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Help please 'God' a nonsense word?

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Help please 'God' a nonsense word?

Makarismos
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Posted 10/02/09 - 04:51 PM:	#21
180 Proof wrote: Oh, why the eff not ... What distinguishes "a thing for which their could be no proof ... no evidence" from a fiction? I suppose that's a fair question, so I will try to answer it as fully as I am able: I have no scientific proof that I am concious. I believe that I am anyway. My proof for this is overwhelming in my eyes, and yet to any dispassionate external observer I can show no facts which would discern me from a complex machine. I have a brain, this can be tested! I have eyes, and my neurons fire of course; but how is it possible to show that I experience conciousness? I can not plug myself in to a data link and let you share my experiences (so far anyway!), and you can not observe my experiences in any way whatsoever. As such I think that there is no measurement that could be used as scientific support for the hypothesis that I am concious. Please, if you have some kind of rigorous test do jump in... Of course, you might believe that I am one who experiences conciousness, because I seem to be like you. You might think that because you experience conciousness then I must also experience it. This is evidence of a type that we all use every day of our lives, and I do not see any problem in such thoughts. However, relying upon such evidence is inherently unscientific. Science does not deal with subjective points of view, arguments from analogy, or guess work. Measurement, prediction, experimentation: these are the heart and soul of this excellent tool that mankind has used to understand the universe. It is not that science is worse or better than religion, they are just different. It would be obviously foolish to expect spiritual endeavour to start MS Windows, just as it would be foolhardy to believe that science could be a good way of running the government, the stock market making decisions about your relationship with your wife, or a political ideology telling the time. These things are all part of what it is to be human, but they are all different, and used in different situations. It is a simple case of the right tool for the particular job, be that exploring inner realms, political cultural systems, or the external objective.

180 Proof
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Posted 10/02/09 - 08:14 PM:	#22
Makarismos wrote: I have no scientific proof that I am concious. I believe that I am anyway. Does one need such proof in order to hold that belief? As such I think that there is no measurement that could be used as scientific support for the hypothesis that I am concious. I think that depends on how "consciousness" is defined and the parameters implied by that definition. Your statement is simply premature. Of course, you might believe that I am one who experiences conciousness, because I seem to be like you. You might think that because you experience conciousness then I must also experience it. Sounds more like a habit, or reflex, than an articulable belief, or claim. This is evidence of a type that we all use every day of our lives ... This is not "evidence" at all, just a pragmatic assumption. When I begin to suspect, however, that you might be a zombie or bot I'll have to question & reformulate my assumption that you're "conscious". Not until then ... Science does not deal with subjective points of view, arguments from analogy, or guess work. Of course it does. Every hypothesis begins with a hunch, or an intuition, which is 'subjective'. If not there'd only be deductions and no discoveries or inventions, no inspired accidents (i.e. 'eureka' moments!). Besides, scientific practice translates singular first-person present-tense predicates (e.g. 'pain') into the plural third-person past-tense predicates (e.g. 'C-fibers firing') and vice versa (in principle); that one variable is not reduced, or reducible by scientific means, to another is neither a limit nor fault since science is not 'alchemy' where purportedly things are 'transformed' but applied mathematics where phenomena are modelled (i.e. translated). It is not that science is worse or better than religion, they are just different. *Science is inexhaustably better than* religion at accurately modelling the world far beyond the reach of our perceptions -- unaided & otherwise -- and contrary to our intuitions. Science is spectacularly better than religion at disciplining our minds for self-criticism & self-correction. Science is immeasurably better than religion at adjudicating between competing claims without violence because it is universalized by mathematics. Scientific reasoning is superior to religious faith in aptly informing our expectations, assessments of risk & contingency plans. Lastly, science is unquestionably better than religion at practicing the circumspect, critical, humility (i.e. fallibilism) its 'method' preaches, which allows scientific practice to improve and develop at a generational pace rather than at the schlerotic millenial crawl of religions. So yeah, science & religion are "different", more or less the way learning & gambling, respectively, are different. ("Non-Overlapping Magisteria" (NOMA) is an empty -- utopian? -- assertion because life is just too damn messy.) It is a simple case of the right tool for the particular job, be that exploring inner realms*, political cultural systems, or the external objective. Okay. So "god" belongs to these "inner realms" and that's why it cannot be sought out scientifically. If this is the case, one is left wondering if there is any evidence of these "inner realms" ... There must be if they are real* -- no matter how inaccessible their contents (e.g. "gods") might be. If by "inner realms" you mean "consciousness" then the implication is that "god" is, or occupies, "a state of consciousness", yet since science (so far) only models brain activity and not "consciousness" wherein, or by which, "god" is experienced, science is inadequate for investigating "god". It's therefore reasonable to assume that "god" is a quale, perhaps a non-ordinary or supersensible one but a quale nonetheless. Well, if I haven't extrapolated too uncharitably, Maka, this is what I think: Epiphenomenal & inexplicable "gods" are tantamount to hallucinations, which reminds me of the old quip "Talking to god is prayer, hearing from god is schizophrenia". Edited by 180 Proof on 10/02/09 - 08:44 PM. Reason: Mumbling in tongues about Boltzmann's equation & Schrödinger's wavefunction ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Gadfly II
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Posted 10/03/09 - 07:00 AM:	#23
brainpharte wrote: I don't know about or talk about whether or not claims really are true, I only know about claims being judged as true. If the above is true, then can you explain "When our purposes require demonstrable reliability and/or logical robustness, we apply the criteria of science to the claim rather than that of the particular faith system." Who are the "we" you refer to, if not all of us? Can you tell me with a straight face that the above quote is not an empirical claim about the state of the world? You claim that statements have no meaning beyond their function in a language game and that function is described by epistemic criteria fully known by the participants and that elements and statements in each language game can not be compared because it is essentially comparing apples and oranges, and yet you persist in making claims favoring one language game over another. How can you claim that god is empty in one language game and is a muddled and confused notion in another language game despite the fact that the participants in the latter game would not agree with you? Concern with the really real is the only reason judgments have value for us. If our language is independent of our states of mind and the state of the world what good can it possibly do us? do you think that it is simply an accident that the polio vaccine works or that planes stay aloft? If justifiable assertion were the only criteria for useful judgments life would be very different that it is. brainpharte wrote: And whether a claim is judged to be true (or not-true) is a function of the epistemic criteria the claim can meet (or fail to meet.) Is this a semantic take on the situation as distinguished from a metaphysical? Seems to me it's epistemological, not metaphysical? I really don't know. This is consensualism. We decide what is true [full stop]. What else could you mean here? Semantics is the relationship of a system of symbols stated axiomatically. The Wittgensteinian language games are not semantic they are behavior. (note; not behavioral) Further, your reliance on epistemic criteria to justify the meaning of language is categorically not Wittgensteinian. One of his main objections to this kind of picture is that it leads to an infinite regress. If meaning is use that conforms with a rule then that rule itself would have to be justified by another and so on. If I am not mistaken W. thinks that rules of semantics is confused. Banno can set me straight on that point if he's out there.
Dare to use your own reason. Kant

brainpharte
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Posted 10/03/09 - 03:35 PM:	#24
Gadfly II wrote: If the above is true, then can you explain "When our purposes require demonstrable reliability and/or logical robustness, we apply the criteria of science to the claim rather than that of the particular faith system." Who are the "we" you refer to, if not all of us? Can you tell me with a straight face that the above quote is not an empirical claim about the state of the world? Not sure what you mean, or what your point is. Do I think my claim is an empirical claim? Yes. After observation and analysis I have concluded that "when our purposes require demonstrable reliability and/or logical robustness we apply the criteria of science to the claim rather than the criteria of some faith system." By "we" I mean people in general. No doubt there are outliers. You claim that statements have no meaning beyond their function in a language game and that function is described by epistemic criteria fully known by the participants and that elements and statements in each language game can not be compared because it is essentially comparing apples and oranges, and yet you persist in making claims favoring one language game over another. How can you claim that god is empty in one language game and is a muddled and confused notion in another language game despite the fact that the participants in the latter game would not agree with you? I do not claim that statements have no meaning beyond their function in a language game--I claim that we can make the most sense of people's statements if we interpret them in the context of the language game in which they are embedded, rather than in our own preferred language game. The most relevant function of an utterance to someone in a particular language game may have little to do with the empirical demonstrability or logical coherence of the proposition expressed in that utterance. People in faith groups jabber their approved babble all the time simply as that group's way of reassuring one another of their “brotherhood” or solidarity, both informally and formally (such as from the pulpit or in publications.) It's a kind of code talk, analogous to a secret handshake. The actual propositional content of this language is empiricallly dubious and often logically incoherent, but being demonstrably reliable and logically coherent is not their purpose. It's an aspect of the mythos, and it's primary function is to meet social, emotional, and psychological goals rather than goals of empirical reliability and rigorous logical coherence. Concern with the really real is the only reason judgments have value for us. If our language is independent of our states of mind and the state of the world what good can it possibly do us? We can use it to meet our purposes, which don't always necessarily require asserting propositions that need to be highly reliable or even coherent. do you think that it is simply an accident that the polio vaccine works or that planes stay aloft? If justifiable assertion were the only criteria for useful judgments life would be very different that it is. When our purposes are to achieve demonstrable reliability and/or logical robustness, we apply the criteria of science. When demonstrable reliability and/or logical robustness are secondary to social, emotional, or psychological goals then in some cases demonstrable reliability and/or logical robustness are traded off. This works very well for hundreds of millions of people in tens of thousands of different groups, most but not all of which are "religious". Sometimes, of course, they pay a heavy price for the lack of reliability or coherence of their claims--such as when they forego medical treatment in favor of "alternative" treatments or in favor of prayer and faith healing, or when they dance with poisonous snakes, or when they drink the Kool-Aid, or when they give away all their stuff because the mothership is coming anon. But on the whole, those hundreds of millions of people apparently find that participation in their ideology group--including the group's particular variation of the language game--works very well to meet their purposes. This is consensualism. We decide what is true [full stop]. What else could you mean here? Semantics is the relationship of a system of symbols stated axiomatically. The Wittgensteinian language games are not semantic they are behavior. (note; not behavioral) I don't mean that a claim REALLY IS true just because it meets someone's criteria. I mean that if we analyze how a person is using true in any actual application we find ultimately that they mean the claim has met whatever criteria they've deemed appropriate for that claim. And it can be readily demonstrated that most disputes about whether or not a claim is true can be reduced to a dispute about the exact kind and degree of criteria the claim should have to meet to be counted as true. Further, your reliance on epistemic criteria to justify the meaning of language is categorically not Wittgensteinian. One of his main objections to this kind of picture is that it leads to an infinite regress. If meaning is use that conforms with a rule then that rule itself would have to be justified by another and so on. If I am not mistaken W. thinks that rules of semantics is confused. Banno can set me straight on that point if he's out there. Don't care if what I say is Wittgensteinian or not. My use of "language game" is loose--not meant to be strictly Wittgensteinian, just in the family. Sorry if this was misleading. Construing "true" as meaning "has met certain criteria" does not lead to a regress. It would lead to a regress only if one construes true to mean Really True. "True" as people actually use it is simply a judgment of approval based on certain criteria, which usually are tacit rather than explicit.
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

Gadfly II
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Posted 10/03/09 - 05:55 PM:	#25
brainpharte wrote: Don't care if what I say is Wittgensteinian or not. My use of "language game" is loose--not meant to be strictly Wittgensteinian, just in the family. Sorry if this was misleading. Yeah, loose is the word, ad hoc in fact. You've cobbled together a few vague ideas into a convenient web of beliefs that enable you to say what you want without the fear that your reasoning will come under scrutiny because you merely retreat into language game land to avoid the prospect of defending your assertions. gimme a break
Dare to use your own reason. Kant

brainpharte
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Posted 10/03/09 - 06:27 PM:	#26
Gadfly II wrote: Yeah, loose is the word, ad hoc in fact. You've cobbled together a few vague ideas into a convenient web of beliefs that enable you to say what you want without the fear that your reasoning will come under scrutiny because you merely retreat into language game land to avoid the prospect of defending your assertions. gimme a break A voice crying out in the wilderness of Vague Generality Land. Give yourself a break and be specific. Address a claim I've made that you find incoherent, illogically inferred, irrelevant, inconsistent with some fact ... . If I haven't answered a challenge you'd made, point it out and I will try to do so. If you think that an answer I've given to one of your challenges is inadequate, then be specific and address it, showing that my response was logically flawed, irrelevant, inconsistent with some fact, etc. But first get you undies unbunched. WTF?
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

Makarismos
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Posted 10/04/09 - 02:44 AM:	#27
180 Proof wrote: ... So yeah, science & religion are "different", more or less the way learning & gambling, respectively, are different. ("Non-Overlapping Magisteria" (NOMA) is an empty -- utopian? -- assertion because life is just too damn messy.) Okay. So "god" belongs to these "inner realms" and that's why it cannot be sought out scientifically. If this is the case, one is left wondering if there is any evidence of these "inner realms" ... There must be if they are real -- no matter how inaccessible their contents (e.g. "gods") might be. ... Perhaps it is not quite so clear cut as you state here. After all, we have all of us experienced only 'inner realms' for all of our existence, in science we have visualised the objective reality only. Out inner realms are dependant upon a single 'point of view', the dispassionate glance of science does not need or want such a subjective starting point. Our whole world is made up of colours, the feel of things, tastes, sounds - science does not describe these sufficiently for us to experience them, only to have some grasp of what these experiences might represent 'in reality'. The trouble is the term 'reality'. Is the feeling of hunger I experience truly real? It might be more accurate to describe it as the result of a genetic adaptation to avoid starvation, or of the input of receptors in my stomach upon my brain. We might describe the process in more basic or more complex terms and remain within the realms of reputable science - but we could not falsify my claim "I feel hungry". Science is many things, but it has limits. 'Inner realms' have evidence that you and I have directly experienced, but science cannot comment upon.

Makarismos
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Posted 10/04/09 - 02:54 AM:	#28
Infact, the two discussions currently undertaken on this thread both concern the word 'reality' and the ambiguity of the concept. In some senses 'reality' is taken to be the laws of physics. Perhaps this view of reality is truly 'real', after all it matches with experiment to a great degree. The other sense of the term seems to refer to the everyday experences - eating toast, riding a bike, talking with friends. To me these two seem to be accessed quite differently. The first is accessed by long study, and what is learnt is used to expand upon aspects of reality, or to make prediction about what might happen given certian variables. The second notion of reality is accessed directly by concious beings such as ourselves. Of course their is a great deal of overlap, and many things can be described by method 1, and experenced by method 2 - but their are also areas where only one is of any use: Quantum mechanics cannot be directly experienced - at least I cannot see a way it could be. This seems to be equally true of many disciplines involving deep mathematics. The experience of eating toast cannot be falsified by science* . Science is uninterested in experiences, anecdotes, and legend. So we have 'Objectively Real' and 'Intersubjectively Real' * If anyone else gets this made in to a t-shirt before me, send a picure!

180 Proof
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Posted 10/04/09 - 03:05 AM:	#29
Makarismos wrote: 'Inner realms' have evidence that you and I have directly experienced, but science cannot comment upon. If you're not familiar with it, read this synopsis of Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" which implies that a phrase like "'inner realms' have evidence ... directly experienced" (i.e epistemic privacy) is nonsensical. Science does not need to "comment upon" grammatical, or conceptual, confusions. Edited by 180 Proof on 10/04/09 - 03:20 AM. Reason: oops ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

Gadfly II
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Posted 10/04/09 - 09:34 AM:	#30
brainpharte wrote: Give yourself a break and be specific. Address a claim I've made that you find incoherent, illogically inferred, irrelevant, inconsistent with some fact ... . OK. You earlier stated that you don't see the infinite regress in your position. How do we judge a statement as true? (O) We judge a statement true by comparing it to epistemic criteria that fits our purposes (E) God is an empty term by E (assumption) How do we judge that E is true? After all it could be false or misapplied. We apply E2 (another epistemic criteria that fits the purpose of explaining the previous use of and epistemic criteria.) How do we judge that E2 is true? After all it could be false or misapplied. We apply E3... and so on OK. So we judge a statement as true by comparing it to an infinite set of epistemic criteria (E') How do we judge that the choice of E' gives reliable results? We believe that it does. Belief is a state of mind. So, the short answer to O is that it is true if we believe it is true and false if we believe it is false. __________________ Now you may object to this by appealing to empirical criteria, but you will have to abandon the the above criteria for truth in order to construct an empirical method that supports it. Otherwise you're simply begging the question. --------------------------- So, you'll need to show that the above scheme is not a vicious regress or justify the regress by an independent method that itself does not lead to a regress. Specific enough for you? Edited by Gadfly II on 10/04/09 - 09:46 AM
Dare to use your own reason. Kant

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