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Free Will - A Thought Experiment
a challenge to those who believe in free will

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Free Will - A Thought Experiment

reincarnated
the moving finger writes

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Posted 11/05/09 - 04:45 AM:	#31
Wirya wrote: But what if the "why" I'm trying to explain is created internally, freely, independently within myself? Sure, you can “freely create” whatever reasons you wish, all I ask is that you be honest about what those reasons are. If you create certain reasons for choosing to do A (in effect justifying your choice to do A) the first time around, why (assuming you are not being capricious) would you reject these perfectly valid reasons and then create a different set of reasons for choosing not-A the second time round? Such a thing would be illogical, irrational. Minyun wrote: If I had it all over again, and had no recollection of what has happened in the present/future, then I would do it exactly the same, not because I wanted to but because there is no way I could do it differently. Cool. A compatibilist or determinist response. unenlightened wrote: In other words, the notion of two times that are the same time is incoherent. keda wrote: It seems to me "the first time" and "the second time" isn't refering to the same time, but the second time is a time after the first. Either that or reincarnated has some two dimensional time in mind, where two events are simultaneous in dimension X but not simultaneous in dimension Y. I can understand the strong desire of a metaphysical libertarian to reject the basis of the thought experiment, but unenlightened’s objection seems to be a straw man. It is not necessary that the “two times are the same time”, it is not even necessary that the original choice and the replay of this choice be in the same universe. It is only necessary that the antecedent conditions be the same. keda wrote: Assuming the first (the second doesn't make much sense) I would always choose the same thing each time the same circumstances occurrs. Another person who has (atemporally) made a different choice would in my situation choose differently, albeit always the same. That I always choose X is due to my will being a rule that dictates what I will do in a specific situation, so much like a computer program will always produce the same output given the same input, so will my will always pick the same action (or inaction) in the same situation. Interesting - you choose the metaphysical libertarian definition of free will, yet your answer to the thought experiment is the same as a compatibilist (or determinist) - in effect you are agreeing that there is a unique 1 to 1 mapping (a deterministic relationship) between antecedent states and your choice. Most metaphysical libertarians would not accept such a relationship, they would not accept that their choice would always be the same given the same conditions. Edited by reincarnated on 11/05/09 - 04:56 AM
crumpled bits of paper, filled with imperfect thoughts... we all talk a different language, talking in defence... and if you don't give up, and don't give in, you may just be ok... (Mike & The Mechanics, "The Living Years")

Cuthbert
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Posted 11/05/09 - 05:49 AM:	#32
reincarnated wrote: I believe that determinists and compatibilists will have no problem conducting the experiment which follows, but I expect that metaphysical libertarians may run into some difficulties ..... My question to you is very simple. On this second time around, would you make the same decision again? Please also provide an explanation for your answer (ie if you answer that you would make the same decision again, why would you do so? Why would you not choose differently the second time around? And if you answer that you would make a different decision, why would you do so? Why would you not choose the same as the first time around?). I chose to buy a Giant rather than a Dawes a couple of years ago. That's a big decision for me. As a metaphysical libertarian, I might have chosen a Dawes and nothing caused me to buy the Giant rather than the Dawes. It was just my decision, for which I had a good enough reason. If I have chosen a Dawes, I would have had a good enough reason for doing that, although it would have been a different reason from the reason I had for buying a Giant. If it's true that I might have chosen a Dawes at that time, then it's also true that, if were that time again, I might choose a Dawes. In fact I bought a Giant at that time, although I was able to have bought a Dawes instead. So it's also true that, if it were that time again, I might again buy a Giant, just as I did in fact, although I'm able to buy a Dawes instead. In the re-run I might choose the Giant because it's cheaper or the Dawes because it's more reliable. In fact I chose the Giant because it's cheaper, but I might have chosen the Dawes because it's more reliable. The experiment seems to show that, in a case in which I can choose to do one thing for one lot of good enough reasons or something else for a different lot of good enough reasons, and I make a metaphysically libertarian choice, then no matter how many such times such a scenario is re-run it remains the case that my choice can go one way or the other. That would imply that, if I face such a situation in the future, then my decision can go either way, depending upon the choice that I make. That's what it is to be free, after all. I don't see the problem for the metaphysical libertarian so far.

keda
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Posted 11/05/09 - 06:22 AM:	#33
reincarnated wrote: Interesting - you choose the metaphysical libertarian definition of free will, yet your answer to the thought experiment is the same as a compatibilist (or determinist) - in effect you are agreeing that there is a unique 1 to 1 mapping (a deterministic relationship) between antecedent states and your choice. Well no, I don't see why I would have to agree with there being a deterministic relationship (causal relationship?) between the two. I could have chosen differently, i which case I will always choose that way in that situation. I.e: Situation X occurs first time, I choose to do Y Situation X occurs second time, I choose to do Y again alternatively: Situation X occurs first time, I choose to not do Y Situation X occurs second time, I choose to not do Y again X does not cause Y, but X and my choice (X => Y) or (X => ~Y) together cause Y (or ~Y)
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

unenlightened
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Posted 11/05/09 - 06:55 AM:	#34
reincarnated wrote: I can understand the strong desire of a metaphysical libertarian to reject the basis of the thought experiment, but unenlightened’s objection seems to be a straw man. It is not necessary that the “two times are the same time”, it is not even necessary that the original choice and the replay of this choice be in the same universe. It is only necessary that the antecedent conditions be the same. And the observer. So now I am to imagine myself observing myself in two different but identical universes? It's a straw thought experiment.
...most of our actions are the result of the past, or according to a future ideal. That's not action, that is just conformity. J Krishnamurti "Philosophy, to the Philistine, is an evolutionary process, watched over by some sort of brisk dynamic Providence, and culminating in the supreme insight of modern thought." John Cowper Powys

Wirya
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Posted 11/05/09 - 12:03 PM:	#35
reincarnated wrote: Sure, you can “freely create” whatever reasons you wish, all I ask is that you be honest about what those reasons are. If you create certain reasons for choosing to do A (in effect justifying your choice to do A) the first time around, why (assuming you are not being capricious) would you reject these perfectly valid reasons and then create a different set of reasons for choosing not-A the second time round? Such a thing would be illogical, irrational. If I am a truly consistent freewill libertarian, then my answer would be simple : because I want to.
"I've always believed that evil is born in a cold heart and a weak mind." - Mike Atkins

Minyun
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Posted 11/05/09 - 10:20 PM:	#36
Cuthbert wrote: In fact I bought a Giant at that time, although I was able to have bought a Dawes instead. So it's also true that, if it were that time again, I might again buy a Giant, just as I did in fact, although I'm able to buy a Dawes instead. In the re-run I might choose the Giant because it's cheaper or the Dawes because it's more reliable. In fact I chose the Giant because it's cheaper, but I might have chosen the Dawes because it's more reliable. I'm going to point out here, that even in the re-run you still chose what is cheaper... you would have been faced with the same situation, and would have made exactly the same decision. This is because all prior events leading up to this decision have happened, just as they would have, perhaps the ATM didn't have notes big enough to buy the Dawes, so it is that you went with the Giant (whatever these things are). The events leading up to you making the decision are still in place, these events cause you to act in a certain way. The same could be said for a man walking in the street, then seeing a bus heading straight for him, obviously he is going to move out of the way, each and every time. This is to preserve his life, his life is the result of previous events. These events make him decide the same outcome, always. Would the tree grow differently if under the exact same conditions?