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Russell's

quickly
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Posted 10/26/09 - 12:26 AM: Subject: Russell's "Refutation"	#1
In Problems of Philosophy, Russell gives the following analysis of Berkeley, quoted at length: [What] Berkeley seeks to prove [is] that whatever can be immediately known must be in a mind. For this purpose arguments of detail as to the dependence of sense-data upon us are useless. It is necessary to prove, generally, that by being known, things are shown tobe mental... Taking the word idea in Berkeley's sense, there are two quite distinct things to be considered whenever an idea is before the mind. There is on the one hand the thing of which we are aware - say the colour of my table - and on the other hand the actual awareness itself, the mental act of apprehending the thing. The mental act is undoubtedly mental, but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental? Our previous arguments concerning the colour did not prove it to be mental; they only proved that its existence depends upon the relation of our sense organs to the physical object - in our case, the table. That is to say, they proved that a certain colour will exist, in a certain light, if a normal eye is placed at a certain point relatively to the table. They did not prove that the colour is in the mind of the percipient...[By] an unconscious equivocation, we arrive at the conclusion that whatever we can apprehend must be in our minds. This seems to be the true analysis of Berkeley's argument, and the ultimate fallacy upon which it rests. ...Acquaintance with objects essentially consists in a relation between the mind and something other than the mind; it is this that constitutes the mind's power of knowing things. If we say that the things known must be in the mind, we are either unduly limiting the mind's power of knowing, or we are uttering a mere tautology...[We] shall have to admit that what, in this sense, is in the mind, may nevertheless not be mental...Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that "ideas" - i.e., the objects apprehended - must be mental, are found to have no validity whatsoever. Russell's argument rests upon his distinction between the object of an apprehension, which is non-mental, and the act of apprehension, which is mental. It is clear, however, that the object itself is neither mental nor physical, and hence merely maintains the status non-mental. For instance: Let us give the name "sense-data" to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on...Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense-datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. Russell therefore must maintain that a sense-datum is non-mental, and the sensation itself is the only mental fact which occurs in any act of apprehension. He must, therefore, maintain that, for instance, the color red which I am not immediately seeing, is non-mental. We know, from his various discussions, that it cannot be physical; but nevertheless I am perplexed as to what this non-mental color is. It seems that Russell must either do the following: (1) Maintain that phenomenal entities are non-mental, or that colors, sounds, textures, exist independently of an act of sensation. They could be, for instance, "permanent possibilities of sensation," or they could exhibit certain physical properties, such as shape and extension. But it seems absurd to me to assume that phenomenal properties are non-mental. Else, (2) Maintain that he equivocated when he wrote that (a) "he went on to argue that sense-data were the only things of whose existence our perceptions could assure us"; (b) that to be known is to be "in" a mind, and therefore to be mental"; (c) "[hence] he concluded that nothing can ever be known except what is in some mind." (a) is not an assertion about the ontological status of objects, but about the epistemic conditions under which one object signifies the existence of another object. (b) asserts the truism if something is "in a mind" then it is mental. But: (c) conflates the thing "in mind" in (b) with (1) a phenomenon; (2) the object of which the phenomenon is a part. (c.1-2) are important, because Russell is claiming that Berkeley's mistake is to assume that if a phenomenon is known, then it is in a mind, and therefore mental; but that the thing known is not necessarily in a mind. But (c2) relies upon the existence of an object of which (c1) is a part, and which Russell has not proved exists. I feel as though I am wrong, because Russell's argument is so well respected. But I'm not sure where I'm going wrong.
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James S Saint
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Posted 10/26/09 - 07:41 PM:	#2
It takes me a minute to adjust from the more customary trite to an actually intelligent posting.. But it seems that this is the never-ending issue of mixing words, their concepts, their mental form, and their physical associations. [What] Berkeley seeks to prove [is] that whatever can be immediately known must be in a mind. For this purpose arguments of detail as to the dependence of sense-data upon us are useless. It is necessary to prove, generally, that by being known, things are shown tobe mental... I can tentatively agree with those statements depending on how those words are really being meant. Knowledge is necessarily an artifact of a mind. It seems that is what Berkeley is trying to convey and stress as important to understand (but perhaps not). "Russell therefore must maintain that a sense-datum is non-mental, and the sensation itself is the only mental fact which occurs in any act of apprehension" In this, it seems that the word "fact" is to exclude logical deduction. I don't use the word "fact" in that manner, but if that is your intent, I can agree with what you mean. "He must, therefore, maintain that, for instance, the color red which I am not immediately seeing, is non-mental. We know, from his various discussions, that it cannot be physical; but nevertheless I am perplexed as to what this non-mental color is." I have to disagree that the color red is non-physical. There is a specific color frequency of light that we label "red". That light, of that frequency is a physical entity that we detect and name "red". "(1) Maintain that phenomenal entities are non-mental, or that colors, sounds, textures, exist independently of an act of sensation. They could be, for instance, "permanent possibilities of sensation," or they could exhibit certain physical properties, such as shape and extension. But it seems absurd to me to assume that phenomenal properties are non-mental." I don't understand why that would be an absurdity. It seems rather obvious to me. "I feel as though I am wrong, because Russell's argument is so well respected. But I'm not sure where I'm going wrong." Seriously, do NOT rely upon what respect is given to others. Respect is given for political reasons, not due to worthiness of truth. Edited by James S Saint on 10/26/09 - 08:58 PM

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Posted 10/26/09 - 09:06 PM:	#3
The way I see it, Russell's refutation of Berkeley's subjective idealism is simply top point out that objects of sensation...colors and such... could be immediately present to the mind AND naive realism could still be true, if those qualities of sensation are inherent in the objects of perception. It is not enough to say that ideas are immediately present to the mind. Berleley must also show that they do not originate from outside the mind and become present to the mind from without, yet immediately. The most Berkeley can establish by his argumentis, according to Russell, is that there is an act of apprehension, which IS mental, involved in the knowing of sense data...as opposed to sensation, which may still be the source of (mental) sense-data. Thus: Russell wrote: .Berkeley's argument is seen to be wrong in substance as well as in form, and his grounds for supposing that "ideas" - i.e., the objects apprehended - must be mental, are found to have no validity whatsoever. Of course, naive realism is false and Russell's point then becomes mute. His refutation of Berkeley's idealism is relevant only if the mind immediately intuits qualities, like color, that are parts of the objecs of perception. In this case, (1) would be true. If those qualities inhere in the natural objects...like most of the ancients believed... then they could cause the objects of immediate pereption, i.e., sense data. But if they inhere in the subject, as Descartes, Locke, Berkely, Hume and most of us modern philosophers, all believed, they offer no evidence to the mind of what caused them to be as they are, within the subject. Therefore, the most we can know of anything is that it is a mental phenomenon. The distinction between the act of apprehending and the thing apprehended vanishes, since both ocur inthin the subject. If we admit, as scientifically we must, that the redness of the tomato is not in the tomato but in the way we apprehend the tomato, then the color we know is an artifact of the mind and not a quality possess by the tomato at all.You can say it has a tendency to reflect light at certain frequencies but you cannot say the the qualitative redness we see is in the mind and not in the tomato.

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Posted 10/29/09 - 03:49 AM:	#4
quickly wrote: I feel as though I am wrong, because Russell's argument is so well respected. But I'm not sure where I'm going wrong. What is meant by (the sense datum of) “the colour itself”? What IS there to the concept of “the colour itself” (the supposed sense datum) which is not also the sensation of “the colour”? To my mind, the “sensation of the colour red” and the so-called “sense datum of the colour red” are one and the same thing (viz the sensation of the colour red), they are not different things. There IS no such thing as the “sense datum” of the colour red which exists seprarately from the sensation of the colour red. The colour red simply does not exist in absence of the sensation of the colour red. By asserting that such a thing as the sense datum is non-mental and is distinct from the mental sensation to which it relates, one is asserting that “the colour itself” has some kind of existence outside of the mind, which I believe is false. Simple Occam wrote: If we admit, as scientifically we must, that the redness of the tomato is not in the tomato but in the way we apprehend the tomato, then the color we know is an artifact of the mind and not a quality possess by the tomato at all.You can say it has a tendency to reflect light at certain frequencies but you cannot say the the qualitative redness we see is in the mind and not in the tomato. Agreed 100%.
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Posted 10/31/09 - 02:18 PM:	#5
James S Saint wrote: "Russell therefore must maintain that a sense-datum is non-mental, and the sensation itself is the only mental fact which occurs in any act of apprehension" In this, it seems that the word "fact" is to exclude logical deduction. I don't use the word "fact" in that manner, but if that is your intent, I can agree with what you mean. Well, I should have said: "the sense-datum itself" is the only thing known in an act of simple apprehension; I said "fact" because it is not a fact to the person perceiving, but the sensation itself is a fact. In External World, Russel defines a fact as follows: "When I speak of a 'fact,' I do not mean one of the simple things in the world; I mean that a certain thing has a certain quality, or that certain things have a certain relation....The constituents of facts, in the sense in which we are using the word 'fact,' are not other facts, but are things and qualities or relations." So the question arises: by things, Russell means such statements as "this is red." But in Problems he denies that, while I can have a simple apprehension of a relation, I do not have a simple apprehension of a sense-datum in a relation. So we are left with a choice between: "sensing 'red'" and "sensing that 'this is red.'" The first falls into the Hegelian problem of 'immediacy'; for the second, Russell has to maintain that he perceives simple sense-data in relations to other things in a simple apprehensive act. I have to disagree that the color red is non-physical. There is a specific color frequency of light that we label "red". That light, of that frequency is a physical entity that we detect and name "red". Yes, but Russell isn't denying this. He specifically claims that I have acquaintance with universals. The problem is: is this sense datum that I see and you do not not in mind in an act of sensation. And if not, where is it? I don't understand why that would be an absurdity. It seems rather obvious to me. Because, you would then have to work out how "this red thing" exists independently of its sensation. Russell seems to simultaneously hold the view that redness exists independently of sensation, that things sensed (sense-data) exist phenomenally and privately, but that things sensed in a different sense ("this" as opposed to "this is red") are in fact red. I think Moore pointed this out in Defense when he gives an analysis of this is a hand (or for Russell, "this is red."). Moore is more permissive in allowing objects of simple acquaintances, but shows that you cannot maintain that you are merely sensing when you sense that "this is red."
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Posted 10/31/09 - 02:27 PM:	#6
[@ simple:] I'm fairly sure I agree with you. I think the problem Russell faces, and the one he is trying to solve, is how acts of sensation are informative of objects non-inferentially. This is why he continually says: "a red patch of color," and not "red." I don't think the problem, though, is that Russell is the color exists in a mind, it's that the "this" exists in mind, which is what Berkeley is saying. In this, I agree with Russell. I don't agree that he has noninferential or nonlogical and simple knowledges of these things, which he conflates with the above question. Edited by quickly on 10/31/09 - 03:18 PM
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Posted 10/31/09 - 02:31 PM:	#7
reincarnated wrote: To my mind, the “sensation of the colour red” and the so-called “sense datum of the colour red” are one and the same thing (viz the sensation of the colour red), they are not different things. There IS no such thing as the “sense datum” of the colour red which exists seprarately from the sensation of the colour red. Well, perhaps the "sense-datum" as object is asserted to be of an ontologically different type than the mental act of perceiving. That is, it does not exist in the same way that an intentional act exists. I'm not sure how this could be the case, and in that case I agree with you, but I think this is what Russell is trying to claim; and because sense-datum theories were so prevalent, looking at how this could be so is interesting (he wasn't an idiot).
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Posted 10/31/09 - 10:56 PM:	#8
What I believe he is saying is this: The sense data of the colour red is objective. The label exists subjectively, but the actual vision is totally objective. To see the colour is to recieve the sense data from the object, and then relay it to the mind. The mind interprets this as 'red' and compares this to the concept of the colour red that is formed in the mind. Everybody's concept of the colour red differs, but the event that causes the perception is totally objective, it is a conduit- if you will- between perception and the object in question.
"Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." Arthur Schopenhauer "To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the path from error to truth." Ludwig Wittgenstein "Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a combination lock: each little adjustment of the dials seems to achieve nothing, only when everything is in place does the door open." Ludwig Wittgenstein

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