Will AI robots ever be conscious?: Philosophy Forums

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Will AI robots ever be conscious?

mway
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Posted 10/29/09 - 06:10 PM:	#121
Mijin wrote: Absolutely, but that has not been shown. Effectively, that the mind is not a program, is a conclusion of the chinese room argument, not a premise. The belief that the brain is a computer and the mind a program, is a popular one, and the chinese room argument is trying to persuade us that perhaps this is not the case. The other analogy I like to use, is imagining humans acting as neurons. I can't remember the classic version of this thought experiment, but put it like this: Let's say there are as many people in the world as neurons in a brain. Every human is then tasked with pretending to be a neuron. Receiving inputs and sending outputs identical with the axon/dendrite connections of a real brain. Now, is this mass brain conscious? If I send a strong input to some of the guys in the pain centres of this giant brain, does this entity "suffer"? You're still not quite there. In your example replace neurons with 1's and 0's and replace consciousness with software. The point is that all of your examples start with the premise that consciousness cannot be software, while mine starts with the premise that it is. The difference between our views is that the mind as software requires no new assumptions, and explains consciousness mechanically. Your examples do require new assumptions, specifically that the humans are somehow different to machines. You don't have to explain what the difference is, the fact that you pose a difference adds an unnecessary assumption. Occams Razor.
Lame is to Wav, as the Brain is to Reality.

Mijin
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 10/29/09 - 06:35 PM:	#122
mway wrote: You're still not quite there. I'm certainly not where I want to be: in a place where you actually respond to the points I make. It doesn't seem like you've considered my thought experiment at all. Try answering the questions (yes, originally meant rhetorically) that I posed at the end of my last post. In your example replace neurons with 1's and 0's and replace consciousness with software. So in my example, I should replace neurons (data/information-processing units within the brain), with 1s and 0s (data). And I should replace consciousness (a feature of the mind) with software (programs). I can't make any sense of that at all. What's your point? The point is that all of your examples start with the premise that consciousness cannot be software Absolutely not, I've made this point several times now. Thought experiments like mine, and the Chinese Room are arguing for the proposition that the mind is not a computer program. They do not assume it, they conclude it. As I said, you can disagree with the Chinese Room, there have been some interesting counter-arguments to it, but accusing it of making an assumption that it does not is invalid. , while mine starts with the premise that it is. Right, and that premise that you're starting with is pretty much the primary point of contention on this thread. The difference between our views is that the mind as software requires no new assumptions, and explains consciousness mechanically. In what sense does it "explain" consciousness? I refer you back to my thought experiment of a "worldwide consciousness" and I ask again: Is this mass brain conscious? If I stimulate its pain centres, does it suffer?

Kamerynn
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Posted 10/29/09 - 10:10 PM:	#123
mway wrote: You just contradicted yourself. Firstly you accept the chinese room, and then you go and say "how can we even know that other people aren't just acting". That isn't a contradiction. Questions aren't propositions; they don't contradict propositions. mway wrote: My example stated the the human brain could be used in the same way as the computer in the chinese room experiment. This means you have to make an assumption that humans are different to machines for the experiment to hold. OR please. I can't put it any simpler then that. You clearly didn't bother to comprehend my responses. That a computer can act as if it understands (or is in pain) is not sufficient to show that it actually understands (or is in pain). I can't put it any simpler than that. Also, the Chinese room argument isn't an experiment. You also haven't answered my questions. It appears that you aren't even trying; you're just quoting a big block of text and making a proclamation, pretending that it addresses everything I've written. Again, "that it can actually be in pain, and not just act like it, is something that you are assuming." I am not assuming that humans are different from machines. I am observing that a human acting as if she is in pain is different from her actually being in pain. I am waiting for you to do some reasoning that shows how we know machines aren't just acting as if. I'm not going to hold my breath, however.
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

Kelby
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Posted 10/30/09 - 11:51 AM:	#124
kamerynn wrote: I am observing that a human acting as if she is in pain is different from her actually being in pain. How is this an observation? Mirror neurons sure contest to the above statement.

Odin
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Posted 10/30/09 - 02:10 PM:	#125
The Chinese Room thing is an annoying example of psuedo-logic. The only difference is a human creates its own program for translating language, while the computer is given one. Once the computer is programmed to "learn," by combination of its sensory inputs and logic, it will be no different than a human. It DOES presuppose dualism at a minimum as MWay said. A human being, like a computer, thinks through mathematical formulations. The fact that we're better at it than what we've been able to create doesn't prove anything.

Mijin
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 10/30/09 - 10:00 PM:	#126
Kelby wrote: How is this an observation? Mirror neurons sure contest to the above statement. Not really. Mirror neurons are neurons that fire whether a person is doing an action, or watching another person do that same action (though some neuroscientists dispute whether we can even conclude that much). They have nothing to do with the difference between feeling something and pretending to feel something. Anyway, surely you aren't trying to argue that acting as though in pain, and being in pain, are one and the same? That would be such a daft proposition that I'm going to give you the benefit of the doubt and assume you're not saying that. Odin wrote: The only difference is a human creates its own program for translating language, while the computer is given one. Once the computer is programmed to "learn," by combination of its sensory inputs and logic, it will be no different than a human. The Chinese Room argument doesn't say that humans can learn language better than a computer. And yes of course a computer can use a learning algorithm. But you're saying that such a program is "no different" to a human. The Chinese Room is an argument for why, in fact, there is a difference between the two systems regardless of their external performance. You're simply asserting the opposite of the conclusion of the Chinese Room argument. It DOES presuppose dualism at a minimum as MWay said. But as I've asked MWay, and as yet received no answer, How does it presuppose Dualism? Where does Dualism enter the argument? A human being, like a computer, thinks through mathematical formulations. You've shown your hand with this statement. Such a belief obviously has no empirical support, and is in fact very counter-intuitive. When I see a delicious meal in front of me, and decide to eat, what mathematical formulae have gone through my mind? (Cue painfully-contrived attempt to shoe horn mathematics into the scenario)

ssu
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Posted 10/31/09 - 12:08 AM:	#127
Odin wrote: A human being, like a computer, thinks through mathematical formulations. The fact that we're better at it than what we've been able to create doesn't prove anything. If you mean by "mathematical formulations" the use of any kinds of functions or algorithms, this is obviously false because it would imply that the incompleteness results (here especially Turings results) are not true. In short, there is uncomputability. And an example of an uncomputable problem that still has an answer is easy to give. Turings (and Gödels) results use in some way or another negative self-refence without resulting a paradoxical result. What you can do with algorithm is hence limited in nature. If you think otherwise, then tell us the algorithm with which you can count the real numbers. After all, every real number is either bigger or smaller than other real numbers so that shouldn't be so difficult? Edited by ssu on 10/31/09 - 12:33 AM

Slipstick Libby
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Posted 11/01/09 - 10:49 PM:	#128
ssu wrote: So in your view a single cell organism with metabolic processes has awareness and a subjective experience? Interaction with the outside world or responsiveness does not mean being conscious about oneself. As I said, the whole thing how we define consciousness differs and the concept is vague. Amoebas that move away from harmful substances are demonstrating the same sort of consciousness we attribute to other organisms much larger than them. Still the point that I try to make holds: the study often concentrates on the brain and with that the focus tends to be on the structure of the brain. (Not always, of course.) It isn't the materials that matter. Its the organization. How the materials are arranged to compose a specific structure. Hell, the materials themselves are arrangements of smaller materials. Perhaps I can make my point more clear with the following example: a scientist that does not know anything about flying tries to explain why an aeroplane is like it is and why it moves as it does. Hence he looks at what the plane is made of, how it is built and becomes an expert on metallurgy. Yet his vast knowledge about materials and metallurgy doesn't explain the overall structure of the plane if he doesn't really take an interest in the operating environment: air. Many questions simply cannot be answered by just looking at what the plane is made of. Aerodynamics for instance gives a lot of answers to many questions why the plane is built as it is. Yet aerodynamics is not something directly related to metallurgy. Now here the scientist still might well succeed if only he broadens his scope of inquiry to the operating environment as air is also made from atoms and quite physical. But here with the study of consciousness a thing called "language" isn't made from atoms. In your view language is but folds in our brains. So obviously something quite physical, right? OK, well tell me about the affects of language on our behaviour just looking at folds in the brain. The simple fact is just by looking at folds in the brain one cannot answer many questions about the effects that language have on our behaviour and consciousness. That "everything is in our folds of our brains" simply doesn't answer many questions as the fact that "aeroplanes are made from various metals, wood and other materials" doesn't give an answer to a vast number of questions about aeroplanes even if it is correct. Observing the structure of the brain is not simply observing what the brain is made out of. You made my point with this paragraph. One doesn't need just to know what a plane is made out of to learn how it flies. One could possibly examine the shape/arrangement of the plane to learn how it flies. Language is an arrangement of atoms, not the atoms themselves. Just like an ocean is not H20. Following the point that statement is in response to, you speak of the inadequacies of science to interpret the structure of the brain. That doesn't mean that it is not interpretable. Simply because we currently lack the understanding does not mean it cannot be understood. Saying "It may not be the ink on the paper or the movement of air, but the folds in our brains." does not mean that language is the material which is folded. Instead I'm saying that language is the fold itself. Physicalism is part of materialism. Here I am referring to a very generalized philosophical view (materialism vs. dualism etc). But physicalism goes well too. I beg to differ. Materialism disregards observations of radiation, energy, and quantum theory. Physicalism, however does not. Well, without interaction with the outside world you wouldn't have consciousness, would you? Elaborate. I have experiences that are not caused by the outside world but instead are caused by myself. Its called dreaming. Again the view of physicalism? What is physicalist about that? OK, let me try to say what I meant. Can you say how you behave in certain occasions, like if it is cold outside? I presume you can: you perhaps put warmer clothes on if you go outside. There's a simple "program of behaviour": colder weather, warmer clothes. But of course you can change your behaviour: you don't cope with the colder environment by clothing, but for instance by using a car when going out. Here the way approached the problem is different. Depends. "It is cold outside" doesn't exactly encompass all of the conditions that could possibly be present. Suppose I already have warm clothes on. Suppose I have no reason to go outside. Suppose I'm used to cold weather. Suppose I'm drunk and the blood in my body is thin. Suppose I have a bad diet and my blood is thick.

Kamerynn
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Posted 11/02/09 - 03:28 AM:	#129
An interesting post, Libby. Although language is a favorite topic of mine, I'm going to refrain from commenting on those aspects of your post. What I want to focus on is the following: Slipstick Libby wrote: Amoebas that move away from harmful substances are demonstrating the same sort of consciousness we attribute to other organisms much larger than them. They are certainly acting in a way that is consistent with them being conscious. However, there is an assumption implicit in the idea that their behavior then demonstrates their consciousness. The very same assumption would lead us from seeing someone pretend to be in pain to the belief that they actually are in pain. I'm not saying that amoeba aren't conscious; I'm saying that I'm not sure if they are. They could be acting as if. Slipstick Libby wrote: It isn't the materials that matter. Its the organization. How the materials are arranged to compose a specific structure. Hell, the materials themselves are arrangements of smaller materials. It depends on what you mean. Molecules can be arranged in particular fashions, resulting in solidity, liquidity, or gaseousness. However, the emergent properties of those solids, liquids, or gases will depend on the element (the material) and not just the organization. Of course, in the end, all elements are just different arrangements of electrons, protons, and neutrons. I can see someone objecting to the thought that "it isn't the materials that matter" based on the former reasoning (and thus perhaps missing your point?) and I can also see one agreeing based on the latter. This is important to draw out; if, by "materials," one is referring to elements (or, on any higher level, things composed by elements), then the material certainly does matter. Only the combination of the right material (say, carbon) as well as its organization (resulting in, say, diamond) amounts to something with a particular "hardness." In this sense, higher level properties depend on both matter and organization. It seems reasonable that only certain materials, in a particular organization, would produce consciousness. Slipstick Libby wrote: Observing the structure of the brain is not simply observing what the brain is made out of. You made my point with this paragraph. One doesn't need just to know what a plane is made out of to learn how it flies. One could possibly examine the shape/arrangement of the plane to learn how it flies. We can certainly understand the brain by understanding brain events, i.e., interactions that occur within the brain. That we can pair brain event x with pain, and brain event y with one acting as if she's in pain, still depends on reports about pain. Even if we measure different kinds of stress in the body, we still only know that those body events are pain events because we have already correlated them with pain itself. That is, reports of pain must play a role at some point in our scientific explanation of pain events, be they in the brain or in the body.
When I'm working on a problem, I never think about beauty. I think only how to solve the problem. But when I have finished, if the solution is not beautiful, I know it is wrong. -- R. Buckminster Fuller

ssu
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Posted 11/02/09 - 06:36 AM:	#130
Slipstick Libby wrote: Amoebas that move away from harmful substances are demonstrating the same sort of consciousness we attribute to other organisms much larger than them. It's obvious that your understanding of what is consciousness differs from mine a lot. To me your example is a very good example of something that hasn't have to do anything with consciousness. It is more likely that an amoeba has built in detectors to do just that: to move away when noticed harmful substances rather than it makes itself a conscious decision: "UH oh...that's a harmful substance there, perhaps I should swim away from it". The human body performs a lot of vital tasks that we as humans do not control consciously: just think about the immune system. Would in your view the immune system would be somehow "conscious" of viruses etc? Futher thinking about it: it is easy to build machines that can follow this kind of basic "if...then" program: if you want to program a robot to do something when in contact with water, just put a detector on the robot to notice H2O. As Kamerynn already said, behaviour that is consistent with conscious acting doesn't have to be conscious acting. And here I'd advise to follow the next quote: Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Now a far more interesting debate would be, if one could somehow teach amoebas to do something that they do not usually do in nature (and here altering the amoebas organs isn't teaching). But first it would be good to an agreement on what conscious means. In my view we learn to be conscious, it is not something we own inherently from birth or at the moment of fertilation (even if inherently have the ability to become conscious). Slipstick Libby wrote: Elaborate. I have experiences that are not caused by the outside world but instead are caused by myself. Its called dreaming. Yes, but think what about you dream about. Dreams do have a connection what you have experienced awake. One can fantasize awake, but still there's a connection to what we have learned, experienced with the outside world, even if think about something we haven't seen. Still you need some, if minimal, interaction with the outside world.

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