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An attempt at a critique of all idealism
Being an argument intended to show idealism is vacuous.

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An attempt at a critique of all idealism

Human5678
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Posted 11/09/09 - 02:27 AM:	#21
To Mega Therion wrote: Nowhere did my points depend ona God, nor was Berkely even in my mind when I was writing whis (it was Fichte, if I recall). And as I've already said, that any objects but qualia depend on a fintie mind seems suspect. I do not deny that they interact, but the position I'm attacking is one of ontological dependence. I see nothing contradictory about objects existing without minds that have a representation of them. If you review your penultimate reply, you mentioned, "(1) Let us suppose, along with the subjective idealist,...." and Berkeley is the only subjective idealist I know of. Fichte, if I am not mistaken is a transcendental idealist as with Kant. If you want to critique about idealism, you need to be precise and understand their exact theory. Merely attacking the point, "idealist state that existence of object depends on the mind" is too simplistic. The word "depend" is often misinterpretated in the idealism discussion. Btw, I think I have lost track on the OP. I would not label myself as an idealist. The only thing i appreciate about idealists in general, is their insight to bring the subject and its mind in association with reality.

180 Proof
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Posted 11/09/09 - 03:55 AM:	#22
bert1 wrote: Well, reality may have other aspects, e.g. (following Halliday) the capacity to act (omnipotence), and spatial extension (omnipresence). But this doesn't divide the substance. These are different 'aspects' (i.e. ways of thinking about) one thing. They are co-extensive in the continuum and are therefore only separable by abstraction. Well, since "the continuum" is itself only an abstraction, the implication (as I surmise) is that mind -- as a "co-extensive" "aspect" -- is also abstract, or merely a way of talking about reality, and therefore not itself real. Things can only emerge after a rearrangement of stuff. A continuum is un-rearrangeable.Any properties/aspects (I'm never quite sure what the best word is) it has are necessary. The necessary aspects of reality are co-extensive and therefore do not transcend or exceed one another. I don't follow you. What we call something doesn't determine that thing. Clearly there are many complex aspects/properties which fit the description of being emergent, and if describing reality as a continuum is apt then I don't see the inconsistency between these descriptions. They are local & global respectively, like waves in relation to an ocean; disparate merelogical descriptions of the same object. It's reality considered as conscious, I think. Anthropormorphism aside, what is there for reality to be conscious of if consciousness is all there is? "Self-consciousness" makes no sense where there is no Other, or self alien to it. And if this 'all-consciousness' is not intentional, then in what way is it "conscious"? I see what you mean. I'm uneasy about this kind of move too. However, I'm not exactly sure what is wrong with it. The reasoning is fallacious, and that's what's wrong with Berkeleyan (i.e. perception --> perceived by god), Fichtean (i.e. subject --> subjectivity of existence) & Hegelian (i.e. subject <<--> Absolute) idealisms.
The question isn't "What do I believe?" but rather "What do I least disbelieve?" Absence of necessary evidence is evidence of necessary absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Tobias
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Posted 11/09/09 - 04:32 AM:	#23
Well, since "the continuum" is itself only an abstraction, the implication (as I surmise) is that mind -- as a "co-extensive" "aspect" -- is also abstract, or merely a way of talking about reality, and therefore not itself real. All philosophy, in fact all conceptualisation are ways of talking about reality, and even this is a way of talking about reality. Reality itself is an abstract way of talkig about reality. Hence nothing 'real' is left. What we are left with is talking about the real. Therefore philosophy, is a study of the ways we talk about what is real. I have always taken this to be the portee of Hegels sentence that all philosophy, necessarily is idealism. (Of course Hegel held that his way of talking about reality was more insightful than all others, but the merits of that I will not get into) Anthropormorphism aside, what is there for reality to be conscious of if consciousness is all there is? "Self-consciousness" makes no sense where there is no Other, or self alien to it. And if this 'all-consciousness' is not intentional, then in what way is it "conscious"? Idealism is exactly about how self consciousness always creates its other. That is the drift of Hegelian idealism. Self consciousness never remains with itself but creates dychotomies because it is confronted with not-selves all the time. Only in last instance will it realise it creates those dychotomies itself and hence nature is not different from spirit, but the other of spirit in which it recognises itself. Absolute idealism is not very different from Spinozistic theory of one substance. It only holds contrary to Spinoza that the substance is not a mechanistic whole, but subject, a self conscious whole. Spinozist theorists happen to infer a more bodily and rather machine like reality and absolute idealists conclude that reality is more synonymous with society and history and hence stress its intelligibility. I'd be careful with equating 'self' with cosmic mind. Cosmic mind has that designing, willing, planning connotation. I'd say that transitions are important in Hegel and he noted in his own age a transition from a pre-given natural order, to an order determined by reason and science. Hence, reality is more shaped by spirit than by substance in our times. This entails more self understanding on how reality is categorically determined in though, because of the historical turn to spirit. (Phenomenology of the spirit entails tha possibility of Logik) (I think every strict determination of what is really really real, including "to be is to be perceived", pre Kantian and a metaphysics which was eterminated 'root and branch')
"The Power of Kant compels you" "The Power of Kant compels you" "The Power of Kant compels you"

To Mega Therion
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Posted 11/09/09 - 12:31 PM:	#24
Human5678 wrote: If you review your penultimate reply, you mentioned, "(1) Let us suppose, along with the subjective idealist,...." and Berkeley is the only subjective idealist I know of. Fichte, if I am not mistaken is a transcendental idealist as with Kant. If you want to critique about idealism, you need to be precise and understand their exact theory. Merely attacking the point, "idealist state that existence of object depends on the mind" is too simplistic. The word "depend" is often misinterpretated in the idealism discussion. Btw, I think I have lost track on the OP. I would not label myself as an idealist. The only thing i appreciate about idealists in general, is their insight to bring the subject and its mind in association with reality. Berkeley never called himself a subjective idealist either; and Fichte's early philosophy is considered the textbook example of the tendency. And I gave the best definition of dependence I could come up with, if you have a better one I would be grateful.
"To express the same idea in another way, I think human knowledge is essentially active. To know is to assimilate reality into systems of transformations." - J. Piaget

bert1
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Posted 11/11/09 - 12:07 AM:	#25
180 Proof wrote: Well, since "the continuum" is itself only an abstraction, the implication (as I surmise) is that mind -- as a "co-extensive" "aspect" -- is also abstract, or merely a way of talking about reality, and therefore not itself real. OK, my talk of reality and aspects was confusing (and perhaps confused). Part of the problem here is finding a suitable vocabulary. I was using 'reality' in the sense that Halliday uses it, to mean the continuum and the discontinuum. The continuum is the unity (non-duality) that introduces stresses within itself which, relative to one another, constitute the discontinuum. The discontinuum is not more than the continuum, nor other than the behaviour patterns of the continuum. The continuum (the Absolute, God) is spatially extended (and is space) because if it wasn't, it couldn't create anything spatially extended. It is capable of introducing stresses (differences) within itself because if it couldn't, we wouldn't have the differentiated world that is abundantly evident. It is sentient because if it wasn't, there is no way for consciousness to emerge as a property of the discontinuum, or a part of the discontinuum, as subjectivity cannot be derived from objects given that subjectivity is a unity that relates its contents without destroying them. I don't follow you. What we call something doesn't determine that thing. Clearly there are many complex aspects/properties which fit the description of being emergent, and if describing reality as a continuum is apt then I don't see the inconsistency between these descriptions. They are local & global respectively, like waves in relation to an ocean; disparate merelogical descriptions of the same object. OK, that's a good point I think. I expressed myself poorly. I'm happy with the idea that the behaviours of the continuum are, in a sense, rearrangements of stuff, and the the phenomenal world emerges from these behaviours. These can be described locally as different from one another (the discontinuum) or the whole can be described globally as a continuum. As you say, like waves (local) in an ocean (global). However, (and we have touched on this before) it is conceivable that the continuum, prior to behaving in a particular way (waving ocean), did not behave in any particular way at all (still ocean). So there are a whole load of properties that cannot be said truly of it in this unwaving state, such as tree-ness, dog-ness etc, anything that emerges as behaviour of the continuum. However there are three properties that we can still truly say of it in this undifferentiated state, namely, spatiality, will (the capacity to act, or introduce change within itself, even if it does not exercise this capacity), and sentience. These are the necessary properties of the Absolute. I say all this like I know what I'm talking about, but I'm not 100% sure about it. It's what I understand from Halliday, and it's the best (or at least the one I like the most) philosophy I've come across so far. Anthropormorphism aside, what is there for reality to be conscious of if consciousness is all there is? "Self-consciousness" makes no sense where there is no Other, or self alien to it. And if this 'all-consciousness' is not intentional, then in what way is it "conscious"? I don't think consciousness necessarily requires an object. But once the continuum has created the discontinuum within it, the discontinuum constitutes the content of consciousness. "Substance feels its own condition" says Halliday.
Said that soldierly mystic called Bradley Please don't take my system too sadly It's really quite fun Thinking everything's One We should all feel unreal very gladly. Timothy Sprigge, 1932-2007 My web page on Halliday.

180 Proof
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Posted 11/11/09 - 01:22 AM:	#26
bert1 wrote: It is sentient because if it wasn't, there is no way for consciousness to emerge as a property of the discontinuum, or a part of the discontinuum, as subjectivity cannot be derived from objects given that subjectivity is a unity that relates its contents without destroying them. This statement seems central to your position, bert1, but it's only a matryoshka doll of terms. I just don't find a distinction (e.g. Halliday's interpretation of "non-duality") that makes a difference. Sentience in the universe doesn't entail that the universe is sentient, but even if the universe is sentient, there is no way for us to know this; and nothing about what we do know about the universe is non-trivially changed by this. Tobias wrote: All philosophy, in fact all conceptualisation are ways of talking about reality, and even this is a way of talking about reality. Reality itself is an abstract way of talkig about reality. Hence nothing 'real' is left. What we are left with is talking about the real. Therefore philosophy, is a study of the ways we talk about what is real. Yeah, but I don't think this makes all philosophy 'idealism' (pace Hegel et al) any more than it makes all physical theories or paintings 'idealistic'. Idealism is exactly about how self consciousness always creates its other. "Consciousness" is assumed to be real without any non-subjective warrant which allows any house of cards (e.g. consciousness --> self-consciousness --> non-self-consciousness ...) to be constructed without limit. ... Hence, reality is more shaped by spirit than by substance in our times. This entails more self understanding on how reality is categorically determined in though, because of the historical turn to spirit. (Phenomenology of the spirit entails tha possibility of Logik) Edited by 180 Proof on 11/11/09 - 01:50 AM. Reason: Squaring my circles ...
The question isn't "What do I believe?" but rather "What do I least disbelieve?" Absence of necessary evidence is evidence of necessary absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Tobias
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Posted 11/12/09 - 03:00 AM:	#27
"Therefore philosophy, is a study of the ways we talk about what is real." Yeah, but I don't think this makes all philosophy 'idealism' (pace Hegel et al) any more than it makes all physical theories or paintings 'idealistic'. Those are unalike. Physical theories represent what is real. They presuppose that what they represent is reality as it is. Philosophy is about how we categorise the real, i.e., how we perceive it, how we make judgements and how we represent it in our accounts of it. It is not about what is perceived, what is judged etc. Paintings too are different from philosophy since they do not reflect on how one paints. An exception and that is why that is striking to me are Picasso's constant redrawing of works he did when he was younger. He made them in old age. "Consciousness" is assumed to be real without any non-subjective warrant which allows any house of cards (e.g. consciousness --> self-consciousness --> non-self-consciousness ...) to be constructed without limit. I think you are right in regard to Fichte, Berkeley and maybe even Kant, but I don't think you are right with respect to Hegel. I think he tries to show that consciousness is always necessary presupposed in all of our endeavours to understand the world. You are right that self consciousness in a Hegelian sense is essentially limitless. It has to since he accepts the one substance doctrine of Spinoza. I do not know if I necessarily agree with the turn to spirit, but I do not disagree either. I think it was part and parcel of enlightenment thought. Now we have a different era, an ecological era. In my view far more metaphysical than the enlightenment era. Nowadays the whole sub specie aeternitate is back. Hegel at least kept himself to the history of the beings which are historical, mankind. Ecology paints the picture of the history of eco systems and hence the self and self consciousness are treated as emergent contingent properties of this history. No more substance as subject wth absolute freedom at the end, but subject as substance with the apocalypse as its teleology.
"The Power of Kant compels you" "The Power of Kant compels you" "The Power of Kant compels you"

GrasBourJei
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Posted 11/16/09 - 03:47 PM:	#28
SemantaBhadra When you say your consciousness comes into contact with another object and begins to have an almost indecipherable distinction from what your impression is, doesn’t’ this also sort of mean how the way your mind is, is affecting the object and how your mind is connected to the way your consciousness is. Also, isn’t it true how what we think of an object is and becomes something which is what the ‘object is’, and so with people, how two people who meet, could possibly not change at all, in any way, from contact with each other…..meaning how the interaction doesn’t change them because maybe, they are somehow firmed to avoid it and/or have already had a sort of contact with smoothing else similar….also the interaction itself make a huge difference…I think in some ways this has to be true because the way we interact doesn’t always change. With everyone, but we act according to the sort of people we are around to an extent.
“To dwell is to garden.” Martin Heidegger

GrasBourJei
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Posted 11/16/09 - 03:55 PM:	#29
SemantaBhadra Also how we process moments…..there is the actual physical connection to the experience, which is subjective…… We know the experience is only our experience, we know the object and/or impression is changed within us from the impression, and how think of the experiences logically separates us even more from the object and/or experience. The connection of our mind to the sense object is further distanced when we understand how the object is affected by our emotions, which are part of our mind, but could also be cause of our space and time; and/or because of how our mind is affecting the consciousness, the emotions, all combined.
“To dwell is to garden.” Martin Heidegger

GrasBourJei
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Posted 11/18/09 - 07:56 PM:	#30
Human5678 “For the majority, the externalness of object is seldom questioned. However, philosophical realists go a step further to assert, without proof, that external objects exist (ontologically) absolutely independent of human minds.” Philosophically, it is probably a very bad idea to be thinking of how and to what extent we could know how accurate our conceptions of what and object is something which we could know. Since we have science to help us to now to what extent we do and do not know of an object’s existence, reality, and how these are affected by consciousness, space and time, mind, emotions, which are part of mind and/or time and space, and what all of this says about the totally of experience; we need to realize not to necessarily align what philosophy is with this idea, but aside from historical facts and ideas, we should find a way to philosophically understand and explain why these are the way they are. AND, the most important part, philosophy is of language, which is of a time, place, culture, mentality, language which stems from human experience of the world, and more ; we should realize how paradoxically, this question is not philosophical at all. And I suppose this leads to idealism, but I’m not sure. But idealism also comes from human experiences, so the ways we think of anything is external and internal; and is of a time and place and is also internal…..hence idealism…from the idea of time and space…..which is basically he theory of relativity; which is both objective and subjective…. “To the idealists, the realist's view of objects existing of absolute independence from mind do not appear to be tenable. They noted that somehow the mind is involved in the actualization of external objects and what is external is only apparent.” This is actually interesting because the philosophy is about how the mind thinks of objects, and so we are totally beholden to the idea of how there are human bodies which perceive the world and how MIND Is totally different. Now the idea of mind is connected to a science which is connected to the concepts of the physical brain, but before all ideas were to be of the mind and so MIND was ephemeral, ideal, and real. The idea of body and perceiving were secondary to the idea of mind and thinking. “I think, therefore I am.” and even more true, the idea of Sophos and the Greek philosophical/spiritual ideal. I honestly the early philosophers were trying to make philosophical discoveries into the ethereal real as much as they were looking to understand physical phenomena. IN religion, science, and philosophy we take the idea of the ‘Unknown’ as being truly meaningful and apart of what we do know; a sort of constant. So essentially ALL idealism is thinking beyond the physical, in a way. This brings to mind a few interesting ideas: The physical world leading to the rational, spiritual and unknown world. ^How humans live; bodies and how we form lifestyle to them, and how this is a sort of ‘philosophy’ and how this lead to a sensibility, and philosophy, and delving in to the deeper aspects of what the lifestyle means about us and the world. ^The unknown being a sort of study of the obscure; the facts and the angles of interesting things for us to know; and this sort of leads to a nihilistic and quaint sensibility of seeking meaning in thing and the meaningless, the most physicalist sense of spirituality.
“To dwell is to garden.” Martin Heidegger

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