The Frege Geach Objection to Emotivism/Non-Cognitivism: Philosophy Forums

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The Frege Geach Objection to Emotivism/Non-Cognitivism
Emotivism's trouble with complex moral statements.

The Frege Geach Objection to Emotivism/Non-Cognitivism

slap
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Posted 08/06/09 - 10:12 AM: Subject: The Frege Geach Objection to Emotivism/Non-Cognitivism	#1
Emotivism as represented classicly by Ayer offers a simple explanation of ethical statements, namley it claims that they are not really statements but rather expressions of emotions, or Boo-Rays. For Example: The ethical statement "lying is wrong" translates to: "Boo lying" Conversely the statement "lying is right" translates to: "Yay lying" Emotivism works extremelly well for these simple atomic sentences and offers a coherent explanation. It however runs into trouble with more complex ethical statements. Take for example the following argument: P1. Lying is wrong P2. If lying is wrong then it is wrong to make my brother lie C It is wrong to make my brother lie. According to the emotivist P1 is really just "Boo lying" likewise P2 must also be some emotion, what simple boo ray it is more compllcated but it seems obvious that the portion of P2 that says "lying is wrong" is a different expression of emotion. In otherwords the second lying is wrong means something different from the first. One might also claim that P2 is really just a different expression of emotion, something like "boo making my brother lie" if this was the case then the following argument wouldn't make sense(yet it seems to) as it uses an identical P2. P1B. Lying is not wrong P2. If lying is wrong it is wrong to make my brother lie CB. It is not wrong to make my brother lie. In this second argument P2 cannot simply be the same negative expression of an emotion, if it were then our second argument would not make sense, yet it seems to. In otherwords emotivism causes extreme problems in the philosophy of language, things which we take much more for granted than emotivism. The emotivists options: The worst response is to say "boo-indoctrination". I think we can all see why this is not a very good response The form of response is to explain a way that allows us to "speak like realists" about morality. By doing so we can then allow ourselves to maintain this moral modus ponens while still claiming ethical statements are expressions of emotion/attitudes. To do this we would need to create a logic of attitudes and Blackburn seems to be the foremost in this endevour. He has however run into many further problems in the philosophy of language/logic with this attempt. Bottom line is before we can invoke emotivism we must "earn truth" by explaining why it seems ok to speak like moral realists, this is something simple emotovism(the emotovism most encountered on this bored) fails to do.
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Posted 08/06/09 - 10:45 AM:	#2
Can you think about arguments about hypothetical emotional states as statements about how one should reasonably feel, or might expect to feel? For example: P1. Lying is wrong P2. If lying is wrong then it is wrong to make my brother lie C It is wrong to make my brother lie. Would be understood as: P1: I feel bad about lying P2: If I feel bad about lying, then I should reasonably feel bad about making my brother lie C: I should reasonably feel bad about making my brother lie So ethical statements are reports of your own feelings, while hypothetical ethical positions are reports of how think you should feel in whatever situations.

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Posted 08/06/09 - 10:52 AM:	#3
No. What you have done is created some evidence for the claim that your translation scheme from English to boo-ray fails with respect to conditionals. Regarding the first argument, its translation is: P1: Boo lying P2: Boo making my brother lie C: Boo making my brother lie (It is clear that your translation scheme is inadequate as it fails to distinguish conditionals.) Regarding the second: P1B: Yay lying P2: Boo making my brother lie CB: ? Maybe you could conclude that the speaker doesn't think of his brother as he does other potential liars. But your CB follows from P1B and the existence of your brother, only. Anyway, we already have truth. To encourage others to earn it would be philosophical propaganda. Edited by Incision on 08/06/09 - 01:48 PM. Reason: added capitals

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Posted 08/06/09 - 11:08 AM:	#4
This is the first I've heard of this problem so forgive me if my comments are simple. What I see happening is the translation of ethical statements into simple expressions of emotion, and the problem arising from this is that one cannot use the same simple expression of emotion to translate the same sentence in two different lines of logical reasoning. The reason I feel that this becomes a problem is 1. It does not follow from the fact that ethical statements are really only expressions of emotion that one ethical statement should mean only one kind of emotional expression and be translatable into just one expression. 2. A logical argument assumes that its premises are in agreeance with the rules of logic. Emotions are not necessarily logically derived. For this reason I am unsure as to whether emotional expressions are even appropriate as premises of a logical argument.

slap
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Posted 08/06/09 - 12:04 PM:	#5
Thats ok eallsup, I made that objection the first time I read it to. I still think the following might work for the emotovist: P1. I believe that I believe that lying is wrong P2. If I believe that I believe that lying is wrong then I believe that I believe that making my brother lie is wrong C I believe that I believe that making my brother lie is wrong. Of course this might not work out and is a bit strange. Although I do think it might be a possible avenue of a response. One could say that we have beliefs about our emotional states, and it seems uncontroversial that most people confuse their "emotions" with beliefs(assuming emotivism is true). In this case I would not actually believe that "lying is wrong" but I would "believe that I believe lying is wrong". From here I could reason to other things that I believe that I believe. This would be biting the bullet, but would explain why we think it is approporiate to use a "moral modus ponens". As for your point 2 it has the taste of gunpowder. I am saying look it seems like people can reason this way, and your saying no they can't because emotivism says they can't(in a more eloquent and complex way than that of course).
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