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Free Will - A Thought Experiment
a challenge to those who believe in free will

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Free Will - A Thought Experiment

Wise Sage
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Posted 11/06/09 - 10:19 AM:	#61
Of course there is no freewill. How else would you question it?

aletheist
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Posted 11/06/09 - 12:04 PM:	#62
reincarnated wrote: A clever answer, which avoids the "trap" referred to by swsthephe. You say “almost certainly”? But why not “certainly”? As a metaphysical libertarian, I believe that I could do otherwise, so I must allow for the possibility that I would do otherwise, even if I consider it to be unlikely. Besides, this is a philosophy forum; do I really have to justify my reluctance to say that something is "certain"? reincarnated wrote: Can you give an example of a case where you would NOT have made the same decision the second time round (and if so, why)? If you cannot give an example, could you perhaps explain why you are unable to give an example? I cannot give an example, because I have no reason to think that I would do otherwise; but again, this in no way entails that I could not do otherwise. The problem with the thought experiment is that it has to do with the past, which everyone agrees is fixed (i.e., determined). The question at issue is whether the same is true of the present and future. reincarnated wrote: Oh, I agree there is no inconsistency. It is indeed possible that there are genuinely random factors in our decision making (the world may in fact be indeterministic at the quantum level), in which case one could indeed do otherwise (but not from intentionality, simply from caprice). But of course, "genuinely random factors" would not be enough to support metaphysical libertarianism. When we say that we can do otherwise, we mean that we can choose to do otherwise; we are not completely constrained by antecedent conditions, whether deterministic or random. reincarnated wrote: Its also instructive to note that the fact that you (probably) would not have done otherwise does not entail that you COULD have done otherwise. I agree--in fact, the thought experiment does not actually entail anything about whether humans have libertarian free will. reincarnated wrote: You simply seem to assume that you could have done otherwise. And you simply seem to assume that I could not have done otherwise. How will we ever settle the matter definitively? I am not sure that we can. reincarnated wrote: To avoid determinism, it is not enough that you THINK that you COULD have done otherwise, it is necessary that you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion. Why? Because if there is not at least one occasion on which you WOULD have done otherwise, as opposed to simply THINKING that you COULD have done otherwise, then it folllows that there is a deterministic relation between antecedent states and your choices (in that for any given antecedent state of the universe, your choice is also determined). I disagree with this. Your thought experiment aside, the reality (as far as we can tell) is that there is only one occasion for any given choice. There is no going back and recreating exactly the same antecedent conditions, let alone repeating them an infinite number of times to see if "you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion." Furthermore, my ability or inability to imagine doing otherwise has no bearing whatsoever on my ability or inability actually to do otherwise. If libertarianism is correct, then I can do otherwise, no matter what I think; and if determinism is correct, then I cannot do otherwise, no matter what I think.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

mutemaler
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Posted 11/06/09 - 12:48 PM:	#63
aletheist wrote: ...Your thought experiment aside, the reality (as far as we can tell) is that there is only one occasion for any given choice. There is no going back and recreating exactly the same antecedent conditions, let alone repeating them an infinite number of times to see if "you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion." Furthermore, my ability or inability to imagine doing otherwise has no bearing whatsoever on my ability or inability actually to do otherwise. If libertarianism is correct, then I can do otherwise, no matter what I think; and if determinism is correct, then I cannot do otherwise, no matter what I think. I thinking you're missing the spirit of the thought experiement. You simply assume you could recreate the conditions, literally roll back the universe, and let it replay from the same spot down to the very last detail. It doesn't really matter if you think this is possible or not (I certainly see no way to do it, but that really doesn't matter). My first answer is for what I still consider the better thought experiment, the one which for me must come first. And that is whether the universe would be different period (with or without people). Because if you believe the universe is necessarily the same the second time around, in other words that there is one and exactly one possible future anytime and anywhere, then there really is no point creating the thought experiment here, it would be meaningless (without the possibility of futures - in the plural - there would be no possibility of choice). And so I will repeat that the universe would NOT be precisely the same the second time around, with or without people in it. And only then proceeding to the thought experiment here say that yes of course, our conscious deliberation (or will) can and does the likelihood of possible futures. As do many things. But I think it is also important to realize that our will acts as a constraint as do other constraints (on possible futures). We need to abandon this "free from all constraints" nonsense, it makes even less sense to me than strict determinism (although its a close race). Edited by mutemaler on 11/06/09 - 01:07 PM

Wirya
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Posted 11/06/09 - 01:55 PM:	#64
reincarnated wrote: I’ll ask you the same question I asked Cuthbert – how does the kind of choice you have just described distinguish itself from a random choice? Because it is not random. I don't mindlessly choose it. There're considerations I take before I come with the conclusion that I have to choose A or B or C, at that second time. But on the other hand, the choice is still a part of my free-will, simply because I let my choice "go with the wind." I choose at the very moment I have to choose, and that constitutes my free-will-ness, because at that moment whether or not there're "outside influences" (which are capable of steering my choice) is not meaningful anymore.
"I've always believed that evil is born in a cold heart and a weak mind." - Mike Atkins

asgebison
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Posted 11/06/09 - 05:38 PM:	#65
aletheist wrote: I disagree with this. Your thought experiment aside, the reality (as far as we can tell) is that there is only one occasion for any given choice. There is no going back and recreating exactly the same antecedent conditions, let alone repeating them an infinite number of times to see if "you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion." Furthermore, my ability or inability to imagine doing otherwise has no bearing whatsoever on my ability or inability actually to do otherwise. If libertarianism is correct, then I can do otherwise, no matter what I think; and if determinism is correct, then I cannot do otherwise, no matter what I think. A person is still free to do otherwise in a deterministic universe, but just doesn't want to. If you imagine the situation again, then you will see that I am not forced into my actions, but that I wanted to act as I did, so the same event will still happen again. Indeterminism is not necessary for this. That person could have done otherwise, but wouldn't do otherwise and in every situation this applies. We cannot change what has happened, and we would be influenced to do what we do now by what has happened. However, in that moment, I could have done, or at least tried, an infinite number of alternative actions, but I just wouldn't because I was convinced of what to do now. If I wanted to do otherwise I would have. In random situations, I could would something, but we do not choose what to would, but our freedom lies in what we are randomly convinced to do.

aletheist
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Posted 11/06/09 - 05:56 PM:	#66
asgebison wrote: A person is still free to do otherwise in a deterministic universe, but just doesn't want to. If you imagine the situation again, then you will see that I am not forced into my actions, but that I wanted to act as I did, so the same event will still happen again. Indeterminism is not necessary for this. That person could have done otherwise, but wouldn't do otherwise and in every situation this applies. By definition, determinism entails that no one is "free to do otherwise". Your approach does not solve the problem; it just changes the question to whether what I want is completely determined. Furthermore, libertarian freedom includes the ability to act contrary to what I want. Desires influence our choices, but do not dictate them.
"Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be responsible." - Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)

magpies
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Posted 11/06/09 - 06:55 PM:	#67
It seems this has gone into the question of does one event have the possiblity of happening differently given its the same event. I don't think this really gets at the question of freewill itself... My reasons for thinking this is that freewill itself means that a person or being is able to make a choice. In the example its not about the person being able to make a choice its about what happens because of the choice. So if you look at the question from a freewill perspective... The person was still able to make a choice... They had 1 way they could go and they had a 2nd way they could go and they made a choice to go one way. That is to me all freewill is... So I guess to me the simple fact that I am able to do anything at all is an expresion of freewill. Because I have the choice to type one word here or a different one. So I guess to me all freewill deals with is our ability to make a choice.

asgebison
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Posted 11/06/09 - 07:27 PM:	#68
aletheist wrote: By definition, determinism entails that no one is "free to do otherwise". Your approach does not solve the problem; it just changes the question to whether what I want is completely determined. Furthermore, libertarian freedom includes the ability to act contrary to what I want. Desires influence our choices, but do not dictate them. What do you mean by " no one is free to do otherwise"? Are you saying that our desires force us? If so, then I don't see any reason to say that, for we are our desires and it simply means that we desire something. We cannot choose (are forced) to desire something, but our actions are what we choose. We choose based on them, and if I wanted something else, then I could have choosen that alternative. There is still freedom for the person. And also, how can we act against our desires? Again, we choose based on our wants. If we don't desire anything then would we do anything at all? And if we did something, why would we do so? Edited by asgebison on 11/06/09 - 07:36 PM

reincarnated
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Posted 11/06/09 - 10:47 PM:	#69
Cuthbert wrote: So, back to your question. In the re-run, what would I do about the trade-off between cheapness and reliability? Well, I would put more value either on cheapness or on reliability, and that would affect my decision - or I might invoke other factors - or I might not make a purchase - or I might go for both. Since I could do all that in the real situation, then it would follow that I could also do it in the re-run. (But it wouldn't follow that I would do any old thing at random. Whatever I ended up doing, I would or could have a good enough non-capricious reason for doing.) It also wouldn’t follow that you do NOT make random choices. I asked you to explain how your choice distinguishes itself from a random choice, but as far as I can see nothing in your description of how you go about making a choice distinguishes your choice from a random choice. It seems to me that you have no idea how you actually arrive at your choice, or (if you prefer) your buying behaviour. You might just as well toss a subconscious mental coin to decide, and subconsciously tell yourself “if the coin comes up heads then I value low cost over reliability, if it comes up tails then I value reliability over low cost”. The result, the outcome (both to your conscious mind and to all observers), would be exactly the same as you describe it. Cuthbert wrote: So I can choose to go for (B) or for (D). That's because (B) and (D) are preferences betrayed by my buying behaviour. And since I can buy either the Dawes or the Giant and have a free choice between them, it follows that I can also choose my values and preferences. You talk of buying behavior as if it were some kind of deterministic cause of your choice, but your buying behavior, according to you, is itself indeterministic (or at best indeterminable). You do not know whether you HAVE any clearly defined buying behavior, since you do not know (even when presented with all the information you could possibly want) whether you would value cost over reliability or vice versa. We could therefore replace your so-called buying behavior with a subconscious random number generator, and get exactly the same result, and you (and everyone else) would be none the wiser. Conclusion: Your choice (as you have described it) could be entirely random (at a subconscious level), and neither you nor the rest of the world would be any the wiser. Would you agree? If you do not agree, can you please explain why we should believe that your choice (at a subconscious level) is necessarily not random? Cuthbert wrote: And I expect we can choose our values can't we? Otherwise it would be vain and foolish to feel regret for having valued cheapness over reliability. I agree we can choose our values, but the only choice which makes sense to me is a deterministic choice. Feeling regret for having valued cost over reliability makes perfect sense in a deterministic world – we learn from our mistakes (if we are wise) so that we can (deterministically) make better choices next time. What other possible purpose could be served by the feeling of regret, apart from being an input to our future decision-making processes? aletheist wrote: As a metaphysical libertarian, I believe that I could do otherwise, so I must allow for the possibility that I would do otherwise, even if I consider it to be unlikely. Besides, this is a philosophy forum; do I really have to justify my reluctance to say that something is "certain"? Its reasonable to be reluctant to claim certainty, but its also reasonable to ask why you are uncertain. Its reasonable to ask why you think that you might not do the same again, especially in a philosophy forum. Can you give a rational reason for wanting to do otherwise in the replay? For my part, I am certain that I would do exactly the same again in the replay, UNLESS there are genuine random factors in play which influence my decision making. There, that’s a simple explanation of my decision-making process, isn’t it? All I am asking is that the metaphysical libertarian also gives a simple explanation of their decision-making process. I am a compatibilist, and though I believe that I would do the same again I do allow for the fact that there may be random elements at work, hence I allow for the fact that I might NOT do the same again – but only because my choice may be influenced to some degree by random elements. My answer would therefore seem to be similar to yours, in that I am almost certain that I would do the same again, but our reasons for giving this answer are very different – I am clear that the only reason I might (want to) choose differently is because of possible random elements; you say that you might (want to) choose differently because….. why? Do you any idea? aletheist wrote: But of course, "genuinely random factors" would not be enough to support metaphysical libertarianism. When we say that we can do otherwise, we mean that we can choose to do otherwise; we are not completely constrained by antecedent conditions, whether deterministic or random. But genuinely random factors could yield a world that is indistinguishable from a world with metaphysical libertarian free will. If one had a subconscious random number generator in one’s head, which influenced one’s conscious decision-making processes, the result could be an agent which (when presented with the thought experiment here) COULD do otherwise than what it did, and indeed in some cases WOULD do otherwise than what it did, but the agent would be unable to explain WHY it might do otherwise than what it did, and would also not be able to give an example of a case where it WOULD do otherwise than what it did. When the agent says that it can do otherwise, the agent genuinely believes that it can choose to do otherwise, the agent does not believe it is constrained by antecedent conditions, whether deterministic or random. Epistemically indistinguishable, in every way, from your own description, and from Cuthbert’s description, of metaphysical libertarian decision-making. aletheist wrote: And you simply seem to assume that I could not have done otherwise. How will we ever settle the matter definitively? I am not sure that we can. I certainly do not assume that you could not have done otherwise, indeed I have presented above an explanation of how you could have done otherwise (through the use of a genuine random number generator). reincarnated wrote: To avoid determinism, it is not enough that you THINK that you COULD have done otherwise, it is necessary that you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion. Why? Because if there is not at least one occasion on which you WOULD have done otherwise, as opposed to simply THINKING that you COULD have done otherwise, then it folllows that there is a deterministic relation between antecedent states and your choices (in that for any given antecedent state of the universe, your choice is also determined). aletheist wrote: I disagree with this. Your thought experiment aside, the reality (as far as we can tell) is that there is only one occasion for any given choice. There is no going back and recreating exactly the same antecedent conditions, let alone repeating them an infinite number of times to see if "you WOULD have done otherwise on at least one occasion." Furthermore, my ability or inability to imagine doing otherwise has no bearing whatsoever on my ability or inability actually to do otherwise. If libertarianism is correct, then I can do otherwise, no matter what I think; and if determinism is correct, then I cannot do otherwise, no matter what I think. Isn’t that just what I said? I’m not sure what it is that you think you disagree with. For determinism to be false, it is not enough that you think you could have done otherwise, it is necessary that you would have done otherwise (on at least one occasion). If there is not at least one occasion when one would have done otherwise, then it follows that “same past = same future”, in other words determinism is true. Looked at in the opposite sense : IF determinism is true THEN it follows that one never would have done otherwise (regardless of whether one thinks that one could have done otherwise) – which is simply a re-phrasing of what I said above. mutemaler wrote: But I think it is also important to realize that our will acts as a constraint as do other constraints (on possible futures). We need to abandon this "free from all constraints" nonsense, it makes even less sense to me than strict determinism (although its a close race). Why does strict determinism not make sense to you? Wirya wrote: Because it is not random. I don't mindlessly choose it. There're considerations I take before I come with the conclusion that I have to choose A or B or C, at that second time. But on the other hand, the choice is still a part of my free-will, simply because I let my choice "go with the wind." I choose at the very moment I have to choose, and that constitutes my free-will-ness, because at that moment whether or not there're "outside influences" (which are capable of steering my choice) is not meaningful anymore. But your description (of how you come to make your choice) is exactly the same as the description of someone who (unbeknownst to them) has a subconscious random number generator which influences their conscious choices, it is literally indistinguishable. Such a person would also say that they don’t mindlessly choose it, they would say that there are also considerations they take before they come with the conclusion, and they would claim that they choose at the very moment they have to choose. Can you give me any reason why I should NOT consider your choices to be random in this sense? aletheist wrote: By definition, determinism entails that no one is "free to do otherwise". Of course one could do otherwise in a deterministic universe – if one accepts a wide enough meaning of “could”. There is (as far as we know) no logical necessity to the world, the world (even if deterministic) is logically contingent as opposed to logically necessary. In which case, the world COULD have been different to what it actually is (that’s the meaning of logically contingent), in which case it also follows that I COULD have done otherwise than what I did do (IF the world had been different to the way it is). Determinism simply means “same past, same future”. So, in the thought experiment as given, where antecedent states remain the same, I could NOT do otherwise than what I did do (but why would I want to do otherwise – I did exactly what I wanted to do), but it does not follow that I could not do otherwise than what I do in the general sense – IF the antecedent conditions were different, THEN I could do otherwise. But IF the antecedent conditions are exactly the same (as in the thought experiment) why on earth would I WANT to do otherwise? It makes no rational or logical sense that I would want to do otherwise than what I did want to do. magpies wrote: So I guess to me all freewill deals with is our ability to make a choice. I agree with you – but to me the only choice that makes any rational sense is a deterministic choice. Edited by reincarnated on 11/06/09 - 10:53 PM
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Posted 11/06/09 - 10:52 PM:	#70
magpies wrote: It seems this has gone into the question of does one event have the possiblity of happening differently given its the same event. I don't think this really gets at the question of freewill itself... My reasons for thinking this is that freewill itself means that a person or being is able to make a choice. In the example its not about the person being able to make a choice its about what happens because of the choice. So if you look at the question from a freewill perspective... The person was still able to make a choice... They had 1 way they could go and they had a 2nd way they could go and they made a choice to go one way. That is to me all freewill is... So I guess to me the simple fact that I am able to do anything at all is an expresion of freewill. Because I have the choice to type one word here or a different one. So I guess to me all freewill deals with is our ability to make a choice. I think this is spot on. I tend to look at it this way: I have a coin in my pocket. When I take it out I can place it on the table heads up or tails up. If I don't have free will, can you tell me which way up I cannot choose to place it? Of course, nobody can tell me. The physical processes that rob my choice from me just happen to be conveniently unidentifiable until after the event. In fact, there is no evidence that I didn't have a choice, and my experience is that I did. Denying free will, like denying the existence of the mind, other people's minds, the universe, or morality, is one of those philosophical thought experiments where people just demand proof of something we constantly experience and can't manage to live without. There is no "proof" of anything, but unless you happen to be unable to make choices then it is reasonable to assume you have free will. You can be sceptical about anything as a thought experiment, but unless you can actually live as if you genuinely don't believe, then all you are doing is playing games. In particular this is the game where you demand people prove their experiences are real, even though everything we can ever know is from experience and we could never live as though we generally disbelieved our experiences. Perhaps we can't explain how we have free will and perhaps our free will is just an illusion. However, nobody can live as if everything they can't explain is an illusion and it is an obvious weakness in a worldview if the people who hold it have to resort to claiming "X is an illusion" while simultaneously living as if they believe in X.

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