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In Defense of Objective Morality

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In Defense of Objective Morality

Yahadreas
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 11/03/09 - 09:35 AM:	#11
A quick extension on the above: a thing is called a hat if we wear it on our head. A thing is called immoral if it harms. You're more than welcome to use the words "hat" or "immoral" differently, but you can't deny that that is being worn on one's head, and that that harms. People place to much importance on the name and not enough on the underlying meaning. Which is where moral disputes often arise. They think the name "immoral" is something special. Something more than just a name. It would be like trying to argue for the real meaning of "hat".
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Wolfman
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Posted 11/03/09 - 12:06 PM:	#12
The first part of this post is addressed to no one in particular. Let me make it clear that I am not asserting any special moral properties or independently existing moral facts. I am not proposing traditional moral naturalism or Kantian deontology. Nor am I positing any absolute moral imperatives. I am very aware of the arguments of moral skeptics (I used to argue for them). So what am I doing exactly? Right now all I am doing is explicating a basis for normativity. That’s all. Let’s take this one step at a time as to avoid strawman philosophy. Ciceronianus mentioned that ethics is not a sort of set of established principles to be applied in each situation. This is a statement with which I agree. I am a proponent of a sort of eudaimonism (and pluralism moreover), similar in structure to Aristotelian virtue ethics. I am not concerned with trying to establish any absolute procedural imperatives. At any rate, I think we have to clear the cobwebs and make sure we’re all on the same page before we proceed any further. Yahadreas wrote: The only "problem" is when people insist on trying to find a moral proposition that is as true as "1 + 1 = 2" or "E = mc^2". I wouldn't even understand what was even meant by such a proposition. Would seem like trying to find a mathematical formula which shows that hats are to be worn on one's head. Complete and utter nonsense. This is good. Moral skepticism, e.g., nihilism, subjectivism, emotivism, non-cognitivism, I think, is warranted when certain epistemological considerations are taken into account. I am agreed with you here. But the next question is: so now what? We can continue to engage in mere intellectual play, or we can extend our reasoning to the realm of the practical. This is an extremely rushed post (I have somewhere to be), but given the number of responses in a short amount of time, I felt the urge to offer some kind of response. Will be back later.
"That which is done out of love is always beyond good and evil" - Nietzsche "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." - Aristotle "It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu "Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is mere intellectual play." - Kant

Wosret
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Posted 11/03/09 - 12:58 PM:	#13
I don't strictly disagree, as you have repeatedly qualified your position away from implying a prescription to accept whatever it may conclude. I assume that this is simply forgone for the presumption that it being objective will be enough for plenty of people. However, what you can do is describe to me facts, and information about reality, as it presents itself in the world, in the form of behaviorism, psychology, neurology, and so on -- but this doesn't mean that just accepting, as best, whatever is normatively the case is justified. There is no reason that one couldn't take the position that such a morality, would be a an inelegant morality of the masses, or some such, and attempt to formulate, or use morality to greater ends. Innovation is not an unknown concept to humanity, after all. I don't see any problems with considering the information that you presented about objective morality, true, justified, and interesting -- but in no way conform any of my moral views to suit it.
"If you've got any last words, say 'em now." - Nadie. "I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

brainpharte
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Posted 11/03/09 - 03:04 PM:	#14
Wolfman wrote: Nagel would say that the problem is to discover the form which reasons for actions take, and whether it can be described from no particular point of view. I thought Nagel's point is that the view from nowhere is incoherent? The method is to begin with the reasons that appear to obtain from our own point of view and those of other individuals, and ask what the best perspectiveless account of those reasons is. What is a "perspectiveless account", and by what possible criteria do we judge which such account is best without those criteria invoking yet other criteria in a regress or circularity? In this respect, morality is concerned with practical reasoning, i.e., having reasons to act and acting in light of those reasons. Practical reasoning apart from a moral dimension typically is about how to achieve some desired end. What would constitute the definitively moral dimension of such reasonings? In what way would these allegedly moral constraints and desired moral ends be different from any other constraints and desired ends?
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

Wolfman
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Posted 11/03/09 - 03:32 PM:	#15
Brainpharte (and the Nagel passage is partially relevant for Wosret too), Right now I am only asserting that there is a logical basis on which the objectivity of normativity is grounded. I am trying to facilitate a discussion aimed at showing why both extreme objectivity and extreme subjectivity are incoherent. I am aware that Nagel finds a view from nowhere problematic. Consider the following passage from his book of the same name: "It seems that objectivity has no place in this domain except what is inherited from the objectivity of theoretical and factual elements that play a role in practical reasoning. Beyond that it applies here with a nihilistic result: nothing is objectively right and wrong, they must rest on a subjective foundation. The assumption is surreptitious, but natural. Values can seem really to disappear when we step outside of our skins, so that it strikes us as philosophical perception that they are illusory. This is a characteristic Humean step: we observe the phenomenon of people acting for what they take to be reasons, and all we see (compare Hume’s treatment of causality) are certain natural facts: that people are influenced by certain motives, or would be if they knew certain things. We are continually tempted to reoccupy Hume’s position by the difficulties we encounter when we try to leave it. Skepticism, Platonism, reductionism, and other familiar philosophical excesses all make their appearance in ethical theory. Particularly attractive is the reaction to skepticism which reinterprets the whole field, ethics included, in completely subjective terms. Like phenomenalism in epistemology, this conceals the retreat from realism by substituting a set of judgments that in some way resemble the originals. The only way to resist Humean subjectivism about desires and reasons for action is to seek a form of objectivity appropriate to the subject. This will not be the objectivity of naturalistic psychology. It must be argued that an objective view limited to such observations is not correct. Or rather, not necessarily correct, for the point is that an objective view of ourselves should leave room for the apprehension of reasons – should not exclude them in advance."
"That which is done out of love is always beyond good and evil" - Nietzsche "Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim." - Aristotle "It is better to do one's own duty, however defective it may be, than to follow the duty of another, however well one may perform it. He who does his duty as his own nature reveals it, never sins." - Lao Tzu "Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is mere intellectual play." - Kant

Wosret
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Posted 11/03/09 - 04:02 PM:	#16
I do understand what you say, and I do very much desire to escape my position on this, but a way of doing so eludes me. I see you offering what sort of thing this could be, but that isn't the same as offering it. If all you mean to say is that extreme objectivism, and extreme subjectivism are incoherent, then I don't disagree.
"If you've got any last words, say 'em now." - Nadie. "I am Horo the Wise." - Horo the Wise.

ciceronianus
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Posted 11/03/09 - 05:14 PM:	#17
Wolfman wrote: Ciceronianus mentioned that ethics is not a sort of set of established principles to be applied in each situation. This is a statement with which I agree. I am a proponent of a sort of eudaimonism (and pluralism moreover), similar in structure to Aristotelian virtue ethics. I am not concerned with trying to establish any absolute procedural imperatives. It strikes me that certain of the ancient thinkers (like Aristotle) approached ethics in a far more practical, which is to say useful, manner than many do now, or have since. Obviously I have a fondness for Cicero, so may not be the most objective judge of his work (although I acknowledge his many faults) but his On Duties (or Obligations) strikes me as a laudable effort to explore practical ethics--using intelligence to determine what is the appropriate value judgment in the conduct of life. I think Dewey was concerned with this also, but did not bind himself to any particular highest good. The focus is on a particular situation or problem, a thoughtful determination of a preferred result in the circumstances, and a determination of the means by which that result is achieved.
"Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts."--C.S. Peirce "There is nothing so absurd but some philosopher has said it."--Marcus Tullius Cicero "Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men."--John Dewey

reincarnated
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Posted 11/04/09 - 09:53 AM:	#18
Wolfman wrote: The answer to the question of whether morality is objective depends on whether we can step back from our own subjective standpoint and adopt a broader perspective. If we can do this, then we have a starting place. The question imho is not whether morality IS objective (its clearly not), its whether morality ever COULD BE objective. Wolfman wrote: Our aim would be to reorder our motives in such a way that is acceptable from an external standpoint. An external standpoint is not necessarily an objective standpoint. Wolfman wrote: There are a series of steps which we can take to improve the way we lead our lives. Nagel would say that the problem is to discover the form which reasons for actions take, and whether it can be described from no particular point of view. The method is to begin with the reasons that appear to obtain from our own point of view and those of other individuals, and ask what the best perspectiveless account of those reasons is. Is there such a thing as a perspectiveless account of morality?
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Posted 11/05/09 - 01:05 AM:	#19
Yahadreas wrote: A quick extension on the above: a thing is called a hat if we wear it on our head. A thing is called immoral if it harms. You're more than welcome to use the words "hat" or "immoral" differently, but you can't deny that that is being worn on one's head, and that that harms. People place to much importance on the name and not enough on the underlying meaning. Which is where moral disputes often arise. They think the name "immoral" is something special. Something more than just a name. It would be like trying to argue for the real meaning of "hat". But I suppose it could be argued that there is a real (i.e. correct) meaning of the word "hat", because the fact that I'm wearing a hat is not altered by my referring to it as "trousers". So someone may argue that what is harmful may not necessarily be immoral; and that whilst we cannot define harmfulness out of existence (as you say) equally we cannot make an action either moral or immoral by definition. A thing may be called immoral if it harms. But it's still open to us to ask: is that thing immoral or not? Just as I may call the thing on my head "trousers" and I may even persuade everyone else to do the same - but it's still legitimate to ask whether I'm wearing trousers or a hat on my head. (See Moore's 'open question' argument.)

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Posted 11/05/09 - 06:26 AM:	#20
Yahadreas wrote: a thing is called a hat if we wear it on our head. A thing is called immoral if it harms. You're more than welcome to use the words "hat" or "immoral" differently, but you can't deny that that is being worn on one's head, and that that harms. A wig is not a hat, but is worn on the head. A hurricane is not immoral, but it harms. Immoral simply means "inconsistent with good morals", and morality is simply the distinction between good actions and bad actions, or between right actions and wrong actions. The problem is that there is no universal objective definition of what is good and what is bad, and of what is right and what is wrong.
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

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