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A proof that we necessarily have Free Will

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A proof that we necessarily have Free Will

Minty
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Posted 05/29/05 - 07:36 AM: Subject: A proof that we necessarily have Free Will	#1
1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect. 2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious. 3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all! 4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious. 5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws. I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers.

ade90212
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Posted 05/29/05 - 08:13 AM:	#2
Minty wrote: 2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious. How can you deduce that the fact that your conviction is subject to physical causality that it has nothing to do with the fact that you are conscious? The conviction that you are conscious depends heavily on the fact that you are conscious, because if you were not conscious the conviction could not esist. Minty wrote: 3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all! You are mistaken in claiming that you know without a shadow of a doubt that you are conscious. All you can be certain of is that there is a thought that you are conscious, not that you are indeed conscious. Minty wrote: 4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious. If all mental states are causally determined, then your 'incorrigible certain knowledge' is a product of this causal process and you could indeed be mistaken. Minty wrote: I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers. How so?
"Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up "What's that?" - It happened like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several times and said: "this is a man", "this is a house", etc. And then the child makes some marks too and asks: what's this then?" - Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value

Minty
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Posted 05/29/05 - 09:58 AM:	#3
ade90212 wrote: How can you deduce that the fact that your conviction is subject to physical causality that it has nothing to do with the fact that you are conscious? The conviction that you are conscious depends heavily on the fact that you are conscious, because if you were not conscious the conviction could not esist. Then you agree with me that mental causality exists. I'm arguing against those that deny this. You are mistaken in claiming that you know without a shadow of a doubt that you are conscious. All you can be certain of is that there is a thought that you are conscious, not that you are indeed conscious. If I have thoughts then a fortiori I am conscious. Without being conscious there would be no thoughts, no emotions, no qualia. Why? Because I am not conscious! If all mental states are causally determined, then your 'incorrigible certain knowledge' is a product of this causal process and you could indeed be mistaken. I've already stated in my opening post why I cannot be mistaken. I'm not sure if I can make it simpler. How so? Free will means the ability of ones mind to choose amongst competing alternatives. If mental causation exists then I am not physically determined to make a specific choice. It seems the only other alternative would be to say I am psychologically determined. I don't want to get into a discussion about this, but it seems to me that if my choices are not constrained by some external factor(s), then I have free will an any meaningful sense of the word.

Mariner
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Posted 05/29/05 - 10:46 AM:	#4
Here I go again, with the argument about free will and truth... If you replace premise 1 with: "If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I do not have free will is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect." You get the same result (a proof that shows how free will is necessary, or at least how "the conviction that convictions are determined by physical laws" is self-contradictory), only stronger, because it does not deal directly with issues of consciousness. It shows how nothing, whether conscious or not, can believe that its beliefs are determined by physical laws, in the strict sense of believing (i.e., holding a conviction which is supposed to be true, to be adequate as a description of reality). Whenever something says "I believe that I do not believe" -- which is what "I believe that my beliefs are the result of a chain of physical cause and effect" amounts to -- one is contradicting himself.
"In faith there is enough light for those who want to believe and enough shadows to blind those who don't." -- Blaise Pascal "The more I am by myself and alone, the more I have come to love myths" -- Aristotle in his later years

Tobias
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Posted 05/29/05 - 01:13 PM:	#5
How do you know it is the 'I' that thinks? Seems their is thinking and forms an 'I', why would I be prior to thinking and not the other way around?
"The Power of Kant compels you" "The Power of Kant compels you" "The Power of Kant compels you"

180 Proof
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Posted 05/29/05 - 02:30 PM: Subject: it thinks, therefore "i am"	#6
Minty wrote: 1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect. yeah, so ... your consciousness is determined (conditioned) by your brain, which in turn is determined (conditioned) by the rest of your body, which is also determined (conditioned) by your bodies interaction with its environment, and so on ... 2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious. perhaps. but i think if you were not conscious the question of consciousness (or "free will") would not come up, and you certainly wouldn't be 'convinced' of anything. 3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all! certainty proves nothing. electrical stimulation applied to the appropriate area(s) of your brain can induce the sensation of "incorrigible knowledge" that, for example, you 'see' red or 'hear' music where in fact neither light nor sound are present. it also seems to me that the very distinction between seeming and being conscious is a hallmark of being conscious; and thus your statement calls into question whether or not you are conscious after all ... 4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious. no. your "incorrigible certain knowledge" might just be a necessary illusion produced by the brain as part of an associated complex advantageous adaptations to evolutionary pressures which we call "cognition". 5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws. no. the behavior of quarks is far less determinate than the behavior of people and yet quarks are clearly governed by physical laws which have been confirmed by the most precise and tested physical theory we have (re: quantum mechanics). ignorance of physical laws (or initial conditions) does not entail that physical laws do not govern our behavior, only that we do not have a precise basis on which to make predictions. that our behavior is not reducible to physical laws also does not entail that physical laws do not govern our behavior any more than the fact of organic chemistry not being reducible to quantum mechanics entails that organic chemistry is independent of (the constraints of) quantum mechanics. your entire position, minty, amounts to an overdrawn argumentum ad ignorantiam. do we have "free will"? if by "free" you mean not determined by physical laws then i don't think so, since it remains to be demonstrated that there are any phenomena at work in the physical universe (e.g. willing, intentionality, etc) that are not determined by (or exempt from or inconsistent with) physical laws. if, however, by "free" you mean not reducible to physical laws (and thereby, more often than not, unpredictable ...) then you're probably correct. Edited by 180 Proof on 05/29/05 - 02:39 PM. Reason: ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Minty
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Posted 05/29/05 - 04:55 PM:	#7
Tobias wrote: How do you know it is the 'I' that thinks? Seems their is thinking and forms an 'I', why would I be prior to thinking and not the other way around? My argument does not depend upon the notion of an I or a self at all. I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that "I" am conscious, but not that there's an "I" or "self". But it's convenient to use these words anyway for ease of communication.

Timothy
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Posted 05/29/05 - 07:52 PM:	#8
Minty wrote: 1. If it were true that I do not have free will, but my behaviour is governed by physical laws, then my conviction that I am conscious is wholly caused by determined events in the brain which form links in a chain of physical cause and effect. Agreed. Minty wrote: 2. Thus my conviction that I am conscious has nothing to do with the fact that I am conscious as, given the causal chain of cause and effect in the brain, I would be convinced that I am conscious even if I were not conscious. And why you assume that the fact of being conscious isn't one of the causes? It could be perfectly possible that such fact is the cause (or one at least) of my conviction. Why it has nothing to do? Minty wrote: 3) But I know without a shadow of a doubt that I am conscious since there is no distinction between seeming to be conscious and really being conscious. Moreover it is very clear that it is my consciousness which provides this incorrigible knowledge, for, if "I" were not conscious, "I" could not think "I" am, since, not being conscious, "I" could never actual think at all! I don't see what purpose serves this. 4) But now we have an internal inconsistency since, on the one hand, I have incorrigible certain knowledge that I am conscious, and yet, on the other hand, if all mental events simply follow physical events in the brain, I could be mistaken in thinking I am conscious. That's because you misteriously said that the fact of being conscious has nothing to do with the conviction of being conscious. 5) Therefore we need to abandon the initial premise i.e that my behaviour is governed by physical laws. I would say that you need to abandon the second premise; or at least prove it. It is the most problematic. I suppose you might argue that this only proves mental causation, but free will would seem to be essentially the exercise of such mental powers. But the "I" isn't the one that exercises such causation. He is passive. He doesn't acts. Therefore, he isn't exercising any will, hence the not neccesary existence of free will.
"Neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules give the exact logic of any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary language has no exact logic." P.F. Strawson

Minty
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Posted 05/30/05 - 09:59 AM:	#9
Timothy wrote: And why you assume that the fact of being conscious isn't one of the causes? It could be perfectly possible that such fact is the cause (or one at least) of my conviction. Why it has nothing to do? I assume it to show that it is incoherent. If you agree that consciousness is causally efficacious, which is what my whole argument is aimed at, then that's fine.

Death Monkey
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Posted 05/30/05 - 11:13 AM:	#10
A quick question: Why do you consider the possibility that consciousness is causally efficacious, and the possibility that behavior is completely determined by physical laws, to be mutually exclusive? You seem to rejecting without any consideration the possibility that consciousness is, itself, a physical process. In this case, it would be both causally efficacious, and determined by physical laws. The only thing your so-called "proof" seems to rule out is epiphenomenalism, which is incoherent anyway. DM
Pseudoscience makes Baby Jesus cry.

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