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An attempt at a critique of all idealism
Being an argument intended to show idealism is vacuous.

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An attempt at a critique of all idealism

To Mega Therion
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Posted 10/25/09 - 12:26 PM: Subject: An attempt at a critique of all idealism	#1
First of all, I am talking here about the 'subjective' idealism of Berkeley, early Fichte and the modern antirealists, not the 'objective' idealism of Plato or Schelling. This I take to be a position that objects in the external world don't exist, and that the mental phenomena we usually consider the effect of external objects are produced by a mind of some sort. Exactly what sort of mind, and how many of them, is irrelevant here. Now, even the idealist must recognise the constant patterns in the succession and placement of mental phenomena; but he believes they can be explained solely by the action of a mind. However, this mind must operate according to its mental representation of some law (as, for example, I light a cigarette because there exists in my mind a representation of a relation between lighting a cigarette and a lit cigarette), and laws are relations between objects. But what kind of objects? Mental phenomena obviously can't be it, as can be seen from the fact that the same phenomenon in a same phenomenal background (by which I mean all other phenomena experienced concurrently) can lead to different phenomena according to what external object caused it. For example, consider the image of a tomato and an image of a really good picture of a tomato. We would be surprised if the tomato tipped over, right? But this seems to offer us little in the way of choice. Using a division of entities according to their relation with a mind, they are either minds, phenomena or external objects. And it is incoherent to say minds can be the objects that figure in the laws in accordance with which a mind creates phenomena; at least I can't attach any meaning to this sentence. So, it seems that external objects of some sort must exist even in the most thorough variety of subjective idealism.

GrasBourJei
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Posted 10/25/09 - 03:46 PM:	#2
In order to write the most complete answer to your very valid question, I, in my extraordinary lack of experience, would still have, and maybe BRECAUSE of this, would have to connect the very interesting points you bring up to the many concepts and philosphers which are connected to this post. In doing this, I am reminded of: Kant and A Priori knowledge; objective idealism Heidegger and the phenomenological aspect of human experience and the mind Hume and his idea of impressions being conencted to the observer; his idea of empiricism in general; how the mind makes impressions which it forms to LOGICAL ideas: the 'laws' of experience Qualia and the mechanics of making impressions What I think your post means generally is: there are facts there are recorded facts there are minds there are external objects there are the impressions/logical use of external objects; what we think of them there are laws and methods and means of communication The idea of objective knowledge being based on subjective experience. The subjective experience is, impression, according to Hume, is undersood in the mind to make a CONCEPT; and so becomes 'objectified knowledge'. Scientifically, a theory which has data contradicitng the oroiginal concept of a theory must be reevaluated. We know what we know is true until and unless we either find new data or choose, because of something lacking, to find the sufficient cause, actian, method, or concept. 'Subjective idealism' is ussually connected to the pramatic approach, and so to science. 'Objective idealism' is connected to, I am supposing, the idea of a superceding idea or concept, and so to monism, metahpysics, and possibly religion. But I am not so sure.......
“To dwell is to garden.” Martin Heidegger

Hamandcheese
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Posted 10/25/09 - 05:01 PM:	#3
The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell is to my mind the best refutation of Berkeley's Idealism outhere. You can read the whole book online here: http://www.ditext.com/russell/russell.html
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Desidude666
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Posted 10/25/09 - 10:46 PM:	#4
Again, when you state subjective idealism (opposed to objective), do you accept noumenal references - that it is as it is. Kant tackled this proposition, and it was 'ideally' (Will) refuted by Arthur Schopenhauer. He suggested that the noumenal reality and the phenomenal reality is the same (as in idealistic, phenomenal idealism). He suggested that our phenomenal idealism usually reflects our desires and needs, however there is a constant in reality. He suggests the Will being a core aspect of 'reality' and then suggests that it's irrational. In that respect, if the Will is irrational, it is not phenomenal as our own desires appear logical to us, hence ideal. Again, I think the hypothesis of the phenomenal ideal is highly subjective. There is no 'ideal' of the objective, as such ideals are our own desires in our subjective phenomena. They might be a part of the noumenal objective, may not reflect reality as noumenal objectivity in itself.
What you are, you are by accident of birth; what I am, I am by myself. There are and will be a thousand princes; there is only one Beethoven. - Ludwig van Beethoven

To Mega Therion
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 10/30/09 - 10:27 AM:	#5
Hm, sorry that it took me so long to reply. GrasBourJei, What I tried to do is that a subjective idealism needs something like the very external world it denies. And I wouldn't say a subjective idealism is connected to science; could you clarify what you meant a bit? Nor would I say objective idealism is necessarily connected to religion. Hegel's, for example, isn't, nor is Peirce's or Plato's. Hamandcheese, As I see it Russell's refutation rests on the suspicious position that sense data are not mental (a position which I disagree with). Furthermore, it is primarily epistemological, while I am interested in examining the ontology which subjective idealism seems to presuppose; and it couldn't be used against, say, a somewhat more sophisticated phenomenalist, while I hold that something similar to what I was getting at could. Desidude, While I argue that there are external objects, I wouldn't equate them with Kant's things-in-themselves. After all, the ding an sich is designed to be unknowable; if we accept that everything that exists is either a mental phenomenon or a ding an sich, we might as well be more consistent and parsimonious and do away with the ding an sich altogether, as Fichte (who, despite the fact that I disagree with his position, I consider a great philosopher) did. As for Schopenhauer, while I must admit I haven't read the World as Will and Representation, from what I know of his philosophy he does posit entities that are analogous to external objects, all his talk of 'representation' aside. These being not only the Will (which in its unity is a rather poor substitute for the external world), but also the Forms, and even bodies. Which brings up an interesting point; it seems to me that every subjective idealist had to smuggle the external world into his system somehow; Berkeley by God, Fichte by the anstoss and other egos, and so on.

GrasBourJei
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Posted 11/05/09 - 01:41 AM:	#6
I thought about this maybe too much, and maybe not nearly enough; and possibly made a huge mess: Fichte: self-consciousness or self-awareness; subjectivity and consciousness Berkeley: "immaterialism"/"subjective idealism" individuals only know directly sensations and so ideas of objects, and not abstractions such as "matter". (Holistic gnoseology) Schelling: Absolute. ~~~~~~~~~~ If we are thinking in terms of ONLY objective idealism, (reality being a concrete we could know), versus subjective idealism, (reality being something we perceive and is colored by our impressions), then I think we should begin with Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle and his concept of the Universal, which is a broad and objective idea, and leads to a specific and objective result. Plato’s and his concept of the Forms, which is broad and objective idea, and leads to the specific and a subjective result. So from these beginning points, we are thinking in terms of the subjective and objective being metaphysical ideals. ~~~~~~~~~~ So we are lead to Monism; and since the major concepts of Plato and Aristotle concerning subjective idealism and objective idealism are linked with idealism, which is a monist concept….and hence we have an understanding of what idealism is, based on the most basic aspect: Monism: Idealism/phenomenalism/mentalistic monism: only mind is real. (Fichte and Descartes?) Neutral monism: both the mental and the physical could be reduced to some sort of third substance, or energy. (Plato and Schelling?) Physicalism/materialism: only the physical is real, ideas could be reduced to the physical. (Aristotle and Kant ?) Holistic gnoseology: only a global approach seeking global knowledge, anti-specialist; comprehensive reality. (Berkeley and Modern Science?) ~~~~~~~~~~ “What I tried to do is that a subjective idealism needs something like the very external world it denies. And I wouldn't say a subjective idealism is connected to science; could you clarify what you meant a bit?” Epistemology and Empiricism We could say how each philosopher is sort oft trying to figure out how to reconcile the basic concepts of objective reality, a subjective reality and so the ways these are affected and affecting their philosophy of epistemology. Physicalism/materialism: empiricism. So from an Epistemological question, we are lead to an answer of the duality of Metaphysics and Materialism. And so I suppose your question essentially is: what is our concept of what we conceptualize objective idealism and subjective idealism to be in terms of what is true and what we conceptualize it as and so: Idealism and conceptualizing and connection to subjective idealism and objective idealism and so Epistemology/empiricism. Part of Epistemology: Noumena (Objectivity) 1) a posited object; event as it is in itself, (independent of the senses); a Concept; metaphysical 2) Kant : Thing-in-itself; material, (metaphysically saying materials exist) 3)the Absolute: the totality of all things; what is; metaphysical * Metaphysical Phenomena (Subjective) 1) Something experienced 2) Something perceived The ways we experience objects, which are objectively existent, is subjective because of our place and time, and sense of things Materialism; Empiricism Perception (Subjective) 1) Experiencing 2) Cognition *Phenomenology ~~~~~~~~~~ Causation and Information Aristotle and Four Causes 1) material; what is, and what is made: both objective and subjective criteria 2) formal: theory: science, what is in use, what is known; both objective and subjective criteria 3) efficient cause: Physical/objective/Science 4) final cause: Holistic/Monistic Objective Metaphysics/only use in philosophy? ~~~~~~~~~~ “Nor would I say objective idealism is necessarily connected to religion. Hegel's, for example, isn't, nor is Peirce's or Plato's.” No, religion would be considered part of both subjective and objective knowledge.
“To dwell is to garden.” Martin Heidegger

samantabhadra
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Posted 11/05/09 - 01:55 PM:	#7
The things with which I am familiar were previously percieved by my mind and now have an existence seprate from the original sense object within my mind. So when I come into contact with a familiar object I feel that what I percieve is a result of my minds interpretation of that object. However when I come into contact with an unfamilar sense object I feel that it exists within my consicousness in its own right apart from the direction or knowledge of my consicousness. Its exitence within my consicouness is totaly a result of perception. To me this implys a seprate existence from my consious self. But because of the unity of my consicousness and my perception ultimately the new object of sense and the resulting conception of it within my consicous mind are ultimately one from the moment I come into contact with it. As far as an object of senses existence before I come into contact with it. I am unsure due to lack of contact with that object. However from the first moment of perception the object of sense becomes one with my consiousness through my perception resulting in knowledge of that object. I was told that I was an idealist of sorts. So this is my perception of how my mind works and how I percive reality. I hope that these thoughts help your critique. I'll try to help if I can and learn the best I can from you.

GrasBourJei
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Posted 11/05/09 - 08:19 PM:	#8
“The things with which I am familiar were previously percieved by my mind and now have an existence seprate from the original sense object within my mind. So when I come into contact with a familiar object I feel that what I percieve is a result of my minds interpretation of that object. However when I come into contact with an unfamilar sense object I feel that it exists within my consicousness in its own right apart from the direction or knowledge of my consicousness.” I think this is a mistaken way of saying, what we know of, we have labeled and what e don’t know, we are open to, until we find a negative label for it. What you are wrong about is “Its exitence within my consicouness is totaly a result of perception.” ALL consciousness is perception, perceived, and perceived, OR at least, to a great extent. “To me this implys a seprate existence from my consious self.” Yes, things we perceive outside of ourselves ARE outside of ourselves and not us…… “But because of the unity of my consicousness and my perception ultimately the new object of sense and the resulting conception of it within my consicous mind are ultimately one from the moment I come into contact with it.” I think since we could logically know we could think of something as being other than what we think of it, and partly this is about our ability to think outside of the moment, somehow. Logically and the ways we make our own perceptions. “As far as an object of senses existence before I come into contact with it. I am unsure due to lack of contact with that object. However from the first moment of perception the object of sense becomes one with my consiousness through my perception resulting in knowledge of that object.” THIS is when we get to one of the points the original poster was referring to. Do we know something if we haven’t experienced it, logically understood it, and/or heard of it from enough sources to make it believable. And this lead again to Monism and the major four concepts: physical, from the mind only, from both, or Holistic. “I was told that I was an idealist of sorts. So this is my perception of how my mind works and how I percive reality.” We could not and we should not underestimate how the ways we perceive affects our ways of thinking of the world, and how important what we believe and think about what we know is, and how and why we believe what we believe, and how we think what we think; etc…………. But all of this is aside from the basic idea of what is, and far we know to be realizing what is and finding the best ways of affecting what is.
“To dwell is to garden.” Martin Heidegger

Human5678
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Posted 11/06/09 - 10:06 PM:	#9
To Mega Therion wrote: What I tried to do is that a subjective idealism needs something like the very external world it denies. The typical idealism of Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, and gang, do not deny the existence of the external world. They, like everyone, recognized the reality of the external world from the common sense perspective. "35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question." George Berkeley: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. 1710. For the majority, the externalness of object is seldom questioned. However, philosophical realists go a step further to assert, without proof, that external objects exist (ontologically) absolutely independent of human minds. To the idealists, the realist's view of objects existing of absolute independence from mind do not appear to be tenable. They noted that somehow the mind is involved in the actualization of external objects and what is external is only apparent. Without denying the existence of the external world, the idealists set out to explore the possibility that the human mind is involved in the actualization of external object. While I agree the involvement of the mind in the actualization of external objects is a very probable hypothesis, the idealists like Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, and others, had not been successful in providing any convincing conclusions to the hypothesis. The best you can do is to critique the idealism of Berkeley (god), Kant (thing-in-itself), Hegel(absolute), and others for not providing any convincing conclusions, but credit should be given to their attempts in bringing the mind as a variable in the actualization of reality. To date, the other sciences, like physics, neuroscience, neuropsychology, cognitive science (2nd generation) and the likes are progressing to demonstrate the inevitable involvement and dependence of the observer on the observed. Edited by Human5678 on 11/06/09 - 10:16 PM

180 Proof
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Posted 11/06/09 - 10:45 PM:	#10
Is mind itself real? Does mind "actualize" mind(s)? Is mind the necessary & sufficient condition of its object(s)? If subject constitutes object, what constitutes (the) subject? Isn't it a compositional fallacy to infer from micro-subjects to macro-subjectivity? compounded by a hasty generalization fallacy to infer from epistemology (e.g. self-certainty) to ontology (e.g. self-ubiquity)? Edited by 180 Proof on 11/06/09 - 10:55 PM. Reason: Ipsa-ting, what else?
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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