New View On Induction: Philosophy Forums

Philosophy Forums » Philosophy of Science » New View On Induction » New View On Induction

New View On Induction
I'm Against Hume.

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6

New View On Induction

YadaYada
fool

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 12, 2004
Location: in the past

Total Topics: 5
Total Posts: 316

Posted 09/23/09 - 01:27 PM:	#41
Aetixintro wrote: >> Oh, so what, I write a new post. Well, let me drive in another nail into the coffin of "Hume's Custom or Habit". http://18th.eserver.org/hume-enquiry.html: Hume wrote: When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another; even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me, as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference. The reason for my interest in his knowledge of physics lies in this quote. I'm a little interested in snooker and there is no doubt that these people in the sport know what they're doing in playing those balls. There should be a very real possibility for constructing a machine that with a cue strikes a ball A with a given power into ball B and that the final position of ball B is known down to very minuteness even before the machine delivers the strike, ie. that the machine will be capable of doing this according to laws of nature. << First, the bolded portion of your post suggests that you are a Newtonian determinist rather than a Baconian empiricist. So you are nothing like Hume, and this is why you have a problem with Hume. You're expecting the world to be entirely determined by laws, just because there are some laws that are actually predictive most of the time. The sad truth is that laws can only predict curved lines on a graph paper, or the expected behavior of imaginary point particles with postulated masses acted upon by postulated forces. That is what physics does. It mathematically deduces what would happen if certain concepts would actually exist under some ideal set of conditions. After that, it is up to you and me to guess (inductively infer) whether the hot air balloon will rise or fall depending on this or that law of physics. In the end, it does what it does. What Hume said is that there are laws, such as Newton's action-reaction that predict ideal behavior, and there is the actual world of experience, which will approximate the law's prediction. But the two will never, never-ever, not once, exactly match. Newton knew this, so here, Hume said nothing new. However, you're right, Hume could have picked a more forceful, more convincing example. Imagine the following variation: Line up 10 balls in a circle. Now, what kind of machine could you think of that will aim the cue ball at the first so it will knock it into the second, and so on, until the tenth is knocked into the corner pocket? The shot would need to be more accurate than the original example by a factor of 10,000,000,000. A molecular irregularity would throw off the shot. Edited by YadaYada on 09/23/09 - 01:45 PM
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

Aetixintro
Concepts and descriptions

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Jul 12, 2008

Total Topics: 33
Total Posts: 386

Posted 09/23/09 - 03:16 PM:	#42
YadaYada From my quote of Hume there's no such entailment of the kind of accuracy that you are writing about here: "What Hume said is that there are laws, such as Newton's action-reaction that predict ideal behavior, and there is the actual world of experience, which will approximate the law's prediction. But the two will never, never-ever, not once, exactly match. Newton knew this, so here, Hume said nothing new." Given ordinary good conditions or improved laboratory conditions for the machine and ball A, B, the accuracy is good enough to counter what Hume writes in this quote. Besides, you'll have to quote Hume where he issues this relationship to Newton or the relationship of the laws in nature. YadaYada wrote: First, the bolded portion of your post suggests that you are a Newtonian determinist rather than a Baconian empiricist. So you are nothing like Hume, and this is why you have a problem with Hume. You're expecting the world to be entirely determined by laws, just because there are some laws that are actually predictive most of the time. I have no need to be placed in any other group than Scientific Realist. I'm not sure about the "lawfulness" regarding the human mind, but, yes, "necessary connections in nature" or "laws of nature" are at least largely determining the world. I don't know exactly how far I can take it, but there's more than enough to take down induction. YadaYada wrote: The sad truth is that laws can only predict curved lines on a graph paper, or the expected behavior of imaginary point particles with postulated masses acted upon by postulated forces. That is what physics does. It mathematically deduces what would happen if certain concepts would actually exist under some ideal set of conditions. After that, it is up to you and me to guess (inductively infer) whether the hot air balloon will rise or fall depending on this or that law of physics. In the end, it does what it does. I don't need to point to certain laws of physics or the rest of science, I'm only referring to "necessary connections in nature" or "laws of nature". This is a part of the strength of my argument. YadaYada wrote: However, you're right, Hume could have picked a more forceful, more convincing example. I'd really like Hume to write that whole book concerning the external world, to be any good. I take you to interpret Hume in an external or all-encompassing skepticism while I believe Hume is drawing up internal skepticism hence the title of the two works relevant here, but so be it. I believe my argument can take the criticism there is! YadaYada wrote: Imagine the following variation: Line up 10 balls in a circle. Now, what kind of machine could you think of that will aim the cue ball at the first so it will knock it into the second, and so on, until the tenth is knocked into the corner pocket? The shot would need to be more accurate than the original example by a factor of 10,000,000,000. A molecular irregularity would throw off the shot. Edit: I believe this is rubbish, that the force vectors... and so. I believe this is an example more relevant to theoretical physics than my instances of possible, normal, (human) accuracy. I don't need to respond to it in order to preserve my argument. I believe I'm also unable to make an inference of what it's supposed to mean or be until (where we are now) the computer age and computer simulations where one is first forced to get by a "world" of issues before one is finally at its solution. That is, the math and physics (and what else) involved don't throw out my argument, there's just a longer chain of matters to negotiate. I'm still good! Cheers! Edited by Aetixintro on 09/28/09 - 09:12 AM
Efficacy of "for since it is at present manifest to me that even bodies are not properly known by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding alone" - Descartes, Meditation II I'm always wanting more, Anything I haven't got, Everything, I want it all, I just can't stop - The Cure, Want

Cadrache
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Dec 09, 2006
Location: AB, Canada

Total Topics: 104
Total Posts: 2644

Posted 09/23/09 - 04:02 PM:	#43
How large is the inner circumference of the circle formed by the 10 balls? (ie. bigger/smaller then the cue ball?) Oh... bleh, nmind. Alls you do is place the first ball against one of the sides of the pool table and then jump shot over the circle so that your ball hits the outside portion of the first ball. This would direct 2 force waves around the circle. Then your 10th ball should spit out of the circle at 90 degrees from the tangents. The rest is mere angle calculation of the 1st ball touching the side of the pool table so that 90 degrees of the tangent is pointing directly to a corner pocket. Edited by Cadrache on 09/23/09 - 04:14 PM
"...There was a writer who asked why it was that when we find positive experiences we say that only the physical facts are real, but in negative experiences we believe that reality is subjective. He made an example of those who say that in birth only the pain is real, the joy a subjective point of view, but that in death it is the emotional loss that is the reality." - Tony Ballantyne, Recursion. _____________________________________________ Truth is want. - The internal state of matters. Truth is Need. - The external state of affairs.

YadaYada
fool

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 12, 2004
Location: in the past

Total Topics: 5
Total Posts: 316

Posted 09/24/09 - 06:35 AM:	#44
OK. Let me try it another way. Inductive logic is like deductive logic except that one or more premises are missing. What that does is to make the conclusion possibly true if the remaining premises are true. This possibility can be expressed as a probability that is different for different inductive arguments. In real life, there are countless occasions when a string of similar objects, facts, or events are experienced. We naturally generalize all the time to classes of objects, facts, or events based on single or a few experiences. If we did not do that, we could not survive. Hume said that this kind of generalization is inductive. Then he argued that the use of induction cannot by justified by either deductive logic or inductive logic. Which means that while use of induction in generalization may be unavoidable, it lacks definite justification and certainty. So Humean knowledge, which is derived solely from personal experience, is inherently wide-ranging, but uncertain. This raised a second problem, directed mainly at empirical science, but also at Galilean/Newtonian mathematical deductive science. Which is that even scientifically objective observations cannot be generalized as facts or laws with certainty. The upshot is that realists who insist on the existence of a single, comprehensive, coherent reality, are left without an epistemological ground to stand on. The rest of us think that science is already probabilistic, and that is just the way the world should be seen.
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

Aetixintro
Concepts and descriptions

Usergroup: Sponsors
Joined: Jul 12, 2008

Total Topics: 33
Total Posts: 386

Posted 09/24/09 - 07:56 AM:	#45
YadaYada, I see that you're historical... You know I've made my decisions on the historical matters. The history is just not the point in this thread. Are you going to respond to my posts and stop dodging? Edit: Fun note. I've posed the question "What do you go by in your life in regarding f.x. the sunrise tomorrow, "lawfulness in nature" or "Hume's Custom or Habit"?" to some people and the "lawfulness" is winning, not that it matters to any degree. Edited by Aetixintro on 09/24/09 - 08:10 AM
Efficacy of "for since it is at present manifest to me that even bodies are not properly known by the senses nor by the faculty of imagination, but by the understanding alone" - Descartes, Meditation II I'm always wanting more, Anything I haven't got, Everything, I want it all, I just can't stop - The Cure, Want

Cadrache
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Dec 09, 2006
Location: AB, Canada

Total Topics: 104
Total Posts: 2644

Posted 09/24/09 - 10:43 AM:	#46
=D I agree with the statement concerning accuracy YadaYada, but I need to question the conclusion. Degrees of accuracy. If you have a degree range of +/- 7 for accuracy; you cannot argue that the actual form of whatever function you are looking at is not with 1/1000ths range of accuracy - simply because another methodology claims that you must have more accuracy.
"...There was a writer who asked why it was that when we find positive experiences we say that only the physical facts are real, but in negative experiences we believe that reality is subjective. He made an example of those who say that in birth only the pain is real, the joy a subjective point of view, but that in death it is the emotional loss that is the reality." - Tony Ballantyne, Recursion. _____________________________________________ Truth is want. - The internal state of matters. Truth is Need. - The external state of affairs.

YadaYada
fool

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 12, 2004
Location: in the past

Total Topics: 5
Total Posts: 316

Posted 09/24/09 - 07:20 PM:	#47
Cadrache wrote: Degrees of accuracy. If you have a degree range of +/- 7 for accuracy; you cannot argue that the actual form of whatever function you are looking at is not with 1/1000ths range of accuracy - simply because another methodology claims that you must have more accuracy. I am trying to point out that there are different sorts of knowledge, and that these can be quite incompatible in their properties. Knowledge of laws does not in any logical way permit an attack on empirical knowledge. The two are quite distinct. For example, I can walk (or roll down) a cow pasture in a lawful predictable manner. But there is no function to predict when I will step into a cowpie, because there is missing information about the distribution and density (probability) of cowpies there. ~~~ The property of accuracy is only applicable to empirical (observational, experimental) knowledge. In theory, without the notion of accuracy, Newton's laws allow perfect prediction, either forward or backward, of the direction of any number of billiard balls. But empirically, probabilistic deviation from the lawful prediction must always be taken into account. So the range of accuracy is arbitrary. I can always increase the requirement, if necessary all the way down to the quantum level simply by adding some more balls. Then a realist, especially a Platonic realist, has no possible counter-argument because the concept of accuracy is missing from his vocabulary. A related logical issue is that Newtonian science is based on continuous math whereas Hume's is discrete probabilistic math. Edited by YadaYada on 09/24/09 - 07:25 PM
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

Cadrache
Tenured Poster

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Dec 09, 2006
Location: AB, Canada

Total Topics: 104
Total Posts: 2644

Posted 09/25/09 - 02:31 PM:	#48
What happens when you argue instead of "different sort of knowledge" - you instead claim different sort of concept? What then happens when you have say, newtonian concepts and quantum concepts? At what point do concepts have no phenomenic nor noumetic 'nodes'? Or relational congruence? For example: Changing the human component to a robotic component does not change the desired conceptual outcome.
"...There was a writer who asked why it was that when we find positive experiences we say that only the physical facts are real, but in negative experiences we believe that reality is subjective. He made an example of those who say that in birth only the pain is real, the joy a subjective point of view, but that in death it is the emotional loss that is the reality." - Tony Ballantyne, Recursion. _____________________________________________ Truth is want. - The internal state of matters. Truth is Need. - The external state of affairs.

YadaYada
fool

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 12, 2004
Location: in the past

Total Topics: 5
Total Posts: 316

Posted 09/26/09 - 04:35 PM:	#49
Cadrache wrote: What happens when you ... claim different sort of concept? I'm not sure how to comment on that because I don't know what happens. My idea of concepts is as the connnection between thought and language, between what is psychological and what is social. Concepts are intermediary between the two. Then there is the practical, applicational aspect. Concepts vary from field to field, and by context. And some concepts must be inborn, not learned, as can be judged by the behavior of animals. So this is a very broad and complex topic in both psychology and philosophy of mind. For example: Changing the human component to a robotic component does not change the desired conceptual outcome. How is there a robotic component?
{}{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{ . . . }{}{}{}{}{ . . . We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates ~ Aristotle

MarchHare
Graduate

Usergroup: Members
Joined: Jun 23, 2009

Total Topics: 4
Total Posts: 190

Posted 09/27/09 - 01:48 AM:	#50
Aetixintro wrote: I think logic, for example, reflects lawfulness of nature and so I infer that if nature exists somewhere, it has to conform to logic as we perceive it. It can't be any different. So, to lay this out clearly: 1. Logic reflects the lawfulness of nature 2. Therefore if nature exists somewhere, it has to conform to logic. Presumably you mean that what is logical is determined by the lawfulness of nature (as opposed to thinking that logic inevitably corresponds with nature, which would make empirical science redundant) but that just begs the question against Hume. How do you know that nature is lawful? Induction. What is the method under questioning? Induction. "Aetixintro" wrote: Clearly, the laws of nature can't be suspended. But Hume's entire problem rests on questioning WHY they can't be suspended, ie. WHAT is our basis for thinking the universe isn't chaotic. Saying that "clearly they can't" is like answering the Euthyphro dilemma "Clearly both are true."
Doubt requires a reason to doubt. Nothing is immune from potential doubt. The correct response to a question isn't always to try to give the question's answer.

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Sorry, you don't have permission to post. Log in, or register if you haven't yet.