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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

keda
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Posted 07/26/09 - 11:01 AM:	#101
ragus wrote: keda wrote So you use magnitudes (which are intensive) to talk about qualities . What do you mean by intensive? As I said, an intensive magnitude is a magnitude of which its parts do not need to be represented in order for the whole to be represented.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

180 Proof
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Posted 07/26/09 - 07:22 PM:	#102
keda wrote: in post no. 80, keda wrote: Mathematics is essentially a science of space and time which are the necessary conditions under which any objects of the senses can be represented to us. Without them no sense perception would be possible. in post no. 84, keda wrote: It is not possible to imagine anything as not existing in space and time. The Transcendental Aesthetic makes no empirical implications either. Would you care to square this circular reasoning?
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

jtoma
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Posted 07/26/09 - 09:52 PM:	#103
180 proof wrote: Would you care to square this circular reasoning? OK; I think I must have my references all misfixed Necessarily, sense perception is in the context of the referent of whatever we mean by 'space' and 'time' or 'space-time' or whatever concepts we have learned that affect the way we perceive the external world. If what Kant conceived as 'space' and 'time' doesn't level with ours, then we might have more sophisticated concepts affecting our perception. Maybe proof thinks that it is possible, through non-euclidean geometry or whatever, to imagine that everything exists in space-time INSTEAD of space and time. If so, then perhaps proof could tell us if watching length contract or something has enabled his imagination of anything outside of space-time. Hyphens... 'The 100 apples in this sack consist of 50 and 50'. The proposition acquired from some english paradigm of reference determination entails that the contents of the sack consist of 50 and 50 whenever it is taken in the conventional way. It proceeds by rules, is analytic that, is deducible that, they consist of 50 and 50. This a fair example of analyticity. THe reference to a paradigm of language is important, because non-euclidean geometry (or whatever else you guys are into) is a language. The empirical facts that we perceive this way are defined THIS way. Edited by jtoma on 07/26/09 - 10:14 PM

cosscos
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Posted 07/26/09 - 10:38 PM:	#104
Kant's transcendental aesthetics could be compared to Keda's intellectual intuition. Cognition of objects is concerned with sensation as well as understanding(verstehen). Those are decisive elements which distinguish false from truth with regard to objects. Keda's intellectual intuition is presumably intuitional understanding in which thought leads to certain sensation.for apprehension about objects. This intellectual intuition is transcendental apperception of which an apple in the bag is truly the apple out of the bag. As for these two apples, as long as I believe, these are of same substance, but are of different attributes. cc

keda
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Posted 07/27/09 - 04:38 AM:	#105
180 Proof wrote: Would you care to square this circular reasoning? I'm not sure what you are asking for. I've already explained that there is a semantic gap between what Einstein calls space and time and what Kant does. To be more specific Einstein has adopted a mutable form of measurement. As opposed to Lorentz who would say the ruler length contracted, and that clocks tick slower, Einstein is saying that space and time themselves are curved. This was a revolutionary redefinition of space and time. I suggest you read the Transcendental Aesthetics, because it certainly doesn't make such implications that you are implying.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

keda
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Posted 07/27/09 - 05:05 AM:	#106
cosscos wrote: Keda's intellectual intuition is presumably intuitional understanding in which thought leads to certain sensation. Intellectual intuition bypasses sensation alltogether. Sensation is passive while the intellect is active, so intellectual intuition is basically the creation of the object, in accordance with the design that the intuitional intellect gives it.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

180 Proof
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Posted 07/27/09 - 04:36 PM:	#107
keda wrote: I'm not sure what you are asking for ... (re: post no. 102) I suggest you read the Transcendental Aesthetics, because it certainly doesn't make such implications that you are implying. Ok, keda. I just wanted to give you a chance to publically clarify your statements which I quoted. You can't have it both ways: either we actually experience (i.e. visualize) things only within, or via, (Euclidean/Newtonian) "space and time" or there are no empirical implications that follow from "space and time as forms of intuitions"; to hold both positions, as you apparently do, is contradictory. Kant's argument rests on implicit assumptions about (some) perceptual-apparatus -- embodied perception (though not "human" perception in particular) and not some "disembodied" sensorium (which is oxymoronic) -- in postulating his "Transcendental Aesthetic". If not, then Kant is not talking about actually what is the case. If Kant is talking about actually what is the case, then his assumptions are empirical (e.g. embodied perception). Assuming (as you arbitrarily do) that I've not read Kant's magnum opus et al, please point out where this rube's thinking (above) goes wrong and in such a way as to encourage me (and anyone else) to (re)read the CPR, 3A, p. 21-43. Edited by 180 Proof on 08/01/09 - 04:34 PM. Reason: Either either-or or both-and?
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

keda
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/28/09 - 04:20 AM:	#108
180 Proof wrote: You can't have it both ways: either we actually experience (i.e. visualize) things only within, or via, (Euclidean/Newtonian) "space and time" or there are no empirical implications that follow from "space and time as forms of intuitions"; to hold both positions, as you apparently do, is contradictory. They are not really contraries, especially as Euclidean space cannot be empirically falsified. Even if you use non-Euclidean geometry as an anlytic tool to describe the behaviour of empirical objects, the objects themselves must exist in Euclidean space in order for us to make such measurements consistently. This is because we must be able to count and thus distinguish homogenous units for measurement, which implies a homogenous i.e. Euclidean space. The same goes for time.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

cosscos
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Posted 07/28/09 - 05:20 AM:	#109
Kant said 'concept without intuition is void, and intuition without concept is reckless'. kant's space and time is completed by the apperception over concept and intuition against objects. Space-time without intuition is void, and intuition without space and time is reckless in behalf of the Euclidean geometry. cc.

jtoma
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 07/31/09 - 11:14 AM:	#110
I don't understand what is going on. One should be charitable even if agents are out. Kant wanted to know if there is an a priori form that we apply to experience, and outside of which, we cannot imagine anything. When he was alive, the content of that form was respresentable by euclidean framework exclusively. Thus the relevant question was whether anyone could imagine something outside of space and time (because keda allegedly contradicted himself by saying that it is impossible to imagine outside the context of space and time). But now we have (according to proof) verified noneuclidean space-time. Now, keda thinks we cannot falsify euclidean space and time because we need to assume it (to conduct the very experiments that seek verification of NONeuclidean space-time--all experiments, I believe he would say, require euclidean assumptions). So, while keda thinks the euclidean assumptions necessry for experimentation are evolutionary, or biological, proof thinks that ONLY noneuclidean and empirically (rather than biologically) acquired assumptions are necessary for expermentation. But Kant can, as was intended, ask keda whether it is possible to imagine something noneuclidean, to which keda must respond 'yes' after the alleged verification of noneuclidean space-time. But now Kant can also ask proof whether, after empirical verification of non-euclidean space-time, he can imagine something that is non-noneuclidean. Proof could respond 'yes' by saying that he can imagine a euclidean framework; but then his position is a lot like keda's, what with being capable of perceiving in the context of both euclidean space and time and noneuclidean space-time. (Proof could also, more interestingly, respond 'yes' by admitting perception outside the context of both space and time and space-time--I would ask what representation is communicated by that admission). On the other hand, if proof thinks that he cannot imagine something 'non-noneuclidean' then he is commmited to always viewing things--e.g. eating an apple, in the context of noneuclidean space-time. Look, roughly, keda interprets kant: 'sense-perception implies different sequential internal states'. The sequence of internal states confers temporality on the sense-perception. Also keda interprets kant: 'we must be able to distinguish sense-perceptions, the objects of which are allegedly external'. Weakly, because the act of distinguishing is a communicable (if verifiable) representation: The difference in sense-perception confers spatial representation on internal perception. (The stronger interpretation of keda's "we must be able to distinguish sensations, which are of external events as opposed to feelings which are of internal events" is, less charitably, that BECAUSE sense-perceptions are distinguishable, the mental images used in the act of distinguishing are somehow 'true' in that they represent something outside of us whose existence we (can) all agree on)/. Consider: 1) sequence of internal states implies that sense-perception occurs in time; 2) difference in sense-perception implies that internal states appear in space. Before I address whether these principles, which keda attributes to kant, have any implications about the possibility certainty concerning the existence of the external, I want to argue that they are (especially when taken together) compatible with noneuclidean perception. a) perception of sequence requires representation of succession; b) difference in representation of succession is only possible by distinguishing--e.g. differentiating between mental images. also, a') difference in sense-perception requires representation of spatial frameworks; b') the plurality of 'spatial frameworks' is only possible by distinguishing--e.g. differentiating between mental images. (NOTE-keda's stronger claim about the a priori form of space, whose application guides all sense experience, would rather conclude by adding: 'with a differentiation of mental images comes a distinction of externally existing objects'). letter order 0 is alternative expression of 1) letter order 1 is alternative expression of 2) a'') difference in sense-perception requires representation of succession and spatial frameworks b'') representation of succession and the plurality of 'spatial frameworks' is only possible by distinguishing--e.g. differentiating between mental images. letter order 2 represents the possibility of conjoining order 0 with order 1. This phrasing is useful because it is sufficiently loose to allow for the incorporation of noneuclidean frameworks: 'Experience is had by differentiating between mental images (a priori form). To differentiate requires representation, which takes time. Representation and duration can be perceived with euclidean or noneuclidean frameworks'. (NOW, incorporate keda's stronger claim that a differentiation of mental images implies a distinction of externally existing objects. CAn externally existing objects be both euclidean and noneuclidean? Superficially, NO. This is proof's interpretation of keda if superficiality turns out to have been very circular.) (). But really, 'euclidean' and 'noneuclidean' just refer to methods (frameworks) of reasoning about sense perception. Different frameworks CAN provide disagreeing mental images about sense-perceptions in the very same model, environment, agent, or specialty field. This is only because it is useful to refer to sense-perceptions in euclidean frameworks sometimes, and in other times, noneuclidean frameworks. But referential utility does not guarantee external existence--other than in the sense that communicated agreements exist externally. And it is useful to use communication to agree that objects only exist in agreement because agreement that P and agreement that -P can both be achieved as long as it is acknowledged that -(Pv-P) or P-->-P. It is useful to acknowledge such things when it is useful to perceive some things in space-time and others in plain space and time (that is, when it is useful to agree to perceive P&-P). Let agreement P concerning a priori form of sense-experience be the euclidean framework. Let agreement -P be the noneuclidean framework. They are compatible so long as frameworks are a priori forms of experience, rather than true representations of externally existing reality. (LEM applies to some frames.) Indeed, in one sense, the coexistence of distinct a priori forms either indicates the unlikelihood that reality is external or that reality permits humans (in their current state of empirical knowledge) vastly different perceptual frameworks. I omit closure at this point--I hope it will be clear from the context what posts I am addressing. But, methodologically, let it be said that I preserve the essence of a question before its content relative to a certain context. That essence is to assume an a priori form of mental images of sense-perceptions and then ask whether mental images WITHOUT that form are imaginable. Also methodologically, note that here, if q is imaginable, then q is communicable. This is because without communication, imagination is unverifiable. Actually, picking nits, 'imaginable' can replaced with 'conceivable' with the assumption that everything conceivable is in principle communicable via its representability. Edited by jtoma on 08/01/09 - 05:29 PM

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