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Challenges to Skeptical Arguments

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Challenges to Skeptical Arguments

oag
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Posted 07/10/09 - 03:15 PM:	#11
wuliheron wrote: That is precisely the point I was trying to make. Skeptical assertions about the nature of life, the universe, and everything (whether positive or negative) cannot be demonstrably related to experience. Hence, they fail the skeptic's own criteria. I think it is the other way around. I don't think that objective arguments are related to experience. They remain forever in abstractions, speculation and theory. The skeptical argument is based on the fact that absolute knowledge is forever an unattainable ideal. Artists are always trying to paint the perfect picture or write the perfect symphony. People are always shooting for perfection but we all know that achieving it is impossible. When someone steps back from something and says, "There, it is perfect.", the skeptic says, "Close but no cigar." When the objectivists step back and say, "There, that is objective reality.", well you get the picture.

treysuttle
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Posted 07/10/09 - 10:47 PM:	#12
sqeecoo: My problem is with the inference that skeptics seem to make in their argument. I agree: If we are BIV's, then we don't have empirical knowledge. But I do not agree that because it might be possible that we are BIV's, then we don't have empirical knowledge. The possibility of error does not exclude us from knowing. If the skeptic thinks that it does (and this is where I am pushing the skeptic), we need a substantive argument....by 'substantive' I mean a valid or strong argument with premises that we can evaluate. My hunch here was that the skeptic might consider offering some reason to believe that we might actually be BIV's...that I think would put us non-skeptics in a much more problematic epistemic condition. Well, to your more general concerns. I haven't offered a theory of justification...I'm not sure there is one..in the sense of the theory of justification. Nor do I think that knowledge is something that can be neatly bottled up in some kind of essential definition. Nor do I get the impression that many epistemologists today hold to such ideas. Like all areas of philosophical inquiry, the issues are vague and fuzzy...like running around in a labyrinth that might not have a 'center'. Yes, as well, like all areas of philosophy, much of our work revolves around intuitions....we look at intuitions and dogmas and play them out to see where they lead us...the end product is a deeper understanding of the human epistemic condition (for lack of a better phrase). Relevant alternatives is just one example...there may be no clear cut answer to what a relevant alternative consists in (an alternative that would be relevant to considering whether a knowledge claim is sound or not). I mean, clearly the possibility that my car is stolen seems moreso a relevant alternative to my claim of knowing that my car is in the parking lot than the possibility that my car transformed into a giant lizard and ran off. But why should it be? Is the possibility that my car was stolen really something that would undermine my claim to know that my car is in the parking lot? At first it seems so, but the more you think about it, the more problematic it becomes. There is very strong probability that my car has not been stolen (think about stolen cars as a sort of lottery...with number of cars over number of cars stolen)...if the probability in a situation that strong would undermine my knowledge claim, then we really are in a pretty bad epistemic situation...or are we? In asking these sorts of questions...it may be that we don't come up with a neat little notion of relevant alternatives...but we can come to a better understand relevant alternatives...at least that is my POV. I am not sure I get what you mean by 'having improved our position'. Speaking only for myself, the only position that I am explicitly concerned with improving here is my understanding of human knowledge -- what it is, how we go about it, how we do and can evaluate it, and what might be its extant for human beings. Yes, one can question some bit of evidence (justification shifting the question)...but such a move is not quite as straightforward as it might at first seem. Some would argue (including myself) that one is committing a level confusion here -- in questioning the evidence one is essentially asking a meta-question concerning the original knowledge claim....the whole game has changed, and perhaps with no effect on the question of whether the original claim was justified. But of course, this is an area of dispute and there is much to examine on all sides of the issue before we fully, if ever, understand all the implications.

oag
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Posted 07/11/09 - 05:44 AM:	#13
treysuttle wrote: sqeecoo: My problem is with the inference that skeptics seem to make in their argument. I agree: If we are BIV's, then we don't have empirical knowledge. Not to butt in here but I don't think that is right. BIAV or not we still have empirical knowledge. em⋅pir⋅i⋅cal –adjective 1.derived from or guided by experience or experiment. 2.depending upon experience or observation alone, without using scientific method or theory, esp. as in medicine. 3.provable or verifiable by experience or experiment. We still have experiment and experience. We know those things that we can know. The BIAV argument is nothing more than a thought exercise on what we cannot know. It is used to point out that we cannot determine the true nature of reality. We can have empirical knowledge but we can never have absolute knowledge.

treysuttle
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Posted 07/11/09 - 07:08 AM:	#14
oag: You might say that we have knowledge of our experience qua experience, but because your experience is essentially hallucinatory, I would not call it knowledge. You may know that you have an experience of seeing an apple, but there is no apple there that you are seeing. But yes, you might restrict your empirical knowledge in that way (phenomenalism). Good point. I am using empirical knowledge in a more robust sense...empirical knowledge (as I use am using the term) signifies the way in which we come about the knowledge -- not what the knowledge is of. What I am concerned about is knowledge of a mind independent reality through the senses. There is no problem of being in an experiential state, the problem is to what extent we could have knowledge of anything corresponding to that experiential state. If we are BIV, then we don't have that kind of knowledge. If we are not BIV, then we very well may have such knowledge (even if its possible that we are BIVs).

oag
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Posted 07/13/09 - 04:02 PM:	#15
treysuttle wrote: oag: You might say that we have knowledge of our experience qua experience, but because your experience is essentially hallucinatory, I would not call it knowledge. But that is the point. No matter where you think the knowledge comes from it is essentially hallucinatory or a vivid dream in nature because the whole thing takes place in your mind, your mental picture of reality. You don't know what is generating that picture. You WANT to believe that it is an objective reality that is basically identical to how you see it rather than computer generated stimulus into your envatted (I invented a word) brain. You may know that you have an experience of seeing an apple, but there is no apple there that you are seeing. The point is that if I see an apple there is an apple. We are merely speculating back and forth on whether that apple hypothetically exists objectively or not. It doesn't matter. What matters is that I see it, I touch it, I taste the sweetness of it. All of that is input from my senses to my brain and my brain registers, green (I prefer Granny Smith), apple, firm, juicy, tasty. If I'm a BIAV I would have the same experience and sensation and never know the difference. The vat builder would have to inform me. What I am concerned about is knowledge of a mind independent reality through the senses. I understand this. You may concern yourself with it. You may posit it as a possibility but you cannot state it unequivocally because you cannot confirm that such an objective reality actually exists or corresponds with your knowledge. There is no problem of being in an experiential state, the problem is to what extent we could have knowledge of anything corresponding to that experiential state. Right. The answer is none. We can only have knowledge of things within our experience. We have no means for gaining knowledge without.

treysuttle
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Posted 07/14/09 - 06:07 AM:	#16
oag: "If I'm a BIAV I would have the same experience and sensation and never know the difference" This is exactly the force of the skeptics argument. Whether you know the difference or not, being a BIV puts you in a different epistemic position from not being a BIV. If you are a BIV then: 'I know there is an apple on the table' is false. But 'There appears to be an apple on the table' is true. But there is no knowledge in the latter....you are merely reporting on an experiential state -- which is compatible with hallucination. That all of our claims are merely reports on experiential states I find implausible (although all may include reporting on experiential states). The reason is because we do in fact...and are usually very good at, distinguishing between hallucinations and reality. Our survival depends on it. oag: "We are merely speculating back and forth on whether that apple hypothetically exists objectively or not" The skeptic says in some skeptical scenarios we have no criteria to distinguish between hallucinating and not hallucinating. The question is not whether there is an external world (that is a metaphysical question). The question is whether we could know that we are not BIV's...and if we cannot know, then does it follow that we do not have knowledge of an external world. If you do not believe in an external world, then this kind of skepticism is not a problem for you (but explaining why and how we are able to distinguish between hallucinations might be). However, even if you do not believe in an external world...the skeptics argument may still be of interest in terms of whether it is valid....and as I suggested, whether the skeptics position really follows from the argument.

John Kievlan
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Posted 07/14/09 - 08:50 AM:	#17
treysuttle wrote: But, from this, it does not follow that the mere possibility of being a BIV excludes one from knowing that one has hands. To have knowledge requires that one at least have a justified true belief. It seems to me that one can have a JTB that one has hands, while not knowing that one is not a BIV. In other words, and I do take this to be controversial, one can have knowledge while at the same time one might be mistaken about whatever is claimed to be knowledge. The push here is against the very high standard (requiring absolute certainty) that has been passed down to us via Descartes, and consequently I think ought to be rejected by anyone interested in combating skepticism. I think you aren't giving the skeptical argument enough credit. The issue is not that one can't be absolutely certain one isn't a BIV -- it is that one has no way to assign any certainty whatsoever to the proposition, "I am not a BIV." One's level of certainty about a proposition depends on the justifications one has for it; but every piece of evidence or argument we have available to us is perfectly compatible with either being a BIV or being what we think we are, i.e., biological human beings. That said, I object to the skeptical argument on different grounds. I do not argue that we are not brains in vats; I think it's impossible to defend either the truth or falsehood of that proposition until and unless one of us manages to get out of his vat and take a look around. I'll quote another passage from your post: treysuttle wrote: I take it as practically uncontroversial that if one is a BIV then one does not know that one has hands (one cannot know something that is false). Why do you take this to be uncontroversial? More to the point, why do you assume that if we are BIVs, we don't have hands? It simply depends on what you mean by "I have hands." If we take "hands" to be a summation of (1) the sensations of having hands, and (2) the capacity to alter our own experiences in the unique ways permitted by the having of hands, then the means by which those hands are implemented (whether by low-level physical processes, or by a piece of software that runs our BIV experiences) does not change the essential fact that, manifestly, we have hands. We can speculate endlessly on what substrate underlies our human experience. Our theories of physics tell us quite a lot about the world around us, but they have limits; they cannot tell us what underlies the quantum foam, and if they could, they wouldn't tell us what underlies that, and so on. Given that we can only explain things to a finite depth, and given that we are doomed to always have a "lower level" that escapes our understanding, what epistemic import is there in speculation as to what forms it might take? As a thought experiment, it is interesting to ask whether it is divine reality, a software program, or simply more esoteric physicality that underlies the deepest level of reality we can examine -- but it does not affect whether we (where "we" means the entities known as "humans" that inhabit known levels of reality) have hands. If, on the other hand, by "we have hands" we mean to say, "the concept of 'hands' will be meaningful in all levels of theory down to the lowest substrates of reality we will ever discover," then we are obviously wrong. The concept of "hands" is not even meaningful in chemistry, and chemistry is a far higher-level discipline than even particle physics or quantum mechanics, much less theories about deeper substrates such as a possible network of vats inhabited by our brains.

oag
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Posted 07/14/09 - 11:48 AM:	#18
treysuttle wrote: This is exactly the force of the skeptics argument. Whether you know the difference or not, being a BIV puts you in a different epistemic position from not being a BIV. Not really. From where you are sitting, in the vat or not, you have the same epistemic position on what you know and experience. Once again, you are declaring the difference in epistemic position from the God's eye view of knowing what the proper one is. That all of our claims are merely reports on experiential states I find implausible (although all may include reporting on experiential states). The reason is because we do in fact...and are usually very good at, distinguishing between hallucinations and reality. Our survival depends on it. The ability to distinguish between reality and hallucination that you are speking to is within the context of perceived reality. We have a vivid dream and in the moment we react as though everything is real. In fact if our bodies didn't paralyze us we would thrash ourselves to death participating physically in them. We only know it was a dream (after the fact) because we wake from it. The same is true of hallucination. We need outside confirmation that it was hallucination, what we really saw or someone else telling us it is not there, etc. Otherwise we will go forward from that moment believing what we saw was real and never knowing the difference. The whole point of the Matrix or BIAV arguments is that the brain can be made to generate flawless hallucinations. You are basing your argument on our ability to distinguish in a different context. In the BIAV context you cannot distinguish the artificial universe as hallucinatory. You will still distinguish dreams and hallucinations within the perceived reality. The skeptic says in some skeptical scenarios we have no criteria to distinguish between hallucinating and not hallucinating. Yes. I find myself saying that often. The question is not whether there is an external world (that is a metaphysical question). Right. The question comes down to the nature of that external world. Edited by oag on 07/14/09 - 11:54 AM. Reason: quote tags

treysuttle
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Posted 07/14/09 - 11:12 PM:	#19
Hi John, The certainity required is not on the BIV premise, but on the claim: 'I know that I have hands'. The skeptic requires not just that we have good reasons for believing that we have hands, but that we be able to eliminate any possibility that would undermine our knowing that we have hands....the BIV scenario is such a possibility. To have to eliminate all such possibilities equates to asking for certainity -- if you know that there is no possibility that you are mistaken, then you are certain. I think if the skeptic is correct about eliminating any possibility that would undermine our having knowledge (a justified >true< belief), then we cannot have knowledge of the external world. I am not arguing that we are not BIVs. I accept that even in principle there is probably no evidence that could provide even the slightest reason for believing that we are not BIVs. But I am suggesting that is not good enough for the conclusion the skeptic wants to convince us of...namely that we cannot have knowledge of an external world. John: "Why do you take this to be uncontroversial? More to the point, why do you assume that if we are BIVs, we don't have hands? It simply depends on what you mean by "I have hands." If we take "hands" to be a summation of (1) the sensations of having hands, and (2) the capacity to alter our own experiences in the unique ways permitted by the having of hands, then the means by which those hands are implemented (whether by low-level physical processes, or by a piece of software that runs our BIV experiences) does not change the essential fact that, manifestly, we have hands." It is uncontroversial that we do not know that we have hands if we are brains in a vat, because that is how the thought experiment is set up. When we say 'BIV' we mean to say that you do not have hands....you are just a brain...in a vat. You may experience yourself as having hands, but this does not mean that you actually have hands. The skeptic is not concerned with denying that you are in an experiential state and the non-skeptic is not concerned with affirming that you are in an experential state....you see? John: "but it does not affect whether we (where "we" means the entities known as "humans" that inhabit known levels of reality) have hands." Whether we actually have hands (and what the implications of this might be) is a different issue from the one that I am concerned with here. I am concerned with whether the skeptical argument soundly demonstrates that even if we do have hands, we could not know that we have hands... oag: If we are BIV then we are not in the same epistemic position as someone who is not a BIV. We may be in the same belief position -- have the same experential states, but knowledge (as I understand it) requires that the content of the belief be true. The content of my belief is not the state of experiencing hands, although that might justify a belief in hands, but the content is about the hands themselves. A claim: 'I have two hands' is not the claim 'I experience myself as having two hands'. The latter is consistent with not having hands, the former is not. If we are BIV, then the former is false, although the latter may be true whether we are BIVs or not. oag, your account of hallucination is fine, we might say -- I know I was dreaming because I experience something else and that I distinguish from my state when dreaming. But if there is no external reality, then literally there is no real difference between a dream and waking. The skeptic is going to say something like, 'Look, you make the distinction between dreaming and being awake based on experiencing yourself 'waking up' and remembering dreams, and so forth. But you might really wake up in just a few minutes, to discover that really you were dreaming inside of a dream. What you thought was the reality distinguished from the dream was really just another dream all along. Of course, in this new waking...you might yet awake again only to find that you were in a dream...and so on. If this is the case, does it follow thereby that we cannot know facts about the world -- assuming that the facts about the world that we believe would be false if we were in fact dreaming? That, is the question. I think I have given at least one good reason to think that the skeptics conclusion does not follow...even if we accept the skeptical scenario and its direct implications.

sqeecoo
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Posted 07/15/09 - 08:05 AM:	#20
treysuttle wrote: sqeecoo: Well, to your more general concerns. I haven't offered a theory of justification...I'm not sure there is one..in the sense of the theory of justification. Nor do I think that knowledge is something that can be neatly bottled up in some kind of essential definition. Nor do I get the impression that many epistemologists today hold to such ideas. Like all areas of philosophical inquiry, the issues are vague and fuzzy...like running around in a labyrinth that might not have a 'center'. Yes, as well, like all areas of philosophy, much of our work revolves around intuitions....we look at intuitions and dogmas and play them out to see where they lead us...the end product is a deeper understanding of the human epistemic condition (for lack of a better phrase). Relevant alternatives is just one example...there may be no clear cut answer to what a relevant alternative consists in (an alternative that would be relevant to considering whether a knowledge claim is sound or not). I mean, clearly the possibility that my car is stolen seems moreso a relevant alternative to my claim of knowing that my car is in the parking lot than the possibility that my car transformed into a giant lizard and ran off. But why should it be? Hi there mate! Sorry for the slow reply. I'm sorry, but this is just not a description I can accept. There is just too much intuition and dogma and vagueness going around for me to see this as a rational description, let alone a coherent theory (which you admittedly say it is not). If this is the only way our "epistemic condition" can be described, then I don't need skeptics to tell me humans have no real knowledge. If our "knowledge" is "based" on semi-magical "inferences" and eliminating what we feel to be the relevant alternatives, then all our knowledge is just guesswork. Now I think all knowledge is guesswork anyway, but that's due to the skeptical argument I discuss below. But your description would be enough to convince me too :P Bear in mind, I don't think all knowledge being guesswork is a problem or that it destroys rationality, or anything like that. It just means that "justification" is not an effective method in rational inquiry. Also, I certainly don't expect a theory of knowledge to be a precise algorithm for selecting the right belief. But if we are supposed to be able to justify or beliefs in a rational way that offers us at least some partial reason to believe that we are likely to be right, then there has to be some semblance of a coherent, rational, and logical method we can use. treysuttle wrote: I am not sure I get what you mean by 'having improved our position'. Speaking only for myself, the only position that I am explicitly concerned with improving here is my understanding of human knowledge -- what it is, how we go about it, how we do and can evaluate it, and what might be its extant for human beings. I am talking about justification as a general method of selecting beliefs. Say you start with the unjustified belief A. You then use some other belief B (along with perhaps some "inference") to justify A. But what have you achieved by this other than shift the question from A to B (and the validity of the inference)? How has your epistemic position improved? If you agree that it has not, then you will have learned something about human knowledge - namely that it is conjectural, and that justification is not a viable method in rational inquiry. treysuttle wrote: The certainity required is not on the BIV premise, but on the claim: 'I know that I have hands'. The skeptic requires not just that we have good reasons for believing that we have hands, but that we be able to eliminate any possibility that would undermine our knowing that we have hands....the BIV scenario is such a possibility. To have to eliminate all such possibilities equates to asking for certainity -- if you know that there is no possibility that you are mistaken, then you are certain. Let me just note that there is no logical relation between having good reason to believe something is true, and something actually being true. You need a dogmatic rule of "inference" to take that step. I think the existence of such dogmatism is all the skeptic needs to show that justification is irrational. So what's the point of it?

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