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a prioricity and necessity

muxol
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Posted 05/27/04 - 05:29 AM:	#1
kripke made a distinction between a prioricity and necessity and some philosophers tend to exploit it by claiming that what is possible about, say, water is not settled a priori by our modal intuitions - we need science; hence a posteriori necessities such as water = H20. is this really the case? indeed, it seems that what is possible about water is due to metaphysical facts about the world. and how we come to know what is possible about water is due to the epistemological limits of science and man. but at the same time, surely what is epistemically possible concerning water is settled a priori by our modal intuitions. we can conceive of possible worlds in which water is not H20, even if its metaphysically impossible for water not to be H20. but how do we know that its impossible for water not to be H20. is current scientific theory infallible? could we ever make such a metaphysically modal claim (that its impossible for water to not be H20)? knowing what is metaphysically possible, however, seems impossible which leaves the above claim (that what is possible is not settled a priori by our modal intuitions) debunked. what is possible concerning water is settled a priori by our modal intuitions. what say u?

antijingoist
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Posted 05/27/04 - 06:05 AM:	#2
An obvious polemical objection to the issues raised above would be to question the meaning of such an inquiry. In other words, what is gained by contemplating such issues? If we were to debate this issue and arrive at some agreed upon conclusions regarding the conflation of epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, what practical use would we have of these conclusions? This seems like a more intriguing question, because to debate issues that offer little in terms of pragmatic application would necessarily be of little value. Consider, for a moment, the purpose of asking philosophical questions. Is it not to seek a better understanding of our experiences? And what use would this better understanding be if we did not apply it to our everyday lives so as to better ourselves in some way? To better ourselves requires an application of the insights arrived at through contemplation of philosophical issues, and this application results in the modification of our behavior in ways that are beneficial to our being. So really, the point of asking philosophical questions is to help us better our lives in some way, to cultivate insightful answers to questions and then apply these insights to our lives in the form of positive behavior modification, is it not? Does your question offer us any meaningful insights into our experience that will allow us to better our lives in some way? Perhaps in some way you feel it does, but if so please enlighten us.
"Free is the man who wills without caprice" ~ Martin Buber Now is the universe looking at itself.? To respond to iconoclasm is to behave as an addict.

Gassendi1
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Posted 05/27/04 - 06:13 AM:	#3
[QUOTE=antijingoist]An obvious polemical objection to the issues raised above would be to question the meaning of such an inquiry. __________________________________________ These issues have a history in philosophy, and they are important philosophical issues about the nature of our knowledge of the world. They concern how we derive that knowledge, and how that knowledge is confirmed. Not everything discussed by philosophers must be something you are interested in, or even understand.

Gassendi1
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Posted 05/27/04 - 06:26 AM:	#4
[QUOTE=muxol]kripke made a distinction between a prioricity and necessity and some philosophers tend to exploit it by claiming that what is possible about, say, water is not settled a priori by our modal intuitions - we need science; hence a posteriori necessities such as water = H20. is this really the case? indeed, it seems that what is possible about water is due to metaphysical facts about the world. and how we come to know what is possible about water is due to the epistemological limits of science and man. but at the same time, surely what is epistemically possible concerning water is settled a priori by our modal intuitions. we can conceive of possible worlds in which water is not H20, even if its metaphysically impossible for water not to be H20. but how do we know that its impossible for water not to be H20. is current scientific theory infallible? could we ever make such a metaphysically modal claim (that its impossible for water to not be H20)? __________________________________________ What is epistemically possible is relative to what we happen to know at some time, or what it is possible (metaphysically?) for human beings to know at any time. I have often wondered what could possibly substantiate Kripke's intuitions about the necessary constitution of water (or his intuition that I could not have had different parents) so that these are a posteriori necessities. And, that I happen to have the same intuition (about my parents and me at any rate) doesn't seem to me to matter. But maybe that's the point about intuitions-they can't be substantiated, since if they could be, they would not be intuitions. The one about the parents and me seem to be about genetic endowment. Is it metaphysically possible that I could have had a different genetic endowment? And still be me?

antijingoist
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Posted 05/27/04 - 06:33 AM:	#5
Gassendi1 wrote: __________________________________________ These issues have a history in philosophy, and they are important philosophical issues about the nature of our knowledge of the world. They concern how we derive that knowledge, and how that knowledge is confirmed. Not everything discussed by philosophers must be something you are interested in, or even understand. Who can doubt that these issues have a long history in Western philosophy, and they are still being debated today because we have not learned that it is meaningless to ask such questions. To say that issues about the nature of our knowledge of the world are important philosophically is to devalue the philosophic endeavor. Why concern ourselves with the nature of knowledge? To arrive at some conclusions about the nature of knowledge is to acquire knowledge about the nature of knowledge, then what about this new knowledge of the nature of knowledge? Now we have to concern ourselves with the nature of our new knowledge about the nature knowledge. Well why stop there, let’s proceed to consider the nature of this new knowledge about the nature of knowledge about the nature of knowledge. Obviously such inquiries are meaningless and are of no practical value. But perhaps you disagree, if so please enlighten us.
"Free is the man who wills without caprice" ~ Martin Buber Now is the universe looking at itself.? To respond to iconoclasm is to behave as an addict.

Gassendi1
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Posted 05/27/04 - 07:10 AM:	#6
But perhaps you disagree, if so please enlighten us _____________________________________________ If whatever human beings did had only practical value, we would have no art, no science, no chess. We would be as animals. "Philosophy begins in wonder" (Aristotle) I wonder about the nature of knowledge, and how it is acquired, and how we can tell whether we know what we believe we know. Science is about knowledge (in fact, that is the derivation of the name, "science," from the Latin for "knowledge" "scientia.". There, that's a bit of knowledge for you. Did you find it useful? If not, so what? It's worth knowing, anyway. It is interesting and worth-while knowing what sort of knowledge science gives us. Is it the kind of knowledge that, for instance, mathematics gives us? There seems to be a difference. Scientific knowledge comes from our sense. It is empirical knowledge. But mathematical knowledge does not seem to come from the senses. It seems to come from "reason." That has been called, "a priori" knowledge (meaning, independently of the senses). And this a priori knowledge seems to have the character of "necessity." It is not merely true, as is all knowledge, but it must be true. It is necessarily true. For, instance, it is impossible that 3+4 should not be seven. But, on the other hand, scientific or empirical knowledge does not seem to be necessary knowledge. It is true that grass is normally green. But it is not impossible that the world should be different, and grass be normally blue, or black, or any other color. It just happens that in this world, grass is normally green. But, now, Kripke seems to have proposed that there is not so great a difference between scientific and mathematical knowledge as we have thought. In fact, he has proposed that some scientific knowledge is also necessary knowledge. He has proposed, for instance, that it is a matter of necessity (as in mathematics) that water is H20, or that any individual must have had the parents he actually had. I find this a startling view. That there are scientific necessities. It is something that goes contrary to the entire tradition of empiricism, upon which science has been founded. Anyone who is interested in philosophy should, it seems to be, be interested in Kripke's view. And, if a person is not interested in philosophy, then why is he reading, let alone, posting, on this board?

antijingoist
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Posted 05/27/04 - 09:19 AM:	#7
To respond to such a post is to partake in that which has been decried in other posts (see, What do you mean when you say the word “I”, post #81); namely, to pick apart certain statements and dispute their logicality with counter propositions. This strategy has been decried because it leads to nothing but insipid disputations. Perhaps a more advantageous strategy would be to raise questions. Please, for a moment, seriously consider your statements. Are art, science and chess really all that impractical? Art exercises creativity, as does science, as does chess. Is creativity not a practical endeavor? Does it not allow for the development of numerous admirable qualities that allow a person to grow? Concerning the enterprise of science, this too is covered extensively, but not exhaustively, in the thread mentioned above. Still, more needs to be said about this issue, both from the historical and philosophical perspectives. It is reassuring that you find knowing about the kind of knowledge science gives us interesting and worth-while, but how can you sincerely maintain that mathematics is not a science? Is your definition of science not narrow and limiting? How do you view sciences that seek knowledge that is not empirical, such as knowledge of our creative urge that is the exigency for the enterprise of science? Can such knowledge be attained, if so, by what means? Can we arrive at such knowledge through “reason”? Is the capacity of reason limited in any way? Is empiricism limited in any way? Have you ever explored non-Western systems of knowing? Are you an eristic philosopher? In your 4,768 posts, have you ever wondered how it is you are able to wonder? Have you ever wondered about wondering with wonderful wonderment?
"Free is the man who wills without caprice" ~ Martin Buber Now is the universe looking at itself.? To respond to iconoclasm is to behave as an addict.

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Posted 05/27/04 - 12:17 PM:	#8
Gassendi1 wrote: I have often wondered what could possibly substantiate Kripke's intuitions about the necessary constitution of water Are not two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom (water) necessarily two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom (water)?
He that dies pays all debts - Shakespeare's Stephano from The Tempest Truth is its own measure - Spinoza, Ethics IIp43s Those who deny [Aristotle's] first principle should be flogged or burned until they admit that it is not the same thing to be burned and not burned, or whipped and not whipped. - Ibn Sina (Avicenna)

Augustinian
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Posted 05/27/04 - 01:50 PM:	#9
muxol writes: -------------------------------------------------------- kripke made a distinction between a prioricity and necessity and some philosophers tend to exploit it by claiming that what is possible about, say, water is not settled a priori by our modal intuitions - we need science; hence a posteriori necessities such as water = H20. is this really the case? -------------------------------------------------------- I think the relevant distinction to draw here is between analyticity and necessity (with 'a prioricity' being a plausible epistemic corollary of analyticity). Few contemporary philosophers would contend that statements involving natural kinds are a priori knowable. The reason why is not difficult to locate; it just seems obvious that the truth-conditions and knowability conditions of modal truths like "water is H20" differ significantly from statements like "bachelors are unmarried" or "2+2=4". Most plausible anti-realist accounts of modality no longer even bother denying all (or most) of the three central contentions about such truths; namely, that: (a) such truths are necessary, (b) such truths are synthetic, and (c) such truths are (only) knowable a posteriori (For an anti-realist account that affirms (a) & (c), but denies (b), see Alan Sidelle's: Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defence of Conventionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), chp 4-5). -------------------------------------------------------- Iindeed, it seems that what is possible about water is due to metaphysical facts about the world. and how we come to know what is possible about water is due to the epistemological limits of science and man. -------------------------------------------------------- I think the primary use of science here is to tell us what is the case, regarding water, rather than telling us what could be the case regarding water. For what could be the case regarding water, we require (among other things), a metaphysics of modality; some principles of individuation, and a theory of natural kinds. -------------------------------------------------------- but at the same time, surely what is epistemically possible concerning water is settled a priori by our modal intuitions. we can conceive of possible worlds in which water is not H20, even if its metaphysically impossible for water not to be H20. but how do we know that its impossible for water not to be H20. is current scientific theory infallible? could we ever make such a metaphysically modal claim (that its impossible for water to not be H20)? -------------------------------------------------------- One common oversight prevalent among critics of the "New Reference" theorists is that critics tend to loose sight of the conditionality of the claims being made regarding natural kind predications. That is, natural kind predications are deemed to be necessary, if they're true in fact. So the relevant truth to bear in mind here is not: [1] Water couldn't have been other than H20 but rather, [2] Water couldn't have been other than H20, if water is in fact H20 With regard to your suspicions about scientific infallibility; [1] has the specious appearance of stultifying all future scientific inquiry into the nature and atomic structure of water, once we arrive at an opinion about that nature. However, this is clearly not the case with [2]. The reason we know that its necessary that water is H20, is because we have good scientific reasons for believing that water is in fact H20 (or, for those who might quibble that "being H20" is a vague predicate; "being relevantly similar to H20"). Of course, we can take a cue from Putnam's Twin Earth and say that its epistemically possible that water is not H20, because its epistemically possible that science may one day reveal that water is not in fact H20, but rather, is some other substance XYZ. In that scenario, we'd discover that water is not necessarily H20. In fact, (and this is the important thing to bear in mind regarding the modality of statements involving natural kinds), in this scenario, we'd discover that water couldn't possibly be H20. So in this context, an important point to keep in mind regarding the views of the New Theorists, is that there is a biconditional relation between natural kind statements and their modalized extensions. -------------------------------------------------------- knowing what is metaphysically possible, however, seems impossible which leaves the above claim (that what is possible is not settled a priori by our modal intuitions) debunked. what is possible concerning water is settled a priori by our modal intuitions. -------------------------------------------------------- It seems fairly clear that some modal truths can be settled by a priori considerations, but I don't think much of a reason has been given to think that all modal truths can be determined in that way. In anycase, its not entirely clear what the extent of your denial is; whether you mean to deny that modal truths of this sort are not determined by a priori considerations, or whether you mean to deny that there are such things as modal truths of this sort. Regards, Augustinian.

Gassendi1
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Posted 05/27/04 - 02:26 PM:	#10
[QUOTE=antijingoist]To respond to such a post is to partake in that which has been decried in other posts ______________________________________ No one can say I didn't try.

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