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A Fair Society
a look at this idea.

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A Fair Society
cortes
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Posted 04/08/08 - 10:32 AM:
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#126
litkey wrote:
Look, there isn't anything special in labelling someone a socialist; if you are going to do so, then I think you should define some words.

I did a couple times at least: a socialist is someone who is disturbed by the unequal distribution of life's circumstances (to use a general phrase) or wealth (to be more particular). That is the core idea of socialism, that inequity is a general problem in need of a solution. Everything else is just a debate about how to solve that supposed problem. Marx had his own ideas. The Fabian socialists had different ideas. Now Rawls has proposed a new idea. Whatever his particular solution, he is motivated by that same core socialist belief.

litkey wrote:
Your "might=right" was in reference to your opinion that: i-Determinism is false ii- An Individuals desire trumps any rights claim. Thus "Might=Right" ...are you now repenting?

This is a nonsequitor. I have argued that "rights" are not real so there is nothing to trump. And it is therfore as absurd to say that "might=right". Might is real. Rights are not. At best they are a social construction, a shared myth. (Speaking primarily here of "natural rights", not rights enforced by law.)

litkey wrote:
although, I think you must be retarded to think determinism is false.

If you believe in determinism then you can't blame me for not believing in it. I didn't have a choice in the matter.

litkey wrote:
You could take a soft-determinism position, although you would still deny the contingency of birth. Did you choose to be born in X country? To be born into X family? The Die was cast a long time ago.

I thought I answered that when I answered my own question: What did you ever do to deserve being born?

I notice that you haven't answered the question. Do you agree with me that nothing you did or can ever do can justtify your existence much less the circumstances of your birth? That every breath you draw is an act of opportunism and a cosmic injustice?

litkey wrote:
Go Ayn Rand. Well, why don't you start a new thread on "selfishness" then we can see where the facts lyeth?

Will do. I actually have a new thread in mind that would subsume this subject.


Edited by cortes on 04/08/08 - 10:57 AM
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Posted 04/08/08 - 10:49 AM:
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#127
Benkei wrote:
I do not treat Rawlsian theory as an arbitrational tribunal. That's your interpretation. Rawls is concerned with moral choices at the original position. The general concept of moral choices as shared in Western society is that impartiality is necessary as proven by how we regulate tribunals and arbitrations which are concerned with the "ultimate" form of a moral choice, namely, a binding decision.

No. Let's recap. You claimed that impartiality is necessary for moral choice. I pointed out that this was a starting assumption behind Rawlsian theory and that no effort had been made to substantiate it as a claim. You then replied that impartiality is required in tribunals for justice and that therefore impartiality is required for justice. I pointed out that that the nature of questions that tribunals answer tells us ahead of time what facts are pertinent and thus it is this which leads to impartialtty with respect to those facts that are not relevant. I then pointed to the institutions that do invent laws, legislatures and voters, who are not impartial but very acutely aware of their self interests.

So you have still not demonstrated your claim that impartiality is necessary for moral choice.

Benkei wrote:
Rawls is not concerned with proof of impartiality as being necessary for a moral choice ...

No, that's why I called it a prejudice. It is a starting assumption or, at best one based on a false analogy.

Benkei wrote:
And also, judges and arbitration tribunals do invent law, they're called precedents. But please, don't let my 15 years of experience in law stand in the way of you thinking I don't know what I am talking about. Moreover, Derrida has firmly shown that even a "simple" judgment is an invention of the law.

Precedents are not binding as any experienced lawyer would know. They do not carry the weight of law. But there is a precedent for judges making law. Read Judges. They got their authority from God. Is Rawls proposing a theocracy?

Benkei wrote:
Funnily enough these partial people are also very partial about being impartial and through debate, looking at it from different perspectives, through altruistic motives, through empathy, through tradition, through law principles such as non-discrimination, universality, political tradition etc. the system as a whole does a pretty good job at eliminating their political-ethico biases, resulting in just and fair laws.

I have no beef with this concept. That is not what we are discussing here though I would not call this impartiality.

Benkei wrote:
I'm certain that most people in society ASSUME that impartiality (I don't but will not go into the discussion about that here as I stated before that it is not necessary to argue Rawls theory) is necessary for a moral decision...

Nope! Far and away more people rely on God (directy or indirectly) for moral decisions. If you want to go by popularity you should look there instead.

But if you want to make a logical case, you need to try again.
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Posted 04/08/08 - 01:27 PM:
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#128
No. Let's recap. You claimed that impartiality is necessary for moral choice.


I claimed that the overlapping consensus in Western society is such that moral choices require impartiality. Note the difference.

I pointed out that this was a starting assumption behind Rawlsian theory and that no effort had been made to substantiate it as a claim.


The reason why there is an overlapping consensus is, as said several times, irrelevant. Whether it is reasoned or an assumption is irrelevant. I only need to show that this overlapping consensus exists and I pointed to impartiality required for tribunals and courts as an example of how society at large requires moral impartiality for these specific types of procedurally regulated moral choices. I never claimed that impartiality is necessary to arrive at a just decision just that our system of law takes it as a basis and the system and tradition considers it necessary as it always argues for impartiality (as can be clearly read in parliamentary discourse).

You then replied that impartiality is required in tribunals for justice and that therefore impartiality is required for justice.


See above.

I pointed out that that the nature of questions that tribunals answer tells us ahead of time what facts are pertinent and thus it is this which leads to impartialtty with respect to those facts that are not relevant.


This sentence doesn't make sense to me. Are you saying that there are laws in place that regulate the proceedings beforehand so that the tribunals operate in an impartial manner? Because that's what I have been saying as well.

We have procedural law to tell the judge or tribunal what facts it may consider and which not to ensure impartiality (such as inadmissable evidence). We have procedural law to ensure the impartiality of judges and arbitrators (a judge is not allowed to have an interest in the case). All these laws were created with the object of ensuring some form of moral impartiality because partiality is believed to lead to unjust decisions. Again, the observation of overlapping consensus is enough; open another thread on the question whether impartiality is necessary for moral choice.

I then pointed to the institutions that do invent laws, legislatures and voters, who are not impartial but very acutely aware of their self interests.


Sure, nevertheless, the worth of impartiality has been expounded in these institutions over and over and over again. Why is this? Because all parties came to the understanding that moral impartiality means no group gets disproportionality fucked over in case the nutcases of the other group out to get them get too much power and it is therefore ultimately in their self-interest to ensure moral impartiality. (which is one explanation why we could value moral impartiality).

So you have still not demonstrated your claim that impartiality is necessary for moral choice.


Which I never claimed, only that I do have reasons to think this is true. I merely claimed that there is overlapping consensus in society that moral impartiality is necessary for a moral choice (just to clarify, moral choice in the sense of morally correct choice.). Whether that's reasoned belief or a simple bias is, once again, irrelevant for the original position. I refer, once again, to the example of the belief of Hernan Cortez as a God. It would be part of an original position for a community with an overlapping consensus that that fact is essential for a concept of justice. It's not about proof at all but about the shared substantive principles as an outcome of an existing political process.

I have no beef with this concept. That is not what we are discussing here though I would not call this impartiality.


See, that's partly why it's impossible to really discuss this matter with you. Rawls specifically considers the elimination of ethico-political bias as moral impartiality. Since you have not read him every word is a source of confusion and makes this discussion really dreary to be honest. At least when we are talking about Rawlsian theory it would be nice if you would make an effort to understand the concepts that he is using even if you disagree with them. It simply facilitates discussion and communication.

Precedents are not binding as any experienced lawyer would know. They do not carry the weight of law. But there is a precedent for judges making law. Read Judges. They got their authority from God. Is Rawls proposing a theocracy?


Strange coming from a person living in a Common Law country (or am I mistaken about your country of origin?).

Let's say that a precedent is not binding. Then every instance that a court renders judgment is an invention of law as the specific techniques of interpretation of the law or powers of the court or application of the law is established again and again. Occasionaly even, precedents get overturned and, yes indeed, new law is actually created by a court as they discard the old and create the new.

And I could take this a step deeper with Derrida but that will just make things more confusing.

In any case, precedents are binding although it could be argued that a court has considerably more freedom to choose whether a particular precedent is applicable in a certain case. This is however not surprising considering that judgments are far more specific than laws and their application in specific instances is naturally less wide.

Nope! Far and away more people rely on God (directy or indirectly) for moral decisions. If you want to go by popularity you should look there instead.


Really? 60% in the Netherlands are more or less religious but only slightly less than 100% thinks moral impartiality is necessary for a moral choice. I see a discrepancy.

I know you'd like to think that any opinion inspired by religion is devoid of reason (which I will let rest) but that doesn't mean they accidentily might be right. It's really just like Ayn Rand, she does say some things that are true, just because of the wrong reasons and based on skewed logic. Are you like her as well that you refute Kant and Rawls by not reading them? Because really, it's quite easy to attack Rawls from several directions and funnily enough you do pick the worst. Maybe read up on some feminist and collectivist literature. Nozick is a good start too.

But that's the big joke about objectivism as it denies human nature and therefore cannot accept any results that humanities studies have reached. The biggest joke is that objectivism is at odds with the evidence of scientific research into human nature and Rawls, accidentaly, is so very close. The irony of how gut-feelings trump "reason" and "logic". grin

But if you want to make a logical case, you need to try again.


If an objectivist is going to be the measure of logic we are in dire straits indeed. It's still a funny remark though.
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Posted 04/08/08 - 05:17 PM:
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#129
Benkei wrote:
I claimed that the overlapping consensus in Western society is such that moral choices require impartiality. Note the difference.

I have better things to do than correct you on this point. If this is your current claim we'll work with it.

Note, however, that there is no concensus in in Western society is such that moral choices require impartiality. And note further that western society is but a small piece of humanity.

Benkei wrote:
I only need to show that this overlapping consensus exists and I pointed to impartiality required for tribunals and courts as an example of how society at large requires moral impartiality for these specific types of procedurally regulated moral choices.

As noted above, this claim is false. But even were it true it would only prove a commonly held belief, like the "overlapping concensus" that the earth was the center of the universe. This being a phillosophy forum one would expect something more than an appleal to popular belief. But if you are going to cite popular belief, maybe you might go to the trouble of providing some supporting opinion surveys.

Benkei wrote:
Are you saying that there are laws in place that regulate the proceedings beforehand so that the tribunals operate in an impartial manner? Because that's what I have been saying as well.

I am saying more than that. I am saying that tribunals are assigned very particular tasks and are handed the law ahead of the task. Knowing the law and nothing about the case one can determine what sorts of information are relevant to applying the law. If, for example, the tribunal is asked to decide if Joe killed Sam, only facts pertinent to that question are relevant and the tribunal is designed to be impartial to all other facts. Knowing the law allows a determination of what facts are relevant and what is irrelevant therefore what sorts of facts the tribunal ought to be impartial to. The law comes before the tribunal and so the tribunal can be structured to serve the law.

That clearly will not work if the law is the subject being ajudicated. That's why you end up with the circularity you did. For example...

Benkei wrote:
We have procedural law to tell the judge or tribunal what facts it may consider and which not to ensure impartiality (such as inadmissable evidence). We have procedural law to ensure the impartiality of judges and arbitrators (a judge is not allowed to have an interest in the case). All these laws were created with the object of ensuring some form of moral impartiality because partiality is believed to lead to unjust decisions. Again, the observation of overlapping consensus is enough; open another thread on the question whether impartiality is necessary for moral choice.

These laws were created by partial legislators and voters, however, not by impartial tribunals. (Indeed, even when judicial systems write their procedures they are far from impartial, they are constructing procedures that are convenient to themselves.) There was no "overlapping concensus", there was a political process e.g. a majority vote elected legislators and a majority of legislators passed a law. In some cases. (e.g. Nazi Germany) a minority may sneak laws into a democracy of a very questionable nature. In other cases (e.g. Communist China) there is not even a democratic process behind the laws.

Benkei wrote:
See, that's partly why it's impossible to really discuss this matter with you. Rawls specifically considers the elimination of ethico-political bias as moral impartiality. Since you have not read him every word is a source of confusion and makes this discussion really dreary to be honest. At least when we are talking about Rawlsian theory it would be nice if you would make an effort to understand the concepts that he is using even if you disagree with them. It simply facilitates discussion and communication.

I very much doubt that's the problem here. Let me be clear, I am not agreeing to Rawls construction in any way.

What I am agreeing with is that people can choose to set aside their self interest and act with empathy. I have not anywhere criticized voluntary acts of kindness, love, or charity. And I am certainly not criticising the pursuit of "win-win" outcomes.

Benkei wrote:
In any case, precedents are binding although it could be argued that a court has considerably more freedom to choose whether a particular precedent is applicable in a certain case. This is however not surprising considering that judgments are far more specific than laws and their application in specific instances is naturally less wide. Occasionaly even, precedents get overturned and, yes indeed, new law is actually created by a court as they discard the old and create the new.

Precedents are never binding as is demonstrated by the fact that they can be changed by the very institutions that created them. All precedent is is a vague expectation of consistent ruling. Just as laws are not binding on the parliament that created them so precedents are not binding on the judges that wrote them.

Moreover, when judges depart too far from the law they begin to usurp the role of the legislature which is the legal equivalent of a coup. Judges often get away with this but it hardly serves as a useful model for the Rawlsian theory of impartiality.

Benkei wrote:
Really? 60% in the Netherlands are more or less religious but only slightly less than 100% thinks moral impartiality is necessary for a moral choice. I see a discrepancy.

Well, if the Netherlands is your world then you live in a small world indeed. But I doubt even in the Netherlands you could get more people to rank judicial impartiality ahead of religion in determining morality.

Benkei wrote:
I know you'd like to think that any opinion inspired by religion is devoid of reason (which I will let rest) but that doesn't mean they accidentily might be right.

You misunderstand me if you think I am claiming that. I am simply pointing out that if you ask people what is the source of their moral beliefs or where morals come from you will get a religious answer about God long before you will get a Rawlsian answer about impartial fantasy worlds.

Benkei wrote:
But that's the big joke about objectivism as it denies human nature and therefore cannot accept any results that humanities studies have reached. The biggest joke is that objectivism is at odds with the evidence of scientific research into human nature and Rawls, accidentaly, is so very close. The irony of how gut-feelings trump "reason" and "logic". If an objectivist is going to be the measure of logic we are in dire straits indeed. It's still a funny remark though.

In fact, that is one among many of my criticisms of Rand. But I am not citing Rand for her correctness and authority but for the existence of people who believe in her philosophy. They defy your claims of concensus acceptance, for whatever popular opinion is worth.
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Posted 04/08/08 - 11:10 PM:
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#130
As noted above, this claim is false. But even were it true it would only prove a commonly held belief, like the "overlapping concensus" that the earth was the center of the universe. This being a phillosophy forum one would expect something more than an appleal to popular belief. But if you are going to cite popular belief, maybe you might go to the trouble of providing some supporting opinion surveys.


No. You state it is false but offer no proof. But go and have a miniature survey and go out in the street and ask people whether they think it is better to have a third party not having a vested interest in making judgments in case of disputes and why. They will answer because the person is impartial and therefore that person will not choose a particular set of self-interests over another (which a dispute is: conflict of interests) simply because he has shared interests.

That does not mean that there are people who would want to make that choice all by themselves so that they reach the best result for themselves but certainly they will start agreeing when we have the powerful government who wants to evict them from their house knocking at their door. They would only be too happy with an impartial third party deciding on whether the eviction is legal.

In any case, for more information read the link I provided earlier.

Well, if the Netherlands is your world then you live in a small world indeed. But I doubt even in the Netherlands you could get more people to rank judicial impartiality ahead of religion in determining morality.


It's one of many communities and the Dutch original position will be different from the US. And you're shifting the argument again. Your claim was that more people rely on God for moral decisions but since only 60% of the people find that God is a necessary concept in their world view but close to 100% considers moral impartiality necessary for just decisions. It says nothing about the SOURCE of prescriptive morality.

As noted above, this claim is false. But even were it true it would only prove a commonly held belief, like the "overlapping concensus" that the earth was the center of the universe. This being a phillosophy forum one would expect something more than an appleal to popular belief. But if you are going to cite popular belief, maybe you might go to the trouble of providing some supporting opinion surveys.


Again, you want that Rawls theory is an epistemological one. It simply isn't and he never intended it to be so. It's a very pragmatic approach to coming to a reasoned solution to perceived social injustices. The framework of biases is already there as the theory is not to be seen apart from the society in which it is applied. Rawls suggests a constant re-evaluation of our concepts of justice when we apply of such concepts in particular instances. It's therefore a theory of reflexive equilibrium. His original position is so highly valued because it is far more sophisticated in reaching moral impartiality than, for instance, the ideal observer but in the final analysis the original position is not the source of concepts of justice but just a means of giving a rational basis for these concepts beyond simple acceptance of tradition or legal positivism.

I have no problem with you disagreeing with Rawls but it would be nice if you would do so for the right reasons. Rawls is simply not a socialist. He only propagates redistribution of wealth when the accumulation of wealth by the rich happens at the detriment of the poor. That might be considered typically socialist and he's attacked voraciously by Nozick on this point, who says that any just transfer of property after the original position is fair and that people should simply beware not to enter into unprofitable business dealings.

Theoretically Nozick sounds very nice but Rawls might say; let's look at a particular situation. Suppose a man becomes sick and needs to buy expensive medicine without being able to work. He even took out health insurance but the health insurance company fucks him over and he ends up paying most of the medicine anyways. He's forced to chose between going to court or buying the medicine as he doesn't have enough money to do both. Subsequently, he has to sell his house after a few years and since it is a forced sale he does not get all the money that it would be worth. In the end he is homeless outside of his own fault. The man didn't deserve it and most people will feel sympathy.

Now, we can say tough luck, that's life, he'll have to depend on charity (and we all know how charitable people are nowadays compared to, for instance, the Middle Ages). Rawls doesn't. If we follow the reflexive equilibrium all the way through, Rawls more or less concludes (I'm paraphrasing awfully here) it is in our self-interest to cover the risk of ourselves potentially winding up in such a position. The method of formulating reasons for this is done through the original position but the reason to start with the exercise is the feeling of sympathy. It's a pragmatic, political justification, debatable and all, not epistemological.

In fact, that is one among many of my criticisms of Rand. But I am not citing Rand for her correctness and authority but for the existence of people who believe in her philosophy. They defy your claims of concensus acceptance, for whatever popular opinion is worth.


Phew. I'm so happy you're not one of them because then arguing would really be useless.

[quote]Precedents are never binding as is demonstrated by the fact that they can be changed by the very institutions that created them. All precedent is is a vague expectation of consistent ruling. Just as laws are not binding on the parliament that created them so precedents are not binding on the judges that wrote them.

Moreover, when judges depart too far from the law they begin to usurp the role of the legislature which is the legal equivalent of a coup. Judges often get away with this but it hardly serves as a useful model for the Rawlsian theory of impartiality.[quote]

They are binding as the institute that created them cannot ignore them without reason (e.g. not apply them to a particular case) and certainly cannot overturn them without a very good reason. But in any case this legal discussion was entirely unrelated to Rawls as it started because you denied that courts and tribunals create law. They do, regardless of whether precedents are binding (in fact, as argued, without precedents, creation of law would be happening in every judgment). However, you seem to agree with that when you say "when judges depart too far from the law they begin to usurp the role of the legislature which is the legal equivalent of a coup".

Oh well, read some Derrida as well: "how not to speak".
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Posted 04/08/08 - 11:12 PM:
quote post
#131
As noted above, this claim is false. But even were it true it would only prove a commonly held belief, like the "overlapping concensus" that the earth was the center of the universe. This being a phillosophy forum one would expect something more than an appleal to popular belief. But if you are going to cite popular belief, maybe you might go to the trouble of providing some supporting opinion surveys.


No. You state it is false but offer no proof. But go and have a miniature survey and go out in the street and ask people whether they think it is better to have a third party not having a vested interest in making judgments in case of disputes and why. They will answer because the person is impartial and therefore that person will not choose a particular set of self-interests over another (which a dispute is: conflict of interests) simply because he has shared interests.

That does not mean that there are people who would want to make that choice all by themselves so that they reach the best result for themselves but certainly they will start agreeing when we have the powerful government who wants to evict them from their house knocking at their door. They would only be too happy with an impartial third party deciding on whether the eviction is legal.

In any case, for more information read the link I provided earlier.

Well, if the Netherlands is your world then you live in a small world indeed. But I doubt even in the Netherlands you could get more people to rank judicial impartiality ahead of religion in determining morality.


It's one of many communities and the Dutch original position will be different from the US. And you're shifting the argument again. Your claim was that more people rely on God for moral decisions but since only 60% of the people find that God is a necessary concept in their world view but close to 100% considers moral impartiality necessary for just decisions. It says nothing about the SOURCE of prescriptive morality.

As noted above, this claim is false. But even were it true it would only prove a commonly held belief, like the "overlapping concensus" that the earth was the center of the universe. This being a phillosophy forum one would expect something more than an appleal to popular belief. But if you are going to cite popular belief, maybe you might go to the trouble of providing some supporting opinion surveys.


Again, you want that Rawls theory is an epistemological one. It simply isn't and he never intended it to be so. It's a very pragmatic approach to coming to a reasoned solution to perceived social injustices. The framework of biases is already there as the theory is not to be seen apart from the society in which it is applied. Rawls suggests a constant re-evaluation of our concepts of justice when we apply of such concepts in particular instances. It's therefore a theory of reflexive equilibrium. His original position is so highly valued because it is far more sophisticated in reaching moral impartiality than, for instance, the ideal observer but in the final analysis the original position is not the source of concepts of justice but just a means of giving a rational basis for these concepts beyond simple acceptance of tradition or legal positivism.

I have no problem with you disagreeing with Rawls but it would be nice if you would do so for the right reasons. Rawls is simply not a socialist. He only propagates redistribution of wealth when the accumulation of wealth by the rich happens at the detriment of the poor. That might be considered typically socialist and he's attacked voraciously by Nozick on this point, who says that any just transfer of property after the original position is fair and that people should simply beware not to enter into unprofitable business dealings.

Theoretically Nozick sounds very nice but Rawls might say; let's look at a particular situation. Suppose a man becomes sick and needs to buy expensive medicine without being able to work. He even took out health insurance but the health insurance company fucks him over and he ends up paying most of the medicine anyways. He's forced to chose between going to court or buying the medicine as he doesn't have enough money to do both. Subsequently, he has to sell his house after a few years and since it is a forced sale he does not get all the money that it would be worth. In the end he is homeless outside of his own fault. The man didn't deserve it and most people will feel sympathy.

Now, we can say tough luck, that's life, he'll have to depend on charity (and we all know how charitable people are nowadays compared to, for instance, the Middle Ages). Rawls doesn't. If we follow the reflexive equilibrium all the way through, Rawls more or less concludes (I'm paraphrasing awfully here) it is in our self-interest to cover the risk of ourselves potentially winding up in such a position. The method of formulating reasons for this is done through the original position but the reason to start with the exercise is the feeling of sympathy. It's a pragmatic, political justification, debatable and all, not epistemological.

In fact, that is one among many of my criticisms of Rand. But I am not citing Rand for her correctness and authority but for the existence of people who believe in her philosophy. They defy your claims of concensus acceptance, for whatever popular opinion is worth.


Phew. I'm so happy you're not one of them because then arguing would really be useless.

[quote]Precedents are never binding as is demonstrated by the fact that they can be changed by the very institutions that created them. All precedent is is a vague expectation of consistent ruling. Just as laws are not binding on the parliament that created them so precedents are not binding on the judges that wrote them.

Moreover, when judges depart too far from the law they begin to usurp the role of the legislature which is the legal equivalent of a coup. Judges often get away with this but it hardly serves as a useful model for the Rawlsian theory of impartiality.[quote]

They are binding as the institute that created them cannot ignore them without reason (e.g. not apply them to a particular case) and certainly cannot overturn them without a very good reason. But in any case this legal discussion was entirely unrelated to Rawls as it started because you denied that courts and tribunals create law. They do, regardless of whether precedents are binding (in fact, as argued, without precedents, creation of law would be happening in every judgment). However, you seem to agree with that when you say "when judges depart too far from the law they begin to usurp the role of the legislature which is the legal equivalent of a coup".

Oh well, read some Derrida as well: "how not to speak".
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Posted 04/09/08 - 08:46 AM:
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#132
Benkei wrote:
But go and have a miniature survey and go out in the street and ask people whether they think it is better to have a third party not having a vested interest in making judgments in case of disputes and why. They will answer because the person is impartial and therefore that person will not choose a particular set of self-interests over another (which a dispute is: conflict of interests) simply because he has shared interests.

Try this, ask people who should run their lives, an impartial judge or themselves in all their partiality? Ask them what is the most important ingredient to a moral choice, belief in correct moral principles (e.g. the ten commandments) or impartiality. Ask people if they prefer a democratic process to create laws or laws from impartial, unelected judges.

What you are overlooking is that most people make a sharp distinction between morality and legality and between law making and judgements under the law. Of these three only the last gives rise to a preference for impartiality.

Notice also, that you are trying to justify impartiality by an appeal to concensus. In other words, you are implicitly admitting that concensus, i.e. approval of those affected, is a more basic value than impariality.

Benkei wrote:
Rawls is simply not a socialist. He only propagates redistribution of wealth when the accumulation of wealth by the rich happens at the detriment of the poor.

Rawls most obviusly is and this is the proof of it. Now you're venturing into utilitariamism. Is a rich man with 100 cows in Bavaria accumulating them to the detriment of a poor person in Bangladesh who is starving to death? By most socialist accounts, any inequity causes suffering for those on the short end. The belief that the rich are the cause of poverty merely by their accumulation of wealth is a socialist one.

Benkei wrote:
Theoretically Nozick sounds very nice but Rawls might say; let's look at a particular situation. Suppose a man becomes sick and needs to buy expensive medicine without being able to work. He even took out health insurance but the health insurance company fucks him over and he ends up paying most of the medicine anyways. He's forced to chose between going to court or buying the medicine as he doesn't have enough money to do both. Subsequently, he has to sell his house after a few years and since it is a forced sale he does not get all the money that it would be worth. In the end he is homeless outside of his own fault. The man didn't deserve it and most people will feel sympathy.

All sorts of bad things happen to people through no fault of their own. And, at the risk of being repetitive, we are not dicussing charity here.

But if everyone got what they deserved we would not exist. That is why I keep asking: What did you ever do to deserve being born?

The poor man in your sob story already has more than he deserved. Nobody cheated him. If he had died during childbirth, through no fault of his own, he would stil have existed for longer than he deserved.

Benkei wrote:
Now, we can say tough luck, that's life, he'll have to depend on charity (and we all know how charitable people are nowadays compared to, for instance, the Middle Ages). Rawls doesn't. If we follow the reflexive equilibrium all the way through, Rawls more or less concludes (I'm paraphrasing awfully here) it is in our self-interest to cover the risk of ourselves potentially winding up in such a position. The method of formulating reasons for this is done through the original position but the reason to start with the exercise is the feeling of sympathy. It's a pragmatic, political justification, debatable and all, not epistemological.

To the extent that it is our self-interest to cover risks we can buy insurance or otherwise form risk spreading associations. Rawls constructs a fantasy world in which we are ignorant of our self knowledge and make bad, but more equal, choices.

Benkei wrote:
They are binding as the institute that created them cannot ignore them without reason (e.g. not apply them to a particular case) and certainly cannot overturn them without a very good reason...But in any case this legal discussion was entirely unrelated to Rawls as it started because you denied that courts and tribunals create law.

It would be more precise to say that whenever a precedent is violated or overturned a reason is given. If a higher court disagrees with that reason it will overrule.

But we have strayed from the point.

The point is that judicial systems are not designed to invent the law but to apply it.
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Makarismos
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Posted 04/10/08 - 03:11 AM:
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#133
Benkei wrote:

Just as it would be sufficient to include Hernan Cortez is a living God as a principle of justice for Aztecs during that time (which is also unreasoned and an assumption but a firm belief about justice) it is sufficient that this principle exists in society as continuously expounded in law, the political arena, everyday opinion etc. It's about overlapping consensus of the main substantive ethico-political doctrines current in a community. If such overlapping consensus cannot be found then an original position is not possible as Rawls states himself.

So you and Rawls must admit, that use of a Rawlsian framework of fairness gives us an idea of what is fair only so long as such an overlapping consensus exists. In other words, fairness is not absolute, and it interpreted differently depending upon which society’s moral norms are considered?

If this is what you, and Rawls are saying, then why bother with the original position at all? It does not establish moral norms as being any more inherently correct, absolute, or binding than they would be if we consider them to be simply what they are – the normative morality of a particular social group. Rawls project certainly seemed to aim to put fairness upon some higher level of proof, to make it somehow seem less arbitrary than mere normative morality.

Do you believe this is Rawls task (to place morality upon an objective, absolute footing)? And do you believe he succeeds in this task? And what are the consequences of your conclusions?

I would suggest that your debate with Cortes is the province of the first two questions. If the consequences of Raws succeeding/failing in this argument do not differ, (and if Rawls does not place morality upon a more absolute footing, or even seek to do so) then perhaps the debate is inconsequential, and you actually agree?

Cheers
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Posted 04/10/08 - 04:35 AM:
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#134
Rawls did not task himself with finding an objective, absolute footing beyond equating justice as fairness. He derives a few liberal principles from the shared concepts of justice that exist in society but admits that without such concensus the framing of the original position is impossible. So, fairness is absolutely necessary for a just society but the particular application of fairness will differ per given community.

As summarised before, the entire exercise of reflexive equilibrium would be as follows:

- We articulate the concept of justice which is widely accepted within a given community.
- We so devise the veil of ignorance that it embodies this concept.
- We consider what implications about concrete and specific matters of justice rational calculators standing in a trustee relation, and hence concerned to advance the eligible interests of their principles, would reach subject to the particular restrictions on their calculations represented by this veil of ignorance.
- We compare these implications with individuals’ considered judgments of justice about these more concrete and specific issues.
- Where there is divergence between implications and judgments, we consider whether individuals might be willing to alter their judgments to bring them into line with principles which, after all, already express their own more abstract views about the concept of justice.
- If there is residual divergence, we modify the veil of ignorance to minimize this divergence.

Rawls concerns himself with the political justification of, for instance, redistribution of wealth, by illustrating that our (Western) concepts of justice and the principles that follow from it as defined in the original position are at odds with strictly procedural approaches to entitlement to property. By applying the original position he shows how the normative morality of a particular social group is regularly inconsistent and his approach is therefore one of pragmatism: instead of shooting from the hip for every moral dillema, he offers the right tools to develop a cogent system of moral rules. The reflexivity of the method is far more important than the actual original position.

What made his original position so "special" is its refinement as opposed to that of ideal observer theories on impartiality. This is probably the only reason why people focus on his original position so much but it's a tool within a wider theory. That, at least, is how I read his work.

Cortes and I disagree so wildly because Cortes cannot accept denying self-knowledge for the purpose of advancing impartiality because his system of ethics is based entirely on self-interest. The moral impartiality devised by the veil of ignorance then is a limitation on knowing your own self-interests and this is clearly at odds with then being able to make moral choices (Cortes, correct me if I misinterpret). I clearly do not believe that self-interest is a basis for an ethical theory and think that moral impartiality is a necessity for moral choices and therefore do not find the veil of ignorance objectionable but indeed a useful tool.
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Glypt
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Posted 04/10/08 - 06:57 AM:
Subject: Rawls theory within liberal typology 		quote post
#135
Understanding Rawlsian theory entails understanding the typology of liberal theory, which consists of a complex matrix of both neutral and non-neutral; perfectionist and anti-perfectionist approaches to liberal understanding.

Rawlsian theory is termed Political Liberalism (PL) within that typology. It is a deontological theory that specifies 'the right' independently from 'the good'. It is to be found within the above matrix at a point that coordinates neutral and anti-perfectionist agendas:

PL is anti-perfectionist because it does not want to appeal for justification from any pre-political ideal of the good (whether such good emerges from religious or secular dogma).

PL is neutral because it doesn't want to allow the state to act on reasons that derive from a particular conception of the good.
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Posted 04/12/08 - 05:10 AM:
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#136
Glypt wrote:
Understanding Rawlsian theory entails understanding the typology of liberal theory, which consists of a complex matrix of both neutral and non-neutral; perfectionist and anti-perfectionist approaches to liberal understanding.

Rawlsian theory is termed Political Liberalism (PL) within that typology. It is a deontological theory that specifies 'the right' independently from 'the good'. It is to be found within the above matrix at a point that coordinates neutral and anti-perfectionist agendas:

PL is anti-perfectionist because it does not want to appeal for justification from any pre-political ideal of the good (whether such good emerges from religious or secular dogma).

PL is neutral because it doesn't want to allow the state to act on reasons that derive from a particular conception of the good.

Is PL not a conception of the good (that society "should" be ordered so as to act on reasons that do not "derive from a particular conception of the good")? Can we question the application of PL without being accused of dogma, or ignorance? If we cannot question it, how does it differ from dogma itself?

If it is not a conception of the good, is PL not neutral as to its own application (i.e. PL would not specify that we should follow it, rather than socialism or fascism)? If it is a conception of the good, is PL not in direct contradiction of itself? Or is there a third way?
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Posted 04/12/08 - 05:52 AM:
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#137
Benkei wrote:
Cortes and I disagree so wildly because Cortes cannot accept denying self-knowledge for the purpose of advancing impartiality because his system of ethics is based entirely on self-interest. The moral impartiality devised by the veil of ignorance then is a limitation on knowing your own self-interests and this is clearly at odds with then being able to make moral choices (Cortes, correct me if I misinterpret). I clearly do not believe that self-interest is a basis for an ethical theory and think that moral impartiality is a necessity for moral choices and therefore do not find the veil of ignorance objectionable but indeed a useful tool.

If I understand correctly, you would advance a Rawlsian framework of thought as one method (and a good method) of arriving at fair choices, given an accepted moral baseline. This framework, for you, is not a good method of providing justification for that baseline. In this respect Rawls makes sense to me: He shows us what we already know to be the case in a clear way. The problems that I perceive only become apparent when such a framework is used to justify the baseline morality itself, as I do not believe that such a baseline is justifiable.

In respect of the discussion that Cortes and yourself are having, it seems that the problem is as follows:

C: Individuals are self interested, there exist no individuals who are not self interested.

B: Moral impartiality is a necessity for moral choices.

C: I can therefore draw the conclusion that moral choices are impossible.

You must deny Cortes first statement in order to deny his conclusion, or else modify your own idea of how to find the correct moral choice. Hope this brings the discussion out of a rut.

Cheers.
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Posted 04/12/08 - 07:02 AM:
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#138
Benkei wrote:
Cortes and I disagree so wildly because Cortes cannot accept denying self-knowledge for the purpose of advancing impartiality because his system of ethics is based entirely on self-interest. The moral impartiality devised by the veil of ignorance then is a limitation on knowing your own self-interests and this is clearly at odds with then being able to make moral choices (Cortes, correct me if I misinterpret). I clearly do not believe that self-interest is a basis for an ethical theory and think that moral impartiality is a necessity for moral choices and therefore do not find the veil of ignorance objectionable but indeed a useful tool.

I think this is a fair summary in terms of the constrast between my moral philosophy and Rawls'. I do not believe that self-interest is inherently immoral and thus seek no means to avoid it. On the contrary, I agree with Rand that morality must begin (but not end) with the self. This is a fundamental point of disagreement between us.

Makarismos wrote:
If I understand correctly, you would advance a Rawlsian framework of thought as one method (and a good method) of arriving at fair choices, given an accepted moral baseline. This framework, for you, is not a good method of providing justification for that baseline. In this respect Rawls makes sense to me: He shows us what we already know to be the case in a clear way. The problems that I perceive only become apparent when such a framework is used to justify the baseline morality itself, as I do not believe that such a baseline is justifiable.

You are absolutely correct here. I noted very early on with Litkey (here or in another similar thread, our discussions have ranged over three or so), that the nature of reason is that it always begins with unproven and unprovable assumptions (postulates). If two people begin with different assumptions then they may come to different conclusions even if their reasoning between is entirely correct. Often disagreements boil down to different assumptions, not necessrily stupidity.

Makarismos wrote:
In respect of the discussion that Cortes and yourself are having, it seems that the problem is as follows:

C: Individuals are self interested, there exist no individuals who are not self interested.

B: Moral impartiality is a necessity for moral choices.

C: I can therefore draw the conclusion that moral choices are impossible.

I must take issue with this summary, however.

I am not merely claiming the first above, that individuals are self-interested. I am claiming that individuals ought to be self-interested. That self-interest is a morally correct choice.

The first thing that I teach my children is to take care of themselves. Only when I am confident that they have mastered that level of competence will I begin to teach them to think about others around them, particularly those they love.

The first is aided, obviously, by the natural human inclination to care for oneself but that does not invalidate the moral dimension.

However, I would agree with you that a morality that relies on denying self-interest is self-destructive. We see this at work in the world around us. The ultimate act of unselfishness is to promote the morality of your enemy and to do his work. There seem many who are only too happy to promote this inane idea.
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Posted 04/12/08 - 01:49 PM:
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#139
Makarismos wrote:

Is PL not a conception of the good (that society "should" be ordered so as to act on reasons that do not "derive from a particular conception of the good")? Can we question the application of PL without being accused of dogma, or ignorance? If we cannot question it, how does it differ from dogma itself?

If it is not a conception of the good, is PL not neutral as to its own application (i.e. PL would not specify that we should follow it, rather than socialism or fascism)? If it is a conception of the good, is PL not in direct contradiction of itself? Or is there a third way?


Political Liberalism…surprisingly enough…is a pre-political theory not a societal theory.

Political theories, such as these do not prescribe what you should do but rather attempt to allow plurality to coexist under the law. Clearly there are certain doctrines that are totally incompatible with such tolerance and such doctrines are those that serve to stop plurality coexisting. In that sense, given such tolerance, there is an assumption of liberalism that Rawls makes clear at the outset. Hence 'POLITICAL' and hence 'LIBERALISM', (the clue is subtly hidden in the title...ie. not SOCIAL BIGOTRY...not SOCIAL INTOLERANCE...etc).

It would be perverse to object to the liberal content in such an expression of neutral and ant-perfectionist intent which constitute the deliberations of pre-political theories of justice. Such a complaint would amount to a criticism of attempting to be fair.

PL need not be morally neutral in the sense of seeking justice so that it can remain neutral regarding 'the good', that would not only be perverse but incoherent. Thereby a liberal political theory differentiates between 'the right' and 'the good'.


Implicit in the priority of 'right' is the idea that justice limits of licit social behaviour. Therefore the claims of citizens to break those limits have no legitimate force. Rawls stresses that unless institutions and the lawful behaviour of citizens allowed and sustained room for diverse lifestyles that could be fully supported, there would be no point. The right and the good compliment one another. "In a phrase: justice draws the limit, the good shows the point."

And yes there are many 'third ways', Rawls theory is always being adjusted and adapted. I must hasten to add these are usually compiled by people who have actually read his books and not just his initial theory of justice (too many people miss the detail by merely scanning secondary reading and all too often these couch biased interpretations), but also the adjustments Rawls has made himself. In the book 'Political Liberalism' he includes a reply to his most telling critic Habermas, but both subscribe to the cooriginality of private and public will. Authors such as Parkinson, Dryzek, and I.M. Young have also made some dents in his armour. The ongoing debate remains in research that seeks for the means by which justice and legitimacy is reconciled


Edited by Glypt on 04/12/08 - 02:03 PM
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Posted 04/13/08 - 04:23 PM:
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#140
Glypt wrote:

Political theories, such as these do not prescribe what you should do but rather attempt to allow plurality to coexist under the law. Clearly there are certain doctrines that are totally incompatible with such tolerance and such doctrines are those that serve to stop plurality coexisting. In that sense, given such tolerance, there is an assumption of liberalism that Rawls makes clear at the outset. Hence 'POLITICAL' and hence 'LIBERALISM', (the clue is subtly hidden in the title...ie. not SOCIAL BIGOTRY...not SOCIAL INTOLERANCE...etc).

If political Liberalism's only goal is to allow plurality, then this seems a strange goal. It does not aim to maximise happiness, wealth, life expectancy, longevity of social order, or warcraft - only plurality. Why should we desire plurality?

It would be perverse to object to the liberal content in such an expression of neutral and ant-perfectionist intent which constitute the deliberations of pre-political theories of justice. Such a complaint would amount to a criticism of attempting to be fair.

The term "fair" is clearly loaded. We all accept that we want society to be fair, and yet we are capable of differing over what constitutes a fair course of action in a given situation. Should the Native Americans be given back their former land? Is it fair to prevent a drug addict from using their drug of choice? Given this, why does dismissing plurality as the basis of "fairness" seem incorrect? Again, why does human society require plurality?

PL need not be morally neutral in the sense of seeking justice so that it can remain neutral regarding 'the good', that would not only be perverse but incoherent. Thereby a liberal political theory differentiates between 'the right' and 'the good'.

I think I understand:- does ‘the good‘ equal the protection and maximisation of plurality? I am not sure what you mean by 'the right', please explain.

Implicit in the priority of 'right' is the idea that justice limits of licit social behaviour. Therefore the claims of citizens to break those limits have no legitimate force. Rawls stresses that unless institutions and the lawful behaviour of citizens allowed and sustained room for diverse lifestyles that could be fully supported, there would be no point. The right and the good compliment one another. "In a phrase: justice draws the limit, the good shows the point."

But why is it that society should strive to make room for "diverse lifestyles"? Diversity, I stress, seems a strange goal indeed, and perhaps an undesirable one in and of itself. It seems to be raised above all others in Rawlian philosophy - though I admit I have mainly read secondary works - perhaps you can explain this more clearly?

And yes there are many 'third ways', Rawls theory is always being adjusted and adapted. I must hasten to add these are usually compiled by people who have actually read his books and not just his initial theory of justice (too many people miss the detail by merely scanning secondary reading and all too often these couch biased interpretations), but also the adjustments Rawls has made himself. In the book 'Political Liberalism' he includes a reply to his most telling critic Habermas, but both subscribe to the cooriginality of private and public will. Authors such as Parkinson, Dryzek, and I.M. Young have also made some dents in his armour. The ongoing debate remains in research that seeks for the means by which justice and legitimacy is reconciled

It seems that the third way is to say that "the good" is best understood in terms of the maximisation of diversity and choice, in a way that does not hinder this. As an expert on his works, perhaps you could tell me: How did Rawls arrive at this conclusion? It seems that Rawls theory suffers (as you indeed say) from a problem of legitimisation, and that its application is thereby limited. It seems that it is quite consistent to question the idea that fairness should be equal to the maximisation of diversity. Please, if i am mistaken in any of this, explain to me what I missed.
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Posted 04/14/08 - 02:26 AM:
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#141
Makarismos wrote:

If political Liberalism's only goal is to allow plurality…


There are no goals in political liberalism… it is concerned with hypothesising the principles of justice, within which a society is free to express such things as personal and public aspirations. Which by necessaity entails a host of different secular and religious ideological perspectives.

Makarismos wrote:

The term "fair" is clearly loaded. We all accept that we want society to be fair, and yet we are capable of differing over what constitutes a fair course of action in a given situation. Should the Native Americans be given back their former land? Is it fair to prevent a drug addict from using their drug of choice?


These various issues are raised as 'public reasons' in society and tackled juridically under the principles of justice convened in the constitutions and statutory structures of the law. The aforementioned being adjusted upon an ongoing "reflective equilibrium"…read the first line of my last message…" PL…[ ]…is …not a societal theory." IOW it does not prescribe what constutes justice in society.
Makarismos wrote:
… Again, why does human society require plurality?


On the whole, western civilisations are plural, I'm sure you would not suggest we need a monistic view to be imposed where plurality obtains. The reasons being as follows:

Each person has a unique perspect…as I've previously stated we are perspectival centres…this means we have unique information about the notion of 'the truth' and reasoned arguments regarding 'the good life'. People of a like mind may form a common agreement in those areas that they have in common… their interests, their metaphysical or secular beliefs etc. Therefore, there will obtain areas of agreement (an overlapping consensus about some primary goods) and disagreement (matters of ideological detail as to what is good, as noted above).

Diverse claims to truth regarding what constitutes 'the good life' or what is 'a good way of life' obtain at any given time: For some 'the good' is gathering extreme wealth, for others it is religion and spirituality, and for others it is the search for a hedonistic or self-serving utopia. This state of affairs reveal an aspect of the human condition … we are 'fallible'.

The sustainability of such diverse/plural projects protects us from any 'final solution' that tries to ignore the principles of fallibility without winning a fairly arbitrated argument in public reason.

Sustaining neutral and anti-perfectionist political principles protect us from the monism of those lunatics hell bent on imposing a single view…the champions of non-pluralism as witnessed in Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot etc.

Accepting the possibility that, in each other, anyone of us may contain insight to humanity's search for universalising principles as to 'the truth' entails that we respect each perspectival centre of a life as having an independent moral status. It follows from this that we also have a vested interest in a principle of political fraternity or citizenship, which gives equal opportunities for diverse opinion to be represented in public reasoning. Various things can disenfranchise people in that regard, not least poverty and marginalisation based upon gender, race, sexual orientation, religious conviction, age, etc

That liberal thought has fallibilistic awareness entails that it must acknowledge its own fallibility and seek to preserve the right to hold and express pluralistic convictions, regarding the truth about how we might live irrespective of the happenstance of our predicaments in this world. To express each of our truths entails equal political opportunities, all can benefit from such primary interests.

Thus, it is for these reasons that political liberalism, must be freestanding ( ie. political) and cannot depend upon or presuppose any single ideological truth but instead support cooperation in such epistemic projects in society (Rawls, PL, 376).

Rawls's freestanding theory provides the means for public deliberation in the widest sense: justification, in the four procedural stages that he also outlines, allows for an ongoing project of revision. This is because a just consensus, a legitimate agreement, that overlaps the principles of justice, obtains once private reflections achieve equilibrium in public reason.

In short Rawls hypothesises a priori upon politically freestanding notions, he does not pronounce upon social goods such as immanent justice, just in the world, but the political means by which such justice can be argued in public reason under certain transcendent principles.

His most effective critic, Jurgen Habermas, in fact does not complain about Rawls's conclusions but with his a priori methodology that relies so much upon Kant. Habermas in fact would come to similar conclusions using Kant but also through Hegel. I'll post more about Habermas's Discourse Theories when it appears more people have grasped Rawlsian deontological stance.


Edited by Glypt on 04/14/08 - 02:42 AM
litkey
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Posted 04/14/08 - 04:53 AM:
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#142
The truth is that we all have an inkling as to what constitutes the good life, this may vary from person to person, but the essential things in life make people happy - when people ignore this in others it causes unrest, anger, and sometimes violence ... Indeed.

Imagine a 'society' miles from us, but easily accessable - we learn that they are running short of food, this is causing problems for them; we have food, infact, we have surplus - is there a duty to assist?

Isn't food something we all need?
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Makarismos
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Posted 04/15/08 - 04:19 AM:
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#143
The op raised some questions:-
litkey wrote:

If you are a right wing demi-god, and were asked: Would you live in a society where 2% held 90% of the wealth, and sweatshops were prevalent - would you say "Yes" to this form of society, or would you think again, as you may end up in the sweatshop?


Now, I understand this as a hypothetical question, asked in order to demonstraight how the original position can be used to find the proper constitution of socioty: to find a fair society. Glypt has since said:-

Glypt wrote:

In short Rawls hypothesises a priori upon politically freestanding notions, he does not pronounce upon social goods such as immanent justice, just in the world, but the political means by which such justice can be argued in public reason under certain transcendent principles.


Does this not mean that Rawls is silent on the question of how to find a fair society? As this is the question this thread seeks to answer, is Rawls perhaps the wrong philosopher to be discussing?
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Posted 04/15/08 - 06:20 AM:
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#144
Makarismos wrote:
Does this not mean that Rawls is silent on the question of how to find a fair society?


No. While political and social justice must not be redicible one to the other... to retain validity... they are firmly held in an inter-dependent and a reflexive relation that is crucial to theories of justice...social and political
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Posted 04/15/08 - 06:26 AM:
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Rawls is working with a pre-existing concept of Justice (mainly from the history of Natural Justice/Rights/Enlightenment...) when speaking of the fair society - in his book he mentions real societies that have witnessed unfairness, and goes on to say that the collective knowledge is such that we all (collectively) nod our heads (as if it were mothers milk) and say "this was an unfair society." ie., Individuals aren't at the original position with no notions of what tyranny means, of pain, of corruption: what knowledge we are unaware of is our Individual Interests, our religion, race, our wealth etc., and Rawls wants to say, that if we are unaware of our religion, it would be a non-sense (or Retarded: see Cortes) to say "give me the society where religion is outlawed."shocked
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Posted 04/19/08 - 02:13 AM:
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#146
Glypt wrote:


No. While political and social justice must not be reducible one to the other... to retain validity... they are firmly held in an inter-dependent and a reflexive relation that is crucial to theories of justice...social and political

Ok, I rather thought you were just typing words to fill space, and surely this shows it clearly. You seem to be saying that political justice is separate and distinct from social justice. That the social realm and the political have different measures of justice, and that these - though inter-dependant - are necessarily interlinked if we are to understand/theorise about justice at all.

This does not come anywhere close to commenting on the passage you quoted from me:-

me wrote:

Does this not mean that Rawls is silent on the question of how to find a fair society?

It seems to me that Rawls cannot use his theoretical framework to describe a way of finding what is just or fair, unless we already know what is just and fair. You have indeed said so much. He advocates pluralaty, and therefore liberalism - but only because these allow freedom of expression and action. Perhaps not even because of these things: Rawls theory is neutral after all, so presumably does not require us to do anything. According to you he only insists on plurality because it is ipso-facto fair - but you give no reasons for this fairness. My question to you is this:-

Is it unfair to force a Rawlsian inspired liberal democracy upon a monarchical society?. For the purposes of this thought experiment, let us assume that the majority of the population worship the leader (perhaps it is Cortes!?) and do not themselves favour a democratic, or liberal state. From what you have said so far, It would follow that you agree that forcing the population to comply with an undesired path would not be fair - but I suspect that you would still want to force the population to conform to a liberal democracy, due to such a governments essential fairness? Your thoughts?


Edited by Makarismos on 04/19/08 - 05:20 AM
Makarismos
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Posted 04/19/08 - 02:25 AM:
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litkey wrote:
Rawls is working with a pre-existing concept of Justice (mainly from the history of Natural Justice/Rights/Enlightenment...) when speaking of the fair society - in his book he mentions real societies that have witnessed unfairness, and goes on to say that the collective knowledge is such that we all (collectively) nod our heads (as if it were mothers milk) and say "this was an unfair society." ie., Individuals aren't at the original position with no notions of what tyranny means, of pain, of corruption: what knowledge we are unaware of is our Individual Interests, our religion, race, our wealth etc., and Rawls wants to say, that if we are unaware of our religion, it would be a non-sense (or Retarded: see Cortes) to say "give me the society where religion is outlawed."shocked

So Rawls shows that, given a knowledge of the world, but a lack of knowledge of the individual who you are, you would chose the set of social conditions which are most fair. Essentialy if we remove our memory our self intrest will ensure that we make fair choices when we consider how the socioty should be organised.

But what if our knowledge of the world included the belief that all wealth should be shared out equally - this is not knowledge about an individual, rather a belief. We have similar beliefs: that social decisions should be made democratically, that individuals should be free to possess property beyond the intervention of the state, that speech should be free so long as it does not at that moment threaten to cause harm. Why are we aloud these beliefs, and not the belief that wealth should be equally shared? What is the difference?

for simplicity we could contrast two (seemingly) incompatible beliefs, and I guess as the resident experts you can tell me what Rawls would say as to why they should or should not be taken in to account:-

1) Wealth should be distributed evenly between all of mankind.
2) mankind should be able to individually possess property, and increase his/her wealth.


Edited by Makarismos on 04/19/08 - 05:21 AM
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Posted 04/19/08 - 06:07 AM:
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Makarismos wrote:
for simplicity we could contrast two (seemingly) incompatible beliefs, and I guess as the resident experts you can tell me what Rawls would say as to why they should or should not be taken in to account:-

1) Wealth should be distributed evenly between all of mankind.
2) mankind should be able to individually possess property, and increase his/her wealth.


I'd like to sugget a starker, clearer contrast:
1) People ought to pursue a (somehow) shared goal of fairness and justice and let individuals find their place within this
2) People ought to pursue their own individual values and work out their differences as necessary

My (2) includes your (2) though people pursuing their own values might just as easiliy give everything to charity.

My (1) includes both traditional socialism and the Rawlsian variety.

Now the important thing to note is that people will not agree on these. Some will advocate (1) and others, like me, (2). But what is most interesting about (2) is that it doesn't require any agreement beforehand as does (1). I can follow (2) all by myself and deal with those who follow (1) as a necessary working out of differences along the way.

In fact, we might say that pretty much everyone is following (2) but that there are some, such as Marx and Rawls who want people to switch to (1). You could say that even they are following (2) in trying to get people to switch to (1) though they would never admit it.

Another way to consider this question is to ask what is the ROI (return on investment) in trying to create a more fair and just world. It seems to be very low indeed as compared to other choices. Of course, if your sole measure is equitable distribution of goods and services then only equality will suffice. But by every other measure that I can imagine (even by the standard of living of the poor) fairness and justice just don't accomplish anything.
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Posted 04/19/08 - 06:43 AM:
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cortes wrote:

I'd like to sugget a starker, clearer contrast:
1) People ought to pursue a (somehow) shared goal of fairness and justice and let individuals find their place within this
2) People ought to pursue their own individual values and work out their differences as necessary

My (2) includes your (2) though people pursuing their own values might just as easiliy give everything to charity.

My (1) includes both traditional socialism and the Rawlsian variety.

I agree, this is a much starker choice, and my thanks for your clarification as to why, it makes the debate upon this point rather more precise.

In fact, we might say that pretty much everyone is following (2) but that there are some, such as Marx and Rawls who want people to switch to (1). You could say that even they are following (2) in trying to get people to switch to (1) though they would never admit it.

I see your point, though my knowledge of Rawls suggests he would not support either of our point#1. It seems that he wishes to place liberal democracy on some surer footing, provide some logical basis of why it is we should live as we do. He attempts to counter the problem of democracy: what if it is unwanted?

Another way to consider this question is to ask what is the ROI (return on investment) in trying to create a more fair and just world. It seems to be very low indeed as compared to other choices. Of course, if your sole measure is equitable distribution of goods and services then only equality will suffice. But by every other measure that I can imagine (even by the standard of living of the poor) fairness and justice just don't accomplish anything.

Perhaps it would still be possible to justify the utility of a fair and just society merely by the collective wants of that society. I agree the species could be far more efficient if mankind were more rigidly organised, and that surely the advantage of a rigid social order, coupled with good leadership, would bring extraordinary productive efficiency, and resilience of society. It would of course do this at the expense of personal liberty.

However if mankind wants anything from life, other than security and longevity, then should we take this in to account? I feel we should.

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Posted 04/19/08 - 07:35 AM:
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Makarismos wrote:
I see your point, though my knowledge of Rawls suggests he would not support either of our point#1. It seems that he wishes to place liberal democracy on some surer footing, provide some logical basis of why it is we should live as we do. He attempts to counter the problem of democracy: what if it is unwanted?

I meant (1) in the most general sense. Clearly Rawls has a more precise notion of fairnes and justice in mind. But I think it is fair to say that the whole point of his exercise is to arrive at a shared concept of fairness and justice (albeit one that requires a lobotomy) before individual goals are taken into account. So I think my (1) includes Rawls but, of course, Rawls implies something far more precise in terms of fairnes and justice.

Makarismos wrote:
Perhaps it would still be possible to justify the utility of a fair and just society merely by the collective wants of that society. I agree the species could be far more efficient if mankind were more rigidly organised, and that surely the advantage of a rigid social order, coupled with good leadership, would bring extraordinary productive efficiency, and resilience of society. It would of course do this at the expense of personal liberty.

This is a notion that is as old as time but is simply not supported by evidence. The reason is that progress, at some point, always requires restructuring and that this restructuring always requires overturning the old regime. This is true in science as well as politics. The more rigid the society the less adaptable it is. Progress requires innovation which requires freedom.

The early communists really believed that communism was going to bury capitalism. The Nazis thought the same.

What a rigid social order brings is efficiency in a particular task. Think about a production line that is rigidly structure to maximize the efficiency of turning out Model T Fords. The virtue of a looser order is to allow for new models or new products to be created.

Makarismos wrote:
However if mankind wants anything from life, other than security and longevity, then should we take this in to account? I feel we should.

It does seem obvious, though, that some rules add value even if they are not eternal.

But this is what I meant by working out differences. If you and I were trapped together on a desert island we might agree not to kill each other and even to cooperate in finding food and signaling for help.

To really understand what I am talking about here, remember that, contrary to what Glypt et alia believe, you are not a member of a single mass of "society" across time and space but of many societies from your family to your school or company to your city to your country to your relgion to humankind. Each of these may work out their own rules and you decide when and how to participate in each and how to resolve the conflicts among them.
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