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Wittgenstein on the moon
"...is there then no objective truth?"

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Wittgenstein on the moon

brainpharte
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Posted 08/12/09 - 07:03 AM:	#41
Gadfly II wrote: You're missing my point. I do that a lot. Actually I suspected that I was missing your point. Perhaps I still do not grasp it. The fact that people are certain of propositions DESPITE accepting epistemic criteria is sufficient to reject the notion that certainty is a function of epistemic criteria. Simply saying that people are being willful is not an exception to the rule. Granting willfulness demonstrates the independence of our attitudes from our epistemic criteria and this is fatal to the assertion that certainty is a function of epistemic criteria. The notion of certainty as people use it is vague or ambiguous, and has quite different meanings in different contexts. I think that in all cases some amount and degree of epistemic criteria are involved. But sometimes it's clear that people mean that they "feel" certain about something--which incorporates a strong emotional/psychological or subjective intuitional component or personal prejudices or sloppy reasoning, etc. which may or may not be consistent with what their epistemic criteria requires--while other times people mean that the claim at issue has met the epistemic criteria they've applied to it independently of their own emotions, wishes, ideological preferences, biases, etc. W's certainty in his moon example is more like the latter--achieved by applying the epistemic criteria that he deems appropriate and accepting the result independently of his own personal wishes, biases, preferences, etc. Bracketing our own personal ideological preferences, biases, emotions, wishes, etc. and sticking to the protocol of the epistemic criteria is more or less what people have long called "being objective" and has been the hallmark of science research. But we have to be trained and learn to evaluate claims this way, because all indications are that incorporating our personal beliefs, emotions, wishes, biases, intuitions etc. is our default mode.
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

Gadfly II
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Posted 08/12/09 - 12:08 PM:	#42
brainpharte wrote: I do that a lot. Actually I suspected that I was missing your point. Perhaps I still do not grasp it. I think you're doing fine. I've covered this territory before, and our conversation has helped me better understand what's going on here. You might find it helpful to read or reread G.E. Moore's Proof of an External World. This is what W. is responding to in On Certainty. I've been approaching this from the POV that both Moore and Wittgenstein are claiming that the skeptic can't get started. So, even though we can't give an answer to the skeptic that he would accept, the arguments raised don't constitute a reason to doubt our initial assumptions about the world. This is the POV that I missed when I first read these two works. It is a very subtle point, so don't beat yourself up for needing time to digest it. It's taken me two years and three read throughs to get to where I am now. And helping you through it has really forced me to articulate some things that I've left vague for a long time. In fact, I take a lot of what you and Human wrote earlier to be skeptical objections. When I realized that I could never give an answer that would stop the next, "but what about..." it became clear that Moore's argument does not refute the skeptic, but it does give us reason to take the skeptic less seriously. brainpharte wrote: The notion of certainty as people use it is vague or ambiguous, and has quite different meanings in different contexts. (How very Wittgensteinian of you ) Yeah,there are a lot of intentional issues tied up in this, but since we are focused on certainty we can't accept vagueness or ambiguity. Where it is vague we need to clarify, and where it is ambiguous we need to draw distinctions. Otherwise, we aren't engaged in philosophy.
Dare to use your own reason. Kant

brainpharte
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Posted 08/12/09 - 01:21 PM:	#43
Gadfly II wrote: (How very Wittgensteinian of you ) Yeah,there are a lot of intentional issues tied up in this, but since we are focused on certainty we can't accept vagueness or ambiguity. Where it is vague we need to clarify, and where it is ambiguous we need to draw distinctions. Otherwise, we aren't engaged in philosophy. I have suggested that anyone can clarify to all the world what he means when he asserts that a claim is "certain" simply by making his standards for justification--his epistemic criteria--explicit. Why does this not resolve the issue? What else do you conceive can be done or said about what anyone means when he says he is "certain" that is not covered by his epistemic criteria--which he may not be explicitly aware of, and which may even include such things as revelation, tradition, intuition, strong emotions, personal preferences, chance, habit, dreams ... ?
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

Human5678
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Posted 08/12/09 - 07:14 PM:	#44
Gadfly II wrote: I think you're doing fine. I've covered this territory before, and our conversation has helped me better understand what's going on here. You might find it helpful to read or reread G.E. Moore's Proof of an External World. This is what W. is responding to in On Certainty. I've been approaching this from the POV that both Moore and Wittgenstein are claiming that the skeptic can't get started. So, even though we can't give an answer to the skeptic that he would accept, the arguments raised don't constitute a reason to doubt our initial assumptions about the world. You may be aware of this, but i'll just refresh. I think it would be more appropriate to extend the issue to Kant's comments in the preface to the 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. i.e. ...it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of cognition for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. Moore's challenge was with reference to the above. As for Wittgenstein's view on certainty, we need to take into account his philosophical views and how they changed during his lifetime. In the early Wittgenstein, he was very certain on certainty based on a very dogmatist grip of analytical philosophy. He was declared to be a sort of supergenius of philosophy at one time, but suddenly he just gave up philosophy. I think he started there is nothing else to learn about philosophy, but it would appear he had reached the limit of his own knowledge at that time. When Wittgenstein came back to philosophy after many years, he would have acquired a greater maturity in philosophical knowledge with a better understanding of human nature and its interaction with reality. Wittgenstein countered Moore's challenge, and after we read the first few paras of 'On Certainy', we are given an inkling that he had changed his mind on the analytical concept of certainty, i.e. propositional certainty. After reading all the 676 paragraphs a few times, it is quite clear on the type of certainty, W is talking about.

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Posted 08/13/09 - 07:48 AM:	#45
brainpharte wrote: I have suggested that anyone can clarify to all the world what he means when he asserts that a claim is "certain" simply by making his standards for justification--his epistemic criteria--explicit. Why does this not resolve the issue? Well, I've already demonstrated earlier that certainty and epistemic criteria are independent. But, clearly certainty is not arbitrary. another reason I think that the issue is not resolved is that we are certain of things that can not survive a skeptical demand for justification. "here is a hand" for example. The skeptic can go into the Cartesian litany of dreaming and error and eventually we have to admit that we can not provide an explicit epistemic criteria for our certainty about the existence of our hand. ( it will probably satisfy us but that is not the point). The solution, from Moore's POV is that the skeptic has to provide reason to doubt in the first place, before we can take his objections seriously. From Wittgenstein's POV, I think he is agreeing with Moore that the skeptic can't get started, but the reason is that certainty is part of our linguistic behavior. Certainty plays a role in our linguistic behavior. (I'm avoiding the phrase "language game," because I think it is misleading). After all, at bottom, Hume was right. There is no logical step between our past experience and future events, but that doesn't vitiate the role that certainty plays in our grammar (as W. would say). brainpharte wrote: What else do you conceive can be done or said about what anyone means when he says he is "certain" that is not covered by his epistemic criteria--which he may not be explicitly aware of, and which may even include such things as revelation, tradition, intuition, strong emotions, personal preferences, chance, habit, dreams ... ? I don't know. for myself, I think it is sufficient to realize that certainty is a mental state and not a feature of a proposition. As such, certainty has nothing to do with epistemology. I said earlier that there were intentional issues here and I'm not clear about the role of intentionality regarding either language or mind. so, I guess we're in the same boat. Hey Human, instead of outlining a course on On Certainty, why don't you enlighten us as to what W. is trying to say about certainty? That would be helpful.
Dare to use your own reason. Kant

ade90212
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Posted 08/13/09 - 09:36 AM:	#46
brainpharte wrote: What else do you conceive can be done or said about what anyone means when he says he is "certain" that is not covered by his epistemic criteria... Having read through the above thread, I am still not really sure what you mean by this. Every time I walk down the road, my behaviour shows that I am certain that the ground will not crumble beneath my feet. Every time I way along a rocky cliff my behaviour shows that I am not certain of my footing, I doubt the integrity of the ground beneath me. I can sort of see what you are driving at with regards to 'epistemic criteria' regarding the second case. But does this mean that in the first case you could identify 'epistemic criteria' in virtue of which I am justified in being certain of the sureness of the ground? It seems to me that you cannot. I am not even aware of that certainty, until it is pointed out to me (or I am 'doing philosophy'). You have rather put the cart before the horse on this one, I think. In our everyday life, it is not our certainty that we justify but rather our uncertainty. In general, one acts with certainty. It is only afterwards that we try to 'justify' that certainty and give it some sort of mythical status. The question is not 'Why be cartain?', but rather 'Why doubt?'
"Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up "What's that?" - It happened like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several times and said: "this is a man", "this is a house", etc. And then the child makes some marks too and asks: what's this then?" - Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value

brainpharte
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Posted 08/13/09 - 10:58 AM:	#47
Gadfly II wrote: Well, I've already demonstrated earlier that certainty and epistemic criteria are independent. A person's certainty can be a function of epistemic criteria, but also be influenced by emotional, psychological, personal preferences ... . Epistemic criteria need not be the only factors or even the determining factors, but still be factors in a judgment of certainty. If we ask anyone for their reasons for being cretain of something, they inevitably provide what amount to epistemic factors—typically empirical evidence and logical inferences. Note that I am not claiming what certainty "is." I am claiming that the aspect of certainty that we can meaningfully and usefully understand is their judgment that the claim at issue has met their epistemic criteria—and that these can be explicitly revealed or can be analyzed and logically inferred. All speculation about what other subjective influences are involved in that particular judgment (emotions, psychological, personal preferences, etc.), typically are too contentious to be useful. The epistemic criteria can be made public, and we all can refer to them to convince others about why they should accept a claim. But, clearly certainty is not arbitrary. another reason I think that the issue is not resolved is that we are certain of things that can not survive a skeptical demand for justification. That kind of skeptic's demand for justification just amounts to a dispute about the sufficiency of the epistemic criteria to warrant a judgment of certainty about the claim at issue. Since there are no universally agreed upon criteria that claims have to meet to qualify as "certain" truth, use of the term is up for grabs. But this dispute is remedied simply by dropping talk about "certain", and discussing what criteria the claim can meet or fail to meet. If the claimant wants to assert that the criteria the claim has met renders the claim "certain" and the skeptic is aware of what criteria have been met, then "certain" is merely a stipulated redundancy, and the substantive dispute is resolved. "here is a hand" for example. The skeptic can go into the Cartesian litany of dreaming and error and eventually we have to admit that we can not provide an explicit epistemic criteria for our certainty about the existence of our hand. ( it will probably satisfy us but that is not the point). The solution, from Moore's POV is that the skeptic has to provide reason to doubt in the first place, before we can take his objections seriously. I think all the skeptic has to do is to ask for clarification about how the "certainty" at issue is determined, how it is distinguished from not-certainty. When is it not philosophically appropriate to ask for an explanation and clarification of what someone means by a term or concept they are using? I don't know. for myself, I think it is sufficient to realize that certainty is a mental state and not a feature of a proposition. I agree. As I see it, certainty is a judgment. But I think we can analyze the judgmennt and differentiate an epistemic aspect (the criteria) from whatever else is involved (subjective, perhaps unconscious aspects.) And the epistemic criteria can be made public, empirically demonstrated and/or rationally analyzed. Edited by brainpharte on 08/13/09 - 11:04 AM
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

brainpharte
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Posted 08/13/09 - 12:17 PM:	#48
ade90212 wrote: brainpharte wrote: What else do you conceive can be done or said about what anyone means when he says he is "certain" that is not covered by his epistemic criteria... Having read through the above thread, I am still not really sure what you mean by this. Every time I walk down the road, my behaviour shows that I am certain that the ground will not crumble beneath my feet. Every time I way along a rocky cliff my behaviour shows that I am not certain of my footing, I doubt the integrity of the ground beneath me. I can sort of see what you are driving at with regards to 'epistemic criteria' regarding the second case. But does this mean that in the first case you could identify 'epistemic criteria' in virtue of which I am justified in being certain of the sureness of the ground? It seems to me that you cannot. I am not even aware of that certainty, until it is pointed out to me (or I am 'doing philosophy'). You have rather put the cart before the horse on this one, I think. In our everyday life, it is not our certainty that we justify but rather our uncertainty. In general, one acts with certainty. It is only afterwards that we try to 'justify' that certainty and give it some sort of mythical status. The question is not 'Why be cartain?', but rather 'Why doubt?' Other than for subjective emotional, psychological, or personal preference influences, we doubt because the claim at issue has not met whatever epistemic criteria we think it should have to meet to qualify as true. If we have no reason to doubt a claim it is because that claim has met whatever epistemic criteria we think it should have to meet. And we claim to be certain when we are convinced that the claim indisputably meets those criteria. Everyday epistemic criteria are tacit, seldom explicitly articulated or even consciously identified. The most rypical everyday epistemic criteria are some unspecified situational degree of empirical reliability and valid logical inference. We make such judgments on automatic pilot all day long, drawing on long-established empirical reliabilities and logical inferences. We don't stop and construct an argument about whether or not the ground will reliably support our next step, we simply automatically assume it will at a glance. But this assumption, if unpacked, will reveal that it is derived from long empirical experience. What else (besides subjective emotions, psychological factors, preferences, intuitions, etc.) is your certainty that a given claim is true based on other than demonstrated empirical reliability and/or logical inference that you believe to be valid? Likewise, if you doubted that claim would your doubt not be the result of the claim's inability to sufficiently meet these criteria? Edited by brainpharte on 08/13/09 - 12:23 PM
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

ade90212
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Posted 08/14/09 - 11:14 AM:	#49
brainpharte wrote: What else (besides subjective emotions, psychological factors, preferences, intuitions, etc.) is your certainty that a given claim is true based on other than demonstrated empirical reliability and/or logical inference that you believe to be valid? Why does it need to be based on anything? Wittgenstein's theme throughout the book is that as often as not we simply act, and that we need provide no justification or criteria to support our actions. One can be certain of something, that is one can act in a way that expresses certainty, without being able to (or wanting to) formulate any criteria in virtue of which we are certain. Would you say that a cat could be certain of the integrity of a floor? Or to put it the other way, would you say that a cat could doubt the integrity of a floor?
"Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up "What's that?" - It happened like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several times and said: "this is a man", "this is a house", etc. And then the child makes some marks too and asks: what's this then?" - Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value

brainpharte
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Posted 08/14/09 - 04:24 PM:	#50
ade90212 wrote: Why does it need to be based on anything? Wittgenstein's theme throughout the book is that as often as not we simply act, and that we need provide no justification or criteria to support our actions. One can be certain of something, that is one can act in a way that expresses certainty, without being able to (or wanting to) formulate any criteria in virtue of which we are certain. Would you say that a cat could be certain of the integrity of a floor? Or to put it the other way, would you say that a cat could doubt the integrity of a floor? Don't lmow about cats (nor clams, nor turnips, nor rocks) being certain or not. If someone's claim of certainty is not based on something then it must be arbitrary, no?. I suspect that we can meaningfully and usefully conceive of at least two kinds or modes of certainty. One being a conscious explicitly declared certainty about the truth or falsity of a particular claim, and the other being a tacit certainty that's an unconscious judgment we've made on automatic pilot drawing on long-established empirical reliabilities and logical inferences. This second mode or category of certainty is what we experience about the ground holding us up for our next step. Typically we don't consciously think about it at all, and I'm not sure it even makes sense to say we're certain of anything until we consciously think about it, but our brains are unconsciously processing lots of sense data regarding that step we're about to take and comparing that new data with past experience. You can get some sense of this if you try walking around on unfamiliar irregular ground with your eyes closed and your ears plugged. Note that even with these senses shut down your brain will continuously be processing empirical proprioceptive and tactile feedback, but any certainty you'd felt about your next step will be shaken in a short time. Note that when we walk around, the second our foot begins to touch down, our brain is judging whether or not that step should be continued, even before we shift all our weight onto that foot. WHo hasn't instantly pulled a foot back when the (empirical) information your brain has automatically and unconsciously processed indicates a problem with the surface we were about to step on? Edited by brainpharte on 08/14/09 - 04:31 PM
"I don't see much sense in that," said Rabbit. "No," said Pooh humbly, "there isn't. But there was going to be when I began it. It's just that something happened to it along the way."

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