is synthetic and known a priori.

interpretation:
This sentence is unique only in that it contains conceptual apparatus appropriate for describing language. But really, any verifiable predication or any predictive and communicable calculation involve the synthetic a priori. This is because they each involve a mental achievement in the form of experiment (I have a loose sense of 'new'--at least for demonstration).

I want to say: there are senses in which every proposition is synthetic, analytic, a apriori, and a posteriori.

That's because:
"There are four sounds in 'oben'" is synthetic because I have never counted the letters in 'oben'. It is analytic because there is at least one rule that is applicable here: the number of letters determines the number of sounds; or: the number of sounds heard determines the number of sounds in 'oben'. It is a priori if we know the number of letters by counting and thus thinking in our heads. The sentence is known a posteriori if you utter the sentence, then directly count the sounds.

It is a different question whether a single use of a proposition may be less susceptible to description by all four of the concepts in question.

Anyway, Thanks for the chat. '
cosscos
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Posted 08/12/09 - 02:56 AM:
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#132
Kant said that sence-object could not be identical with thought-object. It means what you sense, and then what will come to represent in your mind could be different.

I hope there would be some rule in which imagination or pure intuition would work for the object, and its space between the sense and thought.

Jtoma, a priori is the sense-object or the thought-object?





cc

Edited by cosscos on 08/15/09 - 08:36 PM
jtoma
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Posted 08/12/09 - 10:04 AM:
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#133
Well every conception is known a priori. SO i conceive of the objects called two and three and then I conceive of the addition operator...
BUT I also conceive of everything from my sense perception that I register as having perceived. So I may be going through an airport when I have a sense perception of an object--e.g. a sign indicating the gate number, but I will also conceive of the series of numbers leading up to my gate. The conception of this series is a priori. Likewise my experience of the sun rising this morning was prompted by a 'sense-object' but knowledge of the sun's regular speed, direction, and brightness in our sky influenced my thought about this object. I want to say: The act of (physically) seeing the sun secures a transition from 'sense-object' to 'thought-object'.
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