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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

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Analytic-synthetic vs priori/ posteriori

jtoma
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Posted 08/02/09 - 10:54 PM:	#121
180 proof wrote: Well, your last post suggests that we have exhausted this discussion, keda. Okay, fine. Our points & counterpoints are stated here. You've not persuaded me to reconsider my interpretation of Kant and I've not persuaded you to reconsider him either. Perhaps we've given others some food for thought. you all have given me plenty of food for thought and i thank you for that. I hope that you won't mind reading one more post because it exists based on the fruitfulness of your previous posts. keda wrote: This is again merely a semantic issue, since Kant does not take space to mean a description of gravity, but merely as a means to locate objects, something which is not possible on a non-euclidean basis. I know nothing about science, but what use would a conception of space be if it did not permit the location of objects? keda wrote: I'm not sure where you see 'intend'. Non Euclidean geometry is as I have suggested concievable, but we cannot form mental images of such, and it is no coincidence, but a fundamental feature of sensible cognition. See correction. YOu are not suggesting that there is a difference between what is conceivable and what mental images have a possibility of forming? Lets be clear, If noneuclidean geometry is verifiable, then isn't it conceivable? And aren't mental images of its verification are producible? We conceive of mental images; all mental images are conceptions. If there is any exception to this at all, it is the opposite of what you say, that there are more mental images that are possible than are conceivable. Though, I should say that one might expect that Kantian intuitions are more readily called conceptions than mental images; but, an intuition might just be a conceivable mental image that is not superficially representable (perhaps due to the vagueness of the conception). Might it be useful to say that conceptions are perceived by the mind? If a conception can only be vaguely recalled, then perhaps when that conception was conceived it was only vaguely conceived. That there is a vaguely conceived mental image implies that there is a standard of accuracy for mental images. What if someone said that conceptions are usually his standards of accuracy for his perceptions? No, they say, perceptions are sense-perceptions, exclusively. This is because you conceive of things already in your head. They are complements composing mental activity, one might say. What do you conceive of if not mental images? When you are perceiving are you not producing mental images? IF you are aware, Mustn't you conceive of the mental images that you perceive? Otherwise, how would you recall them or verify them or communicate them? Since you can be aware of the communication of the verification of noneuclidean geometry, you must be able to produce mental images of the verification of noneuclidean geometry. Otherwise, what would you communicate? You communicate using concepts, so concepts are mental images. keda wrote: I might see why you think B is implied in 2 that is since it implies A, however the internal states is not what are identified in space, they are only sequentialized in time. A sensation is an affect of something external on the internal, which implies the spatiality of the external, not the internal. Keda, I appreciate the close reading. The root of one's conception of space might be empirically acquired, but what if someone could still conceive of space? Anyway, let me try: Crossing the boundary between the external and the internal must be a transition from a spatial to a non-spatial. But what if I acquire some empirical evidence , which I generalize, then proceed never to trust another empirical particular, only proceeding by generalization--could I then be said confer the spatiality of generalization on my sense-perceptions of the external? Generalization is spatial and internal. keda wrote: While the conception of red is separate from the notion of time, sensations and mental images of red things are instantiated in space and time. Really? Above you told me that internal states are only sequentialized in time. And you also told me that the externality of the sense-perception conferred spatiality on its conception. But now you are saying: Sense-perceptions are instantiated in time as well as space. Mental images are instantiated in space as well as time. These are, respectively, (1) and (2). Do you think the a priori form contains temporal provisions? One way to state my position is that, as well as the a priori form, we also have an a posteriori form. But, the union of the a priori and a posteriori provisions always occurs in conception, or the creation of mental images. I do not think that we need to achieve our concepts of space solely empirically and time solely mentally. On the contrary, the creation of mental images always requires both an a priori form and an a posteriori form. I damn well can conceive of space and it takes time to type. But for conception it requires investigation into each aspect whether the content (space) of the conception was, over a certain time, produced by a priori or a posteriori forms. 180 proof wrote: keda: Even if you use non-Euclidean geometry as an anlytic tool to describe the behaviour of empirical objects, the objects themselves must exist in Euclidean space in order for us to make such measurements consistently. This statement is false. As pointed out already "Euclidean space" is a flat, 3-d abstraction (i.e. idealization) abetted by (our) parochial "intuitions". Nature (i.e. the universe) could only be Euclidean if it were empty; this exchange, however, demonstrates that it isn't. Actual (e.g. empirical) space is curved. And even if non-Euclidean geometries are simply variations on Euclid's system, the fact remains that all geometrical systems are conventions in which some are more convenient for modelling phenomena -- especially those at non-classical scales -- than others. Indeed, the proposition is false. If science says that the way they exist is best described by noneuclidean geometry, then the objects themselves must live in noneuclidean space. Perhaps it is true that we need euclidean to conceive of certain aspects of the experiment which seeks to verify noneuclidean space. For example, how to eat a donut while performing calculations. Perhaps, how do read the data received from the appropriate technology. Maybe all these, how to look through a telescope as well, rely on assumptions conceived of in a euclidean framework. Nonetheless they participate in the verification of the existence of the noneucldiean space in which they exist! Perhaps these experimental methods need not always be conceived of as to be in the space in which their experiment proves them to be in? proof, The geometrical system convenient for predicting the location of stars need not (for the sake of convenience) be the same system useful for predicting the location of the apple that you are eating. Popper apparently thinks that a baby's early death falsifies the theory that the baby innately expected to receive love. The philosopher that proof brings up demarcates science from pseudoscience on the basis of it's falsifiability. Popper:"Kant believed that Newton's dynamics was a priori valid (See his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, published between the first and the second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason.) But if, as he thought, we can explain the validity of Newton's theory by the fact that our intellect imposes its laws upon nature, it follows, I think, that our intellect must succeed in this; which makes it hard to understand why a priori knowledge such as Newton's should be so hard to come by. " If a priori knowledge would have been easy for Kant to come by, then would he not have readily accepted space-time? keda wrote: Newton's theory may have been falsified, but not the idea that there is no absoulute space and absolute time. What do you mean that there is no absolute space or time? There is a view in the philosophy of science, dominant long after Popper, that no scientific theory is falsifiable. Any attempt at verification of a theory requires experimental assumptions. These experimental assumptions, distinct from the hypothesis being tested, may nevertheless be inaccurate and cause a failure of empirical prediction. It is very difficult to tell which members of a set of assumptions are being verified or falsified, since we conjoin different bodies of assumptions--e.g. IF that telescope can magnify 100,000,000x AND that object is within 10 million miles away AND that object is as large as ____ AND the vision of all the experimenters is not deceiving them AND the telescope worker isn't drunk AND my chain of command gives me accurate data...THEN we will be able to see the that object on this day. This is important because it implies that if the technology used to verify noneuclidean geometry was interpreted regularly on euclidean assumptions, then there is some sense in which it is true that 'the objects themselves must exist in euclidean space to make consistent measurements on them'. But keda, even if a hypothesis is not falsifiable, it may still be verifiable and accepted. There is a sense in which is is necessarily true that representations of conceptions (and perceptions) have to incorporate a spatial and a temporal provisions. But it can be verified that in order to make accurate predictions in certain circumstances, noneuclidean geometry is useful. In those circumstances, the relevant mental images would concern a framework both spatial and temporal. Proof, is there any sense in which you can have a sense perception of time? I don't intend to contradict your post, it is just that I had this post partly completed on my computer before I saw your post. W. Foundations p. 162, #27: "evenif the proved mathematical proposition seems to point to a reality outside itself, still it is only the expression of acceptance of a new measure (of reality)." Edited by jtoma on 08/03/09 - 10:42 AM

180 Proof
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Posted 08/03/09 - 01:28 AM:	#122
jtoma wrote: you all have given me plenty of food for thought and i thank you for that. I hope that you won't mind reading one more post because it exists based on the fruitfulness of your previous posts. You're welcome. Interesting post though I don't think you're going to get anywhere with, keda. And I don't really see a way to further the discussion along. This thread's probably run its course. I'll post again if the discussion takes an interesting turn. Btw, I quoted Popper because he both admired Kant greatly but found "transcendental idealism" untenable for post-Newtonian scientific practice. I've more affinity for his students (and critics) Imre Lakatos & Paul Feyerabend than for Popper. Nonetheless, I think Popper's observations are insightful criticisms of Kant's contentions about "a priori validity" (e.g. Newtonian physics, "absolute time and absolute space", Euclidean geometry, etc) that keda cannot seem to answer.
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

keda
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1 of 1 people found this post helpful Posted 08/03/09 - 07:56 AM:	#123
jtoma wrote: I know nothing about science, but what use would a conception of space be if it did not permit the location of objects? It would indeed be fruitless, without some other means of locating them, and this is where euclidean space comes in. A concept never can locate objects, because concepts only specify a set of properties which things have in order to fall under the concept e.g. a cat must be a mammal, but it cannot locate specific cats. Not even a concept of space can locate objects, although it can help doing so, it cannot pinpoint a specific thing. The concept of non-euclidean space can help pinpoint specific things using the intuition of euclidean space as a a basis. The reason for this is that the notion of curvature distorts the counting process. A ruler has marks placed at equidistant locations, for the reason that we can count them. We could place them unequidistant, such as is the case with a logarithmic scale, but it would be inadequate for measurements, because we are no longer measuring homogenous units of space, but plainly the number of marks from a specific point on the ruler. This means if you put the ruler from a different starting point and measure, the measure could in fact differ, since more or less marks could be between the measuring points now. Our rulers and clocks all measure homogenous units of space and time, for the same reason, namely to allow us to precisely locate objects in space time, as well as measure their precise extent. Underlying this is the notion of a homogenous space, the space and the time, in which all objects exist in spatiotemporal relations to one another an de facto inherit properties that are not inherent in the objects but pertain to space and time itself e.g. that you cannot put a left shoe on your right foot, despite that the internal spatial relations of a left shoe and a right shoe are identical. YOu are not suggesting that there is a difference between what is conceivable and what mental images have a possibility of forming? That is precisely what I'm suggesting. We cannot imagine 4D objects, because our imagination is restricted to the imagination of 3D objects, yet we can concieve of 4D objects. We can calculate the distance between two points in 4D space, and we can do the same in 3D non Euclidean space, but we cannot imagine these. It would be purely a mechanical exercise in number crunching, or alternatively an analytic tool to study Euclidean 3D objects, as is the case with Einstein's theory. Lets be clear, If noneuclidean geometry is verifiable, then isn't it conceivable? It would be concievable yes. And aren't mental images of its verification are producible? It would be possible to imagine it, logically speaking. We conceive of mental images; all mental images are conceptions. I wouldn't say images are conceptions, although we can concieve of their form. If there is any exception to this at all, it is the opposite of what you say, that there are more mental images that are possible than are conceivable. For each concept of a thing, there is an infinite number of possible mental images, namely depending on from what perspective you view it. We have no concept of these individual of images in our heads, because they would not fit, but we have a process, or principles that guide a process, what Kant calls schema for these that genererate images given relative spatial and temporal coordinates, as well as orientations of the object and subject relative to space itself, and the direction in time. Imagination itself is a necessary part of the process in cognizing objects, since we must generate images for the representation of the object that correspond to the concept in order to make any judgment. Though, I should say that one might expect that Kantian intuitions are more readily called conceptions than mental images; Intuitions are not concepts but are the counterpart to concepts. They are the identifiers, in our case the spatiotemporal locators of objects. Space and time itself are the irremovable objects that our intuition cannot rid themselves of, which is why the intuition of space and time are pure and not empirical. Might it be useful to say that conceptions are perceived by the mind? Perception is one of those more vague words that Kant uses, although they could be described roughly as consciousness involving sensation, a concept could not be called such, but sensations themselves, intuitions and judgments involving them could be said to be called percepts. What do you conceive of if not mental images? Concepts merely involving qualities e.g. redness as well as concepts defined using negative marks or concepts of relations and modalities don't involve mental images, however we cannot exemplify them without the use of imagination e.g. we must imagine red things to make sense of it, unless of course we only use negative marks e.g. non red things. When you are perceiving are you not producing mental images? Not necessarily, because you can sense things without having an image of what is sensed. IF you are aware, Mustn't you conceive of the mental images that you perceive? Otherwise, how would you recall them or verify them or communicate them? Awareness can be merely a subjective sensation of something e.g. a dog licking your face when you wake up you immadiately sense something, which you are aware of but it takes a while to become aware of what caused it. Or if someone pushes you from behind, you have to look around to see who it is, nonetheles you are aware of the push. Since you can be aware of the communication of the verification of noneuclidean geometry, you must be able to produce mental images of the verification of noneuclidean geometry. Otherwise, what would you communicate? Non euclidean geometry in the sense Einstein uses yes, but this is not to be confused with non euclidean geometry as opposed to euclidean as Euclid and Kant would call it. Keda, I appreciate the close reading. The root of one's conception of space might be empirically acquired, but what if someone could still conceive of space? Anyway, let me try: Crossing the boundary between the external and the internal must be a transition from a spatial to a non-spatial. But what if I acquire some empirical evidence , which I generalize, then proceed never to trust another empirical particular, only proceeding by generalization--could I then be said confer the spatiality of generalization on my sense-perceptions of the external? Generalization is spatial and internal. I'm not sure what you are trying to say (or ask) here. Space is not a concept we aquire empirically, but is presupposed for any empirical cognition. Still the notion of the self, our sensations internal emotions, thoughts all are non-spatial, in that we are not aware of them as entities existing in space, however we are aware of them as existing in time, i.e. they have a temporal order in our mind. Really? Above you told me that internal states are only sequentialized in space. And you also told me that the externality of the sense-perception conferred spatiality on its conception. But now you are saying: Sense-perceptions are instantiated in time as well as space. Mental images are instantiated in space as well as time. These are, respectively, (1) and (2). I suppose you meant sequentialized in time. Sorry for the confusion, I meant the objects of sensations must be spatially and temporally concieved of. The internal states, which is what bears the senstion that the objects cause, do not have a spatial ordering, merely a temporal ordering e.g. first I sense coldness, next hotness. Do you think the a priori form contains temporal provisions? One way to state my position is that, as well as the a priori form, we also have an a posteriori form. But, the union of the a priori and a posteriori provisions always occurs in conception, or the creation of mental images. This sounds quite in line with my thoughts, however I say just this because reading your very first thoughts in this thread first sounded in line with mine as well until I found out later you used the words quite diffenrently, so in fact I'm still quite unsure as to what your thoughts are. I do not think that we need to achieve our concepts of space solely empirically and time solely mentally. On the contrary, the creation of mental images always requires both an a priori form and an a posteriori form. In a way yes, since we must have stuff to operate with to know what we can concieve of and imagine, but once we have this we can excercise our imagination beyond what has been seen e.g. imagine a house before building it. Indeed, the proposition is false. If science says that the way they exist is best described by noneuclidean geometry, then the objects themselves must live in noneuclidean space There exist as I have earlier pointed out an euclidean theory empirically equivalent to special relativity known as Lorentz Ether Theory, which predicted the very same things Einstein's special relativity did, even before Einstein's theory was invented. To Einstein's general relativity a similar extension has been made of Lorentz Ether theory, called General Lorentz Ether Theory which is Euclidean and in fact solves some of the problems that General Relativity doesn't. Does this mean that there is a physical space that is Euclidean, or non Euclidean? It doesn't, but space is merely, to its concept a tool of measurement (whether Euclidean or Non Euclidean) and in its intuition an immediate such, and Euclidean. What do you mean that there is no absolute space or time? Not exactly. Kant found himself dissatisfied with both Newton's notion of absolute real space, and Leibnitz relational ideal space, and in order to solve the problems with each, he had to postulate that space and time are not transcendentally real entities, meaning that their non empirical properties are not real, but presupposed a priori in the form of our senses. Nonetheless he rejected Leibnitz notion of relational space, but asserted that space is absolute, which is exemplified in that handedness cannot be reduced to spatial relations between objects. So no, I'm not saying that space and time are not absolute, however they contain aspects that our senses imposes on objects, some even such that they must in virtue of being senses. These aspects are known as transcendental, and cannot be removed from experience, and Kant is justified in saying these aspects are not real, but ideal (=mental). It is very difficult to tell which members of a set of assumptions are being verified or falsified, since we conjoin different bodies of assumptions--e.g. IF that telescope can magnify 100,000,000x AND that object is within 10 million miles away AND that object is as large as ____ AND the vision of all the experimenters is not deceiving them AND the telescope worker isn't drunk AND my chain of command gives me accurate data...THEN we will be able to see the that object on this day. I recall this position although I can't remember the name either, but the normal solution to this problem would be to investigate each part independently e.g. to make sure the telescope worker isn't drunk and that he is no amateur and is not naturally and/or morally inclined to falsify data etc. What we require merely is that we have sufficintly certain data to make a judgment, and declare the sceptic isn't justified from a practical point of view (not to be confused with pragmatic btw) But keda, even if a hypothesis is not falsifiable, it may still be verifiable and accepted. There is a sense in which is is necessarily true that representations of conceptions (and perceptions) have to incorporate a spatial and a temporal provisions. But it can be verified that in order to make accurate predictions in certain circumstances, noneuclidean geometry is useful. As I have pointed out earlier it depends on at what level the geometry is employed. At a conceptual level any geometry may be employed as an intermediate form of measure, an analytic tool so to speak, which is why both euclidean and non equclidean geometry can be employed and still give the exact same predictions, simply because however neither can be employed without an source space, which is our ability to locate things in which the actual measurement take place. Geometry in the latter sence ceases to be a formal tool, but becomes a science of measurement, and it is important not to confuse these two uses of the term geometry.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

180 Proof
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Posted 08/03/09 - 04:12 PM:

#124

Consider:

3-d Newtonian space is a subspace of 4-d Einsteinian space.

2-d Euclidean (3-d projections onto 2-d) space is a subspace of 3-d Newtonian space.

An unaided 3-d sensorium visualizes 3-d objects in 2-d (re: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Retina) and, via bilateral biological adaptation, visualizes in 3-d (re: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binocular_vision).

A 3-d sensorium, aided e.g. by computer imaging, can visualize 3-d objects in 4-d. (see below)

If 3-d sensorium is "restricted to a priori 3-d perception", then non-3-d perceptions would be impossible; but given that 2-d perception is the baseline for a 3-d sensorium and 4-d perception is possible (with instrumental aid), 3-d perception is not a priori for a 3-d sensorium.

Where does my reasoning go wrong?

If my reasoning is correct, then how is Kant's "Transcendental Aesthetic" possible, or coherent?

keda wrote:
We cannot imagine 4D objects, because our imagination is restricted to the imagination of 3D objects, yet we can concieve of 4D objects. We can calculate the distance between two points in 4D space, and we can do the same in 3D non Euclidean space, but we cannot imagine these.

So "imagine =/= conceive"? Okay. Let "imagine = visualize" ... rolling eyes

http://www.sciencenews.org/view/ge..._Seeing_in_four_dimensions

Edited by 180 Proof on 08/03/09 - 04:44 PM. Reason: Squaring my circles ...

Attached Files:

4-d object1.bmp
(437 KB, 5 downloads)

4-d object2.bmp
(412 KB, 4 downloads)

The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?"

Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence.

[What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

keda
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Posted 08/04/09 - 03:34 AM:	#125
I used to have a rotating tesseract as my avatar, and it didn't look like it was a 4D object rotating, but like it was deforming 3D one, and that just shows that even if you project a 4D object into 2D it doesn't translate back into a 4D object in your head but a 3D one. If you can show me an animation of a 4D object isn't deforming, merely rotating, that doesn't look like its deforming but rotating, I will admit 4D vision is possible, but all edges has to be visible. Btw, that 24 cell looks like 8 balloons sewn together. Edited by keda on 08/04/09 - 03:41 AM
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

cosscos
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Posted 08/04/09 - 04:42 AM:	#126
Kant's space is presumably four dimension or even more demension. This space is manifested by interaction between body and mind. This interaction is processed by means of a certain force. This force is very acrion over change in motion against objects. This change should be produced in the way of transeunt inner change for the sake of revealation of the object in the higher space. Suppose, there is an apple on the table. This apple would press itself down against the table, while the table would press itself up against the apple. These would keep balance in gravity in this present world. I think the object in the higher space will appear by the breakdown of this balace, namely by zero gravity. cc

180 Proof
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Posted 08/04/09 - 07:15 PM:	#127
keda wrote: If you can show me an animation of a 4D object isn't deforming, merely rotating, that doesn't look like its deforming but rotating, I will admit 4D vision is possible, but all edges has to be visible. Your requirement that "all edges has to be visible" cannot be met on a 2-d computer screen even for 3-d objects. Four-dimensional Picasso. Connecting many triangular bits of flat spacetime to make curvy spacetimes demonstrates how our four-dimensional world can arise from the fuzzy "quantum foam" that may exist at the tiniest scales. (Image from researchers who used "non-causal" triangles.) Here: http://images.google.com/imgres?im...%3DN%26start%3D60%26um%3D1 An illustration of 3-d time-slices in 4-d space (e.g. block universe): Long exposure photography produces images of (segments of) the path (ala "worldline") of 3-d objects in 4-d space. People ascending/descending stairs: Automobile traffic at night: A photography from 1930 titled "Modern Traffic": A street cleaner at an intersection: A computer rendering of a man walking in a circle as visualized in 4-d space: A Peter Jensen sculpture (image) of a 3-d object in 4-d space: Edited by 180 Proof on 08/04/09 - 07:58 PM. Reason: oops ...
The question isn't "Which explanations do I believe?" but rather "Which explanations do I least disbelieve?" Absence of evidence THAT MUST BE THERE (i.e. implied by any claim, concept, or (its) predicates, that affects changes in/to the world) entails evidence of absence. [What cannot be done?[What cannot be hoped?[What cannot be known?]]]

keda
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Posted 08/05/09 - 02:21 AM:	#128
What I mean is something like this: You can clearly see where each edge is and how they move in the "rotation" but they all move in a 3D-space and the object does not look like its rotating but rather deforming. I don't see the point with all those images you posted. The fourth dimension cannot be imagined but as a temporal one. Otherwise you have merely a crowdy 3-space. Edit: I just noticed that it does rotate along an axis but it does also deform, which it shouldn't do.
All about making money Free Europe Now How to fix your country In thought, men distance themselves from nature in order thus imaginatively to present it to themselves--but only in order to determine how it is to be dominated - Adorno and Horkheimer

jtoma
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Posted 08/05/09 - 09:51 AM:	#129
Keda, I do not mean to hide my view. Your last post was insightful. jtoma: If noneuclidean geometry is verifiable, then is it conceivable? keda: yes. jtoma: Are mental images verifying noneuclidean geometry producible? keda: such images are imaginable. jtoma(MurmersToHimself): Oh, so we can have a conception whose verification is readily imaginable, yet for which we have no mental image; either for it or its verification. Suddenly, I feel like I have very few mental images. jtoma: But aren't experienced mental images just conceptions? keda: NO! We conceive of the form mental images, and we also conceive of conceptions, but we imagine the verification of noneuclidean geometry. jtoma: No, for me, a mental image is just whatever I see in my head. Yes, there are more things I could see than I do see. I conceive a mental image, but I can conceive of the form of a proposition representing a mental image. WHen I conceive, i am experiencing a conception according to its form. I think conceptions are in principle representable by propositions. keda wrote: I meant the objects of sensations must be spatially and temporally concieved of. The internal states, which is what bears the senstion that the objects cause, do not have a spatial ordering, merely a temporal ordering e.g. first I sense coldness, next hotness. Ok we are moving. If our internal states do not have a spatial ordering, do we anyway have mental images with spatial ordering? What about conception: can we conceive of spatial ordering? How do you account for there being a mental image which presupposes some notion of space? (Happiness may not have a spatial component in its representation, but certainly I can conceive of space--e.g. soccer field, R^2). kant: All which relates to the inward determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time. jtoma: Yes, but evidently determinations which are 'inward' presuppose some spatial representation, if only between the self and the other. This point is independent of our current scientific discussion. kant: Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. jtoma: Well, assuming that intuition guides learning, this is only necessarily true if space and time are separable. If space and time were inseparable, and you were right, then this would be a fact about us and what we can inuit either externally or internally. BUt, if it were possible that space and time were inseparable, then our intuition ought not be held to such a necessity because we may be able to overcome our intuitional bias. keda: The internal sense Kant later identifies as time, by means of which the mind contemplates its internal states. jtoma: Yes, the internal sense he is talking about is intuition, but there are other internal processes that involve conceptions of space. keda: The internal states is not what are identified in space, they are only sequentialized in time. jtoma: But what if I acquire some empirical evidence , which I generalize, then proceed never to trust another empirical particular, only proceeding by generalization--could I then be said confer the spatiality of generalization on my sense-perceptions of the external? Generalization is spatial and internal. This is mental activity (internal state of activity), some images of which contain spatial representations. Is there mental activity without intuition or representation of internal states? (keda: Imagination.) jtoma: well good thing imagination proceeds on the basis of concepts. keda: Space is not a concept we aquire empirically, but is presupposed for any empirical cognition. jtoma: If you have a concept it is either empirically acquired or it is evolutionary. jtoma: Otherwise how did you get it? Keda: Empirical cognition requires a concept of space. Keda: We cognize the empirical, so we must have a concept of space. Jtoma: I see, but where did you get it? Jtoma: On your point of view, the only sense in which it is possible that you acquired the concept of space neither empirically nor evolutionarily that in which you learned it on your own. Perhaps you derived it from some of your concepts. Or perhaps you imagined it. But either way, once you can see the concept of space (with your mind's eye or whatever), then you must have a concept of it, however vague. Otherwise, you just haven't learned it, and you certainly haven't used it. If you had learned the concept of space on your own, you could in principle represent it. Representation of concepts is required for their verification. Jtoma: Anyway, I was just saying that you can conceive of space. Equivalently, you can have a mental image of mental space; you can even portray objects as being in some space you imagine. (Kant: Indeed, every faculty of the mind presupposes conceptual apparatus.) (keda: Intuitions, self-determinations, and states, all occurs inwardly, sequantialized in time.) jtoma: As noted, this inward direction presupposes some notion of space. (kant: And, there are many other faculties of the mind, e.g. abstraction, which require spatial conception for their operation.) jtoma: So it is, at least, not the case that all mental activity presupposes exclusively temporal conception. keda wrote: If you can show me an animation of a 4D object isn't deforming, merely rotating, that doesn't look like its deforming but rotating, I will admit 4D vision is possible, We have been wondering whether noneuclidean conception is possible (NOT 4d vision). Lets be clear here, these images on the computer are proof that 4d conception is possible. This is because we are looking at a construction that is, if carefully observed, reproducible because it shows me what to see(conceive). That thing which we conceive is said to be 4d. 4d vision and 4d conception are different things. HUman vision may be stuck to 3dimensions (these pictures could help that hypothesis too), but human conception is not. e.g.: keda: To prove 4d visualization is to prove the possibility of noneuclidean conception. But this cannot happen, since the verification of noneuclidean geometry is only imaginable, not conceivable. 180 proof: Here is a representation of a 4d object. jtoma(TOhimself): I wish someone would educate us about the distinction betweeen the 4d and noneuclidean geometry. keda: So what if you can show me a 4d object? jtoma: a representation indicates a conception. Even if the imagination was used to get to a conception, that conception must be conceivable to be representable. Otherwise, how would you recall what to represent? Are you saying that we have a different memory for each faculty of the mind? jtoma: To prove the possibility of noneuclidean conception is possible, while proving 4d visualization is not possible, so they are different proofs. Again, mental images have to be conceived of to be experienced. OTherwise you have obscure words like 'imagination' trying to convince you that mental experience can occur without conception. But this is heart of what kant is saying: temporal and spatial conceptions are necessary for mental activity, including imagination. You even say: keda wrote: In a way yes, since we must have stuff to operate with to know what we can concieve of and imagine, but once we have this we can excercise our imagination beyond what has been seen e.g. imagine a house before building it. Indeed, we can imagine beyond what we can see. If we imagine a house before we build it, then we are not imagining something for which we possess no concept; you called it a house. Keda: 'stuff to operate with' is necessary for conception and imagination. Keda: imagination can stretch beyond sight. Jtoma: Can imagination stretch beyond the stuff with which it operates? Kant: NO. Jtoma: I think that mental activity cannot occur without the 'stuff with which it operates'; though, I do think that that 'stuff' changes according to (scientific) theory. Jtoma: Keda, can we imagine beyond what we conceive of? (sniff) W. Foundations p225-6 4.4: "Why are the Newtonian laws not axioms of mathematics? Because we could quite well imagine things to be otherwise." 5.4: "We give an axiom a different kind of acknowledgment from an empirical proposition. And by this I do not mean that the 'mental act of acknowledgment' is a different one." 5.5: "An axiom, I should like to say, is a different part of speech." The 'mental act of acknowledgment' is the same in the empirical proposition and the axiom, both being the act of conception. This is also the act of producing mental images. We might encounter the empirical proposition that '2+2=/=4' while still maintaining that '2+2=4', derived from axioms. If P is an axiom, and -P conceived, then P is no longer an axiom. P is now an empirical proposition. It is contingent. TO state empirical evidence in contradiction to a theory plus a body of assumptions is to produce one way of conceiving of things as being otherwise. Another way to conceive of things as being otherwise is to improve upon already existing conceptions. keda wrote: We cannot imagine 4D objects, because our imagination is restricted to the imagination of 3D objects, yet we can concieve of 4D objects. Keda says we cannot imagine 4D objects but yet we can imagine the verification of noneuclidean geometry and conceive of noneuclidean space. keda:Not even a concept of space can locate objects, although it can help doing so, it cannot pinpoint a specific thing. Jtoma: a concept of space can certainly give relative locations of certain objects. e.g. heliocentricity. Keda: But concepts don't pinpoint. Jtoma: well, no, concepts are used and recalled, but the mind's eye pinpoints (=pinpointing is mental activity and you pinpoint mental concepts =pinpointing is conceiving of a conception or a part of a conception). Keda: The concept of non-euclidean space can help pinpoint specific things using the intuition of euclidean space as a a basis. Jtoma: Well, if you have in mind mental help and physical pinpointing. Keda: The reason for this is that the notion of curvature distorts the counting process. Jtoma: I don't understand what distortion you have in mind. I was thinking 'supplants'. Maybe our ability to count with our eyes is diminished... But, when you imagine beyond what can be seen, you stop using the same counting system as you do when you are seeing, so to speak. Cosscos: I think the object in the higher space will appear by the breakdown of this balace, namely by zero gravity. Jtoma: That is why one call's rigorous thinking 'abstraction'. Keda, please forgive and educate me if I am misrepresenting you. Edited by jtoma on 08/11/09 - 09:39 PM

cosscos
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Posted 08/05/09 - 10:50 AM:	#130
As long as I recall, kant's notion of imagination is not just simple or emprical imagination but transcendental imagination in which a priori-object will locate itself into the space by means of time, like speed of light or even faster.. cc

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