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A Quick Bit of Help With Differance

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A Quick Bit of Help With Differance

PositiveGenius
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Posted 10/14/09 - 03:49 PM: Subject: A Quick Bit of Help With Differance	#1
A good a place to start as any in trying to understand differance is Terence Hawkes Structuralism and Semiotics, please note the uses of difference and differance: "Difference represents the principle by which language works: that is, the process we have referred to as 'binary opposition,' or the perception of phonemic differences between sounds. As Saussure puts it, 'in language there are only differences.' To differ or differentiate, Derrida argues, is also to defer: to postpone; to hold back; to propose a distinction between entities as will enable one to refer to the other, or to be distinguished from it. That is, it represents involvement in a structuring process. Derrida argues that the deferring process in which writing appears to be involved- the written word acting as surrogate for the spoken word- in fact applies to the spoken word itself. That is, language's grounding in difference (distinctions) also implies a commitment to differance (deferring). Thus, speech cannot stand as the reality to writing's shadow, for speech already itself appears to be a shadow of some prior act of signification, of which it manifests the 'trace,' and so one, in an infinite regression. In fact nothing has the purity of absolute presence. Speech is as impure as trace-ridden, as secondary, as any sign-system. Thus when I say 'tree' I am as distant from the actual physical entity growing in the earth as I am when I write 'tree.' " Just a bit of help for anyone who happens to be currently reading Derrida...
"Men's wretchedness in soothe I so deplore, Not even I would plague the sorry creatures more." -Mephistopheles

Cadrache
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Posted 10/14/09 - 04:03 PM:	#2
I disagree. Not 'difference'. Division. Not "Binary Oppostion". Merely absolute presence of perception.
"...There was a writer who asked why it was that when we find positive experiences we say that only the physical facts are real, but in negative experiences we believe that reality is subjective. He made an example of those who say that in birth only the pain is real, the joy a subjective point of view, but that in death it is the emotional loss that is the reality." - Tony Ballantyne, Recursion. _____________________________________________ Truth is want. - The internal state of matters. Truth is Need. - The external state of affairs.

PositiveGenius
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Posted 10/14/09 - 04:25 PM:	#3
Care to elaborate good sir?
"Men's wretchedness in soothe I so deplore, Not even I would plague the sorry creatures more." -Mephistopheles

quickly
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 10/14/09 - 07:57 PM:	#4
My reading of Derrida has become very un-radicalized and is no longer in the mainstream tradition of deconstruction. My suggestion would be to exorcise your discussion of all Derrida jargon which you can't readily translate into another type of philosophical language. Hopefully this helps, however. A. Several myths about language: (1) A word is a representation of a concept which is present to the mind. When the word is spoken, the listener is given a signifier of a representation of which they have an identical concept. (2) A word represents a concept, and a concept is an image which contains an essence. When these essences are shared, communication takes place, because we are transmitting information about the same concepts and their proper relations. (3) Language is properly a verbal phenomena: a spoken word is the de iure signifier of such concepts as we discussed in (1) and (2). When we write, we substitute a form of communication for the correct form. This is confirmed by history: writing came after speech. This is confirmed by practice: writing doesn't permit of correction, and is more liable to error, being of inferior presence. (4) Words each signify one thing (representation), and one thing only. This thing is definite (can be known through its essence) and exists independently of all other things, although it may have relations to them. These relations qua the thing as a concept, however, are purely accidental. B. Derrida's concept of "differance" is meant to disprove each of these naive theses about language and representation: (1a) If when I speak to you, I give you a word which signifies a concept, and you have the same concept, then I have transmitted to you my concept and we have engaged in "proper" communication. But: the word is never identical to itself (no thing is produced identically, or repetition is repetition of difference), nor is the concept signified ever identical to itself. When something comes before the mind, it is never identical to that which came before when the concept was previously recalled, but it is always different. Our associations are nominal, and therefore the notion that "representations always have identical content" or some-such notion must be the effect of some other relation (not the representation; not the thing itself). (2a) Firstly, when a word represents a concept, what does this mean? Do I "represent" to myself a sound (C#)? Do I represent to myself a smell (perfume #11)? While I can recall each of these, I do not form a concept of either in the same way that I form of a concept of the book to my right in front of my desk. In fact, by the principle of difference (identity is nominal or arbitrary), my conception of any sensory act is always different than the last. Even so, I can denote to you without a shared and identical concept, but with our differing concepts. Therefore, communication occurs even if our representations are non-identical. Secondly, when we speak, the information transmitted goes through a deferral. I may believe that when I say "that dog which we have both looked at," I give to you the concept of the dog, and some concept becomes "present to your mind." However, you already have a concept of the dog, and this concept is imperfect. I signify to you the concept, but the concept is yours: therefore, I do not give information in speech by something like a simple act of denoting which you do not already possess, and which is not in a sensible way "present in mind." (3a) While speech came before writing, it doesn't follow that "speech is better than writing" or "you ought to speak." These are moral judgments, and are nothing more than effects of power-relations. They are wholly arbitrary. In fact, when I write (for instance, the word "differance"), I am able to transmit to you more information than if I had spoken the world. Therefore, writing is not necessarily less informative or instructive than speech. Likewise, the notion that writing is a "substitute" for speech is a matter of preference. In order to assert this, one needs to favor speech. Clearly, this position is objectively untenable. More importantly, if speech is associated with notions such as "presence" and "clarity," then the preference of one form of communication over others shows that the association of these terms with speech (or speech with these terms) is suspect. (4a) What does this mean? Suppose I say "mother." You, perhaps, form a definite representation of a "mother" with some definite and correct intension. Once you have produced a meaningful definition, others confirm that you have indeed reproduced a linguistic formula which is commonly agreed to mean "mother." Perhaps then you say: "That barren mother walked into the bar." Well, obviously something is wrong with "mother" in this sentence. Perhaps you meant: "that person with a motherly demeanor" or "that person with a large stomach" or "that person who is nurturing." Perhaps you meant to imply that "She should have had children, and acted accordingly." Clearly, you have signified something which isn't in accord with the concept which the word mother is supposed to signify. What you have done is violated a set of rules about the use of the word "mother." Derrida's point is that there is no "essence" to the "concept 'mother'," but instead of variety of interrelated instances or particulars which are assocated with a term such as "mother," and which are not represented the same at each instantiation. The use of words in such an instance is based on something perhaps more like Lakoff's "cognitive models" or Hume's account of abstract terms. Whatever the case, it is clear that nobody needs anything like "essences" or "similar concepts," that they don't exist very well, and that we get along fine without them. All this is very pragmatic. Derrida is attacking a particular set of doctrines that have been called by Deleuze "fascistic." They are the doctrines that cognition consists of the representation of objects of which each has its own particular essence, and which are clearly and distinctly present to the mind in both thought and language. Derrida's insight is that the stability of concepts (especially a one like "mother" or "child" or "male") is largely a relation of power and socialization, and that without these types of relations communication would be much more difficulty. We nevertheless continue to do and act and think and speak as if this set of doctrines was true, but in fact it is not. Sorry for the long post. Edited by quickly on 10/14/09 - 08:07 PM
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180 Proof
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Posted 10/14/09 - 08:13 PM:	#5
"I" beg to defer.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 10/14/09 - 08:31 PM:	#6
180: Are the following accurate paraphrases of your claims? 1. Derrida does not give a consistent definition to "differance"; but Derrida uses the word in various contexts and with potentially ambiguous meanings. If Derrida is to argue from the concept, he requires (a) consistent (set of) definitions. 2. Deconstruction reduces interpretation from context to operation without a context; so, deconstruction ignores the basic means by which information is received from a text. 3. Derrida is obscure and you don't enjoy his style. 4. Derrida both misinterprets the way in which (linguistic and conceptual) semiotics are used in foundationalist epistemologies and is unable per his argument to provide a sustainable critique of such a system, since by definition any textual substitution is equally admissible and he begs the question of transcendentiality (or identity, etc.) if he pretends that they aren't. 5. You don't find Derrida philosophically edifying.
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Posted 10/14/09 - 08:55 PM:	#7
quickly wrote: 180: Are the following accurate paraphrases of your claims? 1. Derrida does not give a consistent definition to "differance"; but Derrida uses the word in various contexts and with potentially ambiguous meanings. If Derrida is to argue from the concept, he requires (a) consistent (set of) definitions. 2. Deconstruction reduces interpretation from context to operation without a context; so, deconstruction ignores the basic means by which information is received from a text. 3. Derrida is obscure and you don't enjoy his style. 4. Derrida both misinterprets the way in which (linguistic and conceptual) semiotics are used in foundationalist epistemologies and is unable per his argument to provide a sustainable critique of such a system, since by definition any textual substitution is equally admissible and he begs the question of transcendentiality (or identity, etc.) if he pretends that they aren't. 5. You don't find Derrida philosophically edifying. Yes, more or less. An even more succinct & apropos paraphrase. Edited by 180 Proof on 10/14/09 - 09:07 PM. Reason: Making sense of making sense (I hope) ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

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Posted 10/15/09 - 02:05 PM:	#8
The difference between 1 and 2 is 1. The division between 1 and 2 however gives the actual concept of whether or not you are adding or subtracting from one object or another. Derida's Difference -as has been summarized a few times - is extremely limited.
"...There was a writer who asked why it was that when we find positive experiences we say that only the physical facts are real, but in negative experiences we believe that reality is subjective. He made an example of those who say that in birth only the pain is real, the joy a subjective point of view, but that in death it is the emotional loss that is the reality." - Tony Ballantyne, Recursion. _____________________________________________ Truth is want. - The internal state of matters. Truth is Need. - The external state of affairs.

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Posted 10/16/09 - 08:20 AM:	#9
quickly, your suggestion that we "exorcise our discussion of all Derrida jargon" is a good one, but I disagree with your "translation". Derrida was not a pragmatist, pace Rorty. The "concept" of différance is not meant to "disprove" anything--it isn't even a concept, as 180 Proof notes rather disapprovingly. The Saussurean conception of language as constituted by differences is a part of what différance means, but only a part. Heidegger's 'ontological difference' is at least as important. "Being (Sein) is not a being (Seind)" is one of the central ideas of Heidegger's work. The full force of its paradoxicality isn't apparent at first: what "makes" something not nothing (being) is itself nothing (is not a being). What you could call the 'ontic difference' between something and nothing is constituted by the 'ontological difference' between being and beings: being "is" the difference between being and beings. Heidegger always hesitated with the idea that being in some way "was" (made itself present) for the Greeks, that it had since been "forgotten", and that the task for "thinking" (after the end of philosophy) was to remember being in its absence; Derrida's 'différance' can never be present, has always already been forgotten, "is" only in its absence. There's something Kantian about this that I haven't seen discussed very much: knowing is restricted to a given sphere beyond which it can't reach. One key difference with Kant is that for Derrida the source of knowing can't itself be known, there is no transcendental subjectivity (or signifier) whose constitution we can learn through philosophy in order to assure ourselves of the security of our knowing. For Kant, it makes sense to talk about what's beyond knowing (the infamous thing-in-itself), because the knowing (transcendental subjectivity) is itself outside of its knowing; but for Derrida, what's outside of knowing/sense/being/presence--including the knowing/sense/being/presence itself--is nothing. This is what is totalitarian about knowing/sense/etc. : it has to incorporate everything because what it doesn't incorporate is nothing. Certain concepts, however, that relate to this "outside" (death, insanity, nonsense, writing, absence in general) resist incorporation: nonsense can't be made sense of as nonsense, ie. without becoming sense and thus no longer being nonsense--even if the sense is: "here is some nonsense". ("Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'here are our monsters,' without immediately turning the monsters into pets.") These concepts are therefore suppressed by "metaphysics" in favour of their opposites. Words like 'différance', 'writing', 'the margin', etc. are not meant as concepts that describe certain beings, but as "shapes of nothing" as one commentator puts it: they point to the act in "metaphysics" that separates these opposites and suppresses one of them, not in order to indicate something that has been excluded (nonsense is not a something) and should be included (it would no longer be nonsense if it were), but to show that exclusion as the condition for any "something" at all. (This is one of many points where his American fanboys have completely misunderstood him: he's generally taken up in "culture studies", "gender studies", "queer theory", etc. classes that are all about the left-liberal idea of "inclusion", whereas one of the main points of his work is the necessity of exclusion. In France, he was accused of being politically "reactionary", and while I think this is a misunderstanding too, it's probably closer to the truth than the Americans' interpretation.) That's obviously not the whole story of différance: he also mentions Freud's definition of the reality principle as the deferral of pleasure, Nietzsche's concept of the difference of forces, Husserl's concept of the temporal stream of protentions and retentions in consciousness, etc. @ 180 Proof: I generally agree with you: many of Derrida's works are tedious, long-winded, and needlessly complicated. His reception in the US is incredibly out of proportion with his real importance. But I think his 'différance' is an important creation, precisely because it has "potentially ambiguous meanings", and not as a concept to be "argued from". @ Cadrache: Either you're not explaining yourself very well, or you've not even misunderstood Derrida, but simply aren't talking about what he's talking about. Did you even notice that Derrida's term is spelled with an 'a' and not an 'e'?
For philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know.

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Posted 10/16/09 - 02:10 PM:	#10
His concept of differance held a different charge everytime it was initiated, especially from book to book, but there were times when he would initiate the Of Grammatology form in his future writings. It gets even harder for us because we have to logically piece it together whenever he is trying to say differance, he can't say differance without itself already getting lost. He does refer to Charles Peirce in the deconstruction of the "transcendental signified" which he used against Saussure, though he doesn't use peirces 3 fold trap of not being able to distinguish between interpretations, representation, object to where there is no anterior. Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations is also important in trying to decipher meaning in a cultural relativistic way. It is evident that he can take a specific word, hold on to it, analyze its emotional effects, the peculiarities, and reinitiate it to have polysemous or disseminatory effects. He has some really good ideas on going beyond hegel, cosmopolitanism, Christianity, friendship, psychology, literary analysis, etc. No one has to be a "deconstructionist", he takes too many turns in his philosophy where it shouldn't be a slogan, eschaton, commandment, and he uses like 30+ references for each book so its obviously made to enjoy, juxtaposition, advance, refute, etc.
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